IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 402PA15-2
Filed 8 June 2018
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DONNA HELMS LEDBETTER
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 794 S.E.2d 551 (2016) (per curiam),
denying defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review an order entered on 20
October 2014 by Judge C.W. Bragg and dismissing defendant’s appeal from a
judgment entered on 27 October 2014 by Judge Jeffrey P. Hunt, both in Superior
Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 April 2018.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Christopher W. Brooks, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for the State.
Meghan Adelle Jones for defendant-appellant.
BEASLEY, Justice.
In this case we consider whether the absence of a procedural rule limits the
Court of Appeals’ discretionary authority to issue a writ of certiorari. In denying
defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that although it
had jurisdiction to issue the writ, it lacked a procedural mechanism under Rule 21 of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to do so without further exercising
STATE V. LEDBETTER
Opinion of the Court
its discretion to invoke Rule 2 to suspend the Rules. See State v. Ledbetter, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 794 S.E.2d 551, 555 (2016) (per curiam); see also N.C. Rs. App. P. 2, 21.
Because we conclude that the absence of a procedural rule limits neither the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction nor its discretionary authority to issue writs of certiorari, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further
proceedings.
On 1 January 2013, defendant was charged with driving while impaired.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge on 23 December 2013, arguing that
the State violated N.C.G.S. § 20-38.4 (setting forth procedures for magistrates to
follow when the arrestee appears to be impaired during the initial appearance) and
State v. Knoll, 322 N.C. 535, 545-48, 369 S.E.2d 558, 564-66 (1988) (holding that a
charge of driving while impaired is subject to dismissal when the defendant was
prejudiced by the magistrate’s failure to inform the defendant of certain statutory
rights). The trial court denied defendant’s motion on 20 October 2014.
Following the trial court’s denial of her motion, on 27 October 2014, defendant
pleaded guilty to driving while impaired.1 The plea arrangement stated that
“[defendant] expressly retains the right to appeal [t]he [c]ourt’s denial of her motion
to dismiss/suppress her Driving While Impaired charge in this case.” Defendant gave
1In addition to the charge of driving while impaired, the State charged defendant with
simple possession of both a Schedule II and a Schedule IV controlled substance; however, the
two possession charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea arrangement.
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Opinion of the Court
notice of appeal and petitioned the Court of Appeals for review by writ of certiorari
under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and denied
the certiorari petition, holding that defendant did not have a statutory right to appeal
from the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss prior to her guilty plea and that
the petition did not assert grounds included in or permitted by Rule 21. See State v.
Ledbetter, 243 N.C. App. 746, 757, 779 S.E.2d 164, 171 (2015). On 22 September
2016, this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in
light of the Court’s recent decisions in State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 770 S.E.2d 74
(2015), and State v. Thomsen, 369 N.C. 22, 789 S.E.2d 639 (2016). State v. Ledbetter,
369 N.C. 64, 64, 793 S.E.2d 216, 216-17 (2016) (per curiam order).
Upon reconsideration, the same panel of the Court of Appeals issued a
unanimous opinion that again denied defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and
dismissed her appeal. See Ledbetter, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at 555. The
Court of Appeals held that
[a]fter further consideration and review of both
Thomsen and Stubbs, and under the jurisdictional
authority provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e),
[d]efendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review her
motion to dismiss, prior to entry of her guilty plea, does not
assert any of the procedural grounds set forth in Rule 21 to
issue the writ. Although the statute provides jurisdiction,
this Court is without a procedural process under either
Rule 1 or 21 to issue the discretionary writ under these
facts, other than by invoking Rule 2.
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Opinion of the Court
Id. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at 555. The court further declined to invoke Rule 2 to suspend
the requirements of the rules to issue the writ of certiorari. Id. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at
555.
The North Carolina Constitution states that “[t]he Court of Appeals shall have
such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly may prescribe.” N.C. Const. art.
IV, § 12(2). The General Assembly has exercised this constitutional authority by
giving the Court of Appeals “jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs, including
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and supersedeas, in aid of its own jurisdiction, or
to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the trial courts of the General Court
of Justice.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) (2017). “This statute empowers the Court of Appeals
to review trial court rulings . . . by writ of certiorari unless some other statute restricts
the jurisdiction that subsection 7A-32(c) grants.” Thomsen, 369 N.C. at 25, 789
S.E.2d at 641 (citing Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 42-43, 770 S.E.2d at 76). Therefore,
“[s]ubsection 7A-32(c) . . . creates a default rule that the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of certiorari. The default rule
will control unless a more specific statute restricts jurisdiction in the particular class
of cases at issue.” Id. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 642.
In State v. Stubbs we addressed whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review a trial court’s grant of a defendant’s motion for appropriate relief by writ of
certiorari. See 368 N.C. at 41, 770 S.E.2d at 75. We noted that a separate statute,
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Opinion of the Court
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c), specifically addresses review of trial court rulings on motions
for appropriate relief under section 15A-1415. Id. at 42-43, 770 S.E.2d at 76. In
Stubbs “we were not concerned with whether subsection 15A-1422(c) provided an
independent source of jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ. Rather,
we focused on the absence of language in subsection 15A-1422(c) that would limit the
court’s review.” Thomsen, 369 N.C. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 642 (citing Stubbs, 368 N.C.
at 43, 770 S.E.2d at 76) (citations omitted). Finding no limiting language, we held
that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to issue the writ. Id. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at
642 (citing Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 43, 770 S.E.2d at 76).
In State v. Thomsen the sole difference from Stubbs was that the trial court
granted appropriate relief on its own motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(d),
rather than on defendant’s motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415. Compare
Thomsen, 369 N.C. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 642, with Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 41, 770 S.E.2d
at 75. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c) does not mention review of relief granted “pursuant to”
subsection 15A-1420(d); therefore, the parties disagreed on whether the sua sponte
grant of relief was “pursuant to” subsection 15A-1415(b) or subsection 15A-1420(d).
See Thomsen, 369 N.C. at 26, 789 S.E.2d at 642. We held that the answer to this
question did not matter, and that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in either event
“because nothing in the Criminal Procedure Act, or any other statute that defendant
has referenced, revokes the jurisdiction in this specific context that subsection 7A-
32(c) confers more generally.” Id. at 26, 789 S.E.2d at 642. Therefore, the Court of
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Opinion of the Court
Appeals maintains broad jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari unless a more specific
statute revokes or limits that jurisdiction.
Although Stubbs and Thomsen concerned reviews of motions for appropriate
relief, the same statutory analysis applies in this case. With respect to guilty pleas,
subsection 15A-1444(e) states that
[e]xcept as provided in subsections (a1) and (a2) of this
section and [N.C.]G.S. 15A-979, and except when a motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest has been denied,
the defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a
matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no
contest to a criminal charge in the superior court, but he
may petition the appellate division for review by writ of
certiorari.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e) (2017). Here, given that none of the other listed exceptions
apply, defendant’s only method for appeal was by petition for writ of certiorari. See
id. Subsection 15A-1444(e) specifically addresses review of a defendant’s guilty plea
through issuance of a writ of certiorari and contains no language limiting the Court
of Appeals’ jurisdiction or discretionary authority. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
correctly acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ; however, the court
mistakenly concluded that the absence of a specific “procedural process” in the Rules
of Appellate Procedure left the court without authority to invoke that jurisdiction.2
2We note that a separate, unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals correctly followed
Stubbs to exercise its discretion to grant a defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari in
essentially identical procedural circumstances. See State v. Jones, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___,
___, 802 S.E.2d 518, 520-23, 526 (2017) (holding that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
and discretionary authority to grant the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review a
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Opinion of the Court
The Court of Appeals held that because defendant’s petition for writ of
certiorari to review her motion to dismiss did not assert any of the procedural grounds
set forth in Rule 21, the court was “without a procedural process” to issue the writ
other than by invoking Rule 2. See Ledbetter, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at 555.
Rule 21 states, in relevant part, that
[t]he writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate
circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of
the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right
to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take
timely action, or when no right of appeal from an
interlocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial court
ruling on a motion for appropriate relief.
N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1). Regardless of whether Rule 21 contemplates review of
defendant’s motion to dismiss, this Court made it clear in both Stubbs and Thomsen
that “if a valid statute gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari, Rule 21 cannot take it away.” Thomsen, 369 N.C. at 27, 789 S.E.2d at 643
(citing Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 43-44, 770 S.E.2d at 76); see also N.C. R. App. P. 1(c)
(“These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of
the appellate division as that is established by law.”).
By concluding it is procedurally barred from exercising its discretionary
authority to assert jurisdiction in this appeal, the Court of Appeals has, as a practical
judgment entered upon his plea of guilty, even though Rule 21 did not include the particular
circumstance among its enumerated bases for issuance of the writ).
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Opinion of the Court
matter, set its own limitations on its jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari. “The
practice and procedure [of issuing the prerogative writs] shall be as provided by
statute or rule of the Supreme Court, or, in the absence of statute or rule, according to
the practice and procedure of the common law.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) (emphasis
added). Therefore, in the absence of a procedural rule explicitly allowing review, such
as here, the Court of Appeals should turn to the common law to aid in exercising its
discretion rather than automatically denying the petition for writ of certiorari or
requiring that the heightened standard set out in Rule 2 be satisfied.3
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had both the jurisdiction and the
discretionary authority to issue defendant’s writ of certiorari. Absent specific
3 See, e.g., Surratt v. State, 276 N.C. 725, 726, 174 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1970) (per curiam)
(stating that a particular judgment was “reviewable only by way of certiorari if the court in
its discretion chooses to grant such writ” (second italics added) (first citing State v. Lewis, 274
N.C. 438, 164 S.E.2d 177 (1968); then citing In re Croom, 175 N.C. 455, 95 S.E. 903 (1918);
and then citing 4 Strong’s North Carolina Index 2d: Habeas Corpus § 4, at 149-50 (1968)));
State v. Walker, 245 N.C. 658, 659, 97 S.E.2d 219, 220 (1957) (stating that a writ of certiorari
“may be allowed by the Court in its discretion, on sufficient showing made, but such writ is
not one to which the moving party is entitled as a matter of right” (emphasis added)), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 946 (1958); Womble v. Moncure Mill & Gin Co., 194 N.C. 577, 579, 140 S.E.
230, 231 (1927) (“Certiorari is a discretionary writ, to be issued only for good or sufficient
cause shown . . . .” (second italics added) (first citing Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E.
149 (1927); then citing People’s Bank & Tr. v. Parks, 191 N.C. 263, 131 S.E. 637 (1926); then
citing Finch v. Comm’rs of Nash Cty., 190 N.C. 154, 129 S.E. 195 (1925); and then citing State
v. Farmer, 188 N.C. 243, 124 S.E. 562 (1924))); Luther v. Seawell, 191 N.C. App 139, 142, 662
S.E.2d 1, 3 (2008) (stating that the Court of Appeals has “the authority . . . to ‘treat the
purported appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari’ and grant it in [its] discretion” (emphasis
added) (quoting State v. SanMiguel, 74 N.C. App. 276, 277-78, 328 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1985);
and then citing Guthrie v. Conroy, 152 N.C. App. 15, 19, 567 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2002))).
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Opinion of the Court
statutory language limiting the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction, the court maintains its
jurisdiction and discretionary authority to issue the prerogative writs, including
certiorari. Rule 21 does not prevent the Court of Appeals from issuing writs of
certiorari or have any bearing upon the decision as to whether a writ of certiorari
should be issued. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should exercise its discretion to
determine whether it should grant or deny defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that
court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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