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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GREGORY SWATSKY,
Appellant No. 1834 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0002231-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2018
Appellant, Gregory Swatsky, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
72 hours’ to 6 months’ incarceration, imposed after he was convicted of driving
under the influence of a controlled substance (DUI) pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.
§3802(d)(2). Appellant solely argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress the results of a blood test because his consent to that test
was involuntary. We affirm.
Briefly, Appellant was charged with DUI after he was stopped by a police
officer for driving erratically, admitted to the officer that he had taken certain
controlled substances, failed several field sobriety tests, and then consented
to a blood draw that ultimately confirmed the presence of drugs in his system.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test,
contending that his consent to that test was coerced and invalid under
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Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016) (holding “that
motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on
pain of committing a criminal offense”). The trial court denied Appellant’s
motion to suppress and his case proceeded to a non-jury trial. At the close
thereof, the court convicted him of DUI. On November 13, 2017, Appellant
was sentenced to the term of imprisonment stated supra.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he complied with the trial
court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. On January 3, 2018, the trial court filed a Rule
1925(a) opinion. Therein, the court addressed the following, single issue that
Appellant presents for our review: “Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in denying
Appellant’s [m]otion to [s]uppress because[,] based on the totality of the
circumstances, Appellant did not consent to the blood draw[?]” Appellant’s
Brief at 1.
We begin by noting that,
[a]n appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. [Because] the prosecution prevailed in the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the
trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if
the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
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Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708, 721 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Additionally, a trial court’s error in denying a suppression motion will
not require reversal if the Commonwealth can establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless. See Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d
711, 720 (Pa. 1998). “An error is harmless if it could not have contributed to
the verdict. In other words, an error cannot be harmless if there is a
reasonable possibility the error might have contributed to the conviction.”
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 380 (Pa. 2015).
Here, we have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the certified record,
and the applicable case law. We have also considered the well-reasoned
opinion authored by the Honorable Jacqueline L. Russell of the Court of
Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. Judge Russell concludes that, even if it
was improper to deny Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of his blood
test, the admission of that cumulative evidence of Appellant’s intoxication was
harmless error. The Commonwealth presents this same argument on appeal,
relying on Judge Russell’s rationale. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. We
agree with the Commonwealth and Judge Russell that any error in admitting
the results of Appellant’s blood test would be harmless; therefore, we need
not access whether his consent to that test was coerced. We adopt Judge
Russell’s opinion as our own, and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence for
the reasons set forth therein.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/27/2018
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