Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed June 14, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D16-337
Lower Tribunal No. 15-29430
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Michael Faddis,
Appellant,
vs.
Katherine Luddy,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer J.
Multack, Judge.
Alvarez Gonzalez, LLP, and Ignacio M. Alvarez, and Carlos F. Gonzalez,
for appellant.
Katherine Luddy, in proper person.
Before SALTER, EMAS and LUCK, JJ.
LUCK, J.
Michael Faddis appeals a final judgment of injunction for protection against
domestic violence entered against him and in favor of his ex-girlfriend, Katherine
Luddy. We affirm.
Faddis met Luddy when Luddy worked as a fitness model for one of Faddis’
fitness videos. The couple dated for approximately three years, living together at
Luddy’s Miami Beach apartment for approximately the last one and a half years.
The couple experienced difficulties in their relationship, which Faddis attributed to
Luddy’s anxiety and depression, and Luddy to Faddis’ controlling nature. In any
event, on November 24, 2015, Luddy filed a petition for injunction for protection
against domestic violence against Faddis.
The petition specifically alleged an incident occurring on November 22, but
also generally referred to various prior instances of Faddis’ abusive behavior
which occurred prior to the November 22 incident. A hearing was held at which
Luddy appeared pro se, and Faddis was represented by counsel. Each party
testified to their version of events.
According to Luddy, the couple had spent the night of November 21 at her
apartment, but began to argue the morning of November 22. Luddy claimed the
argument started when Faddis insisted she call her psychiatrist to increase the
dosage of her medication, and Luddy refused. When Luddy requested that Faddis
leave her alone, Faddis became enraged, grabbed Luddy, and slammed her against
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the refrigerator. Luddy asked Faddis to leave or she would call the police. Faddis
took Luddy’s cellular telephone away from her, and continued to scream at Luddy
while pinning her against a wall. Faddis then threw Luddy on the bed, turned her
on her stomach, and spanked her. Luddy managed to lock herself in the bathroom,
and after a time Faddis left the apartment. Luddy reported the incident to the
police, who advised her to change her locks and get a restraining order. Faddis
continued calling and texting Luddy after the incident. The following day, Faddis
banged at her apartment door, but Luddy did not let him in.
In response to the trial court’s questioning, Luddy admitted Faddis had
restrained her on prior occasions. She testified to an incident which occurred on
June 22 where Faddis kept hitting her with her own arm against the side of the
head and Luddy locked herself in her car to get away from Faddis. During cross-
examination, Luddy also referred to an incident were Faddis shut a door and
severed her finger. Faddis did not object to this testimony.
Faddis portrayed the couple’s relationship quite differently. He claimed
most arguments arose from financial issues because Luddy was not making much
money and owed Faddis money for negotiating her modeling contracts and
managing Luddy’s social media accounts. Faddis claimed that when he restrained
Luddy, he was trying to protect her because she was depressed, anxious, and
suicidal.
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The trial court found: Luddy’s testimony credible; she had been the victim
of domestic violence; and she had cause to believe that she would be a victim of
domestic violence. Based on these findings, the trial court granted the petition, and
entered the injunction, which Faddis now appeals. Faddis contends the trial court:
(1) denied him due process by considering the testimony regarding prior incidents
other than the one from November 22 alleged in the petition; and (2) erred in
entering the injunction because Luddy failed to produce sufficient and objective
evidence that she had cause to believe she was in imminent danger of domestic
violence.
We reject Faddis’ due process argument for two reasons. First, Faddis did
not object to Luddy’s testimony, and therefore, did not preserve the issue for
appellate review. See Archurra v. Archurra, 80 So. 3d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA
2012) (holding that husband’s argument that trial court relied on testimony and
evidence from a prior proceeding without proper judicial notice was not preserved
for appellate review because the husband did not object at the hearing). Second,
Luddy’s petition did put Faddis on notice, in advance of the hearing, that there
were prior instances of violence. The petition alleged, for example, that Faddis
“[p]reviously . . . physically abused” Luddy, and had threatened her with a weapon
(which was different than the allegations for the November 22 incident). Luddy,
specifically, alleged in the petition that Faddis had “physically assaulted [her]
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countless times throughout their relationship, slapping [her], punching her, pushing
and shoving her and/or pinning her on the floor or against the walls.” Faddis,
Luddy wrote, “also threatened [her] with a knife, on one occasion.” This was
sufficient to put Faddis on notice that there were prior instances of violence, they
were numerous, and involved slapping, punching, pushing, and pinning. The trial
court recounted these allegations at the beginning of the hearing, and Faddis’
counsel cross-examined Luddy about the prior instances of violence. This satisfied
the due process requirements of apprising Faddis of the nature of the allegations
and affording him an opportunity to present his objections. See De Leon v.
Collazo, 178 So. 3d 906, 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“To be sufficient, notice must
be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” (quotation omitted)).
As to whether there was sufficient evidence to support the injunction, Faddis
misunderstands the trial court’s findings. The trial court may grant a domestic
violence injunction for either one of two reasons: the petitioner is the victim of
domestic violence; or he or she has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in
imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. § 741.30(6)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2016). “Domestic violence,” in turn, is “any assault, aggravated assault,
battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated
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stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in
physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or
household member.” Id. § 741.28(2).
Here, after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made two findings: that
Luddy had “been the victim of domestic violence”; and “she’s [had] cause to
believe that she would be a victim of domestic violence in the future.” Faddis
contends that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s cause-to-
believe finding, but he never addresses the trial court’s other finding that Luddy
was the victim of domestic violence. Either finding allows the trial court to grant
an injunction, and in this case, there was sufficient evidence that Luddy was the
victim of domestic violence. The trial court credited Luddy’s testimony that
Faddis pinned her against the refrigerator, and later spanked her. This was battery
by one household member on another, which is domestic violence.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment of injunction.
Affirmed.
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