17-677
Jiang v. Sessions
BIA
Bukszpan, IJ
A073 548 803
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 19th day of September, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
DENNIS JACOBS,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
CHUN XIANG JIANG,
Petitioner,
v. 17-677
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, NJ.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
Assistant Director; Carmel A.
Morgan, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Chun Xiang Jiang, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 14,
2017, decision of the BIA affirming an April 20, 2016,
decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s
motion to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jiang, No. A 073 548 803 (B.I.A.
Feb. 14, 2017), aff’g No. A 073 548 803 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
Apr. 20, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the agency’s denial of Jiang’s motion to reopen
for abuse of discretion, and the agency’s factual findings
regarding country conditions under the substantial evidence
standard. Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir.
2008).
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It is undisputed that Jiang’s 2015 motion to reopen was
untimely because her removal order became final in 1997.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
Although the 90-day filing limitation does not apply to
motions to reopen to seek asylum “based on changed country
conditions” since the time of the original hearing, 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii),
the agency reasonably concluded that Jiang did not
establish any material change in conditions in China.
While Jiang asserted that China’s treatment of
Christians had materially worsened since 1997, the agency
compared Jiang’s new evidence to a 1995 country report in
the record and reasonably determined that Jiang’s evidence
did not show a material change in conditions for
Christians. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253
(B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence
accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material
change in country conditions that would justify reopening,
[the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions
submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time
of the merits hearing below”).
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As the agency concluded, Jiang’s evidence showed a
continuation of former conditions. The agency acknowledged
the recent reports of church demolitions and arrests, but
reasonably concluded that any references to “worsening”
conditions were made in comparison to recent years, as opposed
to the conditions in 1997. Jiang argues that the agency
overlooked or failed to fully consider the 2014 and 2015
reports and articles regarding church demolitions in her home
province, Zhejiang, but the record does not compellingly
suggest that any evidence was ignored. See Wang v. BIA, 437
F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that where “the BIA has
given reasoned consideration . . . and made adequate
findings,” it need not “expressly parse or refute on the
record each . . . piece of evidence offered by the petitioner”
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). The task
of resolving conflicts in the record evidence lies “largely
within the discretion of the agency.” Shao, 546 F.3d at 171.
A comparison of the 1995 and 2013 State Department
reports reveals largely similar conditions: an official ban
on unregistered churches, tolerance of small and discreet
unregistered groups in some areas, and occasional crackdowns
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against religious leaders and activists. While the Zhejiang
cross removals and demolition—most of which targeted state-
sanctioned churches as part of a provincial redevelopment
campaign announced in 2013—may demonstrate the Chinese
government’s continuing hostility toward visible displays of
Christianity, they do not demonstrate a material change in
national or provincial government policy toward unregistered
churches or Christianity generally.
In sum, given that the reports reflect continuing
conditions, or at most some fluctuation as compared to
conditions in 1997, substantial evidence supports the
agency’s conclusion that Jiang failed to show a material
change in conditions for Christians in China. Shao, 546
F.3d at 169. Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its
discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
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in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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