J-S81019-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.W. & A.W., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHILDREN : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: M.W. :
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: No. 1321 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Orphans’ Court at No: 6547
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2018
M.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the August 18, 2017 decree in the Court
of Common Pleas of Lycoming County involuntarily terminating her parental
rights to her twin sons, J.W. and A.W. (collectively, “the Children”), born in
August of 2016.1 Upon careful review, we affirm.
In its opinion accompanying the subject decree, the orphans’ court set
forth the factual and procedural history of this case, which the testimonial
evidence supports. As such, we adopt it herein. See Trial Court Opinion,
8/18/17, at 2-12.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The orphans’ court voluntarily terminated the parental rights of W.F.
(“Father”) by decree entered on July 12, 2017. Father did not file a notice of
appeal.
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By way of background, Mother suffers from an intellectual disability, and
she functions cognitively as an eight-to-ten-year-old child. Id. at 7-8. She is
unable to attend to her personal hygiene, and she is unable to advocate for
herself. Id. at 5-6. Mother also suffers from poor mental health, which was
unspecified in the record. N.T., 8/15/17, at 31.
The Lycoming County Children and Youth Agency (“Agency”) first
became involved with Mother with respect to her oldest child, a female, to
whom she voluntarily terminated her parental rights in May of 2016. Id. at
2. At the time of the Children’s birth in August of 2016, Mother was under the
supervision of the Lycoming County Adult Probation Office, 2 and she resided
in a mental health group home. Id. The court immediately placed the
Children in the emergency protective custody of the Agency, and the court
adjudicated them dependent on August 11, 2016. Id.
Mother was granted supervised visits with the Children, during which
the Agency supervisor attempted to teach Mother appropriate parenting skills.
N.T., 8/15/17, at 39-40. In February of 2017, Mother was removed from the
mental health group home due to, inter alia, not following the rules. Trial
Court Opinion, 8/18/17, at 4; N.T., 8/15/17, at 81. Mother then resided in a
personal care home, during which time she did not consistently attend
____________________________________________
2 Mother completed her probation on July 25, 2017. N.T., 8/15/17, at 81.
The record does not include any evidence regarding Mother’s underlying
crimes.
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supervised visits with the Children. Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/17, at 4. In
fact, prior to her visit on April 24, 2017, Mother missed eight consecutive
visits. N.T., 8/15/17, at 42. After her April supervised visit, Mother did not
visit with the Children again until July 24, 2017, a period of three months. Id.
at 49.
The Children have resided with the same foster parents since birth, and
their foster parents are a pre-adoptive resource. J.W. suffers from
hydrocephaly, a malformation of the skull. Id. at 73. At two months old, J.W.
was diagnosed with torticollis, a condition involving the neck muscles that
causes the head to twist to one side, which, after treatment, the record
indicates has resolved. Id. at 75. However, J.W. receives physical therapy
because he is not walking or showing the foundational skills for walking. Id.
at 75-76. In addition, the Children both suffer from reactive airway disease.
Id. at 74-75.
On May 1, 2017, the Agency filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), and (b). The orphans’ court held a hearing on August 15, 2017. The
Agency presented the testimony of Linda A. Bloom, Mother’s case manager
from the Lycoming/Clinton County Mental Health/Intellectual Disability
Program; and Bruce Anderson, a licensed clinical psychologist who performed
multiple evaluations of Mother, some, but not all of, which related to the
dependency of Mother’s older female child, to whom she eventually
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relinquished her parental rights. In addition, the Agency presented the
testimony of Mary Wilson, the Agency caseworker who supervised Mother’s
visits with the Children; K.N., the Children’s foster mother; and Crystal
Minnier, the Agency caseworker from the time of the dependency of Mother’s
female child to the time of the subject proceedings. Mother testified on her
own behalf.
By decree dated August 18, 2017, and entered on August 21, 2017, the
orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother
timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental
rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) when
[Mother] has not evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to the [C]hildren and failed to perform her parental
duties[?] [Mother] made an effort to have a relationship with her
[C]hildren.
2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental
rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) when there
was insufficient evidence that the [C]hild(ren) were without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary and
causes of the incapacity cannot or will not to be remedied[?]
Mother made some progress to remedy the incapacity.
3. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental
rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) in finding
that the conditions which led to removal or placement of the
[C]hildren continue to exist and they cannot be remedied within a
reasonable period of time and that termination would best serve
the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren[?]
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4. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental
rights of [Mother] when there was insufficient evidence that the
best interests of the [C]hildren would be served by termination,
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)[?]
Mother’s brief at 6-7.
We consider Mother’s issues according to the following standard:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
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We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In this case, we conclude
that the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
This Court has stated as follows:
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted)). Further, we have stated, “[t]he grounds for termination due to
parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative
misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as
well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326,
337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that,
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,
1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also
discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation
omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond
between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
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On appeal, Mother argues that the record evidence is insufficient to
terminate her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). Specifically, Mother
argues that the testimony revealed that she was able to hold the Children,
feed their bottles, and change their diapers. In addition, Mother baldly asserts
that the Agency “was quick to file for termination . . . not giving [Mother] the
chance to prove that she could continue to care for the [C]hildren as they
developed further.” Mother’s brief at 19. For the following reasons, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the court.
The orphans’ court found as follows.
There was an abundance of testimony regarding Mother’s inability
to properly attend to her own basic needs, including her hygiene,
and her inability to advocate for herself in order to protect herself
from being taken advantage of or abused. There was even more
testimony regarding Mother’s inability to properly attend to the
needs of young children. As testified to by Bruce Anderson,
Mother’s intellectual disability causes her to function cognitively
as a child in the 8 to 10 year old range. This, coupled with an
upbringing where she was not properly nurtured and therefore
lacks the abilities/instinct to nurture others, has led the [c]ourt to
find that Mother’s incapacity would cause the Children to be
without proper parental care necessary for their physical and
emotional well-being. Moreover, this incapacity has been present
since before the Children’s birth, and according to Mr. Anderson,
is likely to be permanent.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/17, at 15. Mr. Anderson’s testimony supports the
court’s findings.
Mr. Anderson testified first with respect to his opinion at the time of his
psychological evaluation on Mother in August of 2015, which related to her
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female child to whom she relinquished her parental rights in May of 2016. He
testified on direct examination:
Q. [W]hat was the finding that you made in your initial report
. . . with respect to [Mother’s] ability to parent a child or care for
a child?
A. I was very clear at that time that I did not feel that [Mother]
was capable of caring for a child on her own, meaning without
. . . another competent adult with her at all times. I am not talking
about someone coming in for an hour or two a week to help her
out. I mean, constantly. That I did not feel that she could care
for the child without that. On her own, certainly not. And even
the other person had to be a competent adult who was there
pretty much all the time.
N.T., 8/15/17, at 20. Mr. Anderson performed the next evaluation of Mother
on May 24, 2017, after the Children’s adjudication, when they were nine
months old. He testified that his opinion regarding Mother’s parenting inability
did not change in a subsequent evaluation. Id. at 21. Further, Mr. Anderson
testified that, at the time of his 2017 evaluation, he did not “see anybody that
was with [Mother] constantly who would be a competent adult to help her care
for the [C]hild[ren].” Id. at 21-22.
With respect to whether Mother’s parenting inability will improve, Mr.
Anderson testified:
Q. I know that nothing has changed in your opinion from two
years ago to today with respect to [Mother’s] ability to care for a
child or children. Do you expect that that would change in the
near future or in the future at all based on your assessment of
her?
A. No, I do not expect much change in that regard. [Mother] has
intellectual disabilities. She is limited to some extent. That . . .
itself is not the issue. She has also had some significant mental
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health problems and her upbringing in which she told me about,
the several times that we met in the past prior to this current
interview[,] tells me that . . . she was not nurtured and cared for
properly herself[;] therefore[,] [she] does not have that almost
instinctual sense that many people have who were properly
nurtured and cared for as children. When they become parents,
they pretty much do what was done to them. And for most people
that has been good enough. In [Mother’s] case she was not well
cared for[.] [S]he was mistreated. And so put all that together,
I continue to feel that will not change, her background certainly
will not change, and her abilities to learn new approaches to
managing or caring for the children are not going to change. . . .
Id. at 31.
The orphans’ court found that Mother demonstrated parental incapacity
during supervised visits with the Children, as follows.
The [c]ourt is concerned about Mother’s interactions with the
Children at the visits in which she attended. . . . Mother has had
to be continuously prompted to perform even the most basic
parental duties, and does not take direction from the supervisors
well. Because Mother has so infrequently attended visits, she
does not retain any of the instructions they provide her regarding
how to properly, and gently, handle the Children so that they feel
safe and comfortable. Mother truly has no understanding of the
different stages that children go through developmentally, nor
how to appropriately respond to their present, and changing,
needs.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/17, at 16. The testimony of Mary Wilson, the Agency
caseworker who supervised the visits, supports the court’s findings.
Ms. Wilson testified that she instructed Mother during the supervised
visits on how to care for the Children, including how to hold them, feed them,
speak to them, and nurture them. N.T., 8/15/17, at 44-45. She explained
that Mother was not gentle with the Children. Id. at 45. Specifically, she
testified that, during the visit on April 24, 2017, at which time the Children
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were approximately eight months old, Mother, in attempting to move J.W.,
pulled him by the leg across a blanket on the floor, rather than picking him up
to move him. Id. Likewise, during the visit on July 24, 2017, when the
Children were eleven and one half months old, Mother picked up A.W. by one
arm. Ms. Wilson stated that Mother “was told immediately you cannot . . .
pick up a child that way.” Id. at 51.
Ms. Wilson testified that, “when you look at [Mother] and you make the
eye contact and try to explain to her what is or is not going well [during the
supervised visits], you do not get any response. She does not respond like,
could you tell me again or could you show me. You know, it is just no
response. [S]he just kind of looks at you.” Id. at 47. On cross-examination
by Mother’s counsel, Ms. Wilson testified:
Q. Whenever you would make a suggestion about, say, switching
positions, was [Mother] open to those suggestions?
A. She would make eye contact with me and she would look at
me. She would maybe start something, but she would not follow
through, no.
Id. at 62.
Finally, Ms. Wilson testified on direct examination with respect to her
concern for the Children’s safety if they are placed in Mother’s care:
Q. In your observations of [Mother] caring for the [C]hildren at
the visits, do you have concerns for their safety when they’re in
her care, if they were in her sole care?
A. I would. I would.
Q. What are those concerns?
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A. Supervision is . . . a big one where she gets . . . distracted.
Time management for . . . [C]hildren. We even worked on . . .
while maybe one little guy was quiet and being good, maybe this
one needs to be fed. . . . The [lack of] bonding and nurturing.
. . . I would be concerned that the [C]hildren would be either
confined to a crib, or playpens. . . .
Id. at 60.
In addition, the testimony of Crystal Minnier, the Agency caseworker for
this family since the dependency of Mother’s female child, was consistent with
that of Mr. Anderson and Ms. Wilson. Ms. Minnier explained on direct
examination as follows.
Q. Have you had any opportunity to either observe the visits in
whole or in part since you have been the caseworker?
A. Yes. . . .
Q. What kind of observations can you relay to the [c]ourt[?]
A. I think I was in a unique position because I was the caseworker
previously and I was involved in visitation with her other child.
From my vantage point . . . [Mother] does not appear to have an
understanding of [the Children’s] needs. They’re like a doll baby
to her.
...
If she was the sole caregiver and she wanted to go -- someone
stopped at her house that she had not planned on, she would not
-- in my opinion, she would up and leave and there [the Children
would] be. If she was busy doing something she wanted to do
and it was time to feed [the Children], she would do what she
wanted to do first and -- and they might not get fed. Do I think
that that’s deliberate? No. . . . And that is why we recommended
the need[] for a group home. That’s why we had all the services
we put in for her. And I think the most stable she was,
unfortunately, was when she was being monitored by adult
probation, who I think really put her needs as paramount and did
an excellent job in supervising her. . . .
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N.T., 8/15/17, at 87-90.
Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we conclude that the
record overwhelmingly supports the orphans’ court’s decision to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Indeed,
Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity has caused the Children to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their
physical and mental well-being. Further, the evidence demonstrates that
Mother’s parental incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the record evidence
does not support terminating her parental rights because Mr. Anderson, in
performing his psychological evaluation, did not observe her with the Children
to determine if any bond exists. See Mother’s brief at 26. Mother relies on
In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516 (Pa. Super. 2006), wherein this Court reversed the
order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her three-and-one-half-
year-old daughter after concluding that the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services did not sustain its burden of proof pursuant to Section 2511(b). We
remanded the case to give the parties an opportunity to present further
testimony regarding the emotional bond between the mother and her
daughter and the effect that termination of her parental rights would have on
the child. In this case, we discern no abuse of discretion.
We are governed by the following settled case law:
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While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The
mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental
rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the
orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine
whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387,
397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d
473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court
should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond
can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense
dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the
children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their
foster parents.” In re T.S.M., supra at 268. The Court directed that, in
weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must
keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M.
Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and
we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When
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courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted
children.” Id.
Instantly, the orphans’ court found as follows in terminating Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
[A]lthough Mother may love the Children, there is no bond
between her and the Children. Due to the young age of the
Children and the fact that they have been in placement since their
release from the hospital, [foster parents] are the only family A.W.
and J.W. have ever known. Since the Children were declared
dependent, Mother has attended only 47 of the 80 visits offered.
At the visits, the Children do not gravitate towards her. In fact,
in the most recent visits, the Children have displayed extreme
anxiety when [foster mother] leaves the room, and for several
hours following the visits. Termination of Mother’s parental rights
will not destroy an existing and necessary bond because the
[c]ourt does not feel as though there exists a bond between the
Children and Mother. To the contrary, it is evident to the [c]ourt
that the Children are extremely bonded to [foster parents], and
[foster parents] are extremely bonded to the Children. If efforts
were continued to reunify A.W. and J.W. with Mother[,] and the
Children were to be removed from their current home, it would be
traumatic to them.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/17, at 19 (citation to record omitted).
Upon careful review, there is no evidence of record that a parent-child
bond exists between Mother and the Children. Therefore, it was reasonable
for the orphans’ court to infer that none exists. See In re K.Z.S., supra. As
described infra, the evidence demonstrates that the Children are bonded to
their foster parents, who are a pre-adoptive resource.
Ms. Wilson, the Agency caseworker who observed the interactions
between Mother and the Children during supervised visits, testified that no
parent-child bond was visible between them. N.T., 8/15/17, at 50.
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Specifically, she testified that, during the visit on July 24, 2017, the Children,
then nearly twelve months old, crawled on the floor and did not respond to
Mother who was also on the floor trying to play with them. Id. at 49-50. Ms.
Wilson explained as follows on direct examination.
[U]sually when a parent gets down the floor and your baby’s on
the floor, they — what they want to do is they want to crawl all
over you. . . . These boys at no time during that visit did they go
towards Mother to get on her. . . . They . . . would play with toys.
[O]n a couple of occasions [the Children] crawled out going
towards the door [to the room].
Id. at 50-51. Ms. Wilson also testified that Mother could not distinguish the
Children from one another as recently as the July 31, 2017 visit, when the
Children were nearly twelve months old. Although they are twin boys, Ms.
Wilson testified that A.W. “is much larger” than J.W., and A.W. has a “big grin
with a full mouth of teeth.” Id. at 54.
Mother correctly asserts that Mr. Anderson, the clinical psychologist, did
not observe Mother and the Children in performing his evaluation. However,
he opined with respect to the effect on the Children if they no longer saw
Mother as follows.
Q. [W]ould you have concerns . . . about trauma to the [C]hildren
not seeing [Mother]?
A. No, I would not. I would not. [T]hey went from zero to one
[years old] living with their resource parents. Those are the
people that cared for them, those are the people that love them,
and they in turn have learned to love them, the resource parents.
[The Children are] so young that -- that they never had a chance
in my mind to attach to [Mother]. They attached to the resource
parents, not to [Mother]. It’s a different story when kids are older
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when you get into court hearing talk about emotional bonds. It’s
not the same with infants.
N.T., 8/15/17, at 33-34. Mr. Anderson assessed the bond between the foster
parents and the Children and determined that the Children are “very attached”
to them, and the foster parents are “very attached” to the Children. Id. at
26-27.
K.N., the Children’s foster mother, testified with respect to the four
supervised visits prior to the subject proceedings. Specifically, she testified
that the Children’s behavior after those visits deteriorated to “screaming, . . .
crying,” and not wanting to be put down by the foster parents after the visits.
Id. at 70-71.
We conclude that the testimonial evidence supports the court’s decision
that terminating Mother’s parental rights will serve the Children’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section
2511(b). On this record, no parent-child bond exists. Even if one did exist,
the record demonstrates that the Children’s safety and well-being would be at
risk if they were reunified with Mother. The Children are fortunate to have a
parent-child relationship with their foster parents, who are meeting their
needs, and who desire to adopt them.
Finally, we reject Mother’s reliance on In re C.P., supra. In that case,
we stated that the expert based his opinion that termination was appropriate
solely on the mother’s parental incapacity under Section 2511(a)(2). In doing
so, the expert omitted any consideration of the child’s relationship with the
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mother and the effect termination would have on that relationship. Likewise,
in In re C.P., the agency social worker did not testify to what impact
termination of the parent-child relationship would have on the child. In
contrast, in this case, we conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly
demonstrates that the Children will not suffer any detriment if Mother’s
parental rights are terminated. Accordingly, we affirm the decree.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/06/2016
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