J-A18045-18
2018 PA Super 312
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JEFFREY PETER THOMPSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 4087 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000964-2005
BEFORE: STABILE, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.* and STRASSBURGER, J.**
OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018
Jeffrey Peter Thompson (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order
denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
We provide the following background. On October 6, 2006, Appellant
entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement, wherein he pleaded guilty to
one count each of second-degree murder and robbery for murdering sixteen-
year-old Gregory Paschall.1 Appellant was sentenced pursuant to the
negotiated plea agreement to life in prison without the possibility of parole
(LWOP).2
____________________________________________
1
Appellant was 37 years old at the time.
2
In exchange for the guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed not to pursue the
death penalty.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A18045-18
Appellant filed pro se his first petition pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, on October 2, 2009. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, who filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court granted
counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed that petition as being filed
untimely. This Court affirmed that decision on January 5, 2011. See
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 23 A.3d 1075 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(unpublished memorandum). On June 20, 2014, Appellant filed a second
PCRA petition, which was once again dismissed as being filed untimely. This
Court affirmed that decision on July 31, 2015. See Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 125 A.3d 466 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum).
On October 20, 2017, Appellant filed pro se a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. In that petition, he claimed that his LWOP sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 10/20/2017, at 2. Specifically, he relies upon the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Id. In
Miller, the Supreme Court held that the application of LWOP sentences to
-2-
J-A18045-18
individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed homicides was
unconstitutional.3 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Appellant recognizes that he
was not a juvenile at the time he committed the murder, but argues that he
is an adult offender suffering from a mental disability, and is therefore akin to
a juvenile, i.e., one who is less culpable in committing a crime. Thus, he
argues that the Eighth Amendment prevents him from being sentenced to an
LWOP sentence. Accordingly, Appellant requested that the trial court grant
him a hearing and find that his “sentence is unconstitutional and his continuing
confinement illegal.” Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10/20/2017, at 11.
On November 14, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Before we address Appellant’s claims on appeal, we consider the trial
court’s conclusion that Appellant’s request for relief falls outside the purview
of the PCRA. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/2018, at 9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9543(a)(2)(i)) (concluding that because Appellant has not argued that “his
sentence was illegal at the time it was imposed” or that “there has been a
violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth or United States which so
____________________________________________
3
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the United States
Supreme Court determined that Miller announced a new substantive rule of
law that applies retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736.
-3-
J-A18045-18
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place,” Appellant’s claims fall outside the
purview of the PCRA).
[B]oth the PCRA and the state habeas corpus statute
contemplate that the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus in
circumstances where the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim.
… [W]e have held that the scope of the PCRA eligibility
requirements should not be narrowly confined to its specifically
enumerated areas of review. Such narrow construction would be
inconsistent with the legislative intent to channel post-conviction
claims into the PCRA’s framework, and would instead create a
bifurcated system of post-conviction review where some post-
conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA while others are
not.
Instead, this Court has broadly interpreted the PCRA
eligibility requirements as including within its ambit claims …
regardless of the “truth-determining process” language … from
[s]ection 9543(a)(2)(i). See Commonwealth v. Liebel, [] 825
A.2d 630 ([Pa.] 2003) (holding that claim challenging counsel’s
effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is
cognizable under PCRA); Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v.
Goldberg, [] 773 A.2d 126 ([Pa.] 2001) (holding that claim
alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining
process is cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth v.
Chester, [] 733 A.2d 1242 ([Pa.] 1999) (holding that claim
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of
capital case is cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth v.
Lantzy, [736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999)] (holding that claim alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file an appeal is
cognizable under the PCRA).
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 985-86 (Pa. 2008) (some
citations omitted). In other words, the fact that Appellant’s claim here does
not implicate the truth-determining process does not mean that it could not
be subject to the PCRA. Instead, the focus of a court considering a petition is
on the remedy being sought by the petitioner. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b)
-4-
J-A18045-18
(“The writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by
post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.”) (emphasis added).
In this case, Appellant is seeking a hearing to determine whether his
sentence should be reduced or he should be discharged. See Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, 10/20/2017, at 11. Such relief is clearly contemplated by
the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(a) (“If the court rules in favor of the
petitioner, it shall order appropriate relief and issue supplementary orders as
to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence or
other matters that are necessary and proper.”).
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Commonwealth, see
Commonwealth’s Brief at 7, that the PCRA was the proper vehicle to examine
this petition. Thus, we now consider Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition.
Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the
date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to this
time requirement: (1) interference by government officials in the
presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an
after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner alleges
and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the petition will
be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one of these
exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claims
could have been presented. The timeliness requirements of the
PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court
cannot hear untimely petitions.
Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Because Appellant’s filing is well-outside of the one-year timeframe
provided in the PCRA, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain
-5-
J-A18045-18
Appellant’s petition unless he pleaded and offered proof of one or more of the
three statutory exceptions to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant failed to do so, and therefore the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Appellant’s untimely-filed petition. Based on the foregoing, we
affirm the order of the PCRA court.4
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2018
____________________________________________
4
“[W]e may affirm the PCRA court’s decision on any basis.” Commonwealth
v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2014).
-6-