IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–1369
Filed April 9, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF PROPERTY SEIZED FOR
FORFEITURE FROM MICHAEL WAYNE YOUNG,
MICHAEL WAYNE YOUNG,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon C.
Fister, District Court Judge, and Nathan A. Callahan, District Associate
Judge.
Claimant seeks further review of the forfeiture of his handgun
asserting that the governing statute violates procedural due process.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Michael Young, Tama, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad P.
Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
This case presents a question regarding the proper interpretation
and constitutionality of a provision of Iowa forfeiture law. A property
owner challenges the statutory scheme for a type of in rem forfeiture
proceeding asserting that the code prevents him from filing an answer to
the State’s forfeiture complaint in violation of his right to procedural due
process.
I. Factual and Procedural History.
In 2002, a state trooper noticed a truck pulled over on the side of
the road and conducted a welfare check on the occupants. Michael
Young was seated in the driver’s seat, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and
was slow to respond to the trooper’s questions. While conducting the
check, the trooper observed a twelve-pack of beer on the passenger-side
floorboard and an empty holster on the passenger seat. Young admitted
that he had a loaded handgun under the front seat. He further stated
that he had lost count of the number of alcoholic beverages he
consumed.
The trooper placed Young under arrest and seized the handgun
and ammunition. The State charged Young with illegal possession of a
handgun in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4 (2001) and operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section
321J.2.
More than five years after the gun and ammunition were seized,
the State filed an in rem forfeiture complaint. Young filed a preanswer
motion to dismiss, raising three issues. First, Young claimed that the
forfeiture complaint violated the applicable statute of limitations because
a notice of pending forfeiture was not filed within ninety days of the
seizure of the property. Second, he claimed that the complaint violated
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the general five-year statute of limitations for forfeiture actions as the
last conduct, act, or omission giving rise to the forfeiture was more than
five years prior to the commencement of the action. Third, Young
asserted that the in rem forfeiture was unconstitutional because the
Code specifically prevented him from filing an answer in violation of state
and federal due process guarantees.
The district court rejected the first two arguments on the merits.
The district court did not specifically rule on the constitutional issue, but
instead allowed Young to file an answer to the State’s in rem complaint.
Young declined to file an answer, however, and the district court entered
an order granting the State’s application for forfeiture by default.
Young appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
ruling. On the constitutional issue, a majority of the court of appeals
held that Iowa Code section 809A.13(3) (2007) should be interpreted as
not applying to cases where the State initiates an in rem proceeding
without first serving a notice of forfeiture. Upon such an interpretation,
aggrieved property owners would retain the ability to file an answer. A
concurring opinion reached the same result, but did so by declaring Iowa
Code section 809A.13(3) unconstitutional under the statute’s plain
meaning.
We granted further review. Upon further review, we limit
consideration of this case to the constitutionality of Iowa Code section
809A.13(3) as applied. See Botsko v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm’n, 774
N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 2009) (noting that when this court takes further
review it may address all issues raised on appeal or limit discussion to
selected issues).
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II. Standard of Review.
The court’s review of forfeiture proceedings is for correction of
errors at law. In re Prop. Seized from DeCamp, 511 N.W.2d 616, 619
(Iowa 1994). To the extent that the petitioner raises constitutional
issues, this court’s review is de novo. In re Prop. Seized from Terrell, 639
N.W.2d 18, 21 (Iowa 2002).
III. Discussion.
A. Overview of Iowa Code Chapter 809A.
1. In personam and in rem forfeiture procedures. Entitled the
Forfeiture Reform Act, Iowa Code chapter 809A establishes two types of
forfeiture proceedings—in personam and in rem. Iowa Code §§ 809A.13,
.14. In personam forfeiture occurs pursuant to Iowa Code section
809A.14 and is not at issue in this case.
In rem proceedings are governed by Iowa Code chapter 809A.13.
Under Iowa Code section 809A.13(2), an in rem action may be brought by
the prosecuting attorney “pursuant to a notice of pending forfeiture or
verified complaint for forfeiture.” The use of the term “or” in Iowa Code
section 809A.13(2) indicates that there are two different ways in which
an in rem proceeding might be brought.
2. In rem proceedings pursuant to a notice of pending forfeiture.
Under Iowa Code section 809A.13(2), an in rem proceeding may be
brought “pursuant to a notice of pending forfeiture.” The Code provides
that a notice of pending forfeiture must be served on the owner and
interest holders of the property involved by personal service or certified
mail, subject to certain exceptions. Iowa Code § 809A.8(2)(a)–(b). Once
the notice of forfeiture is served, the owner or interested party may file
within thirty days a claim in the property, a petition for recognition of an
exemption, or an extension of time to file a claim or petition. Id.
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§ 809A.8(1)(b)(2). If a timely claim or petition for recognition of
exemption is received, the prosecuting attorney may then file an action
for judicial forfeiture under the timeline described in the Code. Id.
§ 809A.8(1)(d). If a timely claim or petition for recognition of an
exemption is not received, the prosecuting attorney may proceed to
dispose of the property according to Iowa Code sections 809A.16 and
809A.17. Id. § 809A.8(1)(e).
3. In rem proceedings pursuant to a verified complaint. The Code
also authorizes the commencement of an in rem forfeiture proceeding
through the filing of a verified complaint. Id. § 809A.13(2). This is a
different procedure than that which arises through the filing of a notice
of pending forfeiture. It amounts to a direct resort to courts rather than
a process that involves the service of a notice of pending forfeiture and
subsequent filing of claims and exemptions with the prosecuting attorney
prior to invoking the judicial process.
While the prosecuting attorney is authorized to proceed directly to
judicial process through the filing of a verified complaint under Iowa
Code section 809A.13(2), the next provision of the Code contains a
procedural limitation that appears to apply to all in rem forfeiture
actions. That section provides, “Only an owner of or an interest holder in
the property who has timely filed a proper claim pursuant to section
809A.11 may file an answer in an action in rem.” Id. § 809A.13(3).
Under Iowa Code section 809A.11(1), a proper claim in seized
property is timely filed “within thirty days after the effective date of notice
of pending forfeiture.” Id. § 809A.11(1). Where the prosecuting attorney
commenced forfeiture pursuant to a verified complaint, however, there is
no notice of pending forfeiture and no requirement that a claim be filed
within thirty days. The only notice required for forfeiture of property
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pursuant to an original verified complaint is service of the verified
complaint itself. Literally read, Iowa Code section 809A.13(3) appears to
prohibit an owner or interested party from defending a forfeiture initiated
pursuant to a verified complaint.
B. Statutory and Constitutional Issues Under Iowa Code
Section 809A.13(3). We begin our discussion by agreeing with all
parties to this case that a statutory scheme which would allow the
forfeiture of property without notice and an opportunity to be heard
would violate due process under the United States and Iowa
Constitutions. 1 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9; see
also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S. Ct. 694, 699,
151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 604 (2002); War Eagle Vill. Apartments v. Plummer,
775 N.W.2d 714, 719 (Iowa 2009). The issue presented in this case,
therefore, is whether Iowa Code section 809A.13(3) can be construed to
allow aggrieved property owners and interested parties to file an answer
to a verified forfeiture complaint.
One possible approach in this case is to avoid the constitutional
problem by holding that the limitation in section 809A.13(3) simply does
not apply to in rem proceedings commenced pursuant to a verified
complaint. This approach makes sound policy sense and would conform
to the presumption of statutory constitutionality and our mandate to
construe statutes in a fashion to avoid a constitutional infirmity where
possible. Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1976).
Such a possibility, however, does not exist here. We conclude that
the plain meaning of section 809A.13(3) does not allow for judicial
rescue. The language is not ambiguous, Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882,
1As a result, it is not necessary to consider whether the state due process clause
should be construed in a fashion different from its federal counterpart. See generally
State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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887 (Iowa 1996), and we are not confronted with conflicting statutory
directives that must be harmonized or read in pari materia. State v. Nail,
743 N.W.2d 535, 540–41 (Iowa 2007). Instead, in section 809A.13(3) we
have plain, straightforward language which prohibits a party from filing
an answer where a timely claim has not been made. It is located under
the general section applying to all in rem proceedings. There is no
qualifying or limiting language in this or other related statutory
provisions. In fact, the opposite is true, as the statute provides that
“[o]nly an owner” who has filed a proper claim can file an answer. Iowa
Code § 809A.13(3) (emphasis added). Though it is a matter of art rather
than science, we conclude that we cannot avoid the constitutional issue
posed by the plain language of Iowa Code section 809A.13(3). See
Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 887.
As a result of our approach to the statute, we conclude that the
statute cannot be constitutionally applied in forfeiture proceedings
commenced by verified petition. To do so would violate the due process
rights of property owners or interested parties to notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167, 122 S. Ct. at 699,
151 L. Ed. 2d at 604; War Eagle Vill. Apartments, 775 N.W.2d at 719.
Our approach, however, does not require reversal of the district
court judgment in this case. Although the basis of the district court
opinion is opaque, the district court afforded Young an opportunity to file
an answer to the verified complaint of forfeiture. The district court did
exactly what it should have done, namely, declined to apply the mandate
of Iowa Code section 809A.13(3) to proceedings initiated by verified
complaint and proceeded to provide Young with an opportunity to
present an answer. In short, Young was afforded the process that was
due—notice of the forfeiture and an opportunity to defend. The fact that
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he chose to decline the constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard
below cannot be used as a bootstrap to create a constitutional infirmity
on appeal.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, the opinion of the court of appeals is
vacated in part and affirmed in part, and the district court judgment is
affirmed.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART
AND AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.