Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 10, 2018
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 50492-8-II
Respondent,
v.
PHILLIP J. OGLE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, J. — Phillip J. Ogle appeals the superior court’s order denying his motion to
seal his juvenile court records. Ogle argues that the trial court erred when it determined that it
did not have discretion to seal his juvenile records under RCW 13.50.260(4)(a). The State
concedes error. We accept the State’s concession, reverse the trial court’s order denying Ogle’s
motion, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 1997, Ogle pleaded guilty in juvenile court to a class A criminal offense. Ogle was 16
years old at the time of his plea. Twenty-one years later, Ogle satisfied every condition of his
1997 disposition, paid all required restitution, and had not acquired additional charges or
convictions.
On February 24, 2017, Ogle filed a motion requesting that the superior court seal his
juvenile court records. Ogle argued that the superior court had jurisdiction to seal his records
under RCW 13.50.260(4)(a) because the statute grants the superior court discretionary authority
to determine whether to seal a juvenile offender’s court records. The State agreed. The superior
No. 50492-8-II
court denied Ogle’s motion. The superior court reasoned that RCW 13.50.260(4)(a) required the
court to grant a motion to seal a juvenile’s court records when the juvenile offender met every
requirement listed in RCW 13.50.260(4)(a). However, Ogle had been convicted of an offense
that was not subject to mandatory sealing under RCW 13.50.260(4)(a). The superior court ruled
that because Ogle’s offense was not subject to mandatory sealing under RCW 13.50.260(40(a),
the court did not have authority to seal Ogle’s juvenile records. Ogle appeals.
ANALYSIS
Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Hayes, 182
Wn.2d. 556, 560, 342 P.3d 1144 (2015). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern and
implement the legislature’s intent. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201
(2007). When interpreting the legislature’s intent, we first look to the plain language of the
statute. State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). To determine the plain language
of a statute, we consider the “‘text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which
the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme
as a whole.’” State v. Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706, 711, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015) (quoting Ass’n of
Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wn.2d 342, 350, 340
P.3d 849 (2015)).
If the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute
is ambiguous. Conover, 183 Wn.2d at 711-12. However, if the statute is unambiguous, we must
give effect to its plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State v. Hamedian, 188
Wn. App. 560, 563, 354 P.3d 937 (2015).
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No. 50492-8-II
RCW 13.50.260(4)(a) provides:
The court shall grant any motion to seal records for class A offenses . . . if:
(i) Since the last date of release from confinement, including full-time
residential treatment, if any, or entry of disposition, the person has spent five
consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime
that subsequently results in an adjudication or conviction;
(ii) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the
conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;
(iii) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion
agreement with that person;
(iv) The person is no longer required to register as a sex offender under
RCW 9A.44.130 or has been relieved of the duty to register under RCW
9A.44.143 if the person was convicted of a sex offense;
(v) The person has not been convicted of rape in the first degree, rape in
the second degree, or indecent liberties that was actually committed with forcible
compulsion; and
(vi) The person has paid the full amount of restitution owing to the
individual victim named in the restitution order, excluding restitution owed to
any insurance provider authorized under Title 48 RCW.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, under RCW 13.50.260(4)(a), a superior court is required to grant a motion to seal a
juvenile offender’s court records when the statutory conditions are met. However, RCW
13.50.260(4)(a) discusses only when a court is required to grant a motion to seal a juvenile’s
records. The statute does not say that a court is prohibited from sealing juvenile court records
when the conditions requiring sealing are not met. The plain language of RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)
does not prohibit the superior court from granting a motion to seal juvenile court records under
any given circumstances. The superior court maintains authority to exercise its jurisdiction
consistent with GR 15(c). Under GR 15(c)(1), a party in a juvenile proceeding may request a
hearing to seal court records. After the hearing, the court may order that the juvenile’s court
records “be sealed or redacted if the court makes and enters written findings that the specific
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No. 50492-8-II
sealing or redacting is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety concerns that outweigh
the public interest in access to the court record.” GR 15(c)(2).
We accept the State’s concession that the superior court erred when it determined that it
did not have the statutory authority to seal Ogle’s juvenile court records. We reverse the trial
court’s order denying Ogle’s motion to seal his juvenile court records, and we remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, J.
We concur:
Maxa, C.J.
Sutton, J.
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