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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM HARRIS
Appellant No. 3664 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered October 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-1105182-1996
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2018
Appellant, William Harris, appeals pro se from the from the October 25,
2017 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
denying his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, and denying his petition for habeas
corpus relief. Upon review, we affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural background can be summarized as
follows. Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree
murder and related offenses in connection with the murder of Darryl Gibbs on
October 5, 1996. On May 13, 1999, the trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of life imprisonment. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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on September 10, 2004, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
petition for allowance of appeal on May 3, 2005.
Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on April 14, 2006. After counsel
was appointed, and holding a hearing, the PCRA court entered an order
denying relief on April 28, 2008. We affirmed the order on September 20,
2010. Our Supreme Court denied allocatur on March 29, 2011.
On May 21, 2013, Appellant filed a habeas corpus petition, alleging the
Department of Corrections is holding him illegally in the absence of an actual
sentencing order. Subsequently, on May 13, 2016, Appellant filed a PCRA
petition, his second, arguing his counsel was ineffective. The trial court
entertained both petitions concurrently. After holding a hearing, the trial court
denied both petitions. This appeal followed.
We will address the denial of the PCRA petition first. “[A]n appellate
court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are
supported by the record, and reviews its conclusions of law to determine
whether they are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d
294, 311 (Pa. 2014). All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent
petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final”
unless an exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The
PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition
is untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the
petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to
address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520,
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522 (Pa. 2006) (first alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). As timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of
Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this PCRA petition
is timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa.
2008) (consideration of Brady1 claim separate from consideration of its
timeliness). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA petition must be met,
even if the underlying claim is a challenge to the legality of the sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 60 (Pa. 2007) (“Although legality
of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first
satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.”) (citing
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999)).
The instant PCRA petition is facially untimely as he filed it approximately
ten years after the expiration of the time for a timely filing.2 See Trial Court
Opinion, 1/25/17, at 3-4. Appellant argues the petition meets one of the
exceptions to the timeliness general rule, the previously unknown facts
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1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
2 Appellant’s sentence became final on August 1, 2005, after our Supreme
Court denied his petition for allocatur and the expiration of the time for filing
a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup.Ct.R. 13. Appellant had one year from that
date to file a timely petition. He filed the instant petition approximately ten
years after that date. The instant PCRA petition is therefore facially untimely.
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exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).3 In particular, Appellant argues
he did not know that his trial counsel had been suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two years retroactive to February 26, 2013.
The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
Despite formulating his claim in terms of discovery of new facts
not previously known to him, [Appellant]’s claim, in essence, is
challenging prior counsel’s effectiveness. It is well settled,
however, that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot
serve to invoke the “new facts” exception to the PCRA’s timeliness
requirements. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264
(Pa. 2007) (stating generally that allegations of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness do not invoke “new fact” exception to PCRA’s time-
bar); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d
780 (Pa. 2000) (analyzing supposed newly discovered evidence
claim and recognizing that it actually was a position that prior
counsel was ineffective).
Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/17, at 5 (footnote omitted).
We agree with the trial court’s characterization and analysis of
Appellant’s first claim. Additionally, the trial court noted:
Even if [prior counsel]’s disciplinary proceedings qualified as a
previously-unknown fact, [Appellant] failed to demonstrate i) that
he presented this fact in compliance with [Section] 9545(b)(2), or
ii) that this fact was previously unascertainable with the exercise
of due diligence.
Id.
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3 The exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove two components:
1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown, and (2)
these unknown facts could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 638 (Pa. 2017).
Thus, a petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new facts
earlier with the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v.
Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001).
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We agree. Indeed, Appellant failed to allege and prove when he learned
of counsel’s disciplinary issues. Secondly, Appellant failed to allege and prove
why he could not have learned this information earlier with the exercise of due
diligence.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Appellant’s trial took place in 1998,
whereas the Supreme Court suspended counsel in 2014 for two years
retroactive to February 26, 2013. Appellant argues that the disciplinary
proceedings “revealed that [counsel] had been suffering from mental illness
for many years.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. Nowhere does Appellant explain what
“mental illness” actually means, what “many years” consists of, or how
counsel’s alleged illness affected him.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly disposed
of Appellant’s first claim.
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erroneously denied his habeas
corpus petition. As noted above, Appellant claims he is being unlawfully
detained because the Department of Corrections does not have a signed
sentencing order for him, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9764 (relating to information
required upon confinement and subsequent disposition). The claim is
meritless.
When reviewing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we
are guided by the following:
Our standard of review of a trial court’s order denying a petition
for writ of habeas corpus is limited to abuse of discretion.
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See Commonwealth, Dep't of Corrections v. Reese, 774 A.2d
1255, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2001). Thus, we may reverse the court's
order where the court has misapplied the law or exercised its
discretion in a manner lacking reason. See Lachat v.
Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 487 (Pa. Super. 2001) (defining
abuse of discretion). As in all matters on appeal, the appellant
bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate his entitlement to
the relief he requests. See Miller v. Miller, 744 A.2d 778, 788
(Pa. Super. 1999).
Commonwealth ex rel. Fortune v. Dragovich, 792 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Pa.
Super. 2002), appeal denied, 803 A.2d 732 (Pa. 2002).
Even if we were to assume there is no sentencing order, as alleged, but
not proved by Appellant, Appellant is entitled to no relief. As noted by the
trial court, even in the absence of a sentencing order, it is well-established
that the Department of Corrections has continuing authority to detain an
inmate where there is a record of the valid imposition of sentence. Trial Court
Opinion, 1/25/17, at 7 (citing Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super.
2014)). We agree.
To this end, the trial court found that
[the presiding judge] entered sentencing orders in the instant
matter on May 13, 1999. The original orders are being maintained
by the clerk of courts of [the Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas] as part of [Appellant]’s case file. Additionally,
upon reviewing the criminal docket through the Common Pleas
Case Management System, [Appellant]’s sentence was accurately
docketed.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/17, at 7. Thus, here, as in Joseph, the record
confirmed the imposition, and legitimacy, of Appellant’s sentence.
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Regarding Appellant’s reliance on Section 9764, we conclude that such
reliance is misplaced. In Joseph we noted:
The language and structure of section 9764, viewed in context,
make clear that the statute pertains not to the DOC's authority to
detain a duly-sentenced prisoner, but, rather, sets forth the
procedures and prerogatives associated with the transfer of an
inmate from county to state detention. None of the provisions
of section 9764 indicate[s] an affirmative obligation on the part of
the DOC to maintain and produce the documents enumerated in
subsection 9764(a) upon the request of the incarcerated
person. Moreover, section 9764 neither expressly vests, nor
implies the vestiture, in a prisoner of any remedy for deviation
from the procedures prescribed within.
Joseph, 96 A.3d at 371 (footnote omitted).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to any
relief on his habeas corpus petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/12/18
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