T.C. Memo. 1997-281
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOAO MONTORO AND NEUZA PAULA, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 6182-95. Filed June 23, 1997.
Charles L. Steel IV, for petitioners.
Jeanne Gramling, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
COLVIN, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in
petitioners' Federal income tax and additions to tax as follows:
Additions to Tax Penalty
Sec. Sec. Sec.
1
Year Deficiency 6653(a) 6661 6662
1987 $5,592 $280 $1,398 --
1988 4,604 230 -- --
1990 33,961 -- -- $5,007
1991 96,366 -- -- 17,108
1
Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for an addition to tax for
negligence under sec. 6653(a)(1)(A) for 1987, 50 percent of the interest due on the
underpayment attributable to negligence under sec. 6653(a)(1)(B) for 1987, and an
addition to tax for negligence under sec. 6653(a)(1) for 1988.
2
After concessions,1 the issues for decision are:
(1) Whether petitioners' taxable income from International
Best Buys was $23,574 in 1990 and $147,426 in 1991, as
petitioners contend; $131,508 in 1990 and $396,905 in 1991, as
respondent contends; or some other amount. We hold that
petitioners' income from International Best Buys was $64,910 in
1990 and $201,992 in 1991.
(2) Whether petitioners may carry back net operating losses
of $15,976 to 1987 and $15,491 to 1988. We hold that they may
not.
(3) Whether petitioners are liable for (a) additions to tax
for negligence under section 6653 for 1987 and 1988 and
substantial understatement of income tax under section 6661 for
1987; and (b) the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a)
for 1990 and 1991. We hold that they are.
1
Petitioners concede that they failed to report the
following income:
1990 1991
IBM tax payments for Mr. Paula $44,069 $51,271
IBM severance payment to Mr. Paula -- 36,808
Wages paid to Mrs. Paula by A&P 1,609 --
Interest 2,542 943
Respondent concedes that petitioners are entitled to a
foreign tax credit of $7,510.83 for 1991 relating to the IBM
severance payment to Mr. Paula. Respondent also concedes that
petitioners may deduct a $141 penalty they paid in 1990 as the
result of a premature withdrawal of funds from a certificate of
deposit.
The Court expects the parties to compute petitioners' self-
employment tax liability and personal exemption phase-out (if
applicable) under Rule 155.
3
(4) Whether certain exhibits offered by respondent to
impeach the testimony of petitioner-husband are admissible. We
hold that they are not.
References to petitioner-husband are to Joao Montoro Paula.
References to petitioner-wife are to Nueza Paula. Section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the
years in issue. Unless otherwise indicated, rule references are
to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and references
to income tax returns are to United States (Federal) income tax
returns.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
A. Petitioners
Petitioners lived in Raleigh, North Carolina, when they
filed the petition in this case. Petitioner-husband was born and
raised in Brazil. He graduated from college there and has
degrees in chemical engineering and business administration.
Sometime before 1972, petitioner-husband worked for Ford Motor
Co. in Brazil for 6 years and was promoted to a management
position.
Petitioners have three sons: Luiz, born in 1970; Ricardo,
born in 1972; and Leandro, born in 1975.
Petitioners have had an apartment in Brazil from 1984 until
the time of trial. Petitioners were resident aliens of the
United States during the years in issue.
4
B. 1986 Revaluation of Brazilian Currency
On February 28, 1986, Brazil significantly revalued the
cruzeiro (Cr$). Beginning February 28, 1986, the Brazilian
currency was the cruzado (Cz$). One cruzado equals 1,000
cruzeiros.2 "Brazilian Cruzeiro/Cruzado," 1986-1987 World
Currency Yearbook, 242-249 (Philip P. Cowitt, ed. 1989). The
exchange rate was Cr$ 13,020 per U.S. dollar in February 1986 and
Cr$ 13.84 per U.S. dollar in March 1986.
C. Petitioner-Husband's IBM Employment
In 1972, petitioner-husband began to work for IBM-Brazil in
Campinas, Sao Paulo, Brazil. He worked for IBM for 18 years in
Brazil and the United States. In 1987, he began to work for IBM
in Raleigh, North Carolina. In late 1989 or early 1990, he
returned briefly to Brazil to work for IBM-Brazil. He soon took
a leave of absence from IBM and returned to the United States.
IBM wanted petitioner-husband to work in Brazil. He
resigned from IBM in January 1991 because his family wanted to
stay in the United States.
D. Petitioners' Assets in Brazil in 1986
2
The average official exchange rate was $1 to Cr$ 1841.50
for 1984, and $1 to Cr$ 6205.10 for 1985. Federal Reserve
Bulletin, International Statistics (Sept. 1986; Mar. 1987),
Foreign Exchange Rates. On Feb. 28, 1986, the official exchange
rate of cruzados to U.S. dollars was $1 to Cz$ 13.84. See
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. __ n. 19 (Apr. 30, 1997).
The parties stipulated that the exchange rates for 1986 were as
listed in the Federal Reserve Bulletin: Jan. Cr$ 11345.26; Feb.
Cr$ 13020.00; Mar.-Sept. Cr$ 13.84 (after the currency reform);
Oct. Cr$ 13.98; Nov. Cr$ 14.10; and Dec. Cr$ 14.54.
5
1. Real Property
In 1985, petitioners built a home at 909 Rua Madre Maria
Santa Margarida in Campinas, Sao Paulo. They owned the home in
1986. They also owned vacant land at Rua Jose Jorge Farah in
Campinas, a house at 108 Rua Luiz Gama in Sorocaba, and an
apartment in Mongagua. In 1986, petitioners began to build a
house on the Rua Jose Jorge Farah lot.
2. Personal Property (Telephone and Automobiles)
In 1986, petitioners owned the telephone line for the house
on Rua Madre Maria Santa Margarida. In Brazil, an individual may
buy a telephone line. Once purchased, the owner may resell it.
They also owned two automobiles, a Ford Corcel and a Volkswagen
Santana.
3. Petitioner-Husband's Inheritances
Petitioner-husband inherited Cr$ 415,200 ($30,000)3 in March
1986 from his father. In September 1986, petitioner-husband
inherited Cr$ 1,660,800 ($120,000) from his father.
4. Sale of Petitioners' Assets in Brazil in 1986
In 1986, petitioners sold all of their Brazilian assets,
except their apartment in Mongagua. Petitioners sold the
unfinished house at Rua Jose Jorge Farah to petitioner-husband's
3
U.S. dollar amounts following cruzeiro or cruzado amounts
are the contemporaneous equivalents.
6
brother. Petitioner-husband reported the sale of these assets on
the Brazilian income tax return he filed for 1986.4 In signing
the 1986 Brazilian return, petitioner-husband attested to its
truth. Petitioners reported that, at the end of 1986, their
Brazilian assets (consisting primarily of cash) totaled Cr$
5,173,690 ($355,825). Petitioners kept the cash from the sale of
these assets in a safe in Brazil.
E. Petitioners' Trips to and Movement of Cash From Brazil
In 1990, petitioner-husband traveled to Brazil four times.
He returned to the United States from the first trip on March 16.
Petitioners' son, Leandro, played soccer for the Raleigh Flyers.
In the summer of 1990, petitioner-husband took the team to
Brazil. He returned to the United States on July 5 or 6, 1990.
He returned from his next trips on September 19 and November 16.
He brought cash from their safe on each of these trips.
Petitioners used this money to pay their rent and other living
expenses, their son's college tuition, and to provide funds for
petitioner-husband's business, International Best Buys (discussed
at par. F below).
4
Brazilian law did not require petitioner-wife to sign the
Brazilian tax return.
7
In 1990, petitioners deposited $136,408 in nine bank
accounts (eight in the United States and one in Brazil). Of that
amount, the following is nontaxable:
Date Check/currency Amount deposited Source of funds
4/12 travelers checks $1,790 Mar. Brazil trip
4/24 Cr$ 1,679,225.87 30,531 Brazilian account
7/9 unknown 7,300 July Brazil trip
7/11 currency 3,200 July Brazil trip
8/22 travelers checks 4,000 July Brazil trip
9/25 currency 1,007 Sept. Brazil trip
9/25 currency 1,436 Sept. Brazil trip
11/20 currency/trav. check 2,088 Nov. Brazil trip
11/20 currency 6,596 Nov. Brazil trip
12/3 currency5 6,400 Transfer
12/3 check 2,250 Cashed check for friend
Total $66,598
In 1991, petitioner-husband brought cash from their safe
after each of several trips to Brazil. Petitioner-husband
sometimes kept the cash he brought from Brazil in a safe in his
Raleigh office before he deposited it in petitioners' non-
interest bearing checking accounts. Petitioners deposited
$396,905 in eight (seven U.S. and one Brazilian) bank accounts.
Of the $396,905, petitioners deposited Cr$ 14,651,647.28
($48,009) in the Bank of Itau in Brazil from their personal
assets, and they made nontaxable deposits to U.S. bank accounts
as follows:
5
This deposit was a transfer from account 157460395.
8
Date Check/currency Amount deposited Source
1/21 currency $ 4,650 Jan. Brazil trip
1/22 currency 1,120 Jan. Brazil trip
1/23 currency 200 Jan. Brazil trip
2/1 currency 6,680 Jan. Brazil trip
4/4 currency 9,500 Apr. Brazil trip
4/4 currency 9,500 Apr. Brazil trip
4/4 currency 9,500 Apr. Brazil trip
4/5 currency 7,000 Apr. Brazil trip
4/23 check 640 PanAm refund
5/3 check 8,000 exchanged money
6/4 currency 2,900 June Brazil trip
6/21 currency 500 June Brazil trip
7/18 check 45 manufacturer's rebate
7/26 travelers checks 4,000 July Brazil trip
11/22 currency 3,000 Nov. Brazil trip
12/26 currency 4,800 Dec. Brazil trip
Total $72,035
On some of his trips to Brazil in 1991, petitioner-husband
took money from the safe and gave it to his secretary. He
instructed her to use the money to pay expenses, such as Social
Security, and to wire him the balance. Petitioners deposited the
following funds from wire transfers (from nontaxable sources) in
their U.S. accounts in 1991:
Date Amount deposited Source
4/4 $20,000 personal assets in Brazil
5/29 15,900 Money returned to manufacturer for
jewelry consignment
7/24 5,500 personal assets in Brazil
9/30 8,469 personal assets in Brazil
10/9 10,000 personal assets in Brazil
10/17 15,000 personal assets in Brazil
Total $74,869
F. International Best Buys
In February 1987, petitioner-husband started an import
business in Raleigh called International Best Buys
9
(International) in partnership with Mrs. Joyner (Joyner). Joyner
was petitioner-husband's English teacher in the United States.
Petitioner-husband and Joyner formed International to sell
costume jewelry that they imported from Brazil. Petitioners did
not attach a Schedule C (Profit or Loss From Business (Sole
Proprietorship)) for International to their 1987 and 1988
returns.
In 1989, Joyner transferred her interest in International to
petitioner-wife. The record does not show how much petitioners
invested in the partnership or how much they paid Joyner for her
interest. In 1989, petitioner-husband bought silver jewelry for
International to sell in the United States. He attended trade
shows in San Antonio and other places to try to sell merchandise.
Petitioner-husband began to work full-time for International
in 1990. International's sales of jewelry were poor, and the
company lost money in 1990 and 1991. In 1990 and 1991,
International was a sole proprietorship. Petitioners attached a
Schedule C for International to their 1990 and 1991 returns.
International began to export electronic components to
Brazil in 1990. Petitioner-husband continued to export
electronic components to Brazil in 1991 and stopped importing
jewelry from Brazil. His export sales grew in 1991 and 1992.
International had gross receipts of $64,910 in 1990, $201,992 in
1991, about $400,000 in 1992, and about $1.3 million in 1993.
10
G. Petitioners' U.S. Tax Returns
1. Petitioners' Tax Return Preparer
Michael Perkins (Perkins), a certified public accountant in
Raleigh, prepared petitioners' tax returns for tax years 1989 to
1993. Perkins and petitioner-husband have been friends for more
than 10 years. Their sons played soccer together. Perkins and
his son accompanied petitioner-husband on the soccer team's trip
to Brazil in 1990.
Perkins reviewed some receipts for earlier years to ensure
that petitioner-husband complied with U.S. tax requirements for
deducting business and travel expenses, but he primarily relied
on the worksheets furnished by petitioner-husband. At trial,
Perkins did not remember whether he saw sales receipts, invoices,
journals, or ledgers for International for the years in issue.
2. Petitioner-Wife's Import Business
Petitioner-wife's import sales business had gross receipts
of $4,900 in 1990. Petitioners included that amount in the gross
receipts reported on petitioner-husband's Schedule C for
International for 1990. Petitioners did not file a separate
Schedule C for petitioner-wife's import sales business with their
original 1990 return. Petitioners reallocated $4,900 from
petitioner-husband's International business to petitioner-wife's
Schedule C attached to their amended return for 1990.
Petitioner-wife had costs of goods sold and expenses totaling
11
$3,752 from her import sales business in 1990, as petitioners
reported on their amended return for 1990.
3. International
Petitioners reported that International had gross receipts
of $23,574 in 1990 and $147,426 in 1991, cost of goods sold and
expenses of $39,550 in 1990 and $162,917 in 1991, and losses of
$15,976 in 1990 and $15,491 in 1991.
Petitioner-husband deducted Schedule C expenses for
International of $22,963 in 1990 and $30,234 in 1991. The
parties agree that petitioners' taxable income should be
decreased by $1,119 in 1990 and increased by $4,670 in 1991
because of changes to International's Schedule C expenses for
those years.
4. Net Operating Loss Carrybacks
Petitioners reported net operating losses of $15,976 on
their original return ($14,448 on the amended return) for 1990
and $15,491 on their return for 1991. Petitioners elected to
carry the net operating losses back to 1987 and 1988 by filing
Forms 1045. Petitioners' net operating losses equaled the
Schedule C losses from International in 1990 and 1991.
H. Respondent's Examination
Revenue Agent Margaret Davis (Davis) began to examine
petitioners' returns for 1990 and 1991 late in 1992. Davis asked
petitioners for the books and records of International, including
12
receipts and disbursements journals, the general ledger, work
papers, adjusting journal entries, canceled checks, bank
statements, and deposit slips for all accounts for 1990.
Petitioners gave her some of the bank statements, but did not
give her International's books and records. In November 1992,
Davis asked petitioners for their canceled checks from December
1, 1989, to January 31, 1991. Petitioner-husband told her that
he had destroyed them.
On November 4, 1992, Davis asked petitioner-husband how much
cash on hand he had. Davis did not specify whether "cash on
hand" included cash petitioners may still have had in Brazil.
Petitioner-husband did not understand it to include cash
petitioners had in Brazil. Petitioner-husband told Davis that he
had less than $500 in cash on hand at the beginning and end of
1990.
Petitioner-husband told Davis that he brought no more than
$8,000 each time he returned from Brazil, two or three times a
year.
On November 19, 1992, petitioner-husband told Davis that he
had kept money in a safe in a house in Brazil until he sold the
house in 1990. After he sold the house, he kept the safe
elsewhere in Brazil. Petitioner-husband initially told Davis
that he did not know whether he had more or less than $10,000 in
13
the safe, and that the money in the safe came from savings from
his years of working for IBM and inheritances from his father.
On March 29, 1994, petitioner-husband gave Davis a revised
estimate of the amount of his cash which included the proceeds
from the sale of petitioners' assets in Brazil.
Davis did a bank deposits analysis to estimate petitioners'
income for 1990 and 1991. She examined petitioners' bank
accounts. She sought to exclude from her analysis sources of
income which she thought were nontaxable, including transfers
between accounts, expense reimbursements, and offsetting wire
transfers. She apparently did not believe that petitioners had a
significant amount of money in Brazil as of December 31, 1989.
Petitioners deposited $136,408 in nine bank accounts in
1990. They reported that they had received $23,574 of that
amount as Schedule C gross receipts on their 1990 return.
Respondent subtracted $23,574 and gross receipts of $4,900
allocated to petitioner-wife, and determined that petitioners had
understated their taxable income for 1990 by $107,934.
Petitioners deposited $396,905 in eight bank accounts in
1991, $147,426 of which they reported on their 1991 return as
Schedule C gross receipts. Respondent determined that
petitioners had understated their taxable income for 1991 by
$249,479 ($396,905 - $147,426).
14
OPINION
A. Admissibility of Exhibits AG and AH
Three days before the trial in this case, respondent's
counsel found in the files for this case a currency transaction
report (Exhibit AG) and a criminal referral report prepared by
the NCNB National Bank of North Carolina (Exhibit AH) and sent to
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Respondent's
counsel had seen these documents before, but had not thought that
they were significant. On the day before the trial, respondent's
counsel called petitioners' counsel and told him that respondent
might call Rose Wiseman (Wiseman), an administrative assistant at
NationsBank in Raleigh, as a rebuttal witness. Respondent had
not listed Wiseman as a witness. Respondent's counsel gave him
Wiseman's name and telephone number, but did not give him a copy
of Exhibits AG and AH. Petitioners' counsel did not contact
Wiseman.
At trial, petitioner-husband testified that he made three
cash deposits totaling $28,500 on April 4, 1991, but that he did
not remember the denominations of the currency he deposited.
Respondent called Wiseman to impeach his testimony. During
Wiseman's testimony, respondent offered Exhibits AG and AH into
evidence. Exhibit AG reports that John M. Paula made a $28,500
cash deposit on April 4, 1991, and that the deposit was made to
three accounts and consisted of $28,500 in $100 bills and larger.
15
Exhibit AH is a form Wiseman prepared and sent to the Comptroller
of the Currency entitled "Criminal Referral Report". Wiseman
prepared Exhibit AH based on information she received from the
teller who handled the deposits. The report states:
Mr. Paula came into the Towne North Branch of NCNB
National Bank and made deposits totaling $28,500, in
new, crisp $100 bills. The deposits were made into
three separate accounts. The teller became suspicious
because of the large dollar amount and the new bills.
At trial, petitioners objected to the introduction into
evidence of Exhibits AG and AH because respondent did not
exchange them with petitioners before offering them into
evidence.
Five months before this case was calendared for trial, the
Court's standing pretrial order was served on the parties. It
stated in part:
Any documents or materials which a party expects to
utilize in the event of trial (except for impeachment),
but which are not stipulated, shall be identified in
writing and exchanged by the parties at least 15 days
before the first day of the trial session.
Materials not provided in compliance with our pretrial
orders may be excluded from evidence. Rules 104(c)(2), 132(b);
Moretti v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 637, 644 (2d Cir. 1996).
Respondent contends that Exhibits AG and AH impeach the
testimony of petitioner-husband and, thus, need not be exchanged
15 days ahead of the first day of the trial session. We
disagree. Respondent offered the currency transaction report
16
into evidence to show that petitioner-husband had made three cash
deposits of $9,500 each on April 4, 1991, to three bank accounts.
However, Exhibit AG does not differ substantially from his
testimony. The bank's criminal referral report said that
petitioner-husband deposited $28,500 in "new, crisp $100 bills"
in three bank accounts. Respondent contends that this impeaches
petitioner-husband's testimony that the money he deposited was
from cash he had in his safe in Brazil since 1989. We disagree.
The fact that the $100 bills were new and crisp in 1991 does not
establish that the bills were issued after 1986; they may simply
have been uncirculated. Thus, Exhibit AH does not impeach
petitioner-husband's testimony that the cash he deposited was
from his safe in Brazil.
Respondent contends that petitioner-husband's lack of memory
about the nature of the April 4, 1991, deposits is analogous to a
denial. Respondent relies on United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d
1314, 1321-1322 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 549
F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976). Respondent's reliance on those
cases is misplaced. In United States v. DiCaro, supra at 1321-
1322, a witness had testified to certain facts before a grand
jury but claimed to have forgotten those facts by the time of
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 284
(4th Cir. 1982) (witness' lack of memory impeached by his prior
grand jury testimony); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490,
17
495-496 (8th Cir. 1976) (witness' lack of memory impeached by
prior written statement given to FBI agent). That is not the
case here. Petitioner-husband did not previously state or
testify that he deposited new $100 bills; his lack of specific
memory is believable under the circumstances, unlike the cases
respondent cites. Thus, the documents do not impeach petitioner-
husband's lack of memory.
Respondent contends that the documents are admissible under
rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as admissions
by a party. We disagree. Since respondent did not exchange the
documents with petitioners in compliance with the standing
pretrial order, they are admissible only to impeach testimony, by
agreement of the parties, or for good cause shown. Respondent
has not shown good cause for not complying with the pretrial
order. Respondent knew 2 years before trial that petitioners
contended that the money they deposited was from their Brazilian
funds and should have exchanged Exhibits AG and AH with
petitioners as part of the stipulation process. Respondent's
failure to exchange the documents led to the type of surprise
that the pretrial order and Rule 91 were designed to prevent.
Barkley Co. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 66, 70 (1987); see Branerton
Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974). We conclude that
Exhibits AG and AH are not admissible.
18
B. Deficiency
1. Respondent's Use of the Bank Deposits Method
We must decide whether, as respondent contends, petitioners had
unreported income in the amounts of $107,934 in 1990 and $249,479 in
1991. Respondent reconstructed petitioners' income using the bank
deposits method. Petitioners agree that they deposited $136,408 in
their bank accounts in 1990 and $396,905 in 1991.
If a taxpayer does not maintain adequate books and records,
respondent may reconstruct a taxpayer's income by any reasonable
method which clearly reflects income, sec. 446(b); Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 130-132 (1954), including the bank
deposits method. Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 658 (1990);
Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 656 (1975), affd.
566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977). Bank deposits are prima facie
evidence of income. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77
(1986); Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, supra at 656-657. Where
the taxpayer suggests a nontaxable source, the Commissioner must
either connect the bank deposits to a likely source of taxable
income or negate the nontaxable source alleged by the taxpayer.
Kramer v. Commissioner, 389 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1968), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1966-234.
Respondent's determination is presumed to be correct, and
petitioners bear the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners bear
the burden of proving that unexplained deposits are not taxable
19
to them. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 869 (1991), affd.
on other grounds 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Parks v.
Commissioner, supra at 658.
2. Whether Petitioner-Husband's Testimony Was Generally
Credible
Petitioners contend that they had the money for the bank
deposits in Brazil before 1990 and brought it to the United
States in 1990 and 1991. Respondent contends that petitioner-
husband's testimony regarding their Brazilian funds is self-
serving and lacks credibility.
We decide whether a witness is credible based on objective
facts, the reasonableness of the testimony, the consistency of
statements made by the witness, and the demeanor of the witness.
Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 420-421 (1891); Wood
v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964), affg. 41 T.C.
593 (1964); Pinder v. United States, 330 F.2d 119, 124-125 (5th
Cir. 1964); Concord Consumers Housing Coop. v. Commissioner, 89
T.C. 105, 124 n.21 (1987). We may discount testimony which we
find to be unworthy of belief, but we may not arbitrarily
disregard testimony that is competent, relevant, and
uncontradicted, Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir.
1994), affg. 99 T.C. 370 (1992), and T.C. Memo. 1992-616;
Demkowicz v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 929, 931-932 (3d Cir. 1977),
revg. T.C. Memo. 1975-278; Banks v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 530,
537 (8th Cir. 1963), affg. in part and remanding in part T.C.
Memo. 1961-237; Loesch & Green Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 211
20
F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir. 1954), revg. and remanding a Memorandum
Opinion of this Court. Petitioner-husband's testimony was
plausible and, we believe, generally truthful.
3. Whether Respondent Investigated Leads
Petitioners argue that respondent did not investigate
relevant leads to their nontaxable sources of deposits. We
disagree. Petitioners first told Davis that they had a
substantial cash hoard in Brazil in March 1994. Respondent could
not independently verify how much money they had in Brazil.
Respondent determined that International was a likely source of
petitioners' deposits. Petitioners did not give respondent
International's books and records so respondent could not verify
the extent to which International was a likely source of income.
4. Whether Respondent Subtracted Nontaxable Sources of
Deposits in Reconstructing Petitioners' Income
Respondent contends that respondent properly reconstructed
petitioners' income for 1990 and 1991 using the bank deposits
method by subtracting from petitioners' income nontaxable sources
of deposits including transfers between bank accounts, expense
reimbursements, and offsetting wire transfers. As discussed
below, we conclude that respondent did not subtract all
nontaxable sources of deposits to petitioners' U.S. bank
accounts.
Respondent contends that petitioners have not proven that
their bank deposits in 1990 and 1991 were from cash that they had
at the end of 1989. Respondent contends that petitioners kept
21
poor records, did not show how much cash they had on December 31,
1989, and gave inconsistent estimates of their cash on hand on
that date. Respondent points out that petitioner-husband
initially told Davis that he had less than $500 in cash at the
beginning and end of 1990. We believe that petitioner-husband's
answer was consistent because he did not think Davis intended
cash on hand to include money he had in Brazil.
Petitioner-husband initially told Davis that he brought no
more than $8,000 from Brazil two or three times a year. However,
he made that statement to Davis before he told her about the
significant amount of funds petitioners had in Brazil at the end
of 1989. We are convinced that petitioner-husband brought more
than $8,000 twice a year in 1990 and 1991.
As discussed above, we believe much of petitioner-husband's
testimony about petitioners' cash on hand in 1990.
5. Values Stated on Petitioners' Brazilian Tax Returns
Petitioners contend that their 1986 Brazilian tax return
shows that they had $534,160 (in U.S. dollars) in cash on
December 31, 1986. We disagree. Petitioners reported on their
1986 Brazilian return that they had Cr$ 4,753,690 ($326,939) in
cash and the apartment in Mongagua worth Cr$ 420,000 ($28,886),
for a total of $355,825.
Petitioner-husband testified that petitioners had $328,975
in cash and $209,244 for the "difference of the sales" in
December 1986, which they contend is supported by deeds showing
22
the purchase and sale of petitioners' real property in Brazil.
Petitioner-husband did not define the phrase the "difference of
the sales". As discussed below, we find that petitioners had
$326,939 in cash in December 1989.
Petitioner-husband testified that he sold the Rua Jose Jorge
Farah property for $150,000 and the house at Rua Madre Maria
Santa Margarida for $140,000. Respondent points out that these
amounts are inconsistent with the amounts petitioners reported on
their 1986 Brazilian return. We agree. Petitioner-husband
reported that he sold the Rua Jose Jorge Farah property for Cr$
1,660,000 ($119,942) and the Rua Madre Maria Santa Margarida
house for Cr$ 1,972,600 ($135,667) on petitioners' 1986 Brazilian
return.
Statements in a U.S. Federal tax return are admissions under
Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and will not be
overcome without cogent evidence that they are wrong. Waring v.
Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800, 801 (3d Cir. 1969), affg. per curiam
T.C. Memo. 1968-126; Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312,
337-338 (1989); Lare v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 739, 750 (1974),
affd. without published opinion 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975). In
signing the Brazilian return, petitioner-husband attested to its
truth. We believe it is appropriate to apply this doctrine to
petitioners' Brazilian returns. Thus, we find that petitioners
sold the Rua Jose Jorge Farah property for $119,942 and the Rua
23
Madre Maria Santa Margarida house for $135,667 as reported on
their 1986 Brazilian return.
6. Petitioners' Deposits from Nontaxable Sources
a. Petitioners' Contentions
Petitioners contend that petitioner-husband brought $8,000
back from a trip to Brazil on July 17, 1991, and deposited it 2
days later. We disagree. The July 19, 1991, deposit was made by
wire transfer. We have not included this amount as a nontaxable
source of funds.
Petitioners contend that petitioner-husband made a $20,000
deposit to one of his joint accounts with Mr. Simoes on September
25, 1990, from nontaxable funds. We disagree. Petitioner-
husband told Davis that Mr. Simoes gave him $20,000 to buy parts
or to pay Underwriters' Laboratories. In contrast, petitioner-
husband testified that Mr. Simoes gave him the money to buy
samples, that Mr. Simoes lent him the $20,000, and that the money
was to pay Mr. Simoes' expenses while he was in the United
States. Petitioner-husband's explanations are inconsistent, and
we have not included this amount in petitioners' nontaxable
sources of funds.
Petitioners contend that a $29,307 wire transfer from the
Cayman Islands to one of their accounts in August 1991 was money
Mr. Arnaldo was holding for petitioner-husband in Brazil. We
disagree because Mr. Arnaldo's name is not on the record of the
24
wire transfer. We have not included this amount in petitioners'
nontaxable sources of funds.
b. Respondent's Contentions
Respondent contends that the inheritance check petitioner-
husband received from his father was worth about $120, using the
August 1986 exchange rate of Cz$ 13.84. We disagree.
Respondent's contention about the value of petitioner-husband's
inheritance is contrary to the stipulated exchange rates for
dollars and cruzeiros in August 1986.
Respondent points out that petitioner-husband told Davis
that there were no records of the inheritance check he received
from his father, but at trial he offered into evidence a copy of
the check for Cr$ 1,660,800 ($120,000). We admitted the check
because petitioner-husband had given respondent the number of the
check about a month before trial.
Respondent points out that petitioner-husband told Davis
that he was uncertain whether he had more or less than $10,000 in
the safe. Respondent contends that this is inconsistent with
petitioner-husband's later claim that he kept a large amount of
cash in the safe. Respondent's point seeks to make something out
of nothing. We believe that petitioner-husband kept money in the
safe in Brazil but did not initially tell Davis the amount.
Petitioner-husband wrote to Davis in March 1994 and revised his
estimate of petitioners' cash on hand to include funds from the
sale of petitioners' Brazilian assets.
25
Respondent contends that petitioner-husband told Davis
during the examination that wire transfers to petitioners' bank
accounts were from Brazilian business customers who wired sales
revenue to him. Petitioner-husband later told Davis and
testified that other people, including his sister, sent him money
from Brazil.
Petitioner-husband testified that only petitioners had
access to their safe in Brazil. Respondent contends that
petitioner-husband told Davis that wire transfers from MTB,
Cayman Islands, were sales revenue from a customer (MTB), but
later told her and testified that three or four people, including
his secretary and his sister, wired him money from Brazil. He
told Davis that his sister asked a person with an account outside
of Brazil to wire the money.
We believe that petitioner-husband satisfactorily explained
the wire transfers to petitioners' U.S. accounts. Petitioner-
husband credibly testified that, as his business started to grow
and he needed more money to invest in it, he had several people,
including his sister and his secretary, wire money from Brazil to
petitioners' U.S. accounts. He testified that, on some of his
trips to Brazil, he took money from the safe, gave it to his
secretary to pay expenses such as Social Security, and she wired
him the balance. He also testified that MTB is a bank and denied
telling Davis that it was a customer. He also testified that he
collected a few thousand dollars from two customers in Brazil.
26
Petitioner-husband credibly testified that $58,969 of the
1991 wire transfers (including $50,500 from the Cayman Islands)
to petitioners' bank accounts were from his own money in Brazil.
His testimony is consistent with the documentary evidence. We
have found that other wire transfers were from taxable sources.
On March 29, 1994, petitioner-husband told Davis that he had
obtained the funds for a $6,400 deposit in December 1990 from his
funds in Brazil on a November 16, 1990, trip. In contrast, he
testified that the deposit resulted from a bank-to-bank transfer.
Bank records corroborate his testimony; there was a $6,400
withdrawal from account 157460395 on December 3, 1990, and a
$6,400 deposit to account 6269-258236 on December 3, 1990.
Respondent contends that petitioners' deposits to their
accounts were not made from cash petitioner-husband brought from
Brazil because petitioner-husband or petitioner-wife waited up to
1 month after petitioner-husband returned to the United States to
deposit money in one of their accounts. We disagree for the most
part. Petitioner-husband sometimes kept the money in a safe in
his Raleigh office before he deposited it in his non-interest
bearing checking accounts. To the extent that petitioner-husband
did not convince us that deposits were from nontaxable sources,
we did not include those deposits as a nontaxable source of
funds.
Respondent contends that the fact that petitioner-husband
used the 108 Rua Luiz Gama address as his address on his 1989
27
adjusted Brazilian tax return and 1991 Brazilian tax return shows
that petitioners did not sell that house in September 1986. We
disagree; we give more weight to the fact that petitioners
reported the sale of and paid tax on the Rua Luiz Gama property
on their 1986 Brazilian tax return than we do to the fact that
petitioner-husband used that address on his 1989 and 1991
Brazilian returns, filed when petitioners were no longer living
in Brazil.
Respondent argues that petitioners did not have a
substantial amount of funds in 1990 because petitioner-husband
testified6 that he spent all of the money he brought from Brazil
to the United States accompanying the Raleigh Flyers soccer team
to tournaments in the United States for 5 years. We disagree.
We do not believe that petitioner-husband meant that he actually
spent all of his money following the soccer team.
c. Conclusion
Petitioners owned and sold real property and other assets in
Brazil in 1986, and petitioner-husband brought cash into the
United States when he returned from trips to Brazil. About half
of petitioners' deposits in 1990 and 1991 came from the cash that
6
Petitioner-husband testified as follows:
Q * * * why did you take a soccer team to Brazil?
A * * * I was following since 19-- five years, that I was
following that team, you know, expending all the money that I
brought from Brazil in hotels, in tournaments, here in the United
States, you know, following * * * [those] boys.
28
they had accumulated by the end of 1986 from the sale of most of
their Brazilian assets and inheritances they received in 1986.
We find that, of the disputed deposits, $66,597.25 in 1990 and
$194,913 in 1991 came from petitioners' funds in Brazil and from
other nontaxable sources, such as transfers between accounts,
cashing checks or exchanging money for friends, the PanAm refund,
and a manufacturer's rebate. Petitioners have not shown that the
source of the funds for the remaining items in dispute was
nontaxable. We conclude that petitioners had income from
International of $64,911 for 1990 and $201,992 for 1991.
C. Net Operating Loss Carrybacks
Petitioners contend that they had losses of $15,976 in 1990
and $15,491 in 1991 which they may carry back to 1987 and 1988.
Section 172 allows a taxpayer to deduct net operating
losses. Petitioners bear the burden of proving that they had net
operating losses in 1990 and 1991. Rule 142(a); United States v.
Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., 349 U.S. 232, 235 (1955).
Petitioners must prove the amount of the net operating loss
carryback. Sec. 172(c); Jones v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1100,
1104 (1956), revd. and remanded on other grounds 259 F.2d 300
(5th Cir. 1958); Vaughan v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 596, 600
(1929). Petitioners did not report income of $89,556 in 1990 and
$143,588 in 1991. Petitioners did not show that they had net
operating losses for 1990 and 1991 after taking into account the
29
income they did not report for those years. Thus, we sustain
respondent on this issue.
D. Additions to Tax and Penalty
1. Negligence
Negligence is a lack of due care or failure to do what a
reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the
circumstances. Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th
Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982); Marcello v. Commissioner,
380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), affg. in part and remanding
in part 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C. Memo. 1964-299; Neely v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). Petitioners must show
that they acted reasonably and prudently and exercised due care.
Neely v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioners argue that they are not liable for additions to
tax for negligence and substantial understatement and the
accuracy-related penalty because they relied on their accountant
to prepare accurate returns for them for 1990 and 1991.
Petitioners point out that Perkins testified that petitioner-
husband prepared summaries of his business activities for 1990
and 1991, and that Perkins believed the summaries were accurate.
Good faith reliance on the advice of a competent,
independent tax professional may offer relief from the imposition
of the addition to tax for negligence. United States v. Boyle,
469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985); Leonhart v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d 749,
750 (4th Cir. 1969), affg. T.C. Memo. 1968-98; Otis v.
30
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 671, 675 (1980). Petitioners bear the
burden of proving that their reliance on professional advice was
reasonable. Rule 142(a); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849,
888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S.
868 (1991).
Petitioners failed to explain why they did not report the
IBM tax payments for petitioner-husband for 1990 and 1991 or his
IBM severance payment in 1991, petitioner-wife's wages from A&P
for 1990, or their interest income for 1990 and 1991. See supra,
p. 2, note 1. Petitioners have not shown that their erroneous
claim that they had net operating loss carrybacks to 1987 and
1988 was not due to negligence. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
1078, 1092 (1982) (taxpayer negligently omitted income for 1976,
resulting in a net operating loss for 1976 which he carried back
to 1973; taxpayer liable for negligence for 1973 and 1976). We
hold that petitioners are liable for the addition to tax for
negligence for 1987 and 1988.
2. Substantial Understatement
Section 6661(a) imposes an addition to tax of 25 percent of
the amount of any underpayment attributable to a substantial
understatement of income tax in any taxable year. A substantial
understatement exists if in any year the amount of the
understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax
required to be shown on the return or $5,000. Sec.
6661(b)(1)(A). An understatement is the amount required to be
31
shown on the return less the amount actually shown on the return.
Sec. 6661(b)(2)(A).
Petitioners contend that they are not liable for the
addition for substantial understatement because they acted in
good faith in relying on Perkins in filing their 1990 and 1991
returns. We disagree for the reasons stated at par. B-1, above.
We sustain respondent's determination on this issue.
3. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Taxpayers are liable for a penalty equal to 20 percent
of the part of the underpayment due to negligence or disregard of
rules or regulations or to a substantial understatement of income
tax. Sec. 6662(a), (b)(1) and (2). Negligence includes a
failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the internal
revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
preparation of a tax return. Sec. 6662(c). An understatement is
substantial if it exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax
required to be shown on the return or $5,000. Sec.
6662(d)(1)(A). Petitioners bear the burden of proving that they
are not liable for the accuracy-related penalty imposed by
section 6662(a). Rule 142(a).
Petitioners argue that they are not liable for the accuracy-
related penalty because they relied on their accountant to
prepare accurate returns for them for 1990 and 1991. Petitioners
point out that Perkins testified that petitioner-husband prepared
summaries of his business activities for 1990 and 1991, and that
32
Perkins believed there was no reason to question the accuracy of
those summaries. We disagree.
As discussed at par. B-1, above, petitioners offered no
evidence showing what information or documentation they provided
to Perkins concerning their IBM payments, wages from A&P, or
interest income, and they did not explain why they did not report
various income items for 1990 and 1991 including the income from
International. We hold that petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty for 1990 and 1991 because they have not
shown that they reasonably relied on Perkins.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.