J-A13021-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMIE LYNN SILVONEK :
:
Appellant : No. 818 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002141-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J. and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2017
Jamie Lynn Silvonek appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
on February 11, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
following her entry into a negotiated guilty plea to first-degree murder and
related charges. Silvonek, a 14-year-old at the time of the crime, and her
20-year-old boyfriend, Caleb Barnes, killed Silvonek’s mother, who had
attempted to put an end to their relationship. Prior to the guilty plea,
Silvonek petitioned the court to have her case decertified so that she could
be adjudicated in juvenile court. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court
denied Silvonek’s motion to transfer. She subsequently entered into the
negotiated guilty plea mentioned above and was sentenced to 35 years’
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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incarceration to life, as agreed. In this timely appeal, Silvonek claims the
trial court erred in denying her petition to transfer to juvenile court by
requiring her to self-incriminate to demonstrate her ability to rehabilitate,
misapplying several of the statutory factors, and in basing its determination
on bias, prejudice, and/or ill will. After a thorough review of the submissions
by the parties, the certified record, and relevant law, we affirm.
Pursuant to statute, murder is exempt from classification as a
delinquent act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302, definition of “Delinquent act (2)(i).”
Accordingly, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322, a juvenile charged with murder
must petition the trial court for transfer to the juvenile system. In order to
prevail, the juvenile has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
6322. This determination, in turn, is made by the trial court by considering
the factors listed in section 6355(a)(4)(iii). Those factors are:
(iii) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the public
interest is served by the transfer of the case for criminal
prosecution. In determining whether the public interest can be
served, the court shall consider the following factors:
(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
(B) the impact of the offense on the community;
(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual
posed by the child;
(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly
committed by the child;
(E) the degree of the child's culpability;
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(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives
available under this chapter and in the adult criminal
justice system; and
(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering
the following factors:
(I) age;
(II) mental capacity;
(III) maturity;
(IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the child;
(V) previous records, if any;
(VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent
history, including the success or failure of any previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child;
(VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;
(VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;
(IX) any other relevant factors;
42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii).
Our standard of review is as follows:
Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be
overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the
misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a
manifestly unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality,
prejudice or ill will.
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Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 10 A.3d 336, 338 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
The underlying facts of this matter are particularly important to the
disposition of this matter and must be understood to provide the needed
context to the trial court’s determination and our ruling. The trial court
clearly understood this necessity and provided approximately 22 pages
detailing the factual underpinnings of this matricide.1 We rely upon this
recitation of the facts and direct the parties to attach a copy of the trial court
opinion in the event of further proceedings.
Here, we simply note that Silvonek was the instigator and willing
participant in the murder of her mother,2 who was standing in the way of a
continuing sexual relationship between Silvonek and her adult boyfriend,
Caleb Barnes, a soldier stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland.
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1
See Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/2015, at 2-24.
2
Texts from Silvonek to Barnes on the day they killed her mother capture
the essence of this. 1) “She needs to go, Caleb. Right now. You don’t
understand”; 2) “CALEB” “I’M SERIOUS” “She’s lying” [about Silvonek’s age]
“Please do it, I’m going to throw up” “I can’t stand her lying to you like this”;
3) “I don’t know what her problem is” “She threatened to throw me out of
the house. I want her gone.”; 4) “I just need to you be able [sic] to come
over so we can do whatever necessary, honestly”; 5) “I want her to shut her
fucking face and stop being fake. She just God damn lied to you about my
age and now she’s pulling this shit.” See Commonwealth Exhibit 8,
10/29/2015, Texts, 3/14/2015.
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Silvonek’s first argument is that the trial court abused its discretion
denying decertification by violating Silvonek’s fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. One of the statutory factors for the trial court to consider
is amenability to treatment in the juvenile system. Case law demonstrates
that a component of that determination can be whether the juvenile takes
responsibility for his or her actions. While taking responsibility may be
considered, the court cannot require the juvenile to admit to guilt in order to
prove he or she has taken responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Brown,
26 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. 2011). If the court does use the failure to admit
guilt to determine the juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation, the
juvenile’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has been violated.
Id. Our review of the certified record shows that while the trial court did
consider Silvonek’s lack of acceptance of responsibility for her actions, it did
not require her to admit her crime. Rather, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,
the trial court credited forensic psychiatrist, John S. O’Brien, M.D., J.D., who
determined, “In [Silvonek’s] version, she ‘minimize[d] her problems and
overlook[ed] personal fault,’ by ‘continuing to distance herself from any
responsibility for the offense.’” Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/2015, at 31-32.
The foregoing was not a statement faulting Silvonek for her failure to
admit to her crime. Instead, this comment is part of larger commentary
indicating Silvonek, even at her young age, had become an adept liar and
emotional manipulator of those around her. In using these traits, she was
attempting to avoid responsibility and consequences of her actions. Indeed,
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the record reflects Silvonek has been described by those around her as a
“chameleon”, id. at 29, “socially savvy”, “a psychological bully”, and a
“manipulator”. Id. at 32. Additionally, the record is replete with instances
where Silvonek changed her story and attitude in response to her situation.
The video of Silvonek’s voluntary interview with the police, immediately after
she was taken into custody, is ample demonstration such behavior.3
In reviewing the entire record, it is clear that the determination that
Silvonek avoided responsibility of her actions was not based upon her failure
to admit guilt. She did, in fact, admit to certain aspects of her criminal
behavior in the police interview. Specifically, she admitted to minimally
helping Barnes dispose of her mother’s body. Our review of the certified
record, in toto, confirms that the trial court’s determination that Silvonek’s
failure to accept responsibility for her actions was not based upon a refusal
to admit guilt. Rather, the determination was based upon her actions
viewed in their entirety. Silvonek is not entitled to relief in this issue.
Next, Silvonek argues the trial court improperly considered certain of
the required factors in denying her motion for decertification. She claims
the trial court considered her age and her relationship with co-defendant,
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3
Particularly relevant to this issue, we note: 1) how Silvonek attempted to
blame a friend of hers, Witness One, for giving Barnes the idea of killing her
parents, and 2) how Silvonek claimed Barnes had forcibly raped her after
killing her mother. This court has viewed the interview, as well as all other
available video evidence, in its entirety.
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Caleb Barnes, as aggravating factors rather than as mitigating factors.
Specifically, she claims, “The trial court failed to consider the inherent
coerciveness of Jamie Silvonek’s relationship with a twenty (20) year old co-
defendant when Jamie Silvonek had not reached the age of consent and had
just turned fourteen (14) years old.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. While the
certified record does reflect expert testimony was presented to support this
theory, specifically the testimony of Dr. Frank Dattilio, Ph.D., and Dr. Steven
Berkowitz, M.D., the trial court considered the testimonial evidence of both
experts and rejected them. The trial court reasoned that the primary
foundation of Dr. Dattilio’s opinion was admittedly based upon Silvonek’s
“unreliable recounting and version of events.” Trial Court Opinion at 27.
The trial court further stated, regarding Dr. Dattilio’s reliance on Silvonek’s
version of the events:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that [Silvonek] has presented
many different versions of the events, as they are constantly
changing. Of prime importance, Dr. Dattilio based his opinion on
the fact that [Silvonek] did not execute the killing of her mother,
was surprised by the killing, and was an unwilling participant in
it. However, [Silvonek’s] text messages between [her] and the
Co-Defendant, the Walmart video (not reviewed by Dr. Dattilio),
the Lehigh County Jail letter (not reviewed by Dr. Dattilio prior to
preparing his report), as well as her telephone conversation with
Co-Defendant in the presence of Witness Number One as
recounted in the Preliminary Hearing testimony, undermine this
assertion.
Id. at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).
Dr. Berkowitz opined that due to Adolescent Brain Development,
Silvonek exhibited poor judgment and should not be held to the same legal
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standard as an adult. He further testified that Silvonek suffered from a non-
verbal learning disability. However, the trial court noted that although Dr.
Berkowitz interviewed Silvonek while she was in the Lehigh County Jail and
reviewed the battery of diagnostic assessments performed by Dr. Dattilio, he
did not review Silvonek’s school records, the Walmart video, 4 the
approximately 6,000 text messages between Silvonek and Barnes, the
psychiatric report of Dr. John F. Campion, M.D.5, the sexual assault report of
Dr. Debra Jenssen, M.D.,6 the social media sites used by Silvonek, and
without having interviewed any of Silvonek’s teachers.
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4
The Walmart video is closed circuit video from the Walmart store Silvonek
and Barnes visited to buy cleaning supplies after they had killed Silvonek’s
mother and left her in the Silvonek vehicle in the driveway. The video
shows, in part, Silvonek and Barnes walking arm in arm; Silvonek pulling on
Barnes’ arm, directing him down a specific aisle; and Silvonek carrying a
bottle of what appears to be bleach, swinging it as if it were a sand pail at
the beach. The Lehigh County Jail letter was a note Silvonek attempted to
send to Barnes regarding her decertification hearing in which she asks him
to take the blame for her, claiming that if the situation was reversed, she
would “be on the stand at that hearing, taking the fall for you.” Trial Court
Opinion. 11/16/2015, at 28, fn. 14. In the letter, she further claims “…the
only hope of us ever being together is if I get sent back to Juvenile Court.
After 7 years I can move to wherever you are, and we can be together.” Id.
Finally, Witness One is the friend referred to earlier to whom Silvonek tried
to shift blame. The phone call was one between Silvonek and Barnes, in the
presence of Witness One, in which Silvonek suggested Barnes kill her
mother.
5
Dr. Campion was Silvonek’s therapist prior to the murder.
6
This report was generated after Silvonek, during her police interview,
accused Barnes of having forcibly raped her.
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In light of the above, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
rejecting these expert opinions.7 Rather, the trial court found the testimony
of John S. O’Brien, M.D., J.D., to have been credible. The trial court noted
that Dr. O’Brien had both interviewed Silvonek and thoroughly reviewed the
records:
[Dr. O’Brien] found that [Silvonek] “seamlessly adjust[ed]” her
story and provided multiple versions of what took place on the
evening of March 14, 2015 and early morning hours of March 15,
2015. In [Silvonek’s] version, she “minimize[d] her problems
and overlook[ed] personal fault,” by “continuing to distance
herself from any responsibility for the offense.” [Silvonek] was
found to be “a good liar and had successfully lied on multiple
occasions in order to get what she wanted.” She was seen by
others in the community as being “socially savvy,” “a
psychological bully” and a “manipulator.” Overall, [Silvonek]
presented herself differently to different people in order to
achieve her end goal. Indeed, during the course of her therapy
with Dr. John Campion, [Silvonek] ironically was seen as having
“a significant improvement in her symptoms” at a time when
“her actual performance and participation in school activities
deteriorated” and her relationship with her parents was
contentious.
Dr. O’Brien found [Silvonek] to be “a highly intelligent and
manipulative young woman” who was not a “fearful or
emotionally overpowered passive participant in the pre-planned,
premeditated murder of her mother.” Dr. O’Brien concluded that
[Silvonek] was “an individual who could size up her audience and
behave in a manner that was consistent with their interests and
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7
Although the trial court did note that Dr. Dattilio testified that if, contrary
to his belief, Silvonek did plot, encourage, and participate in the murder of
her mother, then then it would not be in the public interest to decertify.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/2015, at 30, fn. 15. As the trial court determined
Silvonek was the instigator and a willing participant in the killing, the trial
court accepted this aspect of Dr. Dattilio’s testimony.
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their receptiveness to her self-serving and ingratiating
representation of herself.”
Id. at 31-32 (citations to the record omitted).
The trial court accepted Dr. O’Brien’s expert testimony that Silvonek
was a manipulator, not manipulated. As noted, we have reviewed the video
evidence, read the expert reports and testimony, and reviewed the text
messages between Silvonek and Barnes and we find no abuse of discretion
in this determination. Accordingly, Silvonek is not entitled to relief on this
issue.
The last factor Silvonek claims the trial court erred in analyzing was
the determination that juvenile dispositional alternatives were inadequate to
address both society’s and Silvonek’s needs and that Silvonek was an
unlikely candidate to be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court jurisdiction.8 Here, the trial court considered the evidence that the two
programs available to Silvonek had never treated anyone for more than 2½
years, making it likely that Silvonek would be released from such program
well before her 21st birthday. Given the extreme nature of the crime,
including her willing participation in it, as well as Silvonek’s general lack of
amenability for rehabilitation, the trial court reasoned:
As such, this Court finds that the juvenile system is inadequate
to supervise, treat or rehabilitate [Silvonek]. This Court
recognizes that juvenile court jurisdiction ends at the age of
twenty-one (21) regardless of whether or not [Silvonek]
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8
The claim relates to the factors at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355 (F) and (G)(vii).
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continues to pose a threat to society. However, it is more likely
than not that [Silvonek] would be released long before she
attains the age of twenty-one (21) years old, as the treatment
facilities are designed with a shorter duration of treatment in
mind. A period of approximately two and a half (2½) years is
woefully inadequate to expect that [Silvonek] would respond to
treatment or rehabilitation after committing matricide.
In contrast, within the adult system, a state correctional
institution is available to [Silvonek] that would suit her needs.
Specifically, SCI Muncy is a state correctional institution housing
youthful female offenders younger than eighteen (18) years old,
and young adult female offenders between the ages of eighteen
(18) and twenty-one (21). The juvenile programing within the
adult correctional system offered at SCI Muncy mirrors the
programming for juvenile offenders offered at both North Central
Secure Treatment Unit and Adelphoi Village. William Franz, the
Correction Classification Program Manager and SCI Muncy,
explained that the youthful offender and young adult prisoners
are separated from the general prison population. The Youthful
Offender Program offers a great deal of programs designed to be
therapeutic in nature. The prisoners in this program meet with
their counselors and psychologists daily, and overall there is [a]
great deal of interaction with the staff. In this program, the
prisoner would receive an education and be offered programs
run by area Universities. Under the Young Adult Offender
Program, the prisoner undergoes a five (5) phase program, each
phase lasting eight (8) weeks. A young adult prisoner would
have the opportunity to participate in a myriad of programs
which focus on, inter alia, positive relationships, coping skills,
decision making and positive self-esteem. Mr. Franz indicated
that the programs in SCI Muncy are similar to those offered at
North Central Secure Treatment Unit in Danville, Pennsylvania.
However, M. Franz noted that it is less chaotic at SCI Muncy
because they have more options available to them to deal with
rule breakers. Consequently, he believed SCI Muncy to be a
placement that is more conducive to treatment.
Trial Court Opinion, at 35-36.
This rationale belies Silvonek’s claims that the trial court based its
decision simply on the belief that as a juvenile offender Silvonek would be
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released in two and one-half years. Contrary to Silvonek’s claims, we
believe the trial court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of this issue before
determining that Silvonek would be more appropriately served by the adult
correctional facilities.
Finally, Silvonek argues the trial court abused its discretion by basing
its determination on partiality, prejudice or ill will. Essentially, Silvonek
argues, “The lower court found [Silvonek] effectively guilty of all alleged
charges before a trial even commenced. Such findings clearly demonstrate
partiality, prejudice or ill will towards Juvenile Jamie Silvonek.” Appellant’ s
Brief at 29.
We note that Silvonek has cited Commonwealth v Brown, 26 A.3d
485 (Pa. Super. 2011) favorably throughout her brief. As discussed above,
we have found Brown inapplicable under the facts of this case regarding
Silvonek’s self-incrimination claim. However, the Brown decision also
states:
Consistent with our discussion above permitting a psychiatrist to
presume a juvenile’s guilt in determining amenability to
treatment, we conclude that for purposes of analyzing the
factors in § 6355(a)(4)(iii), a trial court may (but need not)
assume that the juvenile is guilty and committed the alleged acts
constituting the offense.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d at 508.
Case law specifically permits the trial court to presume the juvenile’s
guilt when considering decertification. Accordingly, this argument is
unavailing.
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Our review of this matter convinces us that this is an extraordinary
case. Jamie Lynn Silvonek was still a young teenager when she conspired
with her 20 year old boyfriend to murder her mother in order to continue
their relationship. Nonetheless, the trial court carefully considered the
totality of the evidence and applied the facts to the statutory factors listed at
42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). In doing so, the trial court determined, despite
her age, Silvonek was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system
and that the adult system would be better able to provide her with the help
she requires. Accordingly, the trial court found that Silvonek had not carried
her burden to prove that a transfer to the juvenile system would serve the
public interest. Our comprehensive review of the certified record in this
matter confirms that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Silvonek’s motion to transfer to juvenile court.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2017
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Circulated 07/25/2017 11:50 AM