16-356
Singh v. Sessions
BIA
Segal, IJ
A200 240 574
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 11th day of July, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 ROBERT D. SACK,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 SURINDER SINGH,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 16-356
17 NAC
18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,*
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
24 N.Y.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
27 Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S.
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney
General Jefferson B. Sessions III is automatically substituted for
former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch, as the Respondent in this
case.
1 Ferrier, Assistant Director;
2 Michele Y. F. Sarko, Attorney,
3 Office of Immigration Litigation,
4 United States Department of Justice,
5 Washington, D.C.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
10 DENIED.
11 Petitioner Surinder Singh, a native and citizen of India,
12 seeks review of a January 6, 2016, decision of the BIA, affirming
13 a July 1, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
14 Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
15 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
16 Surinder Singh, No. A200 240 574 (B.I.A. Jan. 6, 2016), aff’g
17 No. A200 240 574 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 1, 2014). We assume
18 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
19 procedural history in this case.
20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the
21 IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
22 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
23 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
24 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575
25 F.3d 193, 194, 196 (2d Cir. 2009).
2
1 Under the REAL ID Act, which governs Singh’s application,
2 “[t]he testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain
3 the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the
4 applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s
5 testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific
6 facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a
7 refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The agency may
8 require corroboration despite otherwise credible testimony,
9 and deny an application based on the failure to provide such
10 corroboration, so long as the corroborating evidence is
11 reasonably available. Id.; Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d
12 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2011). Before denying a claim solely
13 based on an applicant’s failure to provide corroborating
14 evidence, the IJ must, either in her decision or otherwise on
15 the record, (1) identify the missing evidence, and explain why
16 it was reasonably available, and (2) provide an opportunity
17 for the applicant to explain the omission and assess any
18 explanation given. Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 197-98. “No
19 court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact
20 with respect to the availability of corroborating
21 evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a
22 reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such
3
1 corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C.
2 § 1252(b)(4).
3 The record does not compel a conclusion that the evidence
4 the IJ sought was not reasonably available. The IJ properly
5 identified the missing evidence — an updated letter from the
6 Congress Party committee chairman to corroborate Singh’s
7 testimony that the Congress Party was aware of the attacks on
8 Singh and his father, and medical confirmation that Singh’s
9 memory was affected by his medical conditions or medication
10 — and afforded Singh two additional months to obtain the
11 evidence. Accordingly, the IJ satisfied the statutory
12 requirement of identifying the missing evidence. See 8
13 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 197-98.
14 And the letters requested by the IJ were clearly available
15 because they were in fact produced; however, they did not
16 corroborate Singh’s testimony. Accordingly, we discern no
17 error in the IJ’s determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
18 Singh’s failure to corroborate his and his father’s
19 alleged attacks is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
20 removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief
21 relied on Singh’s affiliation with the Congress Party and the
22 attacks he and his father allegedly suffered as a result. See
4
1 Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010); Paul v.
2 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
4 DENIED.
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5