IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JULIE REYNOLDS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N16C-12-424 ALR
)
ANTHONY JOSEPH MITCHELL, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: November 17, 2017
Decided: December 19, 2017
ORDER
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
GRANTED
Upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Anthony
Joseph Mitchell (“Defendant”); the facts, arguments, and legal authorities set forth
by the parties; the Superior Court Civil Rules; statutory and decisional precedent;
and the entire record in this case, the Court hereby finds as follows:
1. On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff Julie Reynolds (“Plaintiff”) brought
this action against Defendant alleging that she suffered personal injuries as a result
of an automobile accident caused by Defendant. Plaintiff is self-represented.
2. On March 7, 2017, Defendant filed Interrogatories and a Request for
Production directed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not provide any discovery responses.
3. On April 7, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Rule 3(h)
Production and Executed Medical and Employment Authorizations. The Motion to
Compel was scheduled to be heard by the Court on May 9, 2017 and Plaintiff was
given notice to appear. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s Motion to Compel
and did not appear in court. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to
Compel.
4. Plaintiff did not provide Rule 3(h) documentation or execute
employment and medical authorizations pursuant to the Court’s May 9, 2017 Order.
5. On June 29, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Rule to Show Cause
for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the May 9, 2017 Order. Defendant also filed a
Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Answers to Discovery for Plaintiff’s failure to provide
discovery responses.
6. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for Rule to
Show Cause and Defendant’s Motion to Compel discovery responses on July 18,
2017. Plaintiff did not respond to either motion and, despite having notice to appear,
did not appear in court. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motions and
gave Plaintiff twenty days to produce discovery.
7. Defendant sent the Court’s July 18, 2017 Orders to Plaintiff via
certified mail on July 19, 2017. On August 16, 2017, the Court’s Orders were
returned unclaimed to Defendant’s counsel.
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8. On August 29, 2017, Defense Counsel received a message from
Plaintiff’s mother requesting that all correspondence to Plaintiff be re-sent to a
different address. Defense Counsel complied with this request. However, despite
Defense Counsel’s efforts to correspond with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not responded
to any of the discovery requests or correspondence.
9. In addition, Plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s May 9, 2017
Order or its July 18, 2017 Orders. Plaintiff also failed to comply with the Court’s
scheduling order dated April 19, 2017, which required Plaintiff to identify experts
and file expert reports by September 29, 2017.
10. Thus, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff has not participated in this
action since filing her Complaint.
11. On November 2, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss this action
pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (‘Rule 41(b)”). By Letter
dated November 2, 2017, the Court set a deadline of November 17, 2017 for
Plaintiff’s response to the Motion to Dismiss and advised Plaintiff that the Court
would consider the Motion to Dismiss unopposed if Plaintiff failed to file a response.
12. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or
otherwise communicated with the Court or Defense Counsel.
13. Pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 16, “parties must
adhere to the trial judge’s scheduling order and conduct discovery ‘in an orderly
3
fashion.’”1 If a party fails to obey the Court’s scheduling orders, the Court may
impose sanctions, which include the sanction of dismissal.2 To that end, Rule 41(b)
allows a defendant to move for dismissal of an action for “failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules, or any order of Court.”3
14. However, because the sanction of dismissal is severe, Courts should
only dismiss if a lesser sanction cannot cure the offending conduct.4 The Court
considers six factors when determining the appropriateness of dismissal.5 These
factors are:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility;
(2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery;
(3) a history of dilatoriness;
(4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in
bad faith;
(5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions; and
(6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.6
15. After consideration of these factors, the Court finds that dismissal is
appropriate in this case. Plaintiff has not participated in this action since filing her
Complaint, despite the efforts of the Court and Defense Counsel to communicate
1
Abdullah v. Rago, 2016 WL 6246891 (Del. Super. Oct. 24, 2016) (citing Dillulio
v. Reece, 2014 WL 1760318, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 23, 2014)).
2
Id.
3
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b).
4
See, e.g. Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Service, Inc., 15 A.3d 1221, 1222 (Del. 2010).
5
See id. at 1224.
6
Id.
4
with Plaintiff to obtain a response. Defendant is prejudiced by Plaintiff’s failure to
comply with the Court’s Orders and to provide discovery responses. The Court has
been generous in giving Plaintiff opportunities to respond and appear in court, and
Plaintiff has failed to do so. In addition, because Plaintiff has been completely
absent in this action, the Court finds that a lesser sanction would not cure Plaintiff’s
conduct.
16. The Court recognizes that self-represented litigants may be held to a
less stringent standard in presenting their cases under certain circumstances.7
However, “[l]itigants, whether represented by counsel or appearing pro se, must
diligently prepare their cases for trial or risk dismissal for failure to prosecute.” 8
Indeed, “[t]here is no different set of rules for pro se plaintiffs, and the trial court
should not sacrifice the orderly and efficient administration of justice to
accommodate the unrepresented plaintiff.”9
17. Therefore, the Court finds that this action must be dismissed with
prejudice.
7
Hayward v. King, 2015 WL 6941599, at *4 (Del. Nov. 9, 2015); Anderson v.
Tingle, 2011 WL 3654531, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 15, 2011) (internal citations
omitted); Buck v. Cassidy Painting, Inc., 2011 WL 1226403, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar.
28, 2011) (internal citations omitted).
8
Draper v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 2001).
9
Id.
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NOW, THEREFORE, this 19th day of December, 2017, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
______________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
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