MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 17 2017, 7:16 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jane H. Conley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Leonard L. Petty, October 17, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1705-CR-1029
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Cook
Appellee-Plaintiff. Crawford, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G09-1509-F6-33896
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Following a jury trial, Leonard Lajuan Petty (“Petty”) was convicted of
Criminal Confinement, as a Level 6 felony,1 and Criminal Mischief, as a Class
B misdemeanor.2 Petty now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 22, 2015, Petty got into an argument with Parva Fowlkes
(“Fowlkes”), his grandmother. At the time, Petty was living with Fowlkes in
her Indianapolis home. Petty became angry, and Fowlkes asked him to leave.
When Petty refused to leave, Fowlkes picked up a phone; Petty took the phone
and threw it. Petty then approached Fowlkes, got face to face with her, and
told Fowlkes that she “made [him] do this.” Tr. Vol. II at 31. Fowlkes was
sitting in a chair, and Petty positioned himself so that he was straddling
Fowlkes, with a leg on either side of her thighs. He said, “[W]hat are you going
to do[?] [W]hat are you going to do?” Tr. Vol. II at 31. Petty then began
throwing nearby objects, including a paperweight that he had given Fowlkes.
The objects cracked a marble coffee table, broke a window, and damaged the
window blinds. Fowlkes could not get up with Petty straddling her. After
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a).
2
I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a).
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several minutes, Petty went upstairs, and Fowlkes used a neighbor’s phone to
call 9-1-1. By the time law enforcement arrived, Petty had left the area.
[3] On March 22, 2017, Petty was brought to trial on charges of Criminal
Confinement, as a Level 6 felony; Interference with the Reporting of a Crime,
as a Class A misdemeanor;3 and Criminal Mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor.
A jury found Petty not guilty of Interference with the Reporting of a Crime, and
found Petty guilty of the remaining charges. A sentencing hearing was held,
and Petty was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 545 days for the felony and
180 days for the misdemeanor, with most of the time suspended.
[4] Petty now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Petty argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. When
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, “we look only at
the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” Love
v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017). We neither reweigh the evidence nor
assess the credibility of witnesses, and “will affirm the conviction unless no
reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id.
3
I.C. § 35-45-2-5.
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[6] To convict Petty of Criminal Confinement, the State had to prove that Petty
knowingly or intentionally confined Fowlkes without her consent. See I.C. §
35-42-3-3(a). To “‘confine’ means to substantially interfere with the liberty of a
person.” I.C. § 35-42-3-1. Petty argues that the State failed to prove that he
confined Fowlkes because the encounter was relatively short, Fowlkes did not
say anything while Petty stood there, and Fowlkes was unharmed. Yet,
Fowlkes testified that she wanted to get up, and that she could not do so with
Petty positioned in front of her, throwing objects for several minutes. This is
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that
Petty substantially interfered with Fowlkes’s liberty.
[7] Petty also argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly confined
Fowlkes—Petty relies on his testimony that he blacked out during the
encounter and that Fowlkes did not ask him to move. “A person engages in
conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high
probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Here, Fowlkes testified
that Petty got angry during an argument, put his face close to hers, straddled
her, and prevented her from getting up. Petty told Fowlkes that she made him
do it, and repeatedly asked her what she was going to do. From this evidence, a
jury could reasonably conclude that Petty knowingly confined Fowlkes.
[8] As to Criminal Mischief, the State was obligated to prove that, without
Fowlkes’s consent, Petty recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged
property belonging to Fowlkes. See I.C. § 35-43-1-2. The State specifically
alleged that Petty had broken a window and/or a coffee table. Petty contends
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that the State failed to prove that he even recklessly engaged in the charged
conduct, and again relies on his testimony that he blacked out during the
encounter. “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the
conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might
result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c). In this case, the evidence indicates
that Petty angrily straddled Fowlkes and began throwing objects—including a
paperweight that Petty had given Fowlkes—across the room. By throwing the
objects, Petty damaged a window and coffee table. This evidence supports a
reasonable determination that Petty recklessly damaged the property.
Conclusion
[9] Petty’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
[10] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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