MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 31 2018, 10:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jack Quirk Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Quirk & Hunter PC Attorney General of Indiana
Muncie, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Armando P. Castillo, October 31, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1571
v. Appeal from the
Delaware Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C02-1702-F4-6
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1571 | October 31, 2018 Page 1 of 10
[1] Armando P. Castillo (“Castillo”) was convicted after a bench trial of sexual
misconduct with a minor1 as a Level 4 felony and sentenced to eight years
executed in the Department of Correction. He appeals his conviction and raises
the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted testimony regarding Castillo’s answers during his
interview with police; and
II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
Castillo’s conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In the summer of 2015, J.C. was fifteen years old and lived in a three-bedroom
home with her family, which included her five siblings, her mother, and her
stepfather, Castillo. Tr. Vol. II at 37-39, 43. J.C.’s mother and Castillo were in
one bedroom, her adult brother was in another, and J.C. shared a bedroom
with her sisters. Id. at 39. Her brother was in college at the time, and her
mother was employed and worked mornings on the weekends and afternoons
on the weekdays, after picking up the children from school. Id. at 40, 70. In
the summer of 2015, Castillo began sexually abusing J.C. Id. at 43.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a)(1).
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[4] The sexual abuse occurred in the family’s house, typically on Tuesdays and
Thursdays. Id. at 43-44. On Tuesdays and Thursdays, J.C.’s sisters would be at
dance lessons, her mom would be working, and her brother would be visiting
his biological father, so J.C. and Castillo would be home alone. Id. at 44.
Castillo would either call or text J.C. to come to his bedroom and ask her to
bring him coffee or food. Id. at 45. When J.C. entered the room, Castillo
would lock the bedroom door and tell her to remove all of her clothes. Id. at
46. If J.C. refused, Castillo would remove them himself while holding her
hands down. Id. at 47, 51. Once J.C. was naked, Castillo would touch her bare
breasts and vagina with his hands. Id. at 47. Castillo would then insert his penis
into J.C.’s vagina. Id. at 48. He would continue the sexual intercourse until he
would tell her, “I’m coming. Hold on. I’m coming.” Id. at 48. Castillo would
ejaculate inside of her, except for the one or two occasions that he used a
condom and would then “pull out.” Id. at 48-49. If J.C. attempted to resist the
sexual intercourse, Castillo would “get mad” and would be more aggressive
and “go harder” when having sex with her. Id. at 52-52.
[5] Although these sexual acts usually occurred when no one else was in the house,
occasionally her siblings or mother would be at home. Id. at 52. If her mother
was home, Castillo would not have intercourse with J.C., but would only touch
her breasts and vagina. Id. Occasionally, one of J.C.’s sisters would be home
during these sexual acts and would knock on Castillo’s locked bedroom door.
Id. at 53. When this happened, Castillo would cover J.C.’s mouth and tell
whoever was knocking to wait because he was “trying to talk to your sister.”
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Id. at 53, 82. One of J.C.’s sisters later recalled hearing J.C. screaming in
Castillo’s room, but the sister ignored it because she thought that J.C. had fallen
“or something.” Id. at 81-82.
[6] This sexual abuse continued from the summer of 2015 until January 2017. J.C.
did not disclose the abuse earlier because she was scared. Id. at 53-54. To keep
J.C. from disclosing, Castillo would tell her that if they “didn’t have him [they]
would have no money . . .[and] would be on the streets” because J.C.’s mother
“wasn’t making enough for us to not have another income.” Id. at 54.
Therefore, J.C. worried that her sisters “would go hungry.” Id. She finally told
a friend about the sexual abuse while communicating through a messaging app
that J.C. used on a family member’s iPad. Id. at 61-62. The family member
found the conversation and brought it to the attention of J.C.’s mother. Id. On
January 26, 2017, J.C.’s mother then took J.C. to the hospital for an
examination and testing for sexually transmitted diseases. Id. at 42.
[7] J.C.’s mother confronted Castillo about molesting J.C., and he responded that
“he couldn’t believe that I was believing [J.C.] and . . . making him leave.” Id.
at 112-13. He then stated, “I might as well run.” Id. at 113. In the five days
between Castillo’s abuse of J.C. being discovered and Castillo’s arrest, he made
twenty-six Internet searches about bus and plane fares. Id. at 139, 143. During
the investigation of Castillo, Muncie Police Department Officer Kristofer
Swanson (“Officer Swanson”) interviewed Castillo. Officer Swanson was a
member of the Sexual Molest and Abuse Response Team within the Muncie
Police Department and had investigated several hundred sexual abuse cases.
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Id. at 126-27, 149. When asked about the allegations that he had molested J.C.,
Castillo denied any sexual contact with J.C. Id. at 146-47.
[8] On February 7, 2017, the State charged Castillo with Level 4 felony sexual
misconduct with a minor. Castillo waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench
trial was held. At trial, a video of Officer Swanson’s interview with Castillo
was admitted into evidence and played for the trial court. Officer Swanson
testified and was asked how he would characterize Castillo’s answers to his
questions in the interview. Id. at 136. Castillo objected to the question as
irrelevant and as invading the province of the trier of fact, but his objection was
overruled. Id. at 136-37. Officer Swanson responded to the question, “I felt like
he was avoiding answering the questions I was talking about and being
evasive.” Id. at 137. At the conclusion of the trial, Castillo was found guilty of
Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and the trial court sentenced
him to eight years executed. Castillo now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Testimony
[9] “Questions regarding the admission of evidence are entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015), trans. denied. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision on
appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its
discretion only if its decision regarding the admission of evidence is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the
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court has misinterpreted the law. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we
consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
but we also consider any undisputed evidence that is favorable to the defendant.
Id. Further, even if the admission of evidence is erroneous, the error is harmless
unless it affects the substantial rights of the defendant. Cannon v. State, 99
N.E.3d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
[10] Castillo argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Officer
Swanson to testify that he thought Castillo’s answers during his interview were
evasive. Castillo contends that Officer Swanson’s testimony was not rationally
“based on witness perception” and “was not offered to help clear any
understanding of the witness testimony or determine a fact in issue.” Appellant’s
Br. at 11. Therefore, Castillo asserts that Officer Swanson’s testimony invaded
the province of the trier of fact, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the
statement at trial.
[11] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 701, any witness not testifying as an expert, may
testify “in the form of an opinion” if it is “(a) rationally based on the perception
of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony or determination of a fact in issue.” “The requirement that the
opinion be ‘rationally based’ on perception simply means that the opinion must
be one that a reasonable person could normally form from the perceived facts,”
which are facts received “directly through any of the [witness’s own] senses.”
Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted). The
witness’s opinion is “helpful” “if the testimony gives substance to facts, which
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were difficult to articulate.” Id. (quoting McCutchan v. Blanck, 846 N.E.2d 256,
262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
[12] Here, during his investigation, Officer Swanson conducted an interview of
Castillo and was able to evaluate and personally observe Castillo’s answers to
the questions and his demeanor during the interview. Tr. Vol. II at 133-38.
Thus, Officer Swanson’s opinion was based on his personal perceptions gained
directly through his own senses while questioning Castillo. Additionally,
Officer Swanson’s testimony regarding Castillo’s answers to the interview
questions was helpful to the trial court because it explained why Officer
Swanson raised his voice toward the end of the interview. Specifically, the
State asked Officer Swanson, “I think in the video we saw a, towards the end
your voice raise. How would you characterize the answers that the Defendant
was giving you?” Id. at 136. Based on this question, it was clear that the State
was attempting to establish why Officer Swanson may have appeared frustrated
with Castillo during the interview. Therefore, the testimony was helpful to a
clear understanding of Officer Swanson’s testimony and his behavior while
interviewing Castillo. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted Officer Swanson’s testimony pursuant to Indiana
Evidence Rule 701.
[13] Even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer Swanson’s testimony, the error
was harmless. J.C. testified extensively regarding the sexual abuse she endured
from Castillo and how he would force her to have sexual intercourse. Castillo
has not shown how this sole characterization by Officer Swanson of Castillo’s
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interview answers as being evasive prejudiced his substantial rights and requires
reversal. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted Officer Swanson’s testimony, and even if it was error to do so,
it was harmless.
II. Sufficient Evidence
[14] The deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. When
we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we do not
reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Boggs v. State,
928 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We consider only the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from this evidence. Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 75 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), trans. denied. We also consider conflicting evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013), trans. denied. We will not disturb the verdict if there is substantial
evidence of probative value to support it. Fuentes, 10 N.E.3d at 75. We will
affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Delagrange v. State, 5 N.E.3d 354, 356 (Ind.
2014). A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of
a single witness, even when that witness is the victim. Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.3d
644, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
[15] Castillo argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. He asserts that
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there was no physical evidence presented “that any type of sexual penetration
or misconduct of any kind took place.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Castillo further
alleges that, “[t]he State made no effort to obtain medical evidence to support
its claim of sexual misconduct with a minor.” Id. He also contends that no
witnesses testified that they observed any behavior that amounted to sexual
intercourse or sexual misconduct. Based on this, Castillo maintains that the
State failed to meet its burden and that insufficient evidence was presented to
support his conviction.
[16] In order to support Castillo’s conviction for Level 4 felony sexual misconduct
with a minor, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Castillo was “a person at least twenty-one . . . years of age” who “perform[ed]
or submit[ted] to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct” with a “child at
least fourteen . . . years of age but less than sixteen . . . years of age.” Ind. Code
§ 35-42-4-9(a)(1).
[17] Here, the evidence most favorable to the verdict showed that J.C. testified that
she was fifteen years old at the time when Castillo first forced her to have sexual
intercourse, and it is undisputed that Castillo was older than twenty-one years
old during the relevant time period. Tr. Vol. II at 35, 43; Appellant’s Public App.
Vol. 2 at 18. At trial, J.C. testified that Castillo, on multiple occasions, would
force her to have sexual intercourse. She testified that he would call her to his
room, lock the door, demand that she remove her clothes, and then insert his
penis into her vagina until he ejaculated. Tr. Vol. II at 45-49. In her testimony,
she recalled that Castillo forced her to have sexual intercourse numerous times,
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but that he only used a condom once or twice. Id. at 48-50. J.C. recounted that
if she resisted the sexual encounters, Castillo would force her to submit to
sexual intercourse and would be more aggressive and “go harder” when having
sex with her. Id. at 52-52. J.C.’s testimony established that Castillo engaged in
sexual intercourse with her against her will when she was between the ages of
fourteen and sixteen, and he was over the age of twenty-one. A conviction can
be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even
when that witness is the victim. Dalton, 56 N.E.3d at 648. We, therefore,
conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Castillo’s
conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony.
[18] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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