MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 21 2017, 9:11 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marielena Duerring Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Richard Curtis, Jr., November 21, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A04-1704-CR-827
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L.
Appellee-Plaintiff Cataldo, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D03-1411-F4-19
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Richard Curtis Jr. appeals his convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor
and intimidation, arguing that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not
knowing and intelligent. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The State charged Curtis with sexual misconduct with a minor and
intimidation. On October 25, 2016, two weeks before trial was set to begin,
Curtis’s attorney filed a motion asking the court to hold a bench trial instead of
a jury trial. The motion explained that Curtis “desires to have his case tried
before the Court instead of a jury” and that he “understands that he has a right
to be tried by a jury of his peers, and by making this request specifically
understands that he is waiving his right to a jury trial.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II
p. 42.
[3] At a pre-trial conference held two days after Curtis filed his motion, the trial
court had the following exchange with Curtis:
Court: Mr. Curtis, it’s my understanding that you are now
first setting for the jury trial scheduled for
November 1st. In addition, your attorney has filed,
two days ago, a motion for a bench trial. And is it
your request that we now vacate the jury trial and
proceed with a bench trial on November 7th?
Curtis: Yes, [Y]our honor.
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Court: And you’ve discussed the issues in your case with
your attorney; and without going into any specific
conversations between you and your attorney, do
you feel it is in your best interest to try this case to
the court, as it deals with some type of legal
argument and it’s not necessarily tied to the facts of
the case?
Curtis: Can you say that again, [Y]our Honor?
Court: Generally, in a jury trial there is usually a factual
issue that is in dispute, but in your case I’m
assuming that there is more of a legal issue in that
either there’s a defense that is complicated or the
specific facts and circumstances revolve around a
legal issue, which, generally, the court is more
suitable to be presented with a legal argument as
opposed to a factual argument. Is that your
understanding of the case?
Curtis: Yes, [Y]our Honor.
Court: Okay. And so you are -- you are comfortable in
waiving your jury trial rights to proceed with a trial
just to the court?
Curtis: Yes.
Supp. Tr. pp. 3-4. The court granted Curtis’s request for a bench trial, found
Curtis guilty as charged, and sentenced him accordingly.
[4] Curtis now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] Curtis contends that his jury-trial waiver was invalid. “To constitute a valid
waiver of the right to a jury trial, the defendant’s waiver must be knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances surrounding its entry and consequences.” Anderson v. State, 833
N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Whether a waiver satisfies this standard
is a question of law that we review de novo. Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154,
1157 (Ind. 2016).
[6] Curtis argues that his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because the
trial court’s statement—that a court is “more suitable” than a jury “to be
presented with a legal argument”—is inconsistent with Article 1, Section 19 of
the Indiana Constitution, which provides, “In all criminal cases whatever, the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.” He asserts that the
record “fails to support that he could have possibly made an informed and
knowing waiver based upon the trial court’s statements, which completely
misconstrued the function of a jury as set forth in the Indiana Constitution.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 9.
[7] While we agree with Curtis that the trial court’s characterization of a jury’s role
regarding legal issues could have been more precise, he has given us no reason
to think that it affected the validity of his waiver. First, and most importantly,
the judge’s statement that courts are generally better equipped than juries to
understand and analyze legal issues is not inconsistent with the principle that a
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criminal jury ultimately has “the right to determine the law.” Indeed, the
statement aligns with Indiana’s pattern jury instruction on Article 1, Section 19:
“Under the Constitution of Indiana you have the right to determine both the
law and the facts. The Court’s/my instructions are your best source in
determining the law.” Ind. Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal, No. 1.0300
(4th ed., LexisNexis 2015) (emphasis added); see also Sample v. State, 932 N.E.2d
1230, 1233 (Ind. 2010) (“Ordinarily, the trial court’s instructions are indeed the
best source of the law.”); Walden v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (Ind. 2008);
Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind. 1988). Second, Curtis was
represented by an attorney and therefore had an opportunity, before he talked
to the judge, to carefully consider the role of a jury and the advantages and
disadvantages of a jury trial (e.g., the possibility of jurors being biased against a
defendant accused of sexually abusing a child). Third, Curtis’s attorney did not
object or otherwise speak up during the judge’s questioning, which strongly
suggests that the attorney was comfortable with the judge’s statement and with
Curtis’s understanding of it. For these reasons, we are satisfied that Curtis’s
waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing and intelligent.
[8] Affirmed.
May, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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