People v. Walker

2018 IL App (3d) 140723-B

Opinion filed March 26, 2018
_____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2018

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-14-0723
v. ) Circuit No. 84-CF-190

)

JAMES WALKER, )

) Honorable Robert P. Livas,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Wright concurring in part and dissenting in part, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In July 1984, a Will County jury convicted defendant, James Walker, of felony murder

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1). He was 17 years old at the time of the offense. The court

sentenced him to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant raised

three issues, including his sentence, on direct appeal; this court affirmed. People v. Walker, 136

Ill. App. 3d 177 (1985). The Illinois Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for leave to

appeal. People v. Walker, 111 Ill. 2d 563 (1985).

¶2 In June 2013, defendant filed a postconviction petition. Defendant argued that at his

sentencing hearing, the trial court did not consider his status as a juvenile and the attendant
 characteristics of his youth at the time of the offense. Citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012), in support, defendant alleges his constitutional rights were violated. Defendant also

claimed his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill.

Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Upon the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition.

¶3 Defendant appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition, arguing (1) his sentence

violates the United States Constitution, (2) his sentence violates the proportionate penalties

clause of the Illinois Constitution, and (3) as it applies to juveniles, Illinois’s natural life

sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. In addition to countering defendant’s claims, the State

asserts that defendant’s postconviction petition is untimely.

¶4 BACKGROUND

¶5 The defendant murdered Charles Davis during an attempted armed robbery. Defendant

and his codefendant, Xavier Williams, are African American. In March 1984, defendant and

Williams were minors—17 and 16 years old, respectively. 1 They decided they needed money

and, in order to get some, they should rob a cabdriver. Defendant called Davis’s taxi company

specifically because he thought they were known to employ “white drivers.” Walker, 136 Ill.

App. 3d at 178. Davis was, in fact, white.

¶6 Davis picked up defendant and Williams in his taxi cab. Defendant sat directly behind

Davis in the cab with a loaded, sawed-off shotgun concealed under his coat. After a brief drive,

defendant produced the shotgun and demanded that Davis stop the cab. Williams exited the rear

passenger side of the cab, intending to take over as the driver. Before Williams reached the

driver’s side door, defendant fired the shotgun. Upon seeing the carnage that resulted from

1
In 1984, any minor over the age of 14 charged with murder or armed robbery was mandatorily
prosecuted as an adult pursuant to the Criminal Code of 1961. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, ¶ 702-7(6)(a).
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 defendant shooting Davis in the back of the head with a shotgun at point-blank range, Williams

fled; defendant followed.

¶7 Defendant and Williams both went to the home of a mutual friend where they

encountered friends throughout the night. Each separately told friends that defendant killed

Davis. Defendant and Williams were arrested a few days later. Each provided the police with a

confession that mirrored the other’s account of events in most respects. The significant

difference between their confessions was their professed intent. Williams said he concealed his

face with a cap and scarf, intending merely to rob the driver. Defendant said he was aware he had

no means to conceal his face going into the robbery and killed Davis so that he could not later

identify him.

¶8 Defendant and Williams were indicted for murder and felony murder and tried jointly. A

jury found them both guilty of felony murder. At sentencing, the trial court discussed defendant’s

criminal record—containing both adult dispositions and juvenile records of adjudication—and

the fact that defendant received counseling “for a variety of family, social, sexual and

educational problems.” The trial court sentenced defendant to a discretionary natural life

imprisonment without parole and Williams to 35 years’ imprisonment.

¶9 On direct appeal, defendant contested, inter alia, the imposition of his life sentence. Id. at

181-82. Most notably, defendant argued that none of the statutory requirements for imposing a

life sentence were met in his case. This court rejected all of defendant’s arguments and affirmed

his conviction. Before concluding, this court noted:

“Walker also suggests that this crime was not ‘brutal or

heinous’ since death was instantaneous and did not involve torture

of the victim. He would have us ignore the fact that the murder was

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 casually undertaken, was horribly mutilating to the body of the

victim, and was performed cold-bloodedly without any

provocation, real or imagined, on the part of the victim. No one

can say what mental and physical suffering the victim incurred

during his last few moments of life. We hold that the trial court did

not err in sentencing Walker to life imprisonment.” Id. at 182.

¶ 10 Defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)) in June 2013. He argued his life sentence was unconstitutional

under Miller and violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. See

Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. In August of that year, the trial court advanced

defendant’s petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings. The State filed a motion

to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the original trial court had

considered defendant’s youth and other relevant factors before sentencing. In so doing, the trial

court noted the explicit discussion on the record of defendant’s age and life circumstances during

defendant’s sentencing hearing. The trial court also declined to extend Miller to defendant’s

case, reasoning that Miller applies to mandatory life sentences, not discretionary ones. Miller,

567 U.S. 460.

¶ 11 Defendant appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition, arguing his sentence

violates both the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, contrary to the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Miller, and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

Additionally, defendant argues that, as it applies to juveniles, Illinois’s natural life sentencing

scheme is per se unconstitutional. The State rebuts defendant’s arguments and further asserts that

defendant’s postconviction petition is untimely. We affirmed in an opinion filed on April 25,

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 2016. The supreme court issued a supervisory order on November 22, 2017, directing us to

consider the effect of People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, on defendant’s Miller claim.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 We review the trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition in the second stage

de novo. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). “[I]ssues that were raised and decided

on direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata; issues that could

have been raised, but were not, are considered forfeited.” People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 13

(citing People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 328 (2009)).

¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides three stages to adjudicate postconviction

petitions. In the first stage, only petitions that are “frivolous or *** patently without merit” may

be dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2012). The State may file a motion to dismiss a

postconviction petition at the second stage. Id. § 122-5. In order to survive dismissal, the

defendant must make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Edwards, 197

Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001).

¶ 15 Defendant’s petition asserted two claims: (1) Miller requires defendant’s sentence to be

vacated and that he be resentenced and (2) defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant’s arguments on appeal include the

additional assertion that Illinois’s natural life sentencing scheme is per se unconstitutional, as it

applies to juveniles. The record indicates that defendant declined to amend his petition in the trial

court to include the latter argument. As such, we need not address it. “Any claim of substantial

denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.” 725

ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2012).

¶ 16 I. The State’s Untimely Petition Argument

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¶ 17 The State argues defendant violated the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’s time limitations

(id. § 122-1(c)), forfeiting all claims asserted in his petition. Defendant asserts that the notion

that juveniles are less culpable for their actions than adults is a recent revelation and, therefore,

his petition is timely. More precisely, defendant claims this strand of thought has only been

available to criminal defendants since the Supreme Court decided Miller. We disagree.

¶ 18 Where, as here, the petitioner is not under sentence of death and has not petitioned for

writ of certiorari, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act prohibits filing a postconviction petition

more than six months after the conclusion of proceedings “unless the petitioner alleges facts

showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” Id.; see People v.

Paleologos, 345 Ill. App. 3d 700, 707-08 (2003).

¶ 19 A juvenile’s relative lack of fault, in comparison to their adult counterpart, is not an

intellectual breakthrough that came to light solely in the wake of Miller. Defendant’s position on

this point is undermined by cases he relies upon in his brief. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,

570 (2005), is the most prominent example (noting that juveniles have greater rehabilitative

potential than adults). In fact, the Roper Court explicitly noted the following:

“[D]ifferences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate

that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among

the worst offenders.

***

In Thompson, a plurality of the Court recognized the import

of these characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16 ***.

[Citation.] We conclude the same reasoning applies to all juvenile

offenders under 18.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 569, 570.

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 Given the language in Roper, the argument now asserted by the defendant was available to him

at least as early as 2005. Therefore, his petition is untimely, and we affirm the trial court’s

dismissal. We do not believe that Holman is relevant to the timeliness issue.

¶ 20 II. Defendant’s Miller v. Alabama Argument

¶ 21 Even were his petition timely, defendant’s arguments fail. Miller holds that mandatory

life sentencing for juvenile offenders must be vacated and the defendant must be resentenced at a

discretionary sentencing hearing. The trial court has already provided defendant with the relief to

which defendant is entitled. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life

sentences for defendants under the age of 18 violates the eighth amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at

489; U.S. Const., amend. VIII. The Illinois Supreme Court further held that Miller applies

retroactively. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 34. This reasoning was recently affirmed by the Supreme

Court. Montgomery v. Lousiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Miller and its progeny

hold that the mitigating factors inherent in being a juvenile must be considered before sentencing

someone under the age of 18 to life in prison at the time of the offense. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477.

That is, no mandatory life sentences for juveniles.

¶ 22 The defendant in this case was not given a mandatory sentence. Ergo, Miller does not

apply. Defendant asserts, however, that the trial court did not consider his youth and other

relevant factors before sentencing him to life in prison without parole and, therefore, his sentence

is unconstitutional. We find two problems with this argument.

¶ 23 First, the record belies the argument. The transcript from defendant’s sentencing hearing

demonstrates the trial court was aware of defendant’s age and life circumstances at the time of

his offense. The trial court discussed defendant’s criminal record with trial counsel, which

contained recent juvenile records of adjudication. Defendant’s presentence investigation report

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 indicated that he received counseling “for a variety of family, social, sexual and educational

problems.”

¶ 24 After reviewing the record, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the trial

court, during defendant’s sentencing hearing, was unaware of, or failed to consider, the fact that

defendant was 17 years old with a grossly unstable living environment when he committed

murder.

¶ 25 The trial court imposed a discretionary sentence after a full sentencing hearing. Miller is

inapposite. The defendant is seeking on appeal that which he already received—a proper

sentencing hearing. Thus, defendant failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation at the hearing on the motion to dismiss his postconviction petition as required.

Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246.

¶ 26 III. Supervisory Order

¶ 27 In November 2017, the supreme court issued a supervisory order vacating our prior

judgment and directing us to review defendant’s Miller claim in light of Holman, 2017 IL

120655. We note that neither the supreme court’s supervisory order nor Holman requires us to

review whether defendant timely filed his petition. We do not believe that defendant’s Miller

claim affects our ultimate judgment. Nonetheless, we reviewed it and now find that Holman

supports our original opinion.

¶ 28 In Holman, the supreme court held that courts must consider minor defendants’ youth and

its “attendant characteristics” before imposing a discretionary life sentence. Id. ¶ 46. These

characteristics include the defendant’s age and maturity level, family and home environment,

degree of participation in the crime and susceptibility to peer pressure, incompetence, and

prospects for rehabilitation. Id.

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¶ 29 A jury found that Holman murdered an 82-year-old woman while burglarizing her home.

The presentence investigation report (PSI) stated Holman’s age, and the attorneys highlighted his

age during argument. Id. ¶ 48. The PSI included three psychological reports; none of the reports

indicated that Holman was “immature, impetuous, or unaware of risks.” Id. The reports

concluded that he was mildly retarded and susceptible to peer pressure; however, his psychiatrist

and the court found him competent. Id. The PSI also included Holman’s family background.

¶ 30 Based on the trial evidence, the court concluded that Holman was “intimately involved

with the offense.” Id. The court came to this conclusion despite the parties’ disagreement as to

whether Holman or his cohort pulled the trigger. Finally, the court cited a parole officer’s report,

which indicated that Holman had “ ‘no predilection for rehabilitation.’ ” Id.

¶ 31 The supreme court found that the trial court considered evidence pertaining to the five

attendant characteristics of youth during the sentencing hearing. The court also noted that

“[Holman] had every opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the

product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.” Id. ¶ 49. He presented no mitigating evidence.

Based on the record, the court found that Holman’s sentence “passe[d] constitutional muster

under Miller.” Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 32 In defendant’s case, his PSI and counsel clearly informed the trial court that defendant

was 17 when he committed the offense. Defendant’s PSI discussed his family and personal

background—defense counsel described defendant as “basically a creature of the streets” during

the hearing. The PSI and counsel also discussed defendant’s prior family counseling “for a

variety of family, social, sexual and educational problems.”

¶ 33 Some evidence in this case was even more aggravating than that in Holman. No evidence

indicated that defendant was susceptible to peer pressure or unintelligent. Defendant

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 unquestionably pulled the trigger. The PSI indicated that he obtained his general equivalency

diploma (GED) and made no mention of low intelligence or cognitive disabilities.

¶ 34 As in Holman, defendant had every opportunity to present mitigating evidence to dispute

this conclusion—he presented none. The trial court determined that defendant’s actions were not

the product of immaturity. Knowing defendant’s age and background, the trial court opined that

defendant “would kill for the joy of it and seriously does not care at all about a human life, it

makes no difference to him whatsoever.” This statement clearly reflects the trial court’s opinion

that defendant showed no potential for rehabilitation.

¶ 35 We see no dispositive difference between this case and Holman. In both cases, neither the

trial evidence nor the PSI showed that the defendants were immature, unaware of risks, or

incompetent. Both defendants were intimately involved in egregious crimes and showed no

remorse or prospect of rehabilitation. After review, we still find that defendant’s natural life

sentence “passes constitutional muster under Miller.” Id. Holman does not require a different

result.

¶ 36 IV. Defendant’s Proportionate Penalty Clause Argument

¶ 37 Defendant also argues his discretionary sentence of life without parole violates the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. This

clause mandates that penalties “be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense

and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Id. In other words, a

criminal penalty must be proportionate to the offense committed. People v. Grant, 2014 IL App

(1st) 100174-B, ¶ 41. Defendant’s proportionate penalties clause argument is both untimely and

meritless.

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¶ 38 As discussed previously, defendant’s postconviction arguments must be brought before

the court within six months of the conclusion of proceedings “unless the petitioner alleges facts

showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)

(West 2012). The People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002) (Leon Miller), decision was not a

watershed in proportionate penalty clause jurisprudence. The arguments Leon Miller relied upon

in his case were available to the defendant in this case at trial and within six months of the

conclusion of his proceedings. Even assuming Leon Miller did usher in a new era in

proportionate penalties clause arguments, it was decided in 2002. Id.

¶ 39 Furthermore, defendant’s argument fails on the merits. Leon Miller involved a timely

filed petition with facts that stand in stark contrast to those of this case. Leon Miller received a

mandatory life sentence for acting as a lookout during a robbery that he played no part in

planning, had approximately one minute to contemplate his decision to participate, and never

handled a gun in the course of the offense. Id. at 341. In short, he was “the least culpable

offender imaginable.” Id.

¶ 40 The defendant’s situation in this case is in no way similar to that of the defendant in Leon

Miller. Defendant was the triggerman, not a lookout. He planned his acts before deliberately

putting them into action. Again, he was sentenced at the discretion of the trial court. Defendant’s

sentence does not violate the proportionate penalties clause. See People v. Lauderdale, 2012 IL

App (1st) 100939, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521 (2005)).

¶ 41 CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 43 Affirmed.

¶ 44 JUSTICE WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

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¶ 45 Our supreme court’s decision in Holman restates that before any 17-year-old may be

sentenced to a life sentence, the sentencing judge should consider the offender’s characteristics

of youthfulness, if any. As stated by the majority, these factors include the defendant’s age and

maturity level, family and home environment, degree of participation in the crime and

susceptibility to peer pressure, incompetence, and prospects for rehabilitation.

¶ 46 The majority points out that the PSI submitted to the court advised the court of

defendant’s age, home environment or lack thereof, and the family issues that recently

necessitated some prior counseling. I agree with the majority’s conclusion regarding these three

factors. I also agree that the record does not suggest defendant was incompetent.

¶ 47 However, I write separately to address two additional factors that the majority has

overlooked. These factors, clearly considered by the trial court, include (1) defendant’s degree of

participation in the crime and (2) defendant’s susceptibility to peer pressure. Unlike the majority,

I conclude five factors related to youthfulness were considered by the trial court.

¶ 48 My conclusions are based on my review of the transcript of a combined sentencing

hearing with Williams, defendant’s accomplice, and this defendant. It is very apparent that

defendant’s degree of participation, as the triggerman, was heavily relied upon by the trial court.

For example, during the same sentencing hearing, the court found that Williams “did not pull the

trigger.”

¶ 49 In addition, with respect to defendant’s susceptibility to peer pressure, the court stated, I

think we also have to conclude “Mr. Walker was more the leader in this incident.” Further, the

court found it to be “clear” that there was a “strong possibility” that Williams “would not have

pulled the trigger in this incident as Mr. Walker did.” These comments clearly indicate the court

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 considered Walker may have been responsible for exerting peer pressure on his accomplice to go

through with the armed robbery.

¶ 50 In addition, based on the trial court’s remarks, I am hesitant to join the majority’s

conclusion that the court considered Walker’s immaturity or lack thereof, without any reference

to the trial court’s statement that supports this inference. For this reason, I respectfully dissent

from the statement contained in supra ¶ 34.

¶ 51 In conclusion, I agree the record reveals the trial judge did consider many, if not most, of

the factors that are characteristics of this teenaged mind before imposing a life sentence. For this

reason, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the sentencing hearing was fair even though

defendant’s petition was not timely.

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