MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Nov 19 2018, 10:25 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stacy Y. Hart Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stacy Yuron Hart, November 19, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1092
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82C01-1407-F3-923
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 1 of 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Petitioner, Stacey Yuron Hart (Hart), appeals the trial court’s denial
of his motion to correct erroneous sentence.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Hart presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the
trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous
sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] The facts as they were found by this court on direct appeal are as follows:
From July 15-19, 2014, C.D., a fourteen-year-old runaway, lived
with Hart at various locations in Evansville. During this time,
Hart gave someone methamphetamine in exchange for the use of
a motel room and sold methamphetamine from his car and at
multiple residences. On July 19, police picked up C.D. C.D.
tested positive for methamphetamine, Xanax, marijuana, and
synthetic marijuana. Evansville Police Detective Tony Mayhew
interviewed C.D. regarding her prior whereabouts.
Based on what C.D. told him, Detective Mayhew obtained a
search warrant for Hart’s vehicle. On July 24, police stopped
Hart’s vehicle based on Detective Mayhew’s warrant. The
officer found a digital scale, a cigarette case containing baggie
corners and tweezers, a glass pipe with residue, and small baggies
with what he believed were drugs. Testing of the substances in
the baggies revealed 7.16 grams of methamphetamine, two
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1092 | November 19, 2018 Page 2 of 5
tablets of methadone, three tablets of hydrocodone, and five
tablets of Tramadol.
The State charged Hart with Level 3 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Level 6 possession of a narcotic drug, Class
A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Level 6 felony
possession of a legend drug. It alleged Hart was an habitual
offender. A jury found Hart guilty of all charges except Level 6
felony possession of a legend drug, on which the trial court
directed a verdict. The jury concluded Hart was an habitual
offender based on his prior convictions of Class D felony failure
to return to lawful detention in 2002 and Class C felony
possession of a controlled substance in 2005.
Hart v. State, 2015 WL 6954942, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2015),
trans. denied.
[5] On October 23, 2014, the trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence on the
Level 3 felony dealing methamphetamine conviction, enhanced by twenty years
for the habitual offender adjudication, and concurrent, maximum sentences on
the other two convictions resulting in an aggregate thirty-five-year sentence.
Hart appealed. On direct appeal, he claimed that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue that he was not properly adjudicated a habitual offender. We
rejected the claim and concluded that the State’s evidence of Hart’s prior felony
convictions in 2002 and 2005 established that he was a habitual offender.
[6] On March 8, 2018, Hart filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, asserting
that the State relied on an ineligible prior conviction to support the habitual
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offender adjudication because it was more than ten years old. On April 12,
2018, the trial court denied Hart’s motion.
[7] Hart now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[8] Hart contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
correct his erroneous sentence. Specifically, he maintains that his adjudication
as a habitual offender is invalid because it is not based on qualifying prior
convictions. A trial court’s denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Hobbs v. State, 71 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. We will find an abuse of discretion if the trial
court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it. Id.
[9] With respect to a sentencing error, “it is in the best interests of all concerned
that it be immediately discovered and corrected.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d
783, 786 (Ind. 2004). A motion to correct sentence under Indiana Code section
35-38-1-15 is appropriate only for “sentencing errors that are clear from the face
of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Id.
A sentencing error that requires examination of matters beyond the face of the
sentencing judgment is better suited for resolution on direct appeal and post-
conviction relief. Id. Accordingly, [c]laims that require consideration of the
proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a
motion to correct sentence.” Id. A sentence is defective on its face “if it
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violates express statutory authority at the time the sentence is pronounced, as
when the sentence falls outside the statutory parameters for the particular
offense or is based on an erroneous interpretation of a penalty provision.”
Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[10] Hart’s allegation that one of the underlying convictions used to support his
habitual offender adjudication was more than ten years old at the time of
sentencing and was therefore ineligible is not a claim that can be litigated by
way of a motion to correct error. The evaluation of Hart’s allegation requires
us to look beyond the face of the judgment and examine the underlying
convictions on which the habitual offender adjudication was based. It is only
by examining the evidence of the prior convictions themselves that we could
reach a decision on Hart’s claim. Therefore, as Hart’s contention requires this
court to look beyond the judgment, it may not be adjudicated through a motion
to correct erroneous sentence. See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786. We affirm the
trial court.
CONCLUSION
[11] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Hart’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.
[12] Affirmed.
[13] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur
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