T.C. Memo. 2009-181
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BYRON REYNOLDS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9061-07L. Filed August 10, 2009.
Byron Reynolds, pro se.
Michael Thomas Garrett, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on
respondent’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 1211 and to
impose penalties under section 6673. The petition was filed in
1
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
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response to respondent’s Notice of Determination Concerning
Collection Action(s) Under Section 6330 (notice of determination)
with respect to petitioner’s income tax liabilities for 1998,
1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003.
Background
Petitioner, who resided in California when he filed his
petition, failed to file Federal income tax returns from 1998
through 2003.2
On September 5, 2003, respondent prepared substitutes for
returns (SFRs) for petitioner for taxable years 1998, 1999, and
2001 pursuant to section 6020(b). On January 21, 2004,
respondent mailed statutory notices of deficiency for 1998, 1999,
and 2001 to petitioner’s last known address in California. In
the notices respondent determined income tax deficiencies and
additions as follows:
Additions to tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) and (2) Sec. 6654(a)
1998 $14,297.40 $3,256.32 $345.72
1999 13,154.10 4,695.22 582.64
2001 27,818.00 8,623.58 1,100.84
On April 20, 2004, petitioner mailed a one-page handwritten
letter to the Court in which he specifically referred to the
notices and denied that he owed any Federal income tax liability
2
Petitioner is a habitual nonfiler who has not filed Federal
income tax returns for many years, continuing to at least as
recently as 2007.
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for any year. We accepted the letter as petitioner’s timely but
imperfect petition. We ordered petitioner to file an amended
petition and pay the $60 filing fee on or before June 17, 2004.3
Petitioner failed to respond to the order, and on
August 6, 2004, we dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On November 29, 2004, respondent assessed the income tax
deficiencies, additions to tax, and interest for 1998, 1999, and
2001.4
On December 2, 2004, respondent prepared an SFR for
petitioner for 2002 under section 6020(b). On March 8, 2005,
respondent mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner
at his last known address. Petitioner failed to petition this
Court, and on August 15, 2005, respondent assessed an income tax
deficiency of $18,620, additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1)
and (2) of $6,796.30, an addition to tax under section 6654(a) of
$622.22, and interest for 2002.
On March 18, 2005, respondent prepared an SFR for petitioner
for 2003 under section 6020(b). On June 21, 2005, respondent
mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner at his last
3
Petitioner’s petition stated, in its entirety: “I hereby
petition you about the IRS’s deficiency ‘determinations’ that I
owe income tax and penalties for the years 1998, 1999 and 2001.
I want to have a trial because I do not owe any amount to the IRS
for any year. The IRS is three times wrong.”
4
Respondent later assessed additional amounts for failure to
pay tax after Nov. 29, 2004.
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known address. Petitioner again failed to petition this Court,
and on January 9, 2006, respondent assessed an income tax
deficiency of $18,931, additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1)
and (2) of $6,247.23, an addition to tax under section 6654(a) of
$488.48, and interest for 2003.5
On June 14, 2006, respondent mailed petitioner a Final
Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003. According to the
notice, petitioner’s total balance for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002,
and 2003 was $151,547.19. Petitioner timely filed a Form 12153,
Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (section 6330
hearing). Petitioner’s request stated, in its entirety:
I am requesting for a [sic] Face-to-Face Collection Due
Process Hearing in an Appeals office closest to my
place of residence. This is also to inform you that I
will be audio recording this hearing. One of the
issues we will address is if the IRS follows proper
procedure (sic). If the IRS has considered any of my
prior issues that I’ve raised in the past to be
frivolous, I hereby renounce them.
5
On Jan. 5, 2006, respondent mailed Letter 2800C, popularly
known as a “lock-in letter”, to petitioner’s employer, directing
the employer to disregard the marital status and withholding
allowances shown on petitioner’s Form W-4, Employee’s Withholding
Allowance Certificate, and instead withhold Federal income tax
from petitioner’s wages using a marital status of single and zero
withholding allowances. Petitioner filed a petition with this
Court at docket No. 6814-07 seeking to have respondent enjoined
from changing petitioner’s withholding allowances and ordered to
repay any wages withheld as a result of the changes. However,
this Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the grounds that the lock-in letter was neither a
collection action nor a notice of determination within the
meaning of sec. 6320 or 6330.
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On September 1, 2006, respondent’s Appeals Office received
the case. On October 26, 2006, Settlement Officer Wendy J.
Clinger (Ms. Clinger) informed petitioner that the only issue
raised in his request for a section 6330 hearing--i.e., whether
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) follows proper procedures--was
frivolous and would not be considered. Ms. Clinger also advised
petitioner that he could not dispute his underlying liabilities
because he had had an earlier opportunity to do so. Ms. Clinger
further advised petitioner he would not be allowed a face-to-face
conference with Appeals unless he could provide a nonfrivolous
issue in writing within 14 days from the date of the letter.6 Ms.
Clinger’s letter requested that petitioner provide certain
financial information, including a Form 433-A, Collection
Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed
Individuals, and file his 2004 and 2005 Federal income tax
returns. Ms. Clinger scheduled a telephone conference for 1:30
p.m. on November 21, 2006, to discuss the case with petitioner.
On November 8, 2006, petitioner mailed Ms. Clinger a letter
stating that he could not participate in the telephone conference
on November 21, 2006, and demanding a face-to-face conference.
Petitioner denied that the issue raised in his request for a
6
Ms. Clinger’s letter listed several examples of
nonfrivolous issues, including collection alternatives to levy,
challenges to the appropriateness of collection action, and
spousal defenses.
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section 6330 hearing was frivolous and asserted that he had no
intention of raising frivolous issues at the hearing, but he
failed to identify the issues he planned to discuss. Petitioner
also demanded to see all information respondent had used to
calculate his Federal income tax liability, denied he had had a
prior opportunity to challenge the liabilities, and accused
respondent of using a “canned letter” to “railroad” him.
Petitioner did not provide the requested financial information,
nor did he file his 2004 or 2005 Federal income tax return.
Over the next several months Ms. Clinger and petitioner
continued to exchange correspondence. Ms. Clinger offered
petitioner several telephone conferences and advised him that she
would allow him a face-to-face section 6330 hearing if he could
identify a nonfrivolous issue for her to consider. Ms. Clinger
maintained that petitioner could not use the section 6330 hearing
to challenge the underlying tax liabilities because petitioner
had already had an opportunity to contest them. Ms. Clinger
noted that petitioner had filed a petition with the Tax Court for
1998, 1999, and 2001 but his case was dismissed because of his
failure to timely file an amended petition and pay the filing
fee. Ms. Clinger also noted that according to Forms 4340,
Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified
Matters, respondent had issued notices of deficiency to
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petitioner for 2002 and 2003, and petitioner had failed to timely
file a petition for either year.
Petitioner insisted his issues were not frivolous, and he
continued to demand a face-to-face hearing. However, petitioner
failed to articulate any particular issue he wished to discuss at
the section 6330 hearing. Petitioner denied that he had
previously filed a petition with respect to 1998, 1999, and 2001
and suggested respondent had mistaken him “for another Byron
Reynolds which may be active in your system.”7
Although petitioner was not allowed a face-to-face hearing
and declined to participate in any of the proposed telephone
conferences, Ms. Clinger regarded the exchange of letters as a
correspondence hearing. Accordingly, on March 27, 2007, the
Appeals Office mailed petitioner a notice of determination in
which the Appeals Office concluded that levy action under section
6330 was an appropriate collection action.8
On April 20, 2007, petitioner mailed a one-page letter to
this Court seeking “assistance regarding a Notice of
Determination I received from the Internal Revenue Service for
7
The petition in the earlier case included petitioner’s
name, home address, and Social Security number.
8
In the notice of determination respondent’s Appeals Office
concluded that even if petitioner had responded to Appeals’
request for financial information, no collection alternatives
could have been considered because of petitioner’s continuing
failure to file Federal income tax returns.
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the tax year [sic] 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003.” We
accepted the letter as petitioner’s timely filed petition but
ordered petitioner to file a proper amended petition and pay the
$60 filing fee on or before June 11, 2007.
On June 18, 2007, this Court received petitioner’s amended
petition with attached “beliefs of entitlement”, in which he
argued that respondent’s SFR procedures under section 6020(b) are
invalid and that signing and filing respondent’s Form 1040, U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return, would require petitioner to commit
perjury.9 Accordingly, petitioner requested that we abate “all
assessed or imposed penalties, interest, taxes and Federal Tax
Lien(s)”. On August 11, 2007, petitioner mailed to respondent’s
Office of Chief Counsel a document titled “Consolidation of
Defenses in Motion” in which he moved that this Court dismiss the
instant case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As this
document was never filed with the Court, we declined to consider
it.
On August 11, 2008, respondent filed a motion for summary
judgment and to impose a penalty under section 6673. The Court
ordered petitioner to respond by September 5, 2008, but
petitioner failed to file a response.
9
It is unclear from the record when petitioner mailed the
amended petition. In any event, respondent has not challenged
the timeliness of petitioner’s amended petition.
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Discussion
I. Summary Judgment
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation
and avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla.
Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary
judgment may be granted “if the pleadings, answers to
interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other
acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a
decision may be rendered as a matter of law.” Rule 121(b);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd.
17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753,
754 (1988).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and all
facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985).
However, the nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or
denials of the moving party’s pleadings; rather, the nonmoving
party must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial. Rule 121(d); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, supra
at 820-821.
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II. Section 6330
Section 6330(a) provides that no levy may be made on any
property unless the Secretary has first notified the taxpayer in
writing of his right to a section 6330 hearing. If the taxpayer
properly requests a hearing under section 6330(a), the taxpayer
is entitled to a hearing before an impartial officer of the IRS’s
Appeals Office. Sec. 6330(b). At the hearing, the taxpayer may
raise any relevant issue related to the unpaid tax or proposed
levy, including spousal defenses, challenges to the
appropriateness of the collection action, and offers of
collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may
also challenge the underlying tax liability, but only if the
taxpayer did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency or did
not otherwise have a prior opportunity to dispute the tax
liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).
Following the hearing, the hearing officer must determine
whether the proposed collection action should proceed. In making
the determination the hearing officer shall take into
consideration: (1) Whether the requirements of all applicable
laws and administrative procedures have been satisfied; (2) any
relevant issues raised by the taxpayer during the section 6330
hearing; and (3) whether the proposed collection action balances
the need for efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer’s
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legitimate concern that any collection action be no more
intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3).
In determining whether all applicable laws and
administrative procedures have been followed, a hearing officer
is not required to rely on any particular document. Craig v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 261-262 (2002). However, a Form 4340
is “a valid verification that the requirements of any applicable
law or administrative procedure have been met”. Id. at 262.
Stated differently, a Form 4340 is presumptive proof, absent any
showing of an irregularity, that a tax has been validly assessed
under section 6203. See, e.g., Schwersensky v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2006-178. We have held it is not an abuse of
discretion for an Appeals officer to rely on a Form 4340. Davis
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 40-41 (2000).
In evaluating a taxpayer’s arguments, a hearing officer is
not required to consider irrelevant or frivolous arguments.
Thus, it is not an abuse of discretion for an Appeals officer to
deny a taxpayer’s request for a face-to-face section 6330 hearing
where the taxpayer has raised only frivolous or groundless
arguments. Moline v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-110; Summers
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-219.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Appeals officer’s
determination. Sec. 6330(d)(1). Where the taxpayer’s underlying
liability was not properly at issue in the hearing, we review the
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determination for an abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182
(2000). An Appeals officer’s determination will not be an abuse
of discretion unless the determination is arbitrary, capricious,
or without sound basis in fact or law. Giamelli v. Commissioner,
129 T.C. 107, 111 (2007); Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 23
(2005). In reviewing the Appeals officer’s determination, this
Court ordinarily considers only those issues that the taxpayer
raised at the hearing. Giamelli v. Commissioner, supra at 113.
Petitioner had a prior opportunity to challenge his
underlying liability for each of the taxable years at issue. For
1998, 1999, and 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the Court,
but his case was dismissed when he failed to file an amended
petition or pay the filing fee. For 2002 the record contains a
copy of petitioner’s Form 4340 showing that respondent issued a
notice of deficiency on March 8, 2005. Petitioner does not
assert any irregularity in the form. For 2003 the record
contains a copy of the notice of deficiency that was mailed to
petitioner on June 21, 2005. Although petitioner generally
states that he cannot recall receiving any of the notices of
deficiency, petitioner does not deny he received the notices; and
he has not asserted any argument or offered any documentation to
convince us that there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the validity or receipt of the notices for any of the
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years that would preclude us from granting respondent’s motion
for summary judgment.10 Accordingly, we hold that respondent
properly determined that petitioner was not entitled to challenge
his underlying tax liabilities during the section 6330 hearing,
and we will review respondent’s determination for abuse of
discretion. In doing so, we will limit our review to the issues
petitioner raised at the section 6330 hearing.
III. Abuse of Discretion Review
Ms. Clinger reviewed petitioner’s Forms 4340 for 1998, 1999,
2001, 2002, and 2003 and determined that all legal requirements
and administrative procedures had been satisfied. Ms. Clinger
also verified that a notice and demand for payment was mailed to
petitioner within 60 days of the assessment for each taxable
year, as required by section 6303(a).
The only argument petitioner raised throughout the hearing
process was that respondent did not follow proper procedures.
Given the general nature of petitioner’s argument, petitioner’s
failure to articulate which procedures respondent neglected to
follow, and petitioner’s status as a habitual nonfiler, Ms.
Clinger reasonably concluded that petitioner’s argument was
10
We would reach the same conclusion even if petitioner had
established that he did not actually receive one or more of the
notices of deficiency. This is because the validity of a notice
of deficiency does not depend on the taxpayer’s actual receipt of
notice. Rather, an otherwise sufficient notice of the deficiency
is valid so long as it is mailed to the taxpayer’s last known
address. Sec. 6212(b).
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frivolous and irrelevant. As discussed above, Ms. Clinger
diligently verified that respondent had in fact followed all
applicable laws and administrative procedures.
The record also establishes that, as required by section
6330(c), in making its determination the Appeals Office properly
balanced the need for the efficient collection of tax with
petitioner’s legitimate concern that collection be no more
intrusive than necessary. During the section 6330 hearing,
petitioner failed to provide requested financial information,
failed to file his 2004 or 2005 Federal income tax return, and
failed to identify any reason it would be unfair or intrusive to
proceed with the collection action. On this record, we can
identify no disputed material fact or legal reason that would
preclude us from granting respondent’s motion for summary
judgment.
IV. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner failed to identify any nonfrivolous argument
despite requests that he do so. The only argument he appears to
have raised in his amended petition is a general assertion that
he owes no taxes. We need not consider petitioner’s assertion
that he owes no taxes and that interest should be abated because
he was precluded by section 6330(c)(2)(B) from contesting the
underlying liabilities at the section 6330 hearing, and he does
not assert that he made an interest abatement request during the
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hearing process. See sec. 6404(h); Giamelli v. Commissioner,
supra at 113.
V. Section 6673 Penalty
Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes this Court to impose a
penalty, not to exceed $25,000, whenever the taxpayer’s position
is frivolous or groundless, the taxpayer unreasonably failed to
pursue administrative remedies, or it appears that proceedings
before this Court have been instituted primarily for delay. The
section 6673 penalty applies to proceedings filed under section
6330(d). See Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000).
It is within our discretion whether to impose the section
6673 penalty. We have often imposed the penalty in cases where,
for example, taxpayers have presented arguments in administrative
and judicial proceedings despite being warned such arguments were
frivolous. See Burke v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 189, 197 (2005);
Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-92; Ioane v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-68 ($10,000 penalty imposed where
taxpayer was warned months before trial that his frivolous
arguments, lack of candor, and failure to cooperate in the
stipulation process could result in imposition of the section
6673 penalty). But see Lizalek v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
122 (declining to impose the section 6673 penalty where the
taxpayer raised frivolous arguments for the first time in Federal
court).
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Petitioner’s dealings with respondent’s Appeals Office were
characterized by a lack of cooperation and several frivolous and
groundless assertions. On the other hand, we recognize that
petitioner has encountered financial problems in recent years
that have made it difficult for him to pay his mortgage and meet
his child support obligations. We also recognize that
petitioner, by his own admission, is unsophisticated in tax
matters and may have unwisely relied on a paralegal to assist him
with his case. Perhaps most importantly, we note that petitioner
has expressed a desire to cooperate with respondent in the future
to resolve his tax problems. After taking all of this into
account, and in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to
impose any penalty under section 6673. We warn petitioner,
however, that the unsupported arguments he raised during his
correspondence hearing and before this Court are frivolous, and
this Court may impose a sanction of up to $25,000 if petitioner
continues to advance such arguments in subsequent proceedings
before this Court.
We conclude on the record before us that there is no genuine
issue of material fact requiring a trial, and respondent is
entitled to a decision as a matter of law. We sustain
respondent’s determination to proceed with collection of
petitioner’s 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003 Federal income tax
liabilities.
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We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and to
the extent not discussed above, consider those arguments to be
irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered for
respondent.