IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SAVON ROY, §
§ No. 568, 2017
Defendant-Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID. No. N1612015609
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff-Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: October 31, 2018
Decided: November 14, 2018
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 14th day of November, 2018, having considered the briefs and the record
below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Police arrested Savon Roy on December 25, 2016, and charged him
with attempted robbery in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony,
possession, purchase, ownership, or control of a firearm by a person prohibited,
offensive touching, and reckless endangering in the first degree. A Superior Court
jury convicted Roy of all charges. Roy has appealed his convictions, arguing that
the Superior Court erred by allowing into evidence the victim’s statement to police
under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Because we find that the
Superior Court properly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the victim’s statement, we affirm.
(2) At trial, the victim testified that in the early morning hours of December
25, 2016, after parking his car in his driveway, a man approached wearing dark or
black clothing and a ski mask and pointed a gun at him. The victim put his hands
up but eventually grabbed the gun. A struggle ensued and with the masked man’s
hand on the trigger, a shot was fired into a neighboring home. After the shot, the
masked man fled on foot, leaving behind the gun and a cell phone.
(3) New Castle County Police were dispatched to the area after a report of
an attempted robbery and shots fired. Upon arrival at the victim’s home, Officer
Stephen Przeworski interviewed the victim twice. The victim testified that during
the first interview Przeworski asked him to come outside and to reenact what
happened. During the second interview, about “15 to 20 minutes later,”1 the victim
told Przeworski that the masked man said during the hold-up “[g]ive me everything
you got.”2 Officer Przeworski testified that the victim was “very scared,” “in shock,”
and twenty minutes after the first interview was “still in shock.”3
1
App. to Opening Br. at A24 (Tr. of Przeworski Testimony).
2
Id.
3
Id.
2
(4) During trial, the Superior Court held a hearing on the State’s request to
allow Officer Przeworski to testify that the victim told the officer that the robber said
“[g]ive me all you got” during the robbery. The State argued that the statement was
admissible as a present sense impression and as an excited utterance because the
statement was made while under the stress of the attempted robbery. Roy responded
that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule did not apply because the
victim testified he was calm during the attempted robbery and therefore not excited.
Without deciding whether the statement was a present sense impression, the Superior
Court allowed the testimony, ruling that in spite of “some differing evidence” the
officer’s testimony supported the victim’s excitement during both interviews.4 The
court noted that Przeworski’s training had afforded him specialized knowledge to
recognize and record such details during victim interviews.5 The court also ruled
that Roy was free to argue to the jury, to the extent that he knew, that the victim
remained calm during his testimony to the officer.6 After a two-day trial, the jury
convicted Roy of all charges.
(5) On appeal, Roy argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by
admitting the victim’s out of court statement through Officer Przeworski. He raises
the same argument raised in the trial court—the victim’s statement should have been
4
Id. at A23.
5
Id.
6
Id.
3
excluded because his calm demeanor during the event directly contradicts the
officer’s statements that the victim was “very scared,” “in shock,” and 20 minutes
later “still in shock.”7 The State responds that the statement was properly admitted
because the Superior Court found that the victim was still under the stress of the
event during both interviews with police. The State argues that staying calm during
the confrontation does not mean that the victim remained calm after the attempted
robbery when Officer Przeworski talked to him about the event. According to the
State, when the context is considered—the victim was held up in the dark, by a man
in a ski mask, pointing a gun, which led to a struggle, and a shot fired with the victim
not knowing whether he had been hit—it was expected that the victim would still be
in shock and scared when he spoke with the officer.
(6) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence for abuse of discretion.8 “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has
exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, or so ignored
recognized rules of law or practice to produce injustice.”9
(7) Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 803, an excited utterance is an
exception to the hearsay rule when “a statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
7
Id. at A24.
8
Urquhart v. State, 133 A.3d 981, 981 (Del. 2016).
9
Culp v. State, 766 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
4
event or condition.” The proponent of the excited utterance must show: "(1) the
excitement of the declarant [was] precipitated by an event; (2) the statement being
offered as evidence [was] made during the time period while the excitement of the
event was continuing; and (3) the statement [was] related to the startling event."10
(8) The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
victim’s statement through Officer Przeworski. While other arguments might have
been raised questioning the use of the excited utterance exception, Roy raises only a
single argument on appeal—the trial judge erred because the victim testified that he
was calm during the attempted robbery. But Roy mischaracterizes the victim’s
testimony. The victim testified that he remained calm during the attempted robbery
because he thought reacting otherwise would put him in danger of being shot.11 The
only evidence of the victim’s demeanor during police questioning came from the
police officer, who testified that the victim was scared and in shock during both
interviews. Thus, we find that the Superior Court did not err in accepting the police
officer’s testimony about the victim’s mental state during the two interviews, and
thus the victim’s statement was made “during the time period while the excitement
of the event was continuing.”
10
Urquhart, 133 A.3d at 981.
11
App. to Opening Br. at A16 (the victim described his thought process during the event as, “more
like a what should I do, like cause just doing sometimes might get you like shot.” Further, he
stated that he “tried to agree or obey” with any demands.). Id.
5
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
6