T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-166
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
AIDA B. ABIOG, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 14886-09S. Filed November 2, 2010.
Caroline DeLisle Ciraolo, for petitioner.
Tyler N. Orlowski, for respondent.
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section
7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any
other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent
for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent
section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in
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effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner’s 2005,
2006, and 2007 Federal income taxes of $2,406, $8,464, and $388
and section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties for each year of
$481, $1,693, and $78, respectively. After concessions,1 the
issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner’s salary for
2005, 2006, and a portion of 2007 from the Baltimore, Maryland,
City Public Schools (BCPS) is exempt from Federal income tax
under the Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Phil.,
art. 21, Oct. 1, 1976, 34 U.S.T. 1277 (article 21); (2) whether
petitioner is entitled to deduct certain employment, living,
transportation, and medical expenses that she claimed for 2005
and 2006; and (3) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a) for the 3 years at issue.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
Maryland when she filed her petition.
1
Respondent also determined that petitioner did not include
State income tax refunds and interest income in her gross income
for 2006 and 2007. Petitioner did not address these issues at
trial; therefore, the issues are deemed conceded. See Rule
149(b).
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Petitioner is a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
She received a bachelor’s degree in elementary education and a
master’s degree in educational administration, both from a
university in the Philippines.2 Petitioner has taught since 1997
and was a sixth grade teacher for the Sofronio Espanala District
in Palawan, Philippines, from 2002 until she left the Philippines
in 2005. Petitioner entered the United States on June 22, 2005,
arriving in Baltimore to teach for BCPS as part of an
international teaching exchange program sponsored by the U.S.
Department of State (the State Department).
Amity Institute (Amity) is a nonprofit organization the
State Department approved to operate an exchange teacher program.
The exchange teacher program allows qualified foreign teachers to
enter the United States to teach for up to 3 years. Amity does
not directly recruit teachers from the Philippines. During 2004
and 2005 Amity worked with Badilla Corp. (Badilla), a business
entity from the Philippines, and with Avenida & Associates, Inc.
(Avenida), a business entity from the United States. Badilla and
Avenida are affiliated entities, and they worked together to
facilitate the placement of qualified Filipino teachers in
American schools. Badilla collected background information such
2
In petitioner’s affidavit attached to her opposition to
respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment (the affidavit),
petitioner states that she received her degrees from Palawan
University. At trial, petitioner testified that she received her
degrees from Cagayan State University.
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as transcripts and résumés from teachers in the Philippines who
were interested in the exchange teacher program in the United
States. Badilla found its prospective Filipino teachers
principally by word of mouth and seminars conducted by its
executives. Avenida or Badilla charged placement fees and
additional charges to help teaching candidates with, among other
tasks, finding employers in the United States and obtaining
visas. In the United States, Avenida helped school districts
find promising teaching candidates by providing access to a
database of overseas jobseekers.
In late 2004 petitioner attended an orientation session for
an exchange teacher program Badilla sponsored. She ultimately
submitted her transcript and résumé to Badilla. BCPS worked with
Avenida to receive access to a preselected list of qualified
Filipino teachers. This was the first time BCPS had recruited
teachers from the Philippines. From the preselected teachers
BCPS administrators chose the candidates the school system wanted
to interview. In January 2005 George Duque, manager of
recruitment and staffing for BCPS, traveled to the Philippines to
interview petitioner and other teaching candidates. Shortly
afterwards Badilla informed petitioner that BCPS would be
offering her employment for the 2005-2006 school year.
Petitioner received a letter from BCPS dated January 6, 2005,
officially offering her employment for the 2005-2006 school year.
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Generally, foreign teachers who want to teach in the United
States may obtain one of two types of visas. One is the H-1B
visa for working professionals. The second is the J-1 visa for
individuals coming to the United States under a cultural exchange
program approved by the State Department. The J-1 visa is more
convenient for foreign individuals who are new teachers in the
United States because the visa timing coincides with the academic
year in the United States. Petitioner paid Avenida $5,200 for
the following fees: A $3,200 placement fee, a $725 U.S.
documentation fee, a $500 J-1 visa processing fee, and $775 for
airfare and travel.
Amity sponsored petitioner’s J-1 visa. The State Department
authorized Amity to issue Form DS-2019, Certificate of
Eligibility for Exchange Visitor (J-1) Status. The form
identifies the visitor; identifies the visa sponsor; briefly
describes the exchange program, including the start and end
dates; identifies the category of exchange; and states the
estimated cost of the exchange program. The exchange teacher
program cost $3,000. At all relevant times, Gertrude Hermann was
Amity’s executive director.
An Amity representative explained to petitioner that if she
accepted the teaching offer, BCPS would be evaluating her
performance throughout the school year. If her performance was
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satisfactory, BCPS would continue her employment for the
following school year.
In a letter to petitioner dated April 11, 2005, Amity
confirmed BCPS’ offer. On April 19, 2005, petitioner signed an
Amity exchange teacher contract with Amity and BCPS. Amity
prepared a Form DS-2019 for petitioner’s signature and mailed it
to her. The length of time listed on the Form DS-2019 for
petitioner’s visa was 3 years, the same length of time as the
exchange teacher program. Petitioner signed the form and
returned it to Amity for processing.
Petitioner took three courses as prerequisites to teach for
BCPS. She also requested and received a 1-year leave of absence
from her teaching position in the Philippines, for the period
June 15, 2005, through June 14, 2006. Petitioner did not request
a second leave of absence. Petitioner arrived in Baltimore on
June 22, 2005. On June 30, 2005, petitioner signed a “3 months
with option to extend” lease for an apartment at The Belvedere
Towers Apartments. Petitioner exercised the option and resided
in that apartment until July 31, 2006. She signed a 1-year lease
on August 2, 2006, for a different apartment in the same
apartment building. At all relevant times, petitioner owned
property in the Philippines.
During the years at issue up to the time of trial,
petitioner was married and had three children. In an email to
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Amity dated July 8, 2005, petitioner inquired into the process
for bringing her family to the United States. She was informed
that teachers participating in the exchange teacher program could
not bring family to the United States until the teachers received
a satisfactory evaluation from their schools. Thus, petitioner’s
first opportunity to bring her family to the United States would
be after she completed her first year of teaching for BCPS.
Petitioner’s family came to the United States in August 2006 and
moved into the new apartment, with petitioner, that she leased on
August 2, 2006. Her husband requested and received two leaves of
absence from his employer in the Philippines. The first, for the
period November 14, 2006,3 through December 7, 2007, lists
“vacation” as the reason for the request. The second, for the
period December 5, 2007, through February 26, 2008, lists “sick”
as the reason for the request. Petitioner and her husband
purchased a single-family home in Baltimore in 2009.
On August 10, 2005, petitioner signed a standard Provisional
Contract for Conditional or Resident Teacher Certificate Holders
(BCPS employment contract), effective beginning August 24, 2005.
The BCPS employment contract was for 1 year, terminating at the
end of the 2005-2006 school year. It is the only contract that
petitioner signed with BCPS. All first-year teachers who did not
3
No explanation was provided for why petitioner’s husband’s
leave of absence did not begin August 2006 when he moved to
Baltimore.
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have full professional certification signed a similar BCPS
employment contract. BCPS assigned petitioner to teach sixth
grade mathematics at Diggs-Johnson Middle School (Diggs-Johnson).
The BCPS employment contract required teachers to take the
Praxis I and II tests, which are part of the teacher
certification process that many States require, including
Maryland. Petitioner completed the Praxis I test in late 2006
and the Praxis II in 2007. Petitioner received a Maryland
education certificate in 2007, valid from July 1, 2005, through
June 30, 2010.
Working in the United States provided petitioner with a
salary that was considerably greater than what she had earned in
the Philippines. Petitioner had earned approximately 10,000
Filipino pesos a month teaching in the Philippines, equivalent to
$179 per month or $2,148 per year. Petitioner’s annual salary
for her first year of teaching for BCPS was $37,157, which
increased to $51,263 and $58,262 for her second and third years,
respectively.
With respect to Federal income tax withholding, petitioner
did not provide BCPS with Form 8233, Exemption From Withholding
on Compensation for Independent (and Certain Dependent) Personal
Services of a Nonresident Alien Individual. Consequently, BCPS
withheld Federal income tax from petitioner’s salary during 2005,
2006, and 2007.
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Petitioner engaged professional tax preparers to prepare her
2005, 2006, and 2007 Federal income tax returns.4 For 2005 and
2006 petitioner filed Forms 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien Income
Tax Return. For 2007 she filed Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income
Tax Return. Petitioner reported that her salary from BCPS for
the 2005 and 2006 calendar years was exempt from taxation in the
United States under article 21. Petitioner included all of her
earnings from BCPS for 2007 on her 2007 Federal income tax
return. In her amended petition, however, she contended that the
first 6 months of her 2007 earnings from BCPS were also exempt
from Federal income tax under the 2-year exclusion of article 21.
Petitioner claimed total itemized deductions of $25,636 for
2006. This amount consisted of $4,152 for State and local taxes,
$175 for charitable contributions, $21,259 for unreimbursed
employee expenses, and $50 for tax preparation fees. She claimed
no deductions for 2005, and she claimed the $7,850 head of
household standard deduction for 2007. As a result of the income
exclusion, income tax withholding, and deductions, petitioner
requested refunds for each year 2005 through 2007.
Petitioner returned to the Philippines on June 9, 2008,
before her J-1 visa expired on June 27, 2008. She applied for
4
In the affidavit, petitioner states that Fred Pacheco
prepared all of the returns at issue. At trial, she testified
that Mr. Pacheco prepared the 2005 and 2006 returns and that
Martha Newby prepared the 2007 return.
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and obtained an H-1B visa valid from July 14, 2008, through June
20, 2010. Petitioner was subsequently granted another H-1B visa
valid from October 1, 2009, through September 30, 2012. She
returned to the United States, and as of the date of trial, she
continued to be employed by BCPS.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) selected petitioner’s
2005, 2006, and 2007 Federal income tax returns for examination.
The examining agent sent three questionnaires to petitioner:
Form 8784, Questionnaire - Temporary Living Expenses; Form 9210,
Alien Status Questionnaire; and Form 9250, Questionnaire - Tax
Treaty Benefits. Petitioner completed the forms, dated her
signature September 20, 2008, and returned the forms to the IRS.
The Court received into evidence copies of the three
questionnaires that petitioner had completed. On Forms 8784 and
9210 petitioner wrote that June 22, 2005, was her date of initial
arrival and that at that time she expected to remain in the
United States for 3 years. She answered the next question on
both forms indicating that she revised and renewed her visa
status so that she could stay in the United States for another 3
years.
In the notice of deficiency dated March 23, 2009, the IRS
adjusted petitioner’s income to include the earnings from BCPS
for 2005 and 2006 that petitioner had excluded under article 21.
In addition, the IRS disallowed the total amount of $21,259
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deducted as unreimbursed employee expenses for 2006. The $21,259
consisted of $9,150 for rent, $500 for home furnishings, $1,320
for transportation costs, $1,368 for household insurance, $2,500
for meals, $200 for school supplies, and $6,221 for job search
expenses. The $21,259 amount was categorized as “job search
costs” on petitioner’s 2006 Schedule A, Itemized Deductions.
Petitioner filed her petition contesting all of respondent’s
adjustments.
Respondent moved under Rule 121 for partial summary judgment
concerning the issue of whether petitioner qualified in the years
at issue for the exemption under article 21. Petitioner objected
to the granting of the motion. The issue was fully briefed by
both parties. The motion was set for hearing at trial. When the
case was called for trial, the motion was heard. The parties
relied on their respective positions set forth in their briefs.
The motion for partial summary judgment has been denied.
The case was then tried, and the Court heard testimony from
petitioner, Mr. Duque, and Ms. Hermann. The Court also received
into evidence a form BCPS completed for Amity entitled “Addendum
to Amity Confirmation of Employment Form 2007/2008” (the
addendum). Mr. Duque signed and dated the form July 1, 2007.
The addendum showed that BCPS had retained 170 of the 178 (95.5
percent) Filipino teachers in the past 2 years who had taught for
BCPS through Amity’s exchange teacher program.
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Discussion
I. Income Under Article 21
Petitioner was a nonresident alien for the years at issue
because of her J-1 visa status and her participation in the
exchange teacher program. See sec. 7701(b). In particular,
section 7701(b)(1)(B) provides that a nonresident alien is a
person who is not a citizen or resident of the United States
within the meaning of section 7701(b)(1)(A).5 Generally, a
nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or business within
the United States is taxed on the taxable income effectively
connected with that trade or business. Sec. 871(b). The phrase
“trade or business within the United States” generally includes
the performance of personal services within the United States at
any time within the taxable year. Sec. 864(b). Compensation
paid to a nonresident alien in exchange for the performance of
services in the United States constitutes income that is
effectively connected with the conduct of trade or business in
the United States. Sec. 1.864-4(c)(6)(ii), Income Tax Regs.
Consequently, petitioner’s wages would ordinarily be included in
gross income under the Code. Section 894(a), however, provides
that the provisions of the Code will be applied to any taxpayer
5
As a teacher, petitioner is considered an exempt
individual, and, therefore, not treated as present for purposes
of the substantial presence test. See sec. 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii),
(3)(D)(i), (5)(A)(ii).
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with due regard to any treaty obligations of the United States
that apply to the taxpayer. Therefore, the treatment of
petitioner’s wages might be altered by applicable treaty
provisions. See id.
The United States is a party to an income tax convention
with the Republic of the Philippines. The convention provides an
exemption from U.S. income taxation on income earned by Filipino
teachers teaching in the United States if the requirements of the
convention are satisfied. Article 21 states:
Article 21
TEACHERS
(1) Where a resident of one of the Contracting
States is invited by the Government of the other
Contracting State, a political subdivision or local
authority thereof, or by a university or other
recognized educational institution in that other
Contracting State to come to that other Contracting
State for a period not expected to exceed 2 years for
the purpose of teaching or engaging in research, or
both, at a university or other recognized educational
institution and such resident comes to that other
Contracting State primarily for such purpose, his
income from personal services for teaching or research
at such university or educational institution shall be
exempt from tax by that other Contracting State for a
period not exceeding 2 years from the date of his
arrival in that other Contracting State.
To qualify for the exemption under article 21, a taxpayer
must meet the following requirements: (1) The taxpayer was a
resident of the Philippines before coming to the United States;
(2) she was invited by the Government or a recognized educational
institution within the United States; (3) she was invited for a
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period not expected to exceed 2 years; (4) the purpose of the
invitation was for her to teach or engage in research at the
recognized educational institution; and (5) she did in fact come
to the United States primarily to carry out the purpose of the
invitation. All of the requirements of article 21 must be
satisfied in order for petitioner to qualify for the income
exemption. The only requirement in dispute is whether
petitioner’s invitation to teach in the United States was “for a
period not expected to exceed 2 years”.
The text of article 21 does not specifically state whose
expectation controls the length of the invitation to teach for a
period not to exceed 2 years. Petitioner argues that her
expectation as the invitee is the only expectation that matters.
Respondent counters that either the expectation of the invitor,
BCPS, should be decisive, or the Court should weigh the
expectations of all the parties associated with the exchange
teacher program. In the light of this ambiguity in the text of
article 21, we will consider all the relevant facts and
circumstances, including the expectations of all the parties.
See Santos v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. __, __ (2010) (slip op. at
17). We will construe the language of the treaty liberally. See
N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 363,
378 (1996). Then we will make an objective determination of
whether petitioner was invited to the United States “for a period
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not expected to exceed 2 years”. See Santos v. Commissioner,
supra.
A. Burden of Proof
Generally, the Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency
is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving
that the deficiency is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Furthermore, any deductions
allowed are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears
the burden of proving his entitlement to them. Rule 142(a);
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the
Commissioner regarding factual matters affecting a taxpayer’s
liability for tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and
meets other requirements of the section. Petitioner moved for a
burden shift under section 7491(a), contending that she produced
credible evidence and met the other requirements of the section.
Respondent objected, contending that “petitioner has failed to
introduce credible evidence to support her assertion that her
stay in the United States was expected to last 2 years or less.”
We need not, and we explicitly do not, decide which party bears
the burden of proof because as discussed above, applying Santos
v. Commissioner, supra, we will decide this case on an objective
consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances.
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B. Analysis
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the evidence that
relates to petitioner’s expectation. Petitioner’s reliance on
the apartment leases and the 1-year BCPS employment contract is
unconvincing. One-year apartment leases are commonplace and do
little to indicate a tenant’s long-term expectation to remain in
an area. Moreover, petitioner resided in her first apartment for
a year and 1 month. Her family moved to Baltimore in August
2006, at or about the time she signed her second apartment lease,
which was for 1 year. Thus petitioner’s two leases covered a
period of more than 2 years.
Likewise, BCPS required all of its first-year teachers to
sign what amounts to a standard 1-year employment contract. The
fact that the contract did not guarantee employment beyond the
first year does not mean that petitioner expected to stay in the
United States for only 1 year. Amity had informed petitioner
that so long as her performance was satisfactory, BCPS would
retain her. Petitioner testified that she expected to receive a
satisfactory evaluation from BCPS. We believe that petitioner
could reasonably expect that BCPS would employ her for the second
and third years and perhaps beyond. In fact, petitioner did
receive a satisfactory evaluation at the end of the 2005-2006
school year, and petitioner’s family moved to Baltimore to reside
with her.
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More persuasive are petitioner’s own words in her answers on
the three IRS questionnaires. Her answers indicate that her
initial expectation was to remain in the United States for the
entire length of the J-1 visa and the entire length of the 3-year
exchange teacher program. In response to this evidence against
her, petitioner testified that she did not have any help filling
out the forms and that no one explained the forms to her.
Although this may be true, petitioner’s testimony does little to
support her argument because she has a master’s degree in
educational administration, she speaks fluent English, and the
questions on the forms are straightforward, not requiring any
technical knowledge.
Furthermore, petitioner introduced no evidence that she
expressed to any of the parties involved that she expected to
return to the Philippines within her first 2 years in the United
States. Similarly, petitioner did not testify at trial that she
expected to return home within the first 2 years. Instead, she
stated that she determined her expectation regarding the length
of her stay on a “year-to-year” evaluation of her situation.
It is important to note that one goal of the exchange
teacher program was for the exchange teacher to share her
experiences in the United States with Filipino students when the
teacher returned to the Philippines at the conclusion of the
exchange program. When questioned about this goal, petitioner
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testified that she wanted to share what she learned in the United
States with Filipino students “if I had a chance to”.
Petitioner’s testimony bolsters the argument that she expected to
be in the United States for as long as she could legally stay in
the country and that she had no expectation of returning to the
Philippines within 2 years.
We also find it highly significant that despite the fact
that petitioner stated that she enjoyed teaching in the
Philippines more than in the United States, she remained in
Baltimore teaching at Diggs-Johnson and as of the date of trial
continued to work for BCPS. Petitioner’s actions indicate a
strong commitment to staying in the United States. The fact that
petitioner did not renew her leave of absence in the Philippines,
while not a decisive factor, also weighs against her argument.
In addition, we cannot ignore the financial incentive of
remaining in the United States for as long as possible.
Petitioner incurred more than $8,000 in expenses to participate
in the exchange teacher program and to relocate to the United
States. We also cannot ignore the fact that petitioner inquired
into the process for bringing her family to the United States
before she started teaching and then spent a substantial amount
of money to move her family to Baltimore in 2006. The money
petitioner spent to move herself and her entire family to
Baltimore is not an insignificant sum in comparison to her
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earnings in the Philippines. Moreover, her earnings immediately
grew seventeenfold from $2,148 to $37,157 when she moved from the
Philippines to the United States. Further, her earnings of
$58,262 in 2007, which was her third year at BCPS were, 57
percent greater than her first-year salary.
From the perspective of BCPS, the school system certainly
would not have invested so much time, money, and effort in
recruiting teachers from the Philippines if it did not expect
that the teachers would remain at least for the length of the 3-
year exchange teacher program. Mr. Duque likewise testified that
BCPS wanted to retain the teachers it hired for as long as
possible. Corroborating this testimony is the evidence from the
addendum showing that BCPS retained an extremely high percentage,
95.5 percent, of the Filipino teachers it hired through the
exchange program. Additionally, Ms. Hermann testified that BCPS,
similar to the other school systems that hired foreign teachers
through the exchange program, expected the teachers to stay for
the entire 3-year program. She added that it had been Amity’s
experience that only a small percentage of Filipino teachers
returned to the Philippines before completing the 3-year exchange
teacher program and that most of participants decided to remain
in the United States beyond the 3 years. The testimony of these
witnesses is plausible, reliable, and persuasive.
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In conclusion, after an objective examination of all of the
relevant facts and circumstances, we find that petitioner and
BCPS expected petitioner to stay in the United States for at
least 3 years, which is longer than the “not expected to exceed 2
years” requirement of article 21. Therefore, petitioner’s income
for June 2005 to June 2007, the first 2 years she was in the
United States, is not exempt from Federal income tax under
article 21.
II. 2006 Disallowed Unreimbursed Employee Expenses--$21,259
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary
business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business. The performance of services
as an employee is considered a trade or business for section 162
purposes. Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970). For
an expense to be necessary, it must be “appropriate and helpful”
to the taxpayer’s business. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113-
114. An expense will be considered ordinary if it is a common or
frequent occurrence in the type of business in which the taxpayer
is involved. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). In
order to deduct a business expense, a taxpayer must not have
received reimbursement and must not have had the right to obtain
reimbursement from his employer. Orvis v. Commissioner, 788 F.2d
1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-533; Leamy v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 798, 810 (1985).
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A. Job Search Costs and School Supplies--$6,421
Included in the disallowed unreimbursed employee expenses is
$6,221 for job search costs and $200 for school supplies.
Petitioner’s $6,221 for job search costs is a combination of
expenses she paid in 2005 and 2006. She paid $5,200 for her J-1
visa and $382 for classes and fees in the Philippines as a
prerequisite to teach for BCPS in 2005. Petitioner substantiated
these amounts and is entitled to a deduction for those amounts in
2005.
Petitioner paid $750 for the exchange program fee and $50
for fingerprinting in 2006. The exchange program fee was $3,000.
BCPS paid $1,500 of the fee during petitioner’s first year of the
program. Petitioner was responsible for the two subsequent
annual payments of $750, one made in the second year of the
program and one in the third. Petitioner had to pay the fee to
continue her participation in the exchange program. Petitioner
did not substantiate her $750 payment in 2006, but we are
satisfied that petitioner paid a fee of $750 in 2006 to maintain
her standing in the program. Petitioner did substantiate the $50
fee she paid for fingerprinting. Therefore, petitioner is
entitled to a deduction in those amounts for 2006.
Petitioner deducted $200 for school supplies. She provided
receipts for $106 worth of school supplies purchased in 2005.
Petitioner provided no receipts for any amounts spent for school
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supplies in 2006. The proper year for the deduction for school
supplies is 2005. We are satisfied that petitioner spent $106
for school supplies in 2005 and was not reimbursed by BCPS.
Therefore, petitioner is entitled to a deduction of $106 for
school supplies for 2005. See sec. 62(a)(2)(D) (certain expenses
of elementary and secondary school teachers are deductible to
determine adjusted gross income).
B. Personal Living and Commuting Expenses--$13,470
Respondent also disallowed unreimbursed employee expenses
consisting of $9,150 for rent, $2,500 for meals, $500 for
furniture rental or home furnishings, and $1,320 for commuting
between her apartment and her teaching job at Diggs-Johnson. As
a general rule, personal living expenses are nondeductible. Sec.
262; secs. 1.162-2(a), 1.262-1(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. Section
162(a)(2), however, allows a taxpayer to deduct ordinary and
necessary travel expenses, including meals and lodging, paid or
incurred while away from home in pursuit of a trade or business.
Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).
The reference to “home” in section 162(a)(2) means the
taxpayer’s “tax home”. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 578,
581 (1980); Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 561-562 (1968).
As a general rule, a taxpayer’s tax home is in the vicinity of
his principal place of employment, not where his personal
residence is located, if different from his principal place of
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employment. Mitchell v. Commissioner, supra at 581; Kroll v.
Commissioner, supra at 561-562. An exception to the general rule
exists where a taxpayer accepts temporary, rather than
indefinite, employment away from his personal residence; in that
case, the taxpayer’s personal residence may be his tax home.
Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958). The purpose of
the exception is to mitigate the burden of the taxpayer who must
incur duplicate living expenses due to the exigencies of
business. Kroll v. Commissioner, supra at 562. For purposes of
section 162(a)(2), the taxpayer is not treated as being
temporarily away from home if the period of employment exceeds 1
year. Sec. 162(a) (flush language).
Petitioner contends that her employment with BCPS was
temporary because the BCPS employment contract she signed was for
only 1 year. She contends that her tax home was in the
Philippines, as that was where she resided with her family. In
other words, according to petitioner, her rent, home furnishings,
and commuting expenses for 2006 are deductible because she
expected to stay in the United States for no more than a year,
the length of the BCPS employment contract, and thus, her job was
temporary.
Respondent argues that petitioner’s employment at BCPS was
indefinite and that Baltimore became her tax home when she moved
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there to teach beginning August 2005 for BCPS. For the following
reasons, we agree with respondent.
Petitioner took a 1-year leave of absence from her teaching
job in the Philippines when she moved to Baltimore on June 22,
2005. She began teaching at Diggs-Johnson for BCPS in August
2005. We have already found that petitioner intended to remain
in the Baltimore area for at least 3 years to work for BCPS,
which is clearly more than 1 year. Although petitioner testified
to owning property in the Philippines, she provided no evidence
of duplicate living expenses. Accordingly, Baltimore was
petitioner’s principal place of employment and thus Baltimore was
her tax home. Moreover, petitioner’s employment at BCPS was for
more than 1 year and, therefore, not temporary. Consequently,
petitioner is not entitled to claim a deduction for her rent,
meals, home furnishings, or commuting expenses for 2006.
C. Household Insurance--$1,368
Finally, respondent disallowed an unreimbursed employee
expense of $1,368 for “household insurance”. The total amount in
dispute is actually for health insurance. Generally, health
insurance premiums are a medical expense deductible as an
itemized deduction to the extent they exceed 7.5 percent of
adjusted gross income. Sec. 213(a), (d)(1)(D); Kirsch v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-451. Petitioner provided evidence
that she paid health insurance premiums of $36 in 2005, $36 in
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2006, and $180 in 2007. Petitioner has substantiated these
amounts, and she is entitled to a deduction of $36 for 2005 and
$36 for 2006 if the requirements of section 213 are met.
Although petitioner also substantiated the $180 she paid in 2007,
she did not itemize her deductions that year, claiming instead
the standard deduction for a head of household.
III. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Taxpayers may be liable for a 20-percent penalty on the
portion of an underpayment of tax attributable to negligence,
disregard of rules or regulations, or a substantial
understatement of income tax. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2).
The term “negligence” in section 6662(b)(1) includes any
failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the Code, and
the term “disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or
intentional disregard. Sec. 6662(c). Negligence has also been
defined as the failure to exercise due care or the failure to do
what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances. See
Allen v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1, 12 (1989), affd. 925 F.2d 348,
353 (9th Cir. 1991); Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947
(1985). Negligence also includes any failure by the taxpayer to
keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items
properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. An
“understatement of income tax” is substantial if it exceeds the
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greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the
return or $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1)(A).
The section 6662 accuracy-related penalty does not apply
where the taxpayer shows that he or she acted in good faith and
exercised reasonable cause. Sec. 6664(c)(1). The determination
of whether a taxpayer acted in good faith and with reasonable
cause depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and
includes the knowledge and experience of the taxpayer and the
reliance on the advice of a professional, such as an accountant.
Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. For a taxpayer to rely
reasonably upon advice of a tax adviser, the taxpayer must, at a
minimum, prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) The
adviser was a competent professional with sufficient expertise to
justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and
accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer
actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s judgment.
Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 99
(2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002). Most important in
this determination is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to
determine the proper tax liability. Id.
The Commissioner has the burden of production under section
7491(c), with respect to the accuracy-related penalty under
section 6662. To satisfy that burden, the Commissioner must
produce sufficient evidence showing that it is appropriate to
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impose the penalty. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446
(2001). Respondent has satisfied his burden by producing
evidence that petitioner reported no income for 2005, 2006, and
part of 2007, failed to substantiate claimed deductions, and had
a substantial understatement of income tax for 2006.
Nonetheless, petitioner sought the advice of one return
preparer for her 2005 and 2006 Forms 1040NR and a different
preparer for her 2007 Form 1040. Petitioner stated that her
preparer for 2005 and 2006 was an accountant in the Philippines
and an enrolled agent in the United States. Respondent did not
dispute the competency of either preparer. The preparer of the
Forms 1040NR counseled petitioner that her income was exempt from
taxation in the United States under article 21. Petitioner,
having no formal training in taxation and being new to the U.S.
tax system, reasonably relied upon the advice of a competent tax
preparer and acted in good faith. Respondent’s adjustments for
2007 were minor, and again, petitioner engaged a competent
preparer to prepare her 2007 Federal income tax return.
Therefore, we do not sustain respondent’s determination that the
section 6662 accuracy-related penalty applies for 2005, 2006, or
2007.
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IV. Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments made in reaching our
decision, and to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they
are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.