MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 21 2018, 6:11 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David Wemhoff Carl A. Greci
South Bend, Indiana Faegre Baker Daniels LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ryan G. Milligan
Faegre Baker Daniels LLP
Chicago, Illinois
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re: Estate of Lester Frank May 21, 2018
Sumrall, Deceased Court of Appeals Case No.
71A05-1710-ES-2476
Lester L. Sumrall, Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
Appellant/Petitioner, Court
The Honorable James N. Fox,
v. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Angela N. Grabowski, 71J01-1704-ES-68
Appellee/Counter-Petitioner.
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Lester Frank Sumrall (“the decedent”) died on April 28, 1996. On April 3,
2017, one of the decedent’s grandsons, Appellant Lester L. Sumrall
(“Appellant”), requested that the decedent’s estate be opened and administered.
Appellee Angela N. Grabowski (“Appellee”), the decedent’s granddaughter,
subsequently requested that the probate court deny Appellant’s request to open
the decedent’s estate. Appellee argued that the decedent had been dead for over
twenty years and that there were no estate assets to administer. The probate
court conducted a hearing after which it granted judgment in favor of the
Appellee. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The decedent “founded LeSEA (Lester Sumrall Evangelistic Association) [(“the
ministry”)] in 1957: A ministry which has subsequently given birth to well over
one hundred books and study guides, eleven television stations, a satellite
ministry, three FM radio stations, five shortwave stations reaching over ninety
percent of the world’s population, and a quarterly magazine.” See
https://lesea.com/about-us/legacy/ (last visited May 9, 2018). The ministry
has continued to operate following decedent’s death. The decedent died on
April 28, 1996. At the time of his death, the decedent had three sons: Frank L.
Sumrall, Stephen P. Sumrall, and Peter A. Sumrall. He was preceded in death
by his wife.
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[3] On April 3, 2017, Appellant filed “Petition for Probate and Issuance of Letters
of Administration and for Supervised Administration” of the decedent’s estate.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 10. Appellant claimed to be “interested in the
decedent’s estate by reason of being the Attorney-In-Fact for Frank Lester
Sumrall, the eldest son and heir of the decedent.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.
10. In filing this petition, Appellant acknowledged that the time for filing the
decedent’s will had passed and that the decedent’s estate should be
administered as if the decedent died intestate. While the Appellant’s request
did not detail any specific assets or items of personal property, it indicated “[t]o
the best knowledge of the [Appellant], and after diligent inquiry by the
[Appellant], the estate of the decedent is believed to be solvent, included in such
assets is a possible cause of action against entity(ies) and person(s).”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 12.
[4] On April 21, 2017, Appellee filed a counter-petition in response to Appellant’s
petition. Specifically, Appellee responded as follows:
[Appellee] is informed and so believes [d]ecedent’s estate to be
insolvent in that there are neither assets nor liabilities to
administer. Decedent died nearly twenty-two years ago on April
28, 1996. [Appellee] knows of no assets that need [to be]
administered, nor has any asset of the [d]ecedent been identified
that needs [to be] administered. Further, [Appellee] knows of no
cause of action concerning [d]ecedent or his estate that currently
exists or that existed on [d]ecedent’s date of death, nor has any
cause of action been identified that needs to be pursued. In any
event, to the extent any causes of action existed, such causes
would be barred by the statute of limitations, whether such cause
exists against or on behalf of [d]ecedent’s estate.
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 14–15. In reiterating that decedent “has no estate
assets to administer[,]” Appellee indicated that she “believes [Appellant] filed
his Petition solely to give him a platform to bring frivolous causes of action
personal to him on behalf of [d]ecedent’s estate.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.
15. Five of the six “interested parties and heirs by representation” joined in
Appellee’s counter-petition.1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17.
[5] On July 13, 2017, the probate court conducted a hearing on the petition and
counter-petition. During the hearing, Appellant questioned four witnesses and
gave a lengthy narrative regarding assets that he claimed to have observed in
either 1996 or 2005. Appellant also discussed (1) a tea set which had allegedly
belonged to the decedent’s wife and, at some point, had been given to a family
member as a wedding present; (2) certain copyright interests relating to the
ministry; and (3) a number of paintings. Appellant, however, did not provide
any evidence proving that either the copy right interests or the paintings were
part of the decedent’s estate. At the close of Appellant’s presentation of
evidence, Appellee’s counsel noted that Appellant did not specify any assets
that he believed were still in the estate and “admitted that he had … concerns
about assets moving in 2005” but did nothing to address these alleged concerns
until 2017. Tr. Vol. II, p. 82. Thus, Appellee’s counsel stated “I’d like to move,
essentially, by analogy for a direct verdict.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 82.
1
Appellant’s father, Frank Lester Sumrall, was the only heir not to join Appellee’s counter-petition.
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[6] Following lengthy argument by the parties, the probate court stated the
following:
I see little choice … but to, to grant the motion for judgment on
the evidence, because I just don’t, I’m not hearing that there’s
assets that clearly were [decedent’s] assets or liabilities that need
to be paid, that haven’t been paid, or an asset, that was clearly his
asset, that was to be distributed, in some manner distribute, that
wasn’t distributed. And in fact, I think when you called your
Father, you never established that … there were things he
believed should have been distributed, and that were his
Father’s.… I don’t see any choice other than to issue a judgment
on the evidence, because I just don’t think you presented
evidence that clearly indicate[s] to me, that, [items of personal
property] that not only were in the house, but that they were
assets of, that should have been distributed in the Estate[.]
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 91–92. The probate court also questioned “why nobody picked
up the Estate and tried to move it forward, when somebody could have done
[so] in the intervening time period.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 92. Consistent with its oral
ruling, the probate court subsequently entered a written order granting
judgment in favor of the Appellee.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Appellant waited for more than twenty years following his grandfather’s death
before requesting that an estate be opened and administered. Appellee
counters, arguing that the probate court should deny Appellant’s request given
his failure to make the request in a timely fashion.
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[8] It is a fundamental rule of law that one who sleeps on his rights
loses them. Laches addresses delay in the pursuit of a right when
a party must assert that right in order to benefit from it. The
doctrine of laches “bars a party’s rights when the party has
unreasonably delayed their assertion so as to cause prejudice to
the opposing party. In civil matters, the doctrine of laches
consists of three elements: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a
right; (2) implied waiver from knowing acquiescence in existing
conditions; and (3) circumstances resulting in prejudice to the
adverse party. However, the mere passage of time is insufficient;
the defendant must also show that the plaintiff’s delay was
unreasonable and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result.
Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 815, 822–23 (7th Cir. 1999) (interpreting
Indiana law, internal citations and quotations omitted). “Prejudice may be
created if a party, with knowledge of the relevant facts, permits the passing of
time to work a change of circumstances by the other party.” Burns-Kish Funeral
Homes, Inc. v. Kish Funeral Homes, LLC, 889 N.E.2d 15, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[9] There is no doubt that Appellant delayed in requesting that the decedent’s
estate be opened and administered. By Appellant’s own admission, he had
knowledge of the decedent’s personal property at the time of the decedent’s
death. Despite this knowledge, he waited more than twenty years before
attempting to open and administer the decedent’s estate. Appellant provided
no reasonable explanation that would excuse his failure to seek to have the
decedent’s estate administered at some point during the twenty-plus years since
the decedent’s death. Further, to the extent that Appellant attempts to explain
his delay by asserting that he had recently come to believe that the decedent’s
estate had not been distributed according to decedent’s wishes, the record
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reveals that Appellant has failed to point to any specific items that he believes
were distributed contrary to decedent’s wishes.
[10] Appellant’s delay can also be interpreted as an implied waiver of any request for
the establishment and administration of an estate. Appellant sat idly by and
delayed in attempting to preserve any claimed interest that he or his father
might have had in the property. This includes remaining silent after coming to
believe that some of the decedent’s personal property was moved or distributed
in 2005. His twelve years of silence after allegedly learning that some of the
property at issue had been distributed suggests a knowing acquiesce—if not
outright approval—of the distribution.
[11] Furthermore, even if it were possible to reacquire the decedent’s alleged
personal property, doing so would undoubtedly result in prejudice as it would
create insurmountable evidentiary issues. In this vein, the Appellee argues the
following:
[A]ny estate proceeding would necessitate attempting to (a)
establish what assets belonged to [the decedent], (b) reconstruct
over twenty years’ worth of history regarding the possession and
control of household items of personal property unaided by any
public records, (c) locate and claw items back from heirs or
distributes, such as the recipient of the ‘multi piece tea set,’ and
(d) redistribute those purported assets. This exercise in futility is
a waste of judicial and financial resources.
Appellee’s Br. p. 23. We agree. The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that
“[s]uccessful invocation of the doctrine [of laches] in civil cases has included
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proof that available witnesses did not have a distinct recollection of the details
of the case or that they had no access to records which would disclose the
same.” In re Siegel, 708 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Ind. 1999) (citing French v. State, 547
N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ind. 1989)). The evidentiary issues that would stem from
attempting to establish ownership of personal property that has been distributed
over the course of more than twenty years would undoubtedly result in
prejudice to those adverse to the Appellant’s position as it is unlikely that there
would be any records of distribution or that any witness would have a clear
recollection of all of the details surrounding the distribution of the property.
[12] The judgment of the probate court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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