J-S62009-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ANTHONY DARNELL SAMUELS
Appellant No. 1758 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No: CP-22-CR-0001232-2016
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 09, 2017
Appellant, Anthony Darnell Samuels, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on September 6, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of
Dauphin County, following his conviction of terroristic threats. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2706(a)(1). Appellant claims insufficiency of evidence and an excessive
sentence. Following review, we affirm.
The trial court aptly summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s
bench trial as follows:
A non-jury trial was held and [Appellant] was found guilty
of terroristic threats. Larita Brown testified to the events that took
place on the night of February 16, 2016. Ms. Brown was with her
boyfriend waiting for the bus at the train station in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania when [Appellant, Ms. Brown’s ex-boyfriend,] went
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S62009-17
over to Ms. Brown and demanded twenty ($20) dollars from her.
Ms. Brown said “no” and [Appellant] followed her around the train
station. Ms. Brown testified that this was an ongoing occurrence
(where [Appellant] would demand money from her) and that Ms.
Brown finally had enough and told [Appellant] “no more.” Ms.
Brown [who had a PFA against Appellant] felt threatened and
sought out an Amtrak officer.
When the Amtrak Officer approached [Appellant] to ask him
what was going on, [Appellant] took off and dropped his wallet
and identification. Shortly thereafter, [Appellant] called Ms.
Brown and again demanded money from her. At this time, Ms.
Brown and her boyfriend got on the bus and two stops later,
[Appellant] got on the bus. [Appellant] “charged to the back of
the bus” and once again demanded money from Ms. Brown. While
visibly shaking, Ms. Brown gave [Appellant] twenty ($20) and
[Appellant] left the bus. Ms. Brown went home and [Appellant]
continued to call her and demand money. Ms. Brown testified that
she feels so threatened that if she does not answer the phone,
something terrible is going to happen to her. Ms. Brown testified
that during this phone call, [Appellant] once again threatened to
kill her [as he had done earlier that evening on the bus]. Finally,
on direct examination, Ms. Brown testified that she lives in fear of
[Appellant].
The Commonwealth also introduced the testimony of Ben
Stewart, a patrolman with the Swatara Township Police
Department, who identified the phone number that had been
calling Ms. Brown’s as [Appellant’s].
Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/27/16, at 2-3 (footnotes and references
to notes of testimony omitted).
The trial court found Appellant guilty of terroristic threats and sentenced
him to not less than 24 months or more than 60 months in prison, plus a fine
of $1,000 and costs. Appellant filed a motion to modify his sentence and the
trial court denied that motion by order entered on October 10, 2016. This
timely appeal followed. The trial court granted Appellant’s motion to file a
-2-
J-S62009-17
Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal nunc pro tunc.
Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement in accordance with the court’s
order. The trial court subsequently filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
In this appeal, Appellant asks us to consider two issues:
1. Was the evidence at trial insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Appellant was guilty of terroristic
threats where the Commonwealth failed to show that the
Appellant had the intent to terrorize another[?]
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Appellant to an aggregate sentence of two (2) to five (5) years
of incarceration where the sentence is excessive and
unreasonable in light of the Appellant’s age, mental health
issues, and rehabilitative needs.
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of evidence. Our
Supreme Court has explained:
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient
as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court
is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (citations
omitted). We must evaluate the entire record and we must consider all
evidence actually received. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 45
(Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.2d 410, 416
-3-
J-S62009-17
(Pa. Super. 2011) (additional citations omitted). In passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the trier of fact is free
to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Id.
Appellant was convicted of terroristic threats. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)
provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the crime of terroristic
threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to []
commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another.” In Beasley,
this Court noted:
For a defendant to be convicted of terroristic threats,
the Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made
a threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the threat
was communicated with the intent to terrorize another or
with reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror.
Neither the ability to carry out the threat, nor a belief by the
person threatened that the threat will be carried out, is an
element of the offense. Rather, the harm sought to be
prevented by the statute is the psychological distress that
follows from an invasion of another's sense of personal
security.
Id. at 46 (quoting Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court observed:
[T]his was not a spur-of-the-moment type of threat. [Appellant]
had repeatedly demanded money from Ms. Brown. Even as Ms.
Brown testified in court, she appeared visibly shaken.
[Appellant’s] threat was not made solely as a result of transitory
anger. The relationship between Ms. Brown and [Appellant] has
been contentious for quite some time as they started dating five
or six years ago. [M]erely because a defendant is angry does not
mean that he is not capable of making a terroristic threat.
[Appellant’s] actions began at the train station, continued onto a
-4-
J-S62009-17
public bus, and continued into the night with repeated calls to Ms.
Brown. All these encounters involved threatening language by
[Appellant]. This was not some spur-of-the-moment threat but
an ongoing threat by [Appellant] when he demanded money from
Ms. Brown. [Appellant] evinced a settled purpose to terrorize Ms.
Brown throughout the evening (and many times prior) on
February 16, 2016. [Appellant] directly threatened to kill Ms.
Brown as evidenced by the record. Here, the Commonwealth
came forward with evidence of a settled purpose to terrorize Ms.
Brown,[FN] thus, [Appellant] is entitled to no relief on his
sufficiency challenge.
[FN]
Ms. Brown additionally testified that [Appellant] had choked her previously
and that a PFA was issued against him. Ms. Brown also testified that she was
in fear for her life.
Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/27/16, at 5-6.
Appellant argues that his “words were said in the heat-of-the-moment
when he saw Ms. Brown at the bus station with her new paramour.”
Appellant’s Brief at 9. The record belies his assertion and the cases upon
which Appellant relies, such as Commonwealth v. Anneski, 525 A.2d 373
(Pa. Super. 1987), are easily distinguished as involving factual scenarios
where “a spur-of-the-moment threat result[ed] from transitory anger.” Id.
at 376.
As Ms. Brown explained, Appellant was aware of her new boyfriend prior
to February 16, 2016. Further, Appellant’s actions did not comprise “a”
moment; they involved a series of events spanning a several-hour period.
Appellant harassed and threatened Ms. Brown at the train station and on the
bus. Those threats continued by phone after Ms. Brown returned to her home,
-5-
J-S62009-17
even though Ms. Brown had acceded to Appellant’s demand for money, which
she surrendered to him on the bus.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner
and giving the prosecution as verdict winner all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, we conclude—as did the trial court—that the
evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant made a threat to commit a
crime of violence against Ms. Brown and that the threat was communicated
with the intent to terrorize her. Appellant’s sufficiency challenge fails.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing an excessive sentence of no less than 24 months or
more than 60 months in light of Appellant’s age, mental health issues, and
rehabilitative needs.
In Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. 2006), this
Court stated:
It is well-settled that appeals of discretionary aspects of a
sentence are not reviewable as a matter of right. Our standard of
review when an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of
his or her sentence is very narrow; the Court will reverse only
where appellant has demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion
by the sentencing judge. Before a challenge to the sentence will
be heard on the merits, an appellant, in order to invoke the Court’s
jurisdiction, must set forth in his brief a separate and concise
statement of reasons relied upon in support of his appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)[.]
Id. at 872 (internal citations omitted). Here, Appellant has included the
requisite Rule 2119(f) statement, asserting that “[a] claim that a sentence is
manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raised
-6-
J-S62009-17
a substantial question as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing.” Appellant’s Brief at 12 (citing Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d
638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Because Appellant has raised a substantial
question, we shall consider the merits of the issue.
Again, Appellant argues that his sentence is excessive in light of his age,
mental health issues, and rehabilitative needs.1 However, Appellant does not
explain in what way this sentence is excessive for his age (53 as of the date
of sentencing). Rather, his focus is on mental health and drug addiction, and
his assertion that he could become a productive member of society with
treatment.
The trial court defended the imposition of Appellant’s sentence,
explaining:
In the instant matter, this [c]ourt fashioned a sentence[] that
takes into account the protection of the public, the rehabilitative
needs of [Appellant], and the gravity of the particular offense as
it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the community.
This [c]ourt looked at the totality of [Appellant’s] conduct. This
[c]ourt, in preparation of sentencing, reviewed the presentence
investigation, reviewed the sentencing memorandum prepared by
trial counsel, and reviewed the sentencing guidelines for terroristic
threats with intent to terrorize. [Appellant] had a prior record
score of five (5). [Appellant] has an extensive criminal history
dating back to 1982 including several charges for simple assault.
[Appellant’s] history also includes multiple charges for violating a
PFA. Additionally, [Appellant] showed no remorse at the
____________________________________________
1 In its opinion, the trial court explained its reasons for imposing a sentence
in the aggravated range. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/27/16, at 6-8. Appellant
is not claiming the sentence was excessive because it was in the aggravated
range; he contends the sentence was excessive generally. Appellant’s Brief
at 17-19.
-7-
J-S62009-17
sentencing hearing and continues to put blame on the victim by
calling her “a good actress.”
As indicated at the sentencing hearing, this [c]ourt “deviated
above the guideline range because [this court] believes, . . . the
level of violence is very aggravated in this particular instance.
There’s been a history of abuse, intimidation, and threats and
violence against the victim in this case. And so [this court]
believe[s] for the protection of the victim, [and] to ensure public
safety, [this court] believe[s] that the aggravated sentence is
appropriate in this instance.” N.T.[, Sentencing, 8/30/16, at]
15.[2] As such, this court fashioned a sentence that takes into
consideration the protection of the public, the gravity of the
offenses, and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs.
Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/27/16, at 7-8 (some brackets in original).
We conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate a manifest abuse
of discretion on the part of the sentencing judge. Therefore, Appellant’s
challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence fails.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/9/2017
____________________________________________
2 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court announced that
Appellant would undergo a mental health evaluation once incarcerated at a
state correctional institution and ordered that Appellant follow through on any
treatment recommend by that evaluation. N.T., Sentencing, 8/30/16, at 17.
The September 6, 2016 sentencing order also includes that directive. Order,
9/6/16, at 1.
-8-