J-A14002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.S.D. A/K/A A.S.D. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.S.D. A/K/A A.S.D.
No. 3719 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered October 23, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2550 August, 2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SHOGAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 24, 2017
A.S.D. a/k/a A.S.D. appeals from the trial court’s order, dated October
17, 2016, that denied her petition to change her name. We vacate and
remand for further proceedings.1
A.S.D. is a transgender person, who has lived as a female for more
than six years. In her petition, she avers, in pertinent part, that:
5. There are no outstanding judgments against Petitioner.
6. On August 25, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of a third
degree felony, Access Device Issued to Another Who Did Not
Authorize Use. Pursuant to 54 [Pa.C.S.] § 702(c)(1), more than
two years have elapsed from the completion of Petitioner’s
____________________________________________
1 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court indicated that A.S.D.’s
notice of appeal was untimely filed. We disagree, noting that Pa.R.A.P.
108(2)(b) provides that “[t]he date of entry of an order in a matter subject
to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be the day on which the
clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has
been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b).” A review of the lower court’s
docket in this matter shows that notice of the entry of the trial court’s order
was sent on October 23, 2016, and that the appeal was filed on November
22, 2016. Therefore, we conclude that A.S.D.’s appeal was timely.
J-A14002-17
sentence, and she is not subject to probation or parole
jurisdiction. Petitioner submits her fingerprints to be forwarded
to the Pennsylvania State Police in compliance with 54 [Pa.C.S.]
§ 702(b)(1). …
7. Petitioner requests that her name be changed from [A.S.D.]
to [A.S.D.] for the following reasons:
a. Petitioner has been using the name [A.S.D.]
informally since 2009 and now wishes to legally
change names,
b. Petitioner’s appearance now is consistent with that
of a female and Petitioner has been living as a
female,
c. Continuing to present official identification with a
male name creates confusing and difficult situations
for Petitioner on a regular basis since Petitioner’s
appearance is now female and Petitioner has
informally used a female name,
d. Petitioner believes this name change will lessen
social stigma against Petitioner and that it will
protect Petitioner from potential harassment and
even violence.
A.S.D.’s Petition for Change of Name, 8/19/16, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
In her petition, A.S.D. also requested a waiver of publication and a
sealing of the record. The court scheduled a hearing on the waiver issue;
however, it appears that no hearing was held and no ruling was ever
forthcoming on the waiver/sealing of the record request. Moreover, no
objections to A.S.D.’s petition were filed and, most importantly, no hearing
was held in regard to the petition itself. Subsequently, the court’s order
denying A.S.D.’s petition was issued. Although the court recognized that
A.S.D. had satisfied the requirements of 54 Pa.C.S. § 702(c)(1), it indicated
-2-
J-A14002-17
that the denial was due to the serious circumstances of A.S.D.’s criminal
record. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/17, at 3. The order also provided
that A.S.D. could refile for a name change in twelve months.
As noted previously in footnote 1, A.S.D. filed this timely appeal, 2 and
now raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [A.S.D.’s]
petition for change of name without sufficient evidence, where
the evidence in the record shows that [A.S.D.] met all of the
statutory requirements for a change of name and that [A.S.D.],
a transgender woman, was seeking to change her name to one
consistent with her female identity and appearance rather than
to avoid financial obligations or for any other improper purpose?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [A.S.D.’s]
petition and by mandating an additional twelve-month waiting
period upon [A.S.D.] not required by statute, where [A.S.D.] had
satisfied all statutory requirements and, further, was not
restricted by statute from changing her name because she filed
her petition more than two years after the completion of her
criminal sentence, as provided for in 54 Pa.C.S. § 702(c)(1)(i)?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to exercise
that discretion in a manner comporting with good sense,
common decency and fairness to all concerned by denying
[A.S.D.’s] petition for a change of name when granting it would
enable her to obtain legal identification documents consistent
with her appearance and long-held identity, thereby reducing
social stigma and risks to her safety of harassment, threats of
violence, and discrimination?
A.S.D.’s brief at 3-4.
To begin, we set forth the standards that guide our review of this case.
____________________________________________
2 No Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal was
requested by the trial court, nor was such a statement filed by A.S.D.
-3-
J-A14002-17
Our Supreme Court has instructed that the established standard
of review for cases involving petitions for change of name is
whether or not there was an abuse of discretion. In Re
Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes, 530 Pa. 388, 390 n.1, 609
A.2d 158, 159 n.1 (1992) (citing Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa.
[588,] 591, 50 A.2d [200,] 202 [(1947)]). That Court has also
provided us with an understanding of what constitutes an abuse
of discretion, as follows:
An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has
rendered a judgment that is manifestly
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to
apply the law, or was motivated by partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will. A finding by an appellate
court that it would have reached a different result
than the trial court does not constitute a finding of
an abuse of discretion. Where the record adequately
supports the trial court’s reasons and factual basis,
the court did not abuse its discretion.
Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 469, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123
(2000) (citing Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc. 533 Pa. 441,
447, 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1993) and Morrison v.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Public Welfare, 538 Pa. 122, 133,
646 A.2d 565, 571 (1994)). On matters involving petitions for a
change of name, the Supreme Court has often cited the guiding
principle first enunciated in Falcucci, where it declared:
Whenever a court has discretion in any matter (as it
has in the matter of a change of name) it will
exercise that discretion in such a way as to comport
with good sense, common decency, and fairness to
all concerned and to the public.
Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. at 592, 50 A.2d at 202, (cited and
restated in In the Matter of Robert Henry McIntyre (In Re
McIntyre), 552 Pa. 324, 328, 715 A.2d 400, 402 (1998);
Grimes, 530 Pa. at 392, 609 A.2d at 160).
In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. Super. 2003). Additionally, “our
scope of review is limited to the question of whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the decision reached by the hearing court.” Id.
-4-
J-A14002-17
As noted above, the trial court denied A.S.D.’s petition under section
702(c) “Convicted felons,” which provides:
(1) The court may order a change of name for a person
convicted of a felony, subject to provisions of paragraph (2), if:
(i) at least two calendar years have elapsed from the
date of completion of a person’s sentence and that
person is not subject to the probation or parole
jurisdiction of any court, county probation agency or the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole; or
(ii) the person has been pardoned.
(2) The court may not order a change of name for a person
convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, criminal
conspiracy or criminal solicitation to commit any of the offenses
listed above or an equivalent crime under the laws of this
Commonwealth in effect at the time of the commission of that
offense or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction.
54 Pa.C.S. § 702(c)(1)-(2).
Our review of the record in this case reveals that A.S.D.’s petition
asserts that she has complied with the requirements listed in section 702(c),
and the trial court acknowledges this fact. However, since no hearing was
held we are compelled to vacate the order appealed from pursuant to the
dictates of In re Harris, 707 A.2d 225 (Pa. Super. 1997). The Harris
Court, as in the instant case, was considering the trial court’s denial of a
name change petition filed by a transgender person. Specially, this Court’s
opinion directed that:
Preliminarily, we note that our Supreme Court long ago
articulated the general standard to be applied to petitions
requesting name changes. After determining that the
petitioner has complied with the necessary statutory
-5-
J-A14002-17
prerequisites, the court must hold a hearing after which
the court may, at its discretion, grant or deny the petition.
In making its determination, the court must act in such a way as
to “comport with good sense, common decency and fairness to
all concerned and to the public.” Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa.
[at] 592, 50 A.2d [at] 202 [].
Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
Because no hearing was held, we must vacate the order denying
A.S.D.’s petition and remand the matter for proceedings as directed by the
Harris case.3
Order vacated. Case remanded for proceeding consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Shogan joins this memorandum.
Judge Bowes files a concurring memorandum in which President Judge
Emeritus Bender and Judge Shogan join.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/24/2017
____________________________________________
3 We also note that by the time this decision is handed down, almost one
year has elapsed since the original denial was issued.
-6-