IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0957
Filed July 19, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARCUS ANTINO HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions for eluding and operating while
intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Heidi M. Young of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gentry Brown &
Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2
BOWER, Judge.
Marcus Hall appeals his convictions for one count of eluding, in violation of
Iowa Code section 321.279(3) (2015), and one count of operating while
intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a). Hall claims the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal. Specifically, Hall argues law enforcement did not have a
valid reason to stop his vehicle and there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions. We find there was probable cause to stop Hall’s vehicle and
sufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On September 18, 2015, a law enforcement officer in Des Moines noticed
a gold sedan, driven by Hall, had a malfunctioning brake light. The officer
activated his emergency lights and attempted to initiate a traffic stop, but Hall did
not stop. The officer continued to pursue Hall’s vehicle and was joined by a
trooper from the Iowa State Patrol. During the pursuit, the officer observed Hall
commit several other traffic violations, including failure to yield to an emergency
vehicle, eluding, speeding, and reckless driving. Eventually, Hall stopped at a
parking lot of the apartment complex where he lived, and the officers took him
into custody.
On October 13, the State charged Hall with one count of eluding, one
count of operating while intoxicated, and one count of driving while barred, in
violation of Iowa Code section 321.561.1 Hall filed a motion to suppress,
1
Hall pled guilty to the driving-while-barred charge but proceeded to trial on the other
two charges.
3
claiming the officer lacked either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop
his vehicle. Specifically, Hall stated the brake light the officer claimed was
malfunctioning was functioning properly on the night of the pursuit. On January
21, 2016, the district court denied Hall’s motion to suppress. Following trial, the
jury found Hall guilty on both counts. Following the verdict, Hall renewed his
prior motion for judgment of acquittal, asserting there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdicts. The court denied the motion. Hall appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of motions to suppress based on federal and state
constitutional grounds is de novo. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa
2007). “This review requires ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances as shown by the entire record.’” Id. (quoting State v. Turner, 630
N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001)). Because the district court had the opportunity to
assess the credibility of witnesses, we give deference to its factual findings, but
we are not bound by them. Id.
We review claims of insufficient evidence for errors at law. State v.
Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 614–15 (Iowa 2012). “In reviewing challenges to the
sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict, courts consider all of the
record evidence viewed ‘in the light most favorable to the State, including all
reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.’” Id. at 615
(quoting State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 2002)).
III. Motion to Suppress
Hall claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the initial officer lacked either probable cause or reasonable suspicion
4
to stop his vehicle. Specifically, he claims his brake lights were functioning
properly on the night of the stop. The State contends Hall was not seized and
even if he was, the officer had probable cause to believe that Hall had committed
a traffic violation.
“Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures
by the government.” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2013). Although
claims under our state constitution may be evaluated independently from federal
claims, typically we “apply the general standards as outlined by the United States
Supreme Court for addressing a search and seizure challenge under the Iowa
Constitution.”2 Id. at 291–92.
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are triggered when law
enforcement seizes a person. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 773 (Iowa 2011).
A person is seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment “when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968). The United States
Supreme Court has also stated that a seizure occurs when “a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). “Whether a ‘seizure’ occurred is determined by the
totality of the circumstances.” State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 2008).
2
See Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 291–92 (“Where a party raises both state and federal
constitutional claims but does not argue that a standard independent of the federal
approach should be employed under the state constitution, we ordinarily apply the
substantive federal standards but reserve the right to apply the standard in a fashion
different from federal precedent.”).
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Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude Hall
was seized at the moment the officer activated his emergency lights and
attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The officer’s activation of his lights was a
show of authority in an attempt to restrain Hall’s movement by getting him to pull
over. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 n.16; State v. Harlan, 301 N.W.2d 717, 720
(Iowa 1981) (“The use of sirens, flashing lights or other signals to pull a moving
vehicle to the side of the road might also constitute a show of authority that is a
seizure.”). From that moment on a reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred.” Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 773. Whether probable cause existed to justify a
stop is evaluated against an objective standard. See State v. Tague, 676
N.W.2d 197, 201 (2004). “The State has the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the officer had probable cause to stop the
vehicle.” Id.
“When a peace officer observes a violation of our traffic laws, however
minor, the officer has probable cause to stop a motorist.” Id. Iowa Code section
321.387 states:
Every motor vehicle and every vehicle which is being drawn
at the end of a train of vehicles shall be equipped with a lighted rear
lamp or lamps, exhibiting a red light plainly visible from a distance
of five hundred feet to the rear. All lamps and lighting equipment
originally manufactured on a motor vehicle shall be kept in working
condition or shall be replaced with equivalent equipment.
At the suppression hearing, the officer testified:
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Iowa Code 321.387 requires that any lightbulb originally
manufactured on a vehicle must be in working order. So to refer to
the picture, if the Court would look at the right brake light as
opposed to the left—or compared to the left, the right side
illumination appears nearly twice as large. And that would be
because there is two brake lights that illuminate on the Mercury
Grand Marquis. That’s this type of vehicle.
There's two bulbs inside of that brake light each, two on the
left and two on the right. So on the left-hand side, one of those
bulbs is either burned out or malfunctioning for some reason.
Either way, one of the lamps inside that brake light on the driver’s
side is not working.
Finding no credible contradiction of the officer’s testimony, we conclude the
officer had probable cause to believe Hall had committed a traffic violation and
the stop was justified.3 See Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Hall claims there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for
eluding and operating while intoxicated. We disagree.
Our review of the record indicates sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict on both counts. Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a) states that a person
commits a serious misdemeanor when “1. A person commits the offense of
operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor vehicle in this state in
any of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage or other drug or a combination of such substances.” Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(1)(a). At trial, three law enforcement officers testified about their
observations of Hall. Their testimony included erratic driving, the smell of
marijuana on Hall, watery eyes, and dilated pupils. Hall also admitted to the
3
Our review of the dash-cam recordings are inconclusive as to the brake light issue.
While certain vantage points appear to show the driver’s-side rear brake light working,
other vantage points appear to show one bulb malfunctioning.
7
officers he was smoking marijuana earlier during the day of the incident.
Additionally, one of the officers performed a twelve-step examination of Hall and
determined he was under the influence of a form of cannabis. Hall offered
alternative explanations at trial, but the jury was free to believe the officers over
Hall. See Sanford, 814 N.W.2d at 615 (“Inherent in our standard of review of jury
verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury [is] free to reject certain
evidence, and credit other evidence.”).
Iowa Code section 321.279 (3) provides:
The driver of a motor vehicle commits a class “D” felony if
the driver willfully fails to bring the motor vehicle to a stop or
otherwise eludes or attempts to elude a marked official law
enforcement vehicle that is driven by a uniformed peace officer
after being given a visual and audible signal as provided in this
section, and in doing so exceeds the speed limit by twenty-five
miles per hour or more, and if any of the following occurs:
a. The driver is participating in a public offense, as defined in
section 702.13, that is a felony.
b. The driver is in violation of section 321J.2 or 124.401.
c. The offense results in bodily injury to a person other than
the driver.
At trial, one officer testified that his vehicle was marked, and both officers
testified that they were in uniform. They testified that Hall was the driver and he
exceeded eighty miles per hour in a thirty miles per hour speed zone at one
point. Finally, the officers testified about their reasons for concluding Hall was
under the influence of a controlled substance or drug in violation of Iowa Code
section 321J.2. Much of the officers’ testimony was confirmed by the video
recordings of the pursuits that were shown to the jury. When evaluating the
record in the light most favorable to the State, as we are required to do, we
conclude the jury’s verdicts were supported by sufficient evidence. See Sanford,
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814 N.W.2d at 615 (quoting State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa
2002)). We affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.