IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-2149
Filed April 4, 2018
DEWITT MICHAEL WELLS,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Thomas G. Reidel,
Judge.
The applicant appeals the district court decision denying his request for
postconviction relief on his claim he received an illegal sentence. AFFIRMED.
Eric D. Tindal of Keegan Farnsworth & Tindal, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kevin R. Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, Judge.
DeWitt Wells appeals the district court decision denying his request for
postconviction relief on his claim he received an illegal sentence. We find Wells
has not shown he received an illegal sentence because his special sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment or because Iowa Code section 903B.1
(2009) denied his right to substantive due process. We affirm the district court’s
decision denying Wells’s application for postconviction relief.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Wells pled guilty to lascivious acts with a child, in violation of Iowa Code
section 709.8. Wells was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten
years. The court also determined Wells was subject to a special sentence,
pursuant to section 903B.1. Wells appealed, but his appeal was subsequently
dismissed as frivolous under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1005 by the Iowa
Supreme Court.
On December 15, 2015, Wells filed an application seeking postconviction
relief on the ground he received an illegal sentence.1 He claimed his special
sentence under section 903B.1 constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
violated his right to due process. The court found Wells’s claims were “contrary to
established Iowa law that is binding on this Court under the doctrine of stare
decisis.” The court determined Wells failed to show he received an illegal sentence
and denied his application for postconviction relief. Wells appealed.
1
This was Wells’s second application for postconviction relief. In a previous application
he claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirmed the district court
decision denying his request for postconviction relief. See Wells v. State, No. 11-0632,
2013 WL 520033, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013).
3
II. Standard of Review
An illegal sentence may be challenged at any time. Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.24(5)(a); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). “We generally
review claims that a sentence is illegal for correction of errors at law; however,
when a claim challenges the constitutionality of a sentence, we review it de novo.”
State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018).
III. Cruel and Unusual
Wells claimed the special sentence in section 903B.1 is cruel and unusual
because he could be subject to parole for the rest of his life. He states the special
sentence is disproportionate to the crime charged.
The Iowa Supreme Court has concluded the imposition of a special
sentence of lifetime parole cannot be categorically characterized as cruel and
unusual punishment. State v. Graham, 897 N.W.2d 476, 488 (Iowa 2017) (finding
defendant, a juvenile who had been convicted of third-degree sexual abuse, was
not entitled to relief from the special sentence of lifetime parole on the ground it
was cruel and unusual punishment, noting the parole board might relieve
defendant from parole obligations sometime in the future). In addition, we have
stated, “We conclude that Iowa Code section 903B.1 . . . is not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses to which it applies and its imposition
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” State v. Harkins, 786 N.W.2d
498, 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
We conclude Wells has not shown he received an illegal sentence on the
ground his special sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
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IV. Due Process
Wells also claims section 903B.1 violates his substantive due process
rights. He states the statute does not rationally relate to a legitimate government
purpose. Wells states there is not a high rate of recidivism for sexual offenders.
We apply a rational basis, rather than a strict scrutiny, analysis to this issue.
See State v. Sallis, 786 N.W.2d 508, 514-15 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Jorgensen, 785 N.W.2d 708, 716 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). “A rational basis standard
requires us to consider whether there is ‘a reasonable fit between the government
interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.’” See Harkins, 786
N.W.2d at 505 (citation omitted). We have determined “there is a reasonable fit
between the State's interest in protecting its citizens from sex crimes and the
special sentence imposed pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1.” Id.; see also
State v. Kingery, 774 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“Because there is a
rational basis for a special sentence imposed pursuant to Iowa Code section
903B.1 and .2, we find there is no merit to Kingery's claim that the provision
violates his substantive due process rights.).
Wells has not shown he received an illegal sentence because section
903B.1 denies his right to substantive due process. We affirm the district court’s
decision denying Wells’s application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.