IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
IRA L. LANE,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D17-1982
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed April 6, 2018
3.853 Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,
Keith A. Carsten, Judge.
Ira L. Lane, Chipley, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Ira L. Lane appeals the summary denial of his sworn motion for DNA testing filed
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. Because the postconviction court
failed to attach any court records to its order to refute Lane’s motion, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
Lane was convicted after trial of second-degree murder, false imprisonment, and
robbery; and his convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. See Lane v.
State, 979 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). In his present motion, Lane requested that
DNA testing be performed on a Schwinn bicycle that he alleged was used by the murderer
to fracture the victim’s skull, resulting in his death. Lane admits that he and the victim
engaged in a physical altercation in the victim’s apartment and that he left the victim lying
there in a fetal position, with his hands and feet bound. Lane alleged that the crime scene
photos admitted into evidence at his trial showed that the victim’s body was found not in
a fetal position but with the bicycle on top of him. Lane asserted, however, that the victim
was alive when Lane left, and he denied using the bicycle during the altercation. Lane
further averred in his motion that: (1) he is innocent of the murder; (2) according to the
testimony from the medical examiner, the victim died from blunt force trauma to the head
and neck area; (3) the victim was found by the police lying face up, without his hands and
feet bound; (4) one of the witnesses at trial testified to seeing other individuals entering
and leaving the victim’s apartment long after Lane had last left the apartment; (5) DNA
testing was not previously performed on the bicycle; (6) the bicycle was last in the
possession of the Orlando Police Department’s Evidence Division; and (7) DNA testing
of the bicycle will exonerate Lane and provide forensic evidence of the identity of the
murderer.
Rule 3.853(c) procedurally provides that if the postconviction court concludes that
the motion for DNA testing is facially sufficient then, as was done here, it must order the
prosecuting attorney to respond to the motion. Upon receipt and review of the State’s
response, the court must either enter an order on the merits of the motion or set the
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motion for hearing. Furthermore, because the sworn allegations of a defendant’s motion
must be taken as true, at least until conclusively refuted by the record, Montez v. State,
86 So. 3d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), if the postconviction court denies a legally and
facially sufficient motion for DNA testing without a hearing, it must attach to its order those
portions of the record conclusively refuting the claim. Poole v. State, 225 So. 3d 418, 419
(Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Padgett v. State, 15 So. 3d 35, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Schofield v.
State, 861 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
In summarily denying Lane’s motion, the postconviction court articulated two bases
in support of its conclusion that Lane had not demonstrated that there is a reasonable
possibility that DNA testing of the bicycle, although likely admissible evidence at trial,
would lead to an acquittal or lesser sentence. See King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1247-
49 (Fla. 2002) (affirming denial of motion for DNA testing when the defendant could not
show that the results would raise a reasonable probability of an acquittal or lesser
sentence). First, the court observed that in his motion, Lane admitted that “about 10
punches were thrown” during his fight with the victim and that he had left the victim in a
fetal position with his hands and feet bound. Second, the court noted that Lane had also
admitted that a detective testified that no fingerprints were recovered from the bicycle
connected to Lane.
We conclude that the lower court erred in denying Lane’s motion without attaching
any court records to its denial order. By failing to do so, there is nothing before us refuting
Lane’s claims that someone else murdered the victim using the bicycle long after Lane
left the victim alive and that there is a reasonable probability that DNA evidence will be
found on the bicycle providing the true identity of the killer, thus raising a reasonable doubt
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as to Lane’s guilt. Moreover, the reasons provided by the court for denying the motion fail
to refute the sworn facts alleged in Lane’s motion that the victim was found in an entirely
different position than the position in which Lane left the victim and that the DNA of the
actual killer, and not Lane’s DNA, will be found on the bicycle.
Accordingly, we reverse the order summarily denying Lane’s rule 3.853 motion for
postconviction DNA testing of the bicycle, and we remand for the court either to conduct
an evidentiary hearing on the motion or to attach to its order those parts of the record that
conclusively refute Lane’s claim.1
REVERSED and REMANDED.
TORPY, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
1 See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D) (“On appeal from the denial of relief [sought
in a rule 3.853 motion], unless the record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled
to no relief, the order shall be reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing
or other appropriate relief.”).
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