NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-4233
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALBERT CASTRO,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No.: 1-06-cr-00304-001)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 13, 2017
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 26, 2017)
O P I N I O N*
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
Defendant Albert Castro was sentenced by the District Court to 11 months in
prison after he pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his supervised release. Castro
appealed the District Court’s judgment. Castro’s court-appointed attorney has submitted
an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw. After reviewing the brief, we affirm the
judgment of the District Court and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I. Facts
In 2007, Albert Castro was found guilty of several firearms offenses and was
sentenced to 126 months in prison and 36 months of supervised release. After serving his
prison sentence, Castro violated the terms of his supervised release. In August 2016,
Castro pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his supervised release and was sentenced
to three months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
After he was released from prison the second time, Castro again violated the terms
of his supervised release. He pleaded guilty to the offense. The District Court sentenced
Castro to eleven months in prison.
II. Discussion
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and our precedent necessitate that
counsel fulfill the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2 in order for us to grant the
motion to withdraw. Those requirements are that (1) counsel thoroughly examines the
record in search of appealable issues and (2) explains why the issues are frivolous.
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). Additionally, the Court’s
independent review of the record must also show no nonfrivolous issues. Id. “Where the
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Anders brief initially appears adequate on its face, the proper course is for the appellate
court to be guided in reviewing the record by the Anders brief itself.” Id. at 301 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thus, we first must address whether counsel’s brief adequately fulfills Anders’s
requirements. We find that it does. Counsel raises three appealable arguments, but finds
that each is frivolous.1 First, counsel notes that there is no basis to argue that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to find a supervised release violation and impose a sentence.
Federal district courts have jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United
States based on 18 U.S.C. §3231 and district courts also have authority to revoke a term
of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3). Therefore, a jurisdictional argument
is frivolous.
Second, counsel notes that there is no basis to argue that Castro’s admission of
guilt was invalid. Under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970), guilty pleas
are valid if both “voluntary” and “intelligent.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Castro’s plea was both voluntary and intelligent. Castro took, in his own
words, “full responsibility” for violating the terms of his supervised release. Castro never
asserted that the Court did not comply with due process requirements. He was
represented by a federal public defender and was afforded a revocation hearing. Because
his plea was both voluntary and intelligent, he cannot challenge its validity.
1
When, as here, a guilty plea is entered and accepted, but the defendant seeks to appeal,
there are ordinarily three potential issues for appeal: whether the underlying plea was
both counseled and voluntary, whether the District Court had jurisdiction, and the legality
of the sentence. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Counsel raises
precisely these three issues.
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Finally, counsel notes that there is no basis to argue that the eleven-month
sentence was illegal or unreasonable. On appellate review our responsibility is to “ensure
that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 566 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Castro’s sentence was substantively reasonable, and
imposed in a procedurally fair way: the supervised release violations were Grade C
violations, resulting in a five- to eleven-month prison term. The sentence fell within the
five- to eleven-month range, and there is no basis to argue that the sentence was
unreasonable or imposed in a procedurally unfair way.2
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
2
The District Court noted that it considered Castro’s background and propensity to
violate his terms of supervised release. The Court gave clear insight in the record as to
why it chose to apply the maximum sentence within the guidelines:
I thought I gave Mr. Castro a pretty good break when he was here in August.
That’s just a couple months ago. . . . Given his history and the background and his
criminal record, it seems to me that the Government is justified in asking for a
sentence at the top of the range. I agree that supervised release is not realistic, and
I will not impose any further supervision.
App. 52-53.
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