NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK HORSFALL, No. 16-35433
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05604-JPD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James P. Donohue, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 30, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Horsfall appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Reviewing de novo, we may set
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, or if
the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) applied the wrong legal standard. Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the
medical opinions of Dr. Dan Neims and Dr. Mark Heilbrunn. Concerning
evaluations of Horsfall’s mental impairments, the ALJ reasonably assigned greater
weight to Dr. Kristine Harrison’s opinion – that Horsfall was not disabled from
mental health symptoms – than to Dr. Neims’s opinion, which concluded that
Horsfall was disabled by pain and anxiety disorders and depressive symptoms. In
discounting Dr. Neims’s opinion, the ALJ provided a specific and legitimate
reason when the ALJ properly noted that Dr. Neims’s diagnosis of a major
depressive disorder was contradicted by his own observations and other evidence
in the record. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that an inconsistency between a doctor’s opinion and the
doctor’s clinical findings is a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting the
opinion).
Concerning evaluations of Horsfall’s physical limitations, the ALJ provided
a number of specific and legitimate reasons for giving only some weight to Dr.
Heilbrunn’s opinion, which concluded that Horsfall had postural and motion
limitations. First, the ALJ properly noted that contemporaneous medical evidence
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did not support the limitations opined by Dr. Heilbrunn, where the ALJ noted that
x-rays taken at the same time as the physical examination showed nothing
abnormal about Horsfall’s lumbar spine. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting a
physician’s opinion includes inconsistency with medical records). Second, the
ALJ reasonably inferred that Dr. Heilbrunn relied on Horsfall’s subjective reports
of symptoms and limitations, which were not entirely credible. Tonapetyan v.
Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Third, the ALJ reasonably concluded
that Dr. Heilbrunn’s opinion conflicted with Horsfall’s activities, which included
working as a groundskeeper, driving a car, and daily activities of bathing and
dressing himself. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001).
Finally, the ALJ properly concluded that Dr. Packer’s opinion – that Horsfall’s
back problems were not disabling – was generally consistent with the medical
evidence, and deserving of greater weight than Dr. Heilbrunn’s opinion.
Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040-41.
The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for finding that
Horsfall’s statement concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
his symptoms were not entirely credible. First, the ALJ reasonably found that
Horsfall’s daily activities were inconsistent with the limitations he described.
Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that when
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weighing credibility, an ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities). Second,
the ALJ properly found that Horsfalls’s allegations of limitations were not
supported by the medical evidence. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir.
2005). Finally, we do not consider Horsfall’s contention that the ALJ erred in
using his alleged inconsistent statements in its credibility analysis where Horsfall
did not raise any inconsistencies before the district court. Gregor v. Barnhart, 464
F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ properly considered the lay witness testimony. First, the ALJ
provided a germane reason for rejecting the testimony and report of Horsfall’s wife
when he reasonably concluded that the testimony and report of Horsfall’s wife was
inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). Second, contrary to Horsfall’s contention, the ALJ did
not discount the function report submitted by Horsfalls’s mother. Third,
concerning the function report of Horsfall’s pastor, the ALJ did not accurately
summarize the report when he omitted the pastor’s observations that for a number
of years Horsfall had a “painful battle with back and spinal degeneration,”
resulting in Horsfall having trouble rising, and having difficulty walking forward.
Nevertheless, the ALJ properly discounted the pastor’s observations as inconsistent
with other evidence. Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692
(9th Cir. 2009).
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We reject Horsfall’s contention that the ALJ erred in assessing his residual
functional capacity. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the ALJ need only
include limitations for which there was record support when reaching a residual
functional capacity assessment).
AFFIRMED.
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