IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0904
Filed September 26, 2018
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JEFFREY J. MONAHAN
AND RONAE L. MONAHAN
Upon the Petition of
JEFFREY J. MONAHAN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
RONAE L. MONAHAN n/k/a RONAE L. SCHMEITS,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, Gregory W.
Steensland, Judge.
Wife challenges the economic provisions of the decree dissolving her
marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, PC, West Des
Moines, for appellant.
Michael J. Murphy of Murphy & Murphy Law Offices, PC, Council Bluffs, for
appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
This appeal arises out of the acrimonious dissolution of the thirty-year
marriage of Jeff and Ronae Monahan. During the course of the proceedings, there
were allegations of a murderous plot, domestic abuse, embezzlement, theft, fraud,
waste, and dissipation of marital assets, among other things. Some of the
accusations were well-founded. For example, in violation of a court order, Ronae
entered the marital home and took a substantial amount of the jewelry and
personal property. Ronae also had her employee burn relevant business records.
In addition, the district court found there is some evidence supporting Jeff’s
contention that Ronae investigated how to kill Jeff by poisoning him with
Coumadin.
The district court received the evidence over the course of a four-day trial,
divided the marital property, ordered Jeff to pay Ronae an equalization payment,
and awarded Ronae alimony:
Jeff shall pay a cash settlement to Ronae as part of the
distribution of assets in the total amount of $294,480. That cash
settlement shall be payable in 7 equal annual installments of
$42,068.57. The first installment is due July 1, 2017, and
installments in that same amount are due on July 1 of each
subsequent year until the cash settlement is paid. This cash
settlement is a judgment against Jeff in favor of Ronae. As long as
payment [sic] are timely made they shall not accrue interest.
Commencing July 1, 2024, Jeff shall pay spousal support to
Ronae in the amount of $2,000 per month. This spousal support
shall continue until either party dies, Ronae remarries, or Ronae
reaches the age of 66, whichever comes first.
On appeal, Ronae contends the district court failed to do equity in dividing
the marital property and awarding her spousal support. She also contends the
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award of spousal support should be secured by a life insurance policy insuring
Jeff’s life. Finally, she seeks trial and appellate attorney fees.
I.
Our review in a marriage action is de novo. See In re Marriage of
McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). “Although our review is de novo,
we afford deference to the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons.
This means we give weight to the district court’s findings of fact. This also means
we will affirm the district court unless the district court failed to do substantial
equity.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). We review
the district court's award of trial attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. See In re
Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006).
II.
We first address the district court’s division of the parties’ marital property.
“In dissolution-of-marriage cases, marital property is to be divided equitably,
considering the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 598.21[(5)].” McDermott,
827 N.W.2d at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marriage of Hansen, 733
N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007)). A non-exhaustive list of the relevant statutory
considerations include “[t]he length of the marriage,” “property brought [in]to the
marriage,” “contribution[s] of each party to the marriage,” “[t]he age and . . . health
of the parties,” “[t]he earning capacity of each party,” “[t]he amount and duration of
[any spousal support] order[s],” and “[o]ther economic circumstances of [the]
part[ies].” Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2014). In dividing the property, the district court
must identify and value all assets subject to division. See In re Marriage of Keener,
728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007). “To value the property, we refer to the parties’
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stipulated value of most assets.” McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 679. “Because of the
difficulty surrounding valuation, appellate courts give much leeway to the trial court.
A trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the range of evidence.
Moreover, appellate courts defer to a trial court’s valuations when accompanied by
supporting credibility findings or corroborating evidence.” Keener, 728 N.W.2d at
194 (citations omitted).
As relevant here, the record reflects the following with respect to the parties’
employment and financial circumstances. At the time of trial, Jeff was fifty-one
years old. He retired from the National Guard after twenty years of service, and
he is eligible for pension benefits due to his service. He is the longtime owner and
operator of a profitable auto-body shop. Ronae was fifty-three at the time of trial.
She is a college graduate and holds a degree in business in addition to a
cosmetology license. In 2000, Ronae opened a salon and spa with Jeff. The
parties owned and operated the salon and spa until they separated in 2014. Ronae
testified the salon was very successful. Although Ronae was the full-time owner-
operator of the salon and spa, she has drawn Social Security Disability payments
for the last fifteen years. Over the course of the marriage, the parties obtained a
significant amount of property subject to division. They had a marital home, the
auto-body shop, the salon and spa, tools and inventory, and farmland. They
owned several cars, five four-wheelers, and a significant amount of jewelry and
other personal property.
The first question presented is whether the district court inequitably divided
the parties’ property by failing to treat Jeff’s pension as marital property and divide
the same. Ronae requests she be awarded one-half of the pension. Jeff defends
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the district court’s decree on the ground the National Guard pension has no
present value because Jeff “will not receive any benefits . . . until he reaches the
age of sixty-five.” He therefore contends the failure to divide the pension was
equitable. We disagree. “Under Iowa law pensions are characterized as marital
assets, subject to division in dissolution actions just as any other property.” In re
Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1996). More specifically, “[i]n
Iowa, military pensions are considered marital property and divided as such in
dissolution proceedings.” In re Marriage of Gahagen, No. 03-1731, 2004 WL
1813601, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2004). We modify the decree to provide
Jeff’s pension should be classified as marital property with Ronae to receive one-
half of the marital share of the pension as determined by the Benson formula.
We find the remainder of Ronae’s challenges to the property division to be
without merit. Other than failing to divide Jeff’s pension, the district court sorted
through the evidence, identified the marital property, valued the martial property
and debts, and divided the assets and liabilities in an equitable fashion. The
valuations of the property are within the range of evidence, and we will not disturb
those valuations. See Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 194. Pursuant to those valuations,
Ronae will receive a substantial and equitable equalization payment over the
course of several years. We do modify the decree to provide the equalization
payment shall be entered as a judgment and shall bear interest at the statutory
rate as set forth in Iowa Code section 535.3(1).
In sum, the district court equitably divided the parties’ marital assets and
liabilities with the exception of failing to divide Jeff’s pension from the National
Guard and in failing to provide for statutory interest on the judgment. We modify
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the decree to provide that Jeff’s pension shall be divided subject to the Benson
formula and to provide for interest on the equalization payment at the statutory
rate. We remand this matter to the district court to apply the formula to the facts
and circumstances of this case and to enter a qualified domestic relations order
implementing the division.
III.
We next address the issue of spousal support. The district court awarded
Ronae spousal support in the amount of $2000 per month commencing on July 1,
2024, after Jeff pays the final installment of the equalization payment. The spousal
support will end when either party dies, Ronae remarries, or Ronae reaches the
age of sixty-six, whichever comes first. On appeal, Ronae seeks $6000 per month,
retroactively applied from July 1, 2017, terminable at either parties’ death or
Ronae’s remarriage.
Spousal support “is not an absolute right,” but it may be appropriate
depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. See In re Marriage of
Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 2008). Iowa law generally recognizes three
forms of spousal support: traditional, rehabilitative and reimbursement. Id. at 826.
Given the length of the marriage, the parties agree an award of traditional spousal
support is appropriate here. See In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 411
(Iowa 2015) (identifying twenty years as the “durational threshold” at which an
award of traditional alimony may be appropriate).
The parties disagree regarding the amount and duration of the spousal
support award. The amount of the award is predicated on need and ability. See
id. at 410–11. “[T]he yardstick for determining need has been the ability of a
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spouse to become self-sufficient at ‘a standard of living reasonably comparable to
that enjoyed during the marriage.’” Id. at 411 (quoting Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(f)).
To determine need, we look to the earning capability of the spouses using the
historical record as an objective starting point. See id. We do a similar analysis
to determine the ability to pay. See id.
In reviewing the evidence presented, we conclude the district court’s
resolution of the spousal-support issue was inequitable. Here, the district court
concluded spousal support was necessary but delayed the payment of such
support until after the final payment of the property settlement. While it is correct
that “we consider the property division and spousal support provisions together in
determining their sufficiency,” we conclude it was improper, under the
circumstances presented, to delay the payment of spousal support. See In re
Marriage of Hazen, 778 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). Ronae was entitled
to an equitable division of the marital property at the time of the dissolution of the
marriage. While the district court allowed for the property settlement to be paid
over time due to liquidity constraints, this should not delay the provision of spousal
support when such support is determined to be appropriate. We modify the decree
to provide for the provision of spousal support commencing on the date of
dissolution to be paid monthly thereafter.
We reject Ronae’s claim to increase the amount of spousal support. Ronae
will receive a substantial equalization payment over the course of seven years,
which will bear interest at the statutory rate. Second, Ronae is relatively young
and has significant earning capacity. She has a business degree and cosmetology
license. She has operated a successful salon for almost fifteen years. Although
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she contends she has a medical condition limiting her ability to work, she did not
present substantial medical evidence in support of her claim. The fact that Ronae
has drawn Social Security disability benefits for the last fifteen years is of limited
relevance on this issue; Ronae, by her own admission, has operated full-time a
very successful and profitable salon while drawing the disability benefits. The
evidence does not show that she would not be able to continue to do so into the
future.
Ronae asks this court to order Jeff to purchase a life-insurance policy
insuring his life and naming Ronae as a beneficiary so long as he owes her
equalization and spousal-support payments. Jeff argues such an order would be
inappropriate because Ronae tried to kill Jeff. While Ronae is correct in asserting
the district court has the authority to include an insurance provision in the decree,
the district court is not required to do so. See cf. In re Marriage of Debler, 459
N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1990) (ordering paying spouse list befitting spouse as
beneficiary to life-insurance policy for the duration of the spousal-support award
without indicating it is mandatory to do so); In re Marriage of Mouw, 561 N.W.2d
100, 102 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (reducing life-insurance coverage awarded to
secure spousal-support award). Under the unique facts and circumstances of this
case, the district court declined to do so:
One component of the evidence that is disturbing to this Court
is Jeff’s testimony that shortly after the separation of the parties’, he
bled in the shower. He believes Ronae attempted to either kill or
disable him. While that sounds extreme, it seems to be supported in
some sense by the testimony of Katie Murray that Ronae attempted
to buy Coumadin from her. Under the circumstances, this Court can
understand Jeff’s concern.
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In light of the circumstances of this case, we decline to order Jeff purchase and
maintain a life-insurance policy on his life benefitting Ronae.
We affirm the alimony award as modified in this opinion.
IV.
Finally, we address the issue of trial and appellate attorney fees. Ronae
argues the district court abused its discretion in declining to award her trial attorney
fees. “An award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the [district] court
and [should] not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”
In re Marriage of Romanelli, 570 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Iowa 1997). “Whether attorney
fees should be awarded depends on the parties’ respective abilities to pay, and
fees awarded must be fair and reasonable.” See In re Marriage of Schmadeke,
No. 13-1659, 2014 WL 3930470, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014) (citations
omitted). This was a contentious dissolution proceeding. Both parties probably
incurred unnecessary expense by litigating this case in scorched-earth fashion.
Ronae used three separate attorneys in this case, one of whom withdrew due to
conflicts with Ronae. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in
declining to award fees on the facts presented.
Ronae seeks appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney fees are not a
matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” See In re Marriage of
McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687 (quoting In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d
260, 270 (Iowa 2005)). “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees,
we consider ‘the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party
to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Okland,
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699 N.W.2d at 270). After carefully considering each of these factors, we decline
to award fees.
V.
We have considered each of the parties’ arguments, whether set forth in full
herein. With the exception of the division of Jeff’s pension and the omission of
statutory interest, we conclude the decree is equitable under the circumstances
presented. We affirm the district court’s decree as modified in this opinion and
remand this matter for division of Jeff’s pension pursuant to the Benson formula.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.