IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2017 Term FILED
October 6, 2017
_____________ released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
No. 17-0214 OF WEST VIRGINIA
_____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Petitioner
V.
HONORABLE DAVID J. SIMS, JUDGE OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OHIO COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA
AND ROBERT W. McFARLAND,
Respondents
____________________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
WRIT GRANTED
____________________________________________________________________
AND
_____________
No. 17-0275
_____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Petitioner
V.
HONORABLE DAVID J. SIMS, JUDGE OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OHIO COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA
AND JAMES WILKERSON,
Respondents
____________________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
WRIT GRANTED
____________________________________________________________________
Submitted: September 19, 2017
Filed: October 6, 2017
Patrick Morrisey Matthew Brummond
Attorney General Public Defender Services
Robert L. Hogan Charleston, West Virginia
Charleston, West Virginia Attorney for Respondent,
Attorneys for Petitioner Robert W. McFarland
John M. Jurco
St. Clairsville, Ohio
Attorney for Respondent,
James Wilkerson
JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. When a defendant files a motion to correct a sentence under Rule 35(a)
of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecuting attorney is entitled to
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard on the motion.
2. A circuit court does not have jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of a
motion for reduction of a sentence under Rule 35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure when the motion is filed outside the 120-day filing period set out under that rule.
i
Davis, Justice:
This matter involves two consolidated petitions for writs of prohibition. In
petition No. 17-0275, the State seeks to prohibit enforcement of an order of the Circuit Court
of Ohio County that reduced the criminal sentence of James Wilkerson. In petition No.
17-0214, the State seeks to prohibit enforcement of an order of the Circuit Court of Ohio
County that reduced the criminal sentence of Robert W. McFarland. After carefully
reviewing the briefs, the arguments of the parties, the legal authority cited, and the record
presented for consideration, we grant the writs.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The two consolidated petitions in this matter involve different
underlying circumstances. Therefore, we will present separate factual and procedural
histories.
A. Petition No. 17-0275
Petition No. 17-0275 involves the criminal prosecution of James Wilkerson.
In November 2008, Mr. Wilkerson and a co-defendant, Brandon Myers, robbed and
physically assaulted two thirteen-year-old boys. Mr. Wilkerson and Mr. Myers were jointly
indicted on two counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of assault during the
commission of a felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree robbery. Mr.
1
Myers eventually pled guilty to lesser offenses and received an effective sentence of ten to
thirty-six years confinement.1 The case against Mr. Wilkerson was tried before a jury in July
2011. The jury convicted him of two counts of first degree robbery, one count of assault
during the commission of a felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree
robbery. The trial court sentenced Mr. Wilkerson to forty years incarceration for each of the
robbery convictions and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively–for an effective
sentence of eighty years. The sentences for the remaining convictions were ordered to be
served concurrent to each other and concurrent to the eighty-year robbery sentence.
Mr. Wilkerson appealed his conviction. This Court affirmed the judgment in
State v. Wilkerson, 230 W. Va. 366, 738 S.E.2d 32 (2013). In January 2014, Mr. Wilkerson
filed a pro se motion under Rule 35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure
seeking to have his sentence reduced. The trial court denied the motion as untimely.2 In
April 2014, Mr. Wilkerson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court.
The circuit court denied the habeas petition in June 2016.3 On July 7, 2016, Mr. Wilkerson
filed another Rule 35(b) motion seeking to have his sentence reduced. The State was not
1
Mr. Wilkerson was offered the same plea deal that Mr. Myers was given. Mr.
Wilkerson rejected the offer.
2
The State indicates that it did not receive notice of the Rule 35(b) motion, and
only learned of the matter after the trial court denied the motion.
3
The denial of habeas relief is the subject of a pending appeal, No. 16-0689.
2
given notice of the motion, nor was the state given an opportunity to be heard. On July 12,
2016, the circuit court granted the motion and ordered Mr. Wilkerson’s two forty-year
sentences for first degree robbery be served concurrently. The State filed an appeal of the
order and argued that the Rule 35(b) motion was untimely and that the State was not afforded
notice and an opportunity to be heard.4 Mr. Wilkerson filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
on the grounds that no legal authority existed for the State to file an appeal. This Court
granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on January 25, 2017. Subsequently, the State filed
the instant petition for a writ of prohibition on March 23, 2017.
B. Petition No. 17-0214
Petition No. 17-0214 involves the criminal prosecution of Robert W.
McFarland. The record indicates that in October 2008, Mr. McFarland and a co-defendant,
Eric Holmes, broke into the home of Jonathan Ward and Kelly Mitchell.5 Mr. Ward was
beaten with the butt of a shotgun and the home was robbed. The police captured Mr.
McFarland and Mr. Holmes shortly after the robbery. Mr. McFarland was indicted on one
count of robbery in the first degree, one count of assault during the commission of a felony,
4
Before the State filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition, the circuit
court amended the order and indicated that the reduction of the sentence was under Rule
35(a), not Rule 35(b).
5
Two children were also in the home at the time.
3
malicious assault, and one count of conspiracy.6 Mr. McFarland eventually entered a guilty
plea to attempted robbery in the first degree, and agreed not to challenge the sentence that
was imposed. The circuit court accepted the plea and on July 10, 2009, sentenced Mr.
McFarland to 70 years imprisonment.
Even though the plea agreement prohibited Mr. McFarland from challenging
the sentence, he filed a petition for appeal with this Court. The petition was refused on
January 28, 2010. On May 19, 2010, Mr. McFarland filed a motion to reduce his sentence
under Rule 35(b). In an order entered on June 8, 2010, the circuit court denied the motion
under Rule 35(a) and Rule 35(b).7 Mr. McFarland thereafter filed a petition for habeas
corpus relief in the circuit court. The circuit court denied habeas relief by orders entered on
September 9, 2011, and on August 8, 2012. Mr. McFarland appealed the denial of habeas
relief. This Court affirmed the denial in McFarland v. Ballard, No. 12-1105, 2013 WL
3184657 (W. Va. June 24, 2013).
In August 2013, Mr. McFarland filed a pro se motion in circuit court for a
reduction of his sentence. The circuit court treated the motion as a Rule 35(b) motion and
6
Mr. Holmes was charged separately and eventually convicted and sentenced
to 75 years imprisonment.
7
The motion was denied by Judge Recht.
4
denied the same on October 1, 2013.8 On December 17, 2014, Mr. McFarland filed another
Rule 35(b) motion with the circuit court. The State contends that it did not receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard on the motion. On February 2, 2017, the circuit court entered an
order reducing Mr. McFarland’s sentence to 35 years.9 This order purportedly was based
upon Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion that was filed on May 19, 2010, and resolved by
Judge Recht on June 8, 2010. The State subsequently challenged the order reducing the
sentence though the instant petition for a writ of prohibition.10
8
The motion was denied by the respondent, Judge Sims.
9
The order was entered by the respondent, Judge Sims. The order contained no
findings of fact and failed to cite any specific legal reason for granting the relief.
10
In a supplemental response to the petition, Mr. McFarland informed this
Court that, while the petition was pending, he asked the Parole Board to place him on parole
based upon the circuit court’s order reducing his sentence. Mr. McFarland has indicated that
the Parole Board granted him parole. Mr. McFarland now asks this Court to prohibit the State
from challenging his release on parole in this proceeding. The State has responded that it is
not raising the issue of Mr. McFarland’s release on parole in this proceeding. However, the
State notes, and we agree, that Mr. McFarland’s release on parole does not moot our
resolution of the validity of the sentence reduction order. In view of our ultimate resolution
of the sentence reduction issue, the Parole Board may seek to rescind its order placing Mr.
McFarland on parole. See W. Va. C.S.R. § 92-2-4.1 (“The Board may rescind and issue a
Notice of Temporary Rescission of any grant of parole, . . . [i]f any information becomes
available to the Board which contravenes the evidence the Panel used to reach the parole
decision.”). See also Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding no due
process violation in revoking defendant’s parole solely on the basis that he was erroneously
released on parole); Geer v. Riley, No. 8:09-1769-CMC-BHH, 2009 WL 3571541 (D.S.C.
Oct. 26, 2009) (revoking defendant’s parole two years after learning that he was erroneously
placed on parole); United States ex rel. Claybourn v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., No. 00 C 7896,
2000 WL 1889679 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2000) (revoking defendant’s parole four months after
learning that he was erroneously placed on parole). We wish to make clear that we take no
position on the merits of any action by the Parole Board to rescind the parole order. See
(continued...)
5
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both of the consolidated cases in this matter seek a writ of prohibition to
prevent enforcement of resentencing orders by the circuit court. There are limited
circumstances in which the State may request a writ of prohibition in a criminal matter. We
have held that
The State may seek a writ of prohibition in this Court in
a criminal case where the trial court has exceeded or acted
outside of its jurisdiction. Where the State claims that the trial
court abused its legitimate powers, the State must demonstrate
that the court's action was so flagrant that it was deprived of its
right to prosecute the case or deprived of a valid conviction. In
any event, the prohibition proceeding must offend neither the
Double Jeopardy Clause nor the defendant’s right to a speedy
trial. Furthermore, the application for a writ of prohibition must
be promptly presented.
Syl. pt. 5, State v. Lewis, 188 W. Va. 85, 422 S.E.2d 807 (1992), superseded by statute on
other grounds as recognized by State v. Butler, 239 W. Va. 168, 799 S.E.2d 718 (2017). In
Syllabus point 4 of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), we
set forth the following standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition:
In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of
prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but
10
(...continued)
Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing “that the
government has waived the right to reincarcerate when its agents’ actions are so affirmatively
improper or grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally inconsistent with fundamental
principles of liberty and justice to require a legal sentence to be served in its aftermath.”).
6
only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its
legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means,
such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the
petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not
correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is
clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower
tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent
disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5)
whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important
problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are
general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for
determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should
issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear
that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of
law, should be given substantial weight.
With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the issues presented.
III.
DISCUSSION
In order to resolve the petitions presented in this matter we need only address
the merits of two issues. First, in the case of Mr. Wilkerson the dispositive issue is whether
the State was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the circuit court ruled
upon his Rule 35 motion.11 The second issue that we will address concerns the State’s
11
The State’s petition presented several additional arguments that attacked the
reasons given by the circuit court for reducing Mr. Wilkerson’s sentence. We will not address
those additional arguments on the merits in this proceeding. The additional arguments made
by the State should be considered and ruled upon in the first instance by the circuit court,
particularly when, as here, the State has presented four affidavits in support of its arguments
(continued...)
7
contention that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b)
motion.12
A. The State’s Right to Notice and an Opportunity
to Be Heard on a Rule 35(a) Motion
As previously noted, Mr. Wilkerson filed a Rule 35(b) motion, which the
circuit court converted into a Rule 35(a) motion in its second order.13 Consequently, our
analysis is under Rule 35(a). The State contends that this Court should prohibit enforcement
of the order reducing Mr. Wilkerson’s sentence, because it did not have notice that Mr.
Wilkerson filed the motion for sentence reduction, nor was it afforded an opportunity to be
heard in opposition to the motion.14 Mr. Wilkerson contends that the State is not entitled to
11
(...continued)
against the sentence reduction. Upon remand, the State will have an opportunity to present
to the circuit court its reasons for opposing the motion. See Skaggs v. Eastern Associated
Coal Corp., 212 W. Va. 248, 256 n.3, 569 S.E.2d 769, 777 n.3 (2002) (“Because the circuit
court did not reach the merits of these [contentions] . . ., we decline to address them, and
leave them for the circuit court to address on remand.”).
12
The State also argued that it did not have notice and an opportunity to be
heard on Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion. Insofar as the dispositive issue presented by
Mr. McFarland’s motion involves the jurisdiction of the circuit court, we need not address
the notice and opportunity to be heard argument as it relates to Mr. McFarland’s motion.
13
The State contends, and we agree, that the circuit court converted the motion
from Rule 35(b) to Rule 35(a), because the motion was untimely under Rule 35(b).
14
Mr. Wilkerson has argued that the petition in this case should be dismissed
as untimely, because it was not filed until more than eight months after the circuit court’s
initial order. Insofar as the delay was attributed to the State’s erroneous, but good faith belief
(continued...)
8
relief for three reasons. First, Mr. Wilkerson argues that he filed the motion pro se and
innocently and unknowingly failed to serve a copy on the State. Second, he argues that “Rule
35(a) does not set forth any requirement that a trial court give the State the opportunity to
defend an illegal sentence.” Third, Mr. Wilkerson contends that the State could have filed
a motion for reconsideration once it received the order reducing his sentence. For the reasons
to follow, we reject Mr. Wilkerson’s arguments.
The text of Rule 35(a) provides as follows:
(a) Correction of Sentence. The court may correct
an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the
14
(...continued)
that it could appeal that order, we decline to dismiss the petition. The State promptly filed
the petition after our dismissal of the erroneous appeal. We addressed a similar issue in State
ex rel. Smith v. Sims, 235 W. Va. 124, 772 S.E.2d 309 (2015), as follows:
J.Y. urges this Court to dismiss this petition seeking a writ of
prohibition as untimely. We decline to do so because the
petitioner did in fact immediately file an appeal of the March 6,
2014, dismissal order with this Court on March 19, 2014.
However, by order dated September 17, 2014, this Court
dismissed the appeal. . . . Following entry of our order, the
petitioner promptly filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.
Id. at 132 n.5, 772 S.E.2d at 317 n.5. See also State ex rel. David Allen B. v. Sommerville,
194 W. Va. 86, 89 n.6, 459 S.E.2d 363, 366 n.7 (1995) (“So long as the act sought to be
prohibited has not occurred, the relief sought in this case will not be considered to be time
barred.”); State ex rel. W. Virginia Truck Stops, Inc. v. McHugh, 160 W. Va. 294, 299, 233
S.E.2d 729, 732 (1977) (“The mere expiration of time is not the controlling factor in
determining whether the petitioner proceeded in prohibition in a timely manner. There must
be an intervening change of position of the respondent induced by the inaction of the
petitioner.”).
9
time period provided herein for the reduction of
sentence.
It is quite clear that Rule 35(a) does not expressly require that the State be given notice and
an opportunity to be heard. However, the absence of explicit language in Rule 35(a)
affording the State the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard is not controlling. We
resolved a similar issue in State ex rel. Reed v. Douglass, 189 W. Va. 56, 427 S.E.2d 751
(1993).
In Reed, the defendant filed a motion under Rule 32.1(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking early release from probation. The defendant served a
copy of the motion, which included a date that the motion would be heard by the circuit
court, on the State. However, before the date of the hearing the circuit court entered an order
releasing the defendant from probation. The State subsequently filed a petition for writ of
prohibition with this Court seeking to preclude enforcement of the order. In that proceeding,
the State argued that it was entitled to both notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
circuit court resolved the motion. This Court initially observed that Rule 32.1(b) did not
expressly provide for the State to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.15 However,
the Court found that, in light of other rules, it was clear that notice and an opportunity to be
heard was required. The opinion addressed the matter as follows:
15
The rule was subsequently amended to expressly provide for notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
10
[U]nder Rule 49(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the parties in a criminal proceeding are required to
serve written motions on each other. Under Rule 32(a)(1) of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, when sentencing is
initially considered by the court, “[t]he attorney for the state
shall have an equivalent opportunity [as the defendant and
counsel] to speak to the court.”
Moreover, Rule 32(c)(3)(C) of the West Virginia Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which relates to the presentence
investigation and report to the court, provides that any material
in the report “which [is] disclosed to the defendant and his
counsel shall be disclosed to the attorney for the state.” . . .
....
Under the provisions of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure, we conclude that Rule 49(a), which
requires notice to be served on the other party, Rule 32(c)(3)(C),
which grants to the prosecuting attorney the right to review
presentence information, and Rule 32(a)(1), which grants to the
prosecuting attorney the right to address the court regarding
sentencing, carry the implied right on the part of the prosecuting
attorney to be heard where a defendant seeks a favorable
modification of the terms of probation. . . .
Consequently, we hold that when a defendant moves to
obtain a favorable modification of the terms of probation under
Rule 32.1(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the prosecuting attorney is entitled to reasonable notice of the
motion for modification and an opportunity to be heard.
The respondent judge's failure to accord an opportunity
to the prosecuting attorney to be heard and entry of the order
without a hearing were acts beyond his legitimate powers and
are, therefore, subject to prohibition. . . .
11
Reed, 189 W. Va. at 57-59, 427 S.E.2d at 752-54 (footnote omitted). The decision in Reed
controls our resolution of whether notice and opportunity to be heard is required under Rule
35(a).
As previously noted, Rule 35(a) does not expressly provide for the State to
receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard. However, as Reed pointed out, Rule
49(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure requires written motions be served
on all parties.16 See also State v. Dorisio, 189 W. Va. 788, 795, 434 S.E.2d 707, 714 (1993)
(noting that Rule 49(a) requires that “[w]ritten motions . . . shall be served upon each of the
parties[.]”).17 Further, as noted in Reed, Rule 32(c)(3) requires the court to give the State an
16
Rule 49(a) provides as follows:
(a) Service: When Required – Written
motions other than those which are heard ex parte,
written notices, designations of record on appeal,
and similar papers shall be served upon each of
the parties.
17
See also United States v. Esekhigbe, Crim. No. H-05-0354-1, 2012 WL
2361733, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2012) (“Defendant filed a subsequent pro se amended
motion, but failed to serve the Government. Consequently, the amended motion is not before
the Court.”); Morgan v. State, 359 Ark. 168, 177, 195 S.W.3d 889, 895 (2004) (“The record
reveals that Appellant attempted to file several pro se motions, but was not allowed to do so
because of his failure to serve the State with copies of the motions.”); State v. Bohanna, No.
16-CA-81, 2017 WL 3207976 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 2017) (“[T]he trial court . . .
denied Appellant’s motion for leave, as a blanket motion, finding Appellant had not served
the motion(s) upon any other party in the case, pursuant to Criminal Rule 49.”).
12
opportunity to be heard before a defendant is sentenced.18 See also Seward v. Hane, 882
N.W.2d 874, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he State . . . was entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard.”); State v. Heinz, 146 Ohio St. 3d 374, 380, 56 N.E.3d 965, 972
(2016) (“[A]s the state’s legal representative, the prosecuting attorney is entitled to proper
18
Rule 32(c)(3) provides as follows:
(3) Imposition of Sentence. – Before imposing sentence,
the court must:
(A) verify that the defendant and defendant's counsel
have read and discussed the presentence report made available
under subdivision (b)(6)(A). If the court has received
information excluded from the presentence report under
subdivision (b)(5) the court in lieu of making that information
available must summarize it in writing, if the information will
be relied on in determining sentence. The court must also give
the defendant and the defendant's counsel a reasonable
opportunity to comment on that information;
(B) afford defendant's counsel an opportunity to speak on
behalf of the defendant;
(C) address the defendant personally and determine
whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present
any information in mitigation of sentence;
(D) afford the attorney for the state an opportunity
equivalent to that of the defendant's counsel to speak to the
court; and
(E) if sentence is to be imposed for a crime of violence
or sexual abuse, address the victim personally if the victim is
present at the sentencing hearing and determine if the victim
wishes to make a statement or present any information in
relation to the sentence.
13
notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard at proceedings in which the state is a
party[.]”). In light of our decision in Reed and the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3) and Rule
49(a), we now hold that when a defendant files a motion to correct a sentence under Rule
35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecuting attorney is entitled
to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard on the motion.
The record is quite clear in showing that the State did not receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard on Mr. Wilkerson’s motion to reduce his sentence. Consequently,
prohibition is appropriate to preclude enforcement of the circuit court’s order reducing Mr.
Wilkerson’s sentence. On remand, the circuit court must afford the State an opportunity to
be heard on the merits of Mr. Wilkerson’s converted Rule 35(a) motion.
B. Jurisdictional Time Limitation in Rule 35(b)
The State contends that Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion was untimely;
therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to reduce his sentence.19 Mr. McFarland argues
19
Mr. McFarland filed his Rule 35(b) motion on December 17, 2014. However,
the circuit court’s order erroneously stated that it was granting relief based upon a Rule 35
motion filed by Mr. McFarland on May 19, 2010. The record clearly shows that Judge Recht
entered a final order on June 7, 2010, that denied Mr. McFarland relief under Rule 35(a) and
Rule 35(b). Therefore, the circuit court could not base its ruling on the May 19, 2010,
motion, because it was previously resolved on the merits by Judge Recht. In fact, in this
proceeding Mr. McFarland has not argued that he sought relief under the May 19, 2010,
motion. It is obvious to this Court that the circuit court was attempting to circumvent the
(continued...)
14
that the time limitation in Rule 35(b) is not jurisdictional; therefore, the circuit court had
authority to grant him relief under the rule.20 We disagree with Mr. McFarland.
We begin by examining the text of the relevant rules. Rule 35(b) provides in
part as follows:
19
(...continued)
time limitation set out under Rule 35(b) by reviving a motion that already had been resolved
and final. Consequently, our analysis of Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion will be based
upon the motion he filed on December 17, 2014.
20
Mr. McFarland has also argued that this Court does not have authority to
create procedural rules that are jurisdictional. According to Mr. McFarland, only the
legislature can enact procedural rules that are jurisdictional. Mr. McFarland has not cited to
any authority holding that this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority is limited to
creating non-jurisdictional rules. See Syl. pt. 5, State v. Wallace, 205 W. Va. 155, 517 S.E.2d
20 (1999) (“The West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure are the paramount authority
controlling criminal proceedings before the circuit courts of this jurisdiction; any statutory
or common-law procedural rule that conflicts with these Rules is presumptively without force
or effect.”); Syl. pt. 1, Stern Brothers, Inc. v. McClure, 160 W.Va. 567, 236 S.E.2d 222
(1977) (“Under Article VIII, Section 8 [and Section 3] of the Constitution of West Virginia
(commonly known as the Judicial Reorganization Amendment), administrative rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have the force and effect of
statutory law and operate to supersede any law that is in conflict with them.”). It is true that
many of the time periods in rules promulgated by this Court are not jurisdictional. See, e.g.,
Syl. pt. 3, Crea v. Crea, 222 W. Va. 388, 664 S.E.2d 729 (2008) (“Rule 28(a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court is not jurisdictional and may be
extended for good cause.”). However, this does not mean that we do not have authority to
promulgate rules with time periods that are jurisdictional. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 3, Roberts v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 208 W. Va. 218, 539 S.E.2d 478 (2000) (“‘The requirement of Rule
59(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than ten days after entry of the judgment is mandatory and jurisdictional. The time required
for service of such a motion cannot be extended by the court or by the parties.’ Syllabus
point 1, Boggs v. Settle, 150 W. Va. 330, 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965).”).
15
(b) Reduction of sentence. – A motion to reduce a
sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence
without motion within 120 days after the sentence is imposed or
probation is revoked, or within 120 days after the entry of a
mandate by the supreme court of appeals upon affirmance of a
judgment of a conviction or probation revocation or the entry of
an order by the supreme court of appeals dismissing or rejecting
a petition for appeal of a judgment of a conviction or probation
revocation. The court shall determine the motion within a
reasonable time. . . .
The 120-day limitation on filing a motion under Rule 35(b) is addressed in Rule 45(b)(2) of
the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure as follows:
(b) Enlargement. – When an act is required or allowed to
be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown
may at any time in its discretion:
....
(2) Upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period, permit the act to be done if the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but the court may not extend
the time for taking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35,
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(Emphasis added).
It is clear that Rule 35(b) imposes a 120-day limitation on filing a motion under
it, and Rule 45(b)(2) prohibits enlargement of that time period. We have previously upheld
circuit court rulings denying motions under Rule 35(b) as being untimely filed. See Barritt
v. Painter, 215 W. Va. 120, 122, 595 S.E.2d 62, 64 (2004) (“[T]he Appellant’s [Rule 35(b)]
motion was untimely and properly denied by the lower court.”); See also State v. Stephens,
16
No. 15-0291, WL 765746, at *2 (W. Va. Feb. 26, 2016) (mem. dec.) (“[P]etitioner’s January
27, 2015, motion was untimely filed under Rule 35(b), which requires that a motion for a
reduction of sentence be filed within 120 days after imposition of the same.”); State v. Cline,
No. 14-1098, 2015 WL 3694312, at *2 (W. Va. June 15, 2015) (mem. dec.) (“Petitioner
missed the deadline to file a motion for reduction of sentence by approximately ninety
days.”); State v. Harris, No. 13-1073, 2014 WL 4693602, at *2 (W. Va. Sept. 22, 2014)
(mem. dec.) (“Further, it is clear that petitioner's motion for reduction of sentence was
untimely.”); State v. Redman, No. 13-0225, 2014 WL 1272553, at *3 (W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014)
(mem. dec.) (“Petitioner’s attempt to reduce his sentence based on these factors failed to
meet the time limits found in Rule 35(b) and the circuit court was correct in failing to
consider them.”); Cook v. Plumley, No. 12-1348, 2013 WL 6184030, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 26,
2013) (mem. dec.) (“[P]etitioner’s probation was revoked in April of 2005, but his Rule
35(b) motion to reduce his sentence that is the subject of the present appeal was not filed
until September of 2011, well beyond the 120-day limitation required by the statute and our
case law.”); State v. Brooks, No. 12-0454, 2013 WL 2300973, at *2 (W. Va. May 24, 2013)
(mem. dec.) (“Rule 35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that
a motion for reduction of sentence must be made within 120 days after sentence is imposed.
It is undisputed that petitioner failed to meet this deadline, and the circuit court was correct
to deny the motion as untimely, to the extent petitioner sought a reduction of sentence.”);
Mugnano v. Ballard, No. 11-0464, 2012 WL 3030871, at *2 (W. Va. June 29, 2012) (mem.
17
dec.) (“this Court concludes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
Mugnano’s Rule 35(b) motion as untimely filed[.]”). However, we have not been previously
called upon to decide whether the time period in Rule 35(b), read in conjunction with Rule
45(b)(2), is a jurisdictional limitation. As an issue of first impression, we turn to federal
decisions that have squarely addressed the issue.
Federal courts have addressed the jurisdiction issue in the context of similar
prior versions of federal Rule 35(b) and federal Rule 45(b).21 In United States v. Hill, 826
F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit succinctly addressed the issue as follows:
Rule 35(b) grants only 120 days in which to file, and
Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b) forbids the enlargement of this period.
The 120-day period is jurisdictional. . . . Under a former version
of Rule 35(b), the 120 days was a limit on the judge’s power to
reduce the sentence. . . . Now only the filing deadline is
jurisdictional. Either way, Rule 45(b) establishes that the
deadline is inflexible. . . . Hill missed the deadline, and missing
a jurisdictional deadline deprives the court of power to act. . . .
Id. 826 F.2d at 508 (internal citations omitted). It has been said that “the 120-day limit for
filing a Rule 35(b) motion is jurisdictional and cannot be waived or extended.” Silano v.
United States, 621 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See also United States v.
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 2242-43, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979) (“Federal
21
The current version of federal Rule 35(b) is now substantively different from
our rule. The current version of federal Rule 45(b), while worded differently, is substantively
the same as our rule.
18
Rule Crim. Proc. 35 now authorizes district courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days after
it is imposed or after it has been affirmed on appeal. The time period, however, is
jurisdictional and may not be extended.”); United States v. Hudson, 9 F.3d 104 (5th Cir.
1993) (“As Hudson does not allege that his sentence was illegal, Rule 35(b)’s jurisdictional
time limit on such claims bars them.”); United States v. Jay, 979 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“The 120-day limit of Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional.”); United States v. Foley, 983 F.2d 1073
(7th Cir. 1992) (“The limit established by Rule 35(b) was jurisdictional.”); United States v.
Stump, 914 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The time limit prescribed by Rule 35 is
jurisdictional, and unless the 120 day requirement is met, the court has no jurisdiction or
power to alter sentence.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); In re United States, 898
F.2d 1485, 1486 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The time period is jurisdictional; consequently, a court
may not extend the 120-day period and is without jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 35(b)
motion filed after the period expires.”), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized
by United States v. Orozce, 160 F.3d 1309, 1313 (1998); United States v. Smith, 839 F.2d
175, 182 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e do not consider whether Smith failed to meet the 120-day
requirement of Rule 35(b), which is jurisdictional and cannot, under any circumstances, be
extended by order of the court.”); United States v. Gomez-Soto, No. CR-82-0561-SC, 1994
WL 507719, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1994) (“The time limit prescribed by Rule 35(b) is
jurisdictional, and unless the 120 day requirement is satisfied, the court has no jurisdiction
or power to alter the sentence.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 68 F.3d 481 (9th Cir. 1995);
19
United States v. Howard, No. Crim. 92-00074-01-SD, 1994 WL 258630, at *2 n.4 (D.N.H.
Jan. 20, 1994) (“The 120-day time limitation of former Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional and may
not be extended.”); United States v. Urdaneta, 771 F. Supp. 28, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Under
Rule 35(b) as it provided prior to November 1, 1987, a motion to reduce a sentence could be
made within 120 days after the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked, a time
period which is jurisdictional, and may not be extended.”); Sparks v. United States, Nos. 91 C
851 & 89 CR 149-5, 1991 WL 83562, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 1991) (“In its letter this Court
told Sparks accurately that it had no jurisdiction under Fed.R.Crim.P. (Rule) 35(b) to grant
such relief because his request had come far outside of the jurisdictional 120-day time
limit[.]”); United States v. Young, No. 86-386, 1991 WL 55819, at *6 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 1991)
(“It is well established that [t]he 120-day time limit stated in Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional and
cannot under any circumstances be extended by the court.” (internal quotations and citation
omitted)); United States v. Sinclair, 702 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D. Del. 1989) (“A Rule 35(b)
motion must be made within 120 days from the imposition of sentence or its affirmance on
appeal. The 120-day time period is jurisdictional and cannot be extended by order of a
court.”); United States v. Williams, No. 79-13, 1988 WL 2146, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1988)
(“The time limits of Rule 35(b) are jurisdictional. If the motion is untimely under the rule and
the sentence is a lawful one, the court is powerless to act.”); United States v. Dickenson, 673
F. Supp. 2, 3 (D. Me. 1987) (“The import of the jurisdictional content of the Rule 35
requirement is that the Court loses jurisdiction over the sentence for purposes of modification
20
pursuant to the Rule if a timely motion for modification of the sentence is not filed within
the 120-day period specified.”); United States v. Nevarez-Diaz, 648 F. Supp. 1226, 1229
(N.D. Ind. 1986) (“It is well settled that the 120-day time limit of Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional
in nature and, as such, cannot be extended by the sentencing court.”); United States v. Lee,
382 F. Supp. 292, 295 (S.D.W. Va. 1974) (“The 120-day time limitation stated in Rule 35
is jurisdictional and cannot, under any circumstances, be extended by order of the court.”).
Although we are not bound by the interpretation federal courts placed on a
former version of its Rule 35(b), we find the decisions of those courts persuasive on the
question of jurisdiction.22 See State v. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. 551, 563, 466 S.E.2d 402, 414
(1995) (“[W]e have repeatedly recognized that when codified procedural rules . . . of West
Virginia are patterned after the corresponding federal rules, federal decisions interpreting
those rules are persuasive guides in the interpretation of our rules.” (citations omitted)).
Consequently, we hold that a circuit court does not have jurisdiction to rule upon the merits
of a motion for reduction of a sentence under Rule 35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure when the motion is filed outside the 120-day filing period set out under
that rule.
22
We have previously declined to follow federal courts in resolving a different
issue under Rule 35(b). See State v. Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 304, 480 S.E.2d 507, 513 (1996)
(“Given the history of federal Rule 35(b), we find the federal interpretations of their former
Rule 35(b) have limited persuasive value in determining a ‘reasonable period’ under our Rule
35(b).”).
21
In the instant proceeding, the record shows that Mr. McFarland’s petition for
appeal of his original sentencing order was refused by this Court on January 28, 2010. Under
the terms of Rule 35(b), Mr. McFarland had 120 days from the date of the denial of his
petition for appeal to file a motion for reduction of his sentence. However, the Rule 35(b)
motion that Mr. McFarland relied upon to obtain relief was filed on December 17, 2014,
nearly four years after his petition for appeal was denied. This motion clearly was untimely.
Therefore, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the motion.
Consequently, prohibition is appropriate to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s order
reducing Mr. McFarland’s original sentence.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of prohibition in case No. 17-0275 is granted. The
circuit court is prohibited from enforcing its order reducing the criminal sentence of Mr.
Wilkerson. This case is remanded for the circuit court to give the State notice of a hearing
and an opportunity to be heard on the motion to correct Mr. Wilkerson’s sentence. In case
No. 17-0214, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The circuit court is prohibited
from enforcing its order reducing the criminal sentence of Mr. McFarland. Finally, this case
is remanded with instructions to dismiss Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion as untimely
filed.
22
Writs granted.
23