In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: H.A., A.A., Ri.A., and Ro.A. (Minor Children), and R.A. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 19 2019, 10:14 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Katherine N. Worman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the Parent- February 19, 2019
Child Relationship of: H.A., Court of Appeals Case No.
A.A., Ri.A., and Ro.A. (Minor 18A-JT-2107
Children), Appeal from the Vanderburgh
and Superior Court
The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,
R.A. (Father), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Renee A.
Ferguson, Magistrate
v. Trial Court Cause No.
82D04-1711-JT-2195
The Indiana Department of 82D04-1711-JT-2196
Child Services, 82D04-1711-JT-2197
82D04-1711-JT-2198
Appellee-Plaintiff.

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 Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] R.A. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to

H.A., A.A., Ri.A., and Ro.A. We affirm.

Issue
[2] Father raises several issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court properly admitted certain evidence
at the termination hearing.

II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
termination of Father’s parental rights.

Facts
[3] Father and As.A. (“Mother”) are the parents of Ro.A., who was born in

October 2007; A.A., who was born in July 2009; H.A., who was born in

October 2010; and Ri.A., who was born in June 2014 (collectively, “the

Children”). On July 8, 2016, the State charged Father with two counts of child

molesting, as Class A felonies, for molesting H.A. and A.A. In November

2016, Mother left the three older Children with a friend and refused to take the

Children back.

[4] On November 23, 2016, the Vanderburgh County Department of Child Services

(“DCS”) filed petitions alleging that each of the Children were children in need

of services (“CHINS”) due to: (1) Father’s incarceration for sexually abusing

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 two of the Children; (2) Mother’s refusal to take custody of the Children; (3)

Mother’s failure to address the Children’s medical needs; and (4) Mother’s

failure to provide the Children with a safe and appropriate home. After a

hearing, the trial court found that the Children were CHINS. A January 2017

dispositional order required Father to notify DCS upon his release from

incarceration and ordered Mother to participate in certain services. The

Children have resided in foster homes since the November 2016 removal from

Mother’s care.

[5] In November 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate Father’s and Mother’s

parental rights. 1 A hearing was held in February and May 2018. At that time,

Father remained incarcerated on the pending child molestation charges. Father

participated in the hearing by telephone.

[6] Tarita Moore, a family case manager for DCS, testified that she first met the

Children in 2016 when DCS received a hotline call about the family. Over

Father’s objection, Moore testified that, upon arriving, H.A. and A.A. almost

immediately told Moore that “their Dad was in jail for molesting them.” Tr.

Vol. II p. 66.

[7] Hilary Bemis, a family case manager for DCS, testified that Ri.A. goes to a

therapeutic preschool, where “he receives most of his services, which includes

1
Mother’s parental rights were terminated by default. On appeal, DCS conceded that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. See A.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Services, No. 18A-JT-527
(Ind. Ct. App. July 9, 2018).

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 speech therapy, physical therapy, [and] occupational therapy.” Id. at 56. He

also sees physicians at Riley Hospital due to his club feet. H.A. and A.A.

receive weekly skills training and individual therapy. Ro.A. receives weekly

individual therapy.

[8] Stephanie Whalen, a community resource specialist with Southwestern

Behavioral Healthcare (“Southwestern”), testified regarding the skills training

that she provided to H.A. and A.A. beginning in January 2017. Whalen

worked with H.A. and A.A. on social skills, coping skills, personal boundaries,

personal space, and how to follow rules and directions. Over Father’s

objection, Whalen testified that, according to the foster mothers, one of the girls

exposed or pulled down another foster child’s underwear and one of the girls

got on another girl in a “humping position.” Id. at 44.

[9] Mendy Martin, social worker and therapist with Southwestern, also testified

regarding her work with H.A. and A.A. Over Father’s objection, Martin

testified that H.A. and A.A. had separately disclosed that Father “had touched

their bad spot.” Id. at 49. Through Martin’s testimony, the State also sought to

admit Exhibit F and Exhibit G, which were H.A.’s and A.A.’s medical records

from Southwestern. Over Father’s objection, the trial court admitted the

exhibits.

[10] Ashley Williams, a therapist with Maglinger Behavioral Health Services,

testified that she has provided therapy to Ro.A. Ro.A. told Williams that

Ro.A. “should be in jail” because Father “made him have sex with his sisters.”

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 Id. at 81. Ro.A. described watching videos of people having sex, described

Mother and Father having sex, and reported that Father had sex with his

sisters. Ro.A. also reported that Father “made him put his privates . . . on his

sister’s privates and made him move around.” Id. Ro.A. told Williams that

Mother and Father “rubbed his penis at the same time and they made him pee

in a cup [and] the pee was different than when it’s in [a] toilet.” Id. at 82.

Father also made Ro.A. touch Father’s penis, and Mother videotaped these

acts. Finally, Ro.A. reported that Father made him “kiss his sister’s vagina”

and that Father also “kissed his sister’s vagina.” Id.

[11] Ro.A. stated that seeing his sisters “triggered” him and made him feel “weird

and itchy.” Id. at 83. As a result, sibling visitations with his sisters were

stopped, and Ro.A. has made progress. According to Williams, “[Ro.A.] has

made the statement that his real Mom and real Dad should be in prison. This

child went from idolizing [them] to taking the blame to recognizing that his real

Mom and Dad broke the law and they should be in prison. That’s significant

progress in a child.” Id. at 86. Williams testified that it is not in Ro.A.’s best

interest to have contact with Father.

[12] Father denied sexually molesting H.A., A.A., and Ro.A. and denied observing

Mother engage in inappropriate sexual activity with the Children. Father

claimed that Ro.A. had a “history of deceptive problems” and “has exaggerated

and made up a lot of stories over the years.” Id. at 28. Father testified that he

touched A.A. and Ro.A. only in the “medical sense.” Id. at 33, 35.

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[13] After the hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law

as follows:

*****

17. Father is currently in the Daviess County Jail. He is charged
with sexually molesting [H.A.] and [A.A.].

18. Father is denying the charges.

19. Father stated that he had no idea who could have molested
the children.

20. [Ro.A.] has also reported sexual molestation at the hands of
mother and father.

21. Father reports that [Ro.A.] has a chromosomal disorder,
mild autism, and is mildly mentally handicapped.

22. Father denies [Ro.A.’s] allegations as well.

23. Father testified that the children have referred to “touching”
in their allegations and father can show that he has been the
primary caregiver and has had cause to touch the children in
their genital area.

24. Father does not know when his criminal case will end and
when he would be available to parent his children.

25. When asked how long the children should have to wait for
permanency, father replied that, “he doesn’t have an answer”.

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 26. Father went on to state that there isn’t any guarantee that the
children would not be molested in an adoptive home.

27. All of the children have been in therapy.

28. [H.A.] and [A.A.] have been reported by a therapist to have
boundary issues and have exhibited sexualized behavior.

29. [H.A.] and [A.A.] have trouble expressing feelings and show
feelings through aggressive behavior.

30. [Ro.A.] stated to his therapist that he was forced by father to
engage in sexual acts with his sisters, watch pornography, watch
his father have sex with his sisters, and watch mom and dad
engage in sexual acts.

31. This trauma has resulted in [Ro.A.’s] sisters being a sexual
trigger to him.

32. [Ro.A.] stated that both his mother and father should be in
prison.

33. The therapist for [Ro.A.] has stated in her opinion [Ro.A.]
should not have any further contact with his father.

34. The Department of Child Services Case Managers along
with the children’s Court Appointed Special Advocate have all
testified that termination of father’s parental rights and adoption
are in the best interest of the children.

*****

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 7. The Court now finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the allegations of the petition to terminate parental rights are true
in that:

a. All four children have been removed from the care and
custody of their parents for at least six (6) months after the
dispositional decree was placed in the order book.

b. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the removal of the [Children] will not be
remedied.

c. There is [a] reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship between the father and his
children poses a threat to the well-being of the children.

d. Termination of the parent-child relationship between
[the Children] and their father is in the best interest of the
children.

e. The plan of the Department of Child Services for the
care and treatment of the children upon termination of
father’s parental rights is adoption, which is acceptable
and satisfactory.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 32-34.

Analysis
I. Admission of Evidence

[14] Father first challenges the admission of certain evidence during the termination

hearing. The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the

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 trial court. In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d 603, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

Evidentiary rulings of a trial court are afforded great deference on appeal and

are overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. We will find

an abuse of discretion if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and the

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. Moreover, not all trial

court error is reversible. In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of E.T., 808

N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ind. 2004) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 61). Indiana Trial Rule 61

provides that we must “disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which

does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Our Supreme Court has

held that “[t]he improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the

judgment is supported by substantial independent evidence to satisfy the

reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned

evidence contributed to the judgment.” E.T., 808 N.E.2d at 645-46.

A. Testimony of Therapists

[15] Father challenges the admission of certain testimony by the Children’s

therapists, Martin and Williams. Martin was the therapist for H.A. and A.A.,

and Williams was the therapist for Ro.A. Over Father’s hearsay objection,

Martin testified regarding H.A.’s and A.A.’s statements to her regarding

Father’s alleged molestation of the girls. Over Father’s hearsay objection,

Williams testified regarding Ro.A.’s statements to her regarding Father’s and

Mother’s alleged molestations of him.

[16] A hearsay statement is one “other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
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 matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay statements are not

admissible, except pursuant to certain exceptions within the Rules of Evidence.

Ind. Evidence Rule 802. One such exception, which DCS argues is applicable

here, “generally permits statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis

or treatment to be admitted into evidence, even when the declarant is

available.” VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind.

Evidence Rule 803(4)). The statements must be “made by persons who are

seeking medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past

or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character

of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to

diagnosis or treatment.” Id. “Rule 803(4)’s exception is grounded in a belief

that the declarant’s self-interest in obtaining proper medical treatment makes

such a statement reliable enough for admission at trial—more simply put, Rule

803(4) reflects the idea that people are unlikely to lie to their doctors because

doing so might jeopardize their opportunity to be made well.” Id.

[17] “This belief of reliability, though, necessitates a two-step analysis for admission

under Rule 803(4).” Id. “First, ‘is the declarant motivated to provide truthful

information in order to promote diagnosis and treatment,’ and second, ‘is the

content of the statement such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely

on it in rendering diagnosis or treatment.’” Id. (quoting McClain v. State, 675

N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996)). “Statements made by victims of sexual assault or

molestation about the nature of the assault or abuse—even those identifying the

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 perpetrator—generally satisfy the second prong of the analysis because they

assist medical providers in recommending potential treatment . . . .” Id.

But in cases like the one here, where the declarant is a young
child brought to the medical provider by a parent, we have
acknowledged that such an inference may be less than obvious.
Such young children may not understand the nature of the
examination, the function of the examiner, and may not
necessarily make the necessary link between truthful responses
and accurate medical treatment. In that circumstance, “there
must be evidence that the declarant understood the professional’s
role in order to trigger the motivation to provide truthful
information.” This evidence does not necessarily require
testimony from the child-declarant; it may be received in the
form of foundational testimony from the medical professional
detailing the interaction between him or her and the declarant,
how he or she explained his role to the declarant, and an
affirmation that the declarant understood that role. But whatever
its source, this foundation must be present and sufficient.

Id. at 261 (internal citations omitted).

[18] Father argues that H.A. and A.A. did not understand Martin’s role in order to

trigger the motivation to provide truthful information. Martin testified that she

explained her role as therapist to H.A. and A.A., explained what therapy was,

and explained the importance of telling the truth. Martin stated that the girls

seemed to understand the importance of telling the truth. When asked if the

girls understood the purpose and goal of therapy, Martin responded: “[Y]es and

no. I think just with their ages sometimes it’s hard for them to understand what

therapy is. But I think that they understood that I was someone there that was

supposed to be able to help them process things.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Although
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 the girls’ young age made it difficult for them to completely understand therapy,

according to Martin, they understood that Martin was there to help them

process events that happened to them and understood the need to be truthful.

Under these circumstances, the girls’ statements were reliable, and the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Martin’s testimony regarding the

girls’ statements to her.

[19] As for Williams’ testimony, Father argues that Ro.A. had no concept of

truthfulness and did not understand the purpose of therapy. Williams testified

that she explained her role as a therapist to Ro.A. in terms of being a “helper

coming to help him feel better.” Id. at 77. Ro.A. often colored pictures for

Williams and addressed them as: “For my therapist.” Id. at 85. Williams had

discussions with Ro.A. about the importance of being truthful, and Ro.A.

“seem[ed] to understand” the concept of truth. Id. at 77-78. Williams played a

game with Ro.A. to explain the difference between a truth and a lie. Williams

explained that, prior to meeting with her, it did not appear that Ro.A. “had any

understanding of truth and lie.” Id. at 87.

[20] Father’s argument focuses on Williams’ testimony regarding Ro.A.’s lack of

understanding of truthfulness prior to working with Williams; Williams,

however, made it clear that she worked with Ro.A. to explain truthfulness to

him, and he seemed to understand. Under these circumstances, Ro.A.’s

statements were reliable, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting Williams’ testimony regarding Ro.A.’s statements to her.

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 B. Whalen’s Testimony

[21] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Whalen’s

testimony regarding the foster mother’s statements to her. Whalen, a

community resource specialist with Southwestern, testified that, according to

the foster mothers, one of the girls exposed or pulled down another foster

child’s underwear and one of the girls got on another girl in a “humping

position.” Tr. Vol. II p. 44.

[22] Father argues that this evidence is not admissible under the medical diagnosis

or treatment exception of Evidence Rule 803(4) because the information came

from the foster mother, not the girls. DCS “does not dispute this.” Appellee’s

Br. p. 24. DCS, however, argues that the evidence is admissible because “the

purpose is to show the effect that the statement had on the listener.” Id. at 25

(citing Whited v. State, 645 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Bottoms v.

B&M Coal Corp., 405 N.E.2d 82, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).

[23] We do agree with Father that the trial court erred in admitting Whalen’s

testimony regarding foster mother’s statements. The statements do not fall

within one of the hearsay exceptions. We find, however, that any error in the

admission of the evidence is harmless. DCS introduced substantial admissible

evidence of the Children’s statements to their therapists regarding Father’s

alleged actions. The admission of very brief testimony regarding foster

mother’s observations of sexualized behaviors did not impact Father’s

substantial rights. This evidence was not germane to the ultimate issues before

the court.
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 C. Exhibit F and Exhibit G

[24] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibit F

and Exhibit G, which were H.A.’s and A.A.’s medical records from

Southwestern. These exhibits were admitted during Martin’s testimony over

Father’s objection. Father contends that the exhibits contain progress notes

from another therapist that also worked with H.A. and A.A. and that “there is

no foundation laid for A.A. and H.A.’s hearsay statements to the other medical

professional.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18.

[25] DCS argues that any error in the admission of the exhibits was harmless. We

note that Father does not point to any specific hearsay statements made to the

other medical professional at issue here. Father makes no effort to explain how

his substantial rights were impacted by the admission of these exhibits. Given

Father’s lack of cogent argument, we agree that any error in the admission of

the exhibits was harmless.

B. Family Case Manager’s Testimony

[26] Next, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

Moore’s testimony regarding H.A.’s and A.A.’s statements to her. Moore

testified that she first met the Children in 2016 when DCS received a hotline

call about the family. Over Father’s objection, Moore testified that, upon

arriving, H.A. and A.A. almost immediately told Moore that “their Dad was in

jail for molesting them.” Id. at 66.

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[27] During the termination hearing, DCS argued that the statement was admissible

as an excited utterance. See Ind. Evid. R. 803(2). Moore testified that H.A. and

A.A. were not “in any kind of significant emotional state” at the time. Tr. Vol.

II p. 66. We do not find that this statement qualified as an excited utterance.

See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that

a stabbing victim’s statement to an officer was not admissible as an excited

utterance where the victim was no longer under the stress of the stabbing when

the officer interviewed him).

[28] On appeal, DCS argues that any error in the admission of the statement was

harmless. We agree. Father admitted that he had been charged with two

counts of child molesting for molesting H.A. and A.A. We have noted that

H.A.’s and A.A.’s statements to their therapist that Father molested them were

admissible. Consequently, Moore’s testimony was cumulative of Father’s and

Martin’s testimony, and any error in the admission of Moore’s testimony was

harmless. See, e.g., B.H. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 989 N.E.2d 355, 363

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that, to the extent it was error to admit testimony

regarding progress reports, any error was harmless).

II. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Termination

[29] Father challenges the termination of his parental relationship with the Children.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re

K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225,

1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is
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 ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e]

[c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054

(2000)). We recognize, of course, that parental interests are not absolute and

must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper

disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, “‘[p]arental

rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their

parental responsibilities by failing to provide for the child’s immediate and long-

term needs.’” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d

258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).

[30] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the

evidence or judge witness credibility. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind.

2011). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most

favorable to the judgment. Id. We must also give “due regard” to the trial

court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

(quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).

[31] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), “The trial court shall enter

findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections

(a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights. 2 Here, the

2
Indiana Code Sections 31-35-2-8(a) and (b), governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a
delinquent child or CHINS, provide as follows:

(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall
terminate the parent-child relationship.

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 trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting DCS’s

petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. When reviewing findings of fact

and conclusions of law entered in a case involving the termination of parental

rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we determine whether

the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the

findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court’s judgment

only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the

findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not

support the judgment. Id.

[32] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the

allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship

involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

(A) That one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for
at least six (6) months under a dispositional
decree.

(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall
dismiss the petition.

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 (ii) The court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-
21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family
preservation or reunification are not required,
including a description of the court’s finding, the
date of the finding, and the manner in which the
finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a local office
or probation department for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22)
months, beginning with the date the child is
removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or
a delinquent child.

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
or the reasons for placement outside the
home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child;
and

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 (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the child.

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re

V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

[33] Father makes three arguments on appeal. First, Father argues that several of

the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Next, Father argues the trial

court’s conclusion that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal would

not be remedied is clearly erroneous. Finally, Father argues the trial court’s

conclusion that termination of Father’s rights is in the best interests of the

Children is clearly erroneous.

A. Findings

[34] Father challenges several of the trial court’s findings of fact. First, Father

challenges the trial court’s finding that “Father does not know when his

criminal case will end and when he would be available to parent his children.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 33. Father testified that he has been in jail for

nineteen months, that he did not know when his trial would occur, that he had

no idea when he would be released, and that he could not currently take

custody of any of the Children. This finding is supported by the evidence.

[35] Father next challenges the trial court’s finding that “[w]hen asked how long the

children should have to wait for permanency, father replied that, ‘he doesn’t

have an answer.’” Id. During the evidentiary hearing, Father testified as

follows:

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 Q How long should your children have to wait for you to get out
of prison - out of jail, sir?

A Well, I mean, I don’t really have that answer. You know, to
say if my children should have to wait and then I was found
guilty would be – you know, it would be wrong for them. But at
the same time for my kids not to wait and be taken out of their
homes and separated and adopted into other homes, there’s no
guarantee that they would be even safe within the homes that
they adopted in or anything else. And then I was found not
guilty and they wouldn’t be a part of my life or their own life and
with each of their siblings. It’s just unfair.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 34-35. Although the wording of the trial court’s finding is

slightly different than the language used in the question, the trial court

adequately summarized Father’s statement—Father does not know how long

he will be in jail and how long the Children should have to wait. The trial court

committed no error.

[36] Next, Father challenges the trial court’s finding that “[a]ll of the children have

been in therapy.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 33. Father concedes that H.A.,

A.A., and Ro.A. have been receiving psychological therapy, but he argues that

Ri.A. has not been receiving therapy. DCS presented evidence that Ri.A. has

been receiving speech, physical, and occupational therapies. The trial court’s

finding is supported by the evidence.

B. Probability that Removal Conditions will be Remedied

[37] Father next argues that the trial court erred by finding there is a reasonable

probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the

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 reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

We first note that Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the

disjunctive. Subsection (b)(2)(B)(iii), which concerns repeated CHINS

adjudications, is inapplicable here. Consequently, DCS was required to

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that

either: (1) the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons

for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, or (2) the

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s

well-being. The trial court here found both that the conditions resulting in the

Children’s removal will not be remedied and that the continuation of the

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. Father

does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the continuation of the parent-

child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. By failing to

challenge this finding, Father has implicitly conceded the sufficiency of the

evidence to support subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) and has effectively waived review of

the trial court’s determination under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).

[38] Waiver notwithstanding, we will address Father’s argument. “In determining

whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Child’s] removal . . . will not be

remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-

43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the

conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’” Id. In

analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent’s fitness “as of the

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 time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of

changed conditions.” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children,

839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial

court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than

efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to

give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that

parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[39] Father’s only arguments are that he has been unable to participate in services

due to his incarceration and that the family case managers and Court

Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) have not been in contact with him outside

of court hearings. The Children were initially removed due to Father’s

incarceration for allegedly sexually abusing two of the Children and Mother’s

refusal to take custody of the Children, failure to address their medical needs,

and failure to provide them with a safe and appropriate home. Father was

charged with molesting H.A. and A.A., and those charges are pending. During

the proceedings, Ro.A. also accused Father of molesting him and forcing him

to participate in sexual activity with H.A. and A.A. Ro.A. disclosed to his

therapist many disturbing instances of abuse. Ro.A.’s therapist recommended

that Ro.A. have no further contact with Father. Given the significant

allegations of sexual abuse of H.A., A.A., and Ro.A. by Father, the trial court’s

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not

be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

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 C. Children’s Best Interests

[40] Father next challenges the trial court’s determination that termination is in the

best interests of the Children. In determining what is in the best interests of a

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. See In re

A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In doing so, the trial court

must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id.

at 168. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s

emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at

1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that

his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired

before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s

need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best

interests of a child. Id.

[41] Father argues that he has maintained his innocence in the criminal case and

that he could be “found innocent on his criminal charges but have lost the rights

to his children.” Appellant’s Br. p. 24. Father also argues that a best interest

determination should not be based solely on the recommendations of the family

case managers and the CASA. Father focuses on the family case managers and

CASA’s lack of contact with him during his incarceration.

[42] We agree that a best interest determination cannot be supported solely on the

recommendations of the family case managers and CASA. We have held that

“[r]ecommendations of the case manager and court-appointed [special]

advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be
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 remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that

termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis added), trans. denied. There is no indication,

however, that the trial court based its best interest conclusion on only the

opinions of the family case managers and the CASA. Moreover, Father’s

argument focuses on himself and the lack of contact by the family case

managers and CASA with himself. The issue here, however, is the best

interests of the Children.

[43] The Children have been out of Father’s care since July 2016, when he was

charged with molesting H.A. and A.A. Since that time, Ro.A. has disclosed

extremely disturbing allegations of additional abuse. Both family case

managers testified that adoption was in the Children’s best interests due to

Father’s ongoing incarceration and the nature of the charges. The CASA also

recommended adoption because the Children needed permanency and stability.

H.A., A.A., and Ro.A. have each needed significant therapy to address their

behaviors and to process the trauma they have suffered. Although they have

each made progress, the Children need permanency, stability, and a safe

environment. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court’s finding

that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests is

not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion
[44] The trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights is not clearly erroneous.

We affirm.
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[45] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and May, J., concur.

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