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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: L.D.G., JR., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: N.M.W., MOTHER : No. 2386 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 19, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2018-a9052
IN RE: J.D.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: N.M.W., MOTHER : No. 2408 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 19, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2018-a9053
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2019
N.M.W (“Mother”) appeals from the July 19, 2018 decrees entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans’ Court Division
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her dependent children, J.D.G.,
male child, born in October of 2008, and L.D.G., Jr., male child, born in
September of 2012 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.
1Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513, this court sua sponte consolidated these appeals
because they involve related parties and issues. (Order of court, 9/6/18.)
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The orphans’ court set forth the following:
[Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services
Agency (“Agency”)] first received a referral regarding
this family in September 2010. Between 2010 and
2013, the Agency provided general protective services
to the family. In December 2013, dependency
petitions were filed, and on August 13, 2014 both
[C]hildren were adjudicated dependent. The Children
were placed in the legal custody of a maternal aunt
until September 8, 2014, when an emergency custody
Order placed the Children in the care of the Agency.
A shelter care hearing was conducted on
September 15, 2014. The Children were then in the
care of the Agency for twenty-three (23) consecutive
months. On August 3, 2016, the Children were
returned to the care of Mother; however, shortly
thereafter, on September 13, 2016, the Children were
returned to the care of the Agency. They have
remained in the Agency’s care since that time. In
total, then, the Children have been out of Mother’s
care for approximately forty-five (45) months of the
past forty-six (46) months, except for the brief period
in August and September 2016.
Unfortunately, Mother has failed to remedy the
difficult circumstances that originally caused the
Children to come into the care of the Agency,
particularly with regard to extremely unsuitable
housing conditions, and she has failed to adequately
comply with the Permanency Placement Plans that the
Agency designed for her. On May 16, 2018, the
Agency filed the subject Petitions for the Involuntary
Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights under
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act. On
August 10, 2018, Mother filed a timely appeal in the
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Superior Court from our July 19, 2018
Decrees.[Footnote 2][2]
[Footnote 2] Despite this being a fast
track appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2), the [orphans’
c]ourt was delayed in receiving the official
transcript of this hearing due to
unexpected medical difficulties suffered
by th[e orphans’ c]ourt’s stenographer.
Immediately upon receipt of the
transcript, the [orphans’ c]ourt promptly
addressed this appeal.
Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 1-2 (citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
[At the termination of parental rights hearing,] [w]e
heard the testimony of Ericka Way, the Agency
caseworker who became involved with this family in
February 2018.[Footnote 4] Ms. Way testified
regarding more than twenty (20) visits to Mother’s
home between 2011 and 2018. The first visit occurred
on September 28, 2010. That was an unannounced
visit to the home following the referral that was made
2 The record reflects that Mother simultaneously filed a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
Thereafter, the orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion.
We further note that the orphans’ court noted that:
the biological father (“Father”) did not appear at the
hearing, although his court-appointed counsel was
present. The Agency has had no contact with Father
since November 2016. He has not sought assistance
from the Agency, nor has he been an active resource
for the Children. Decrees granting the Agency’s
Petitions to Terminate Father’s Rights as to both
Children were signed on July 19, 2018. Father has
not filed an appeal.
Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 1 n.1.
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to the Agency about this family. The house was found
to be “cluttered and filthy,” with no food in the home
and ants crawling on a high chair. Upon these
discoveries, the Agency assisted by providing cleaning
supplies.
[Footnote 4] The caseworker formerly
involved with this family is no longer
employed by the Agency.
Over the years, the majority of the visits to Mother’s
home were scheduled visits, yet Ms. Way testified that
upon entering the home, it was consistently found in
the same cluttered and filthy condition. Mother was
repeatedly informed that she needed to clean the
home. The Agency notes through the years included
descriptions such as filthy, smelling of human and dog
urine, dog feces in the home, trash on the floors
throughout the home, food on the floor, ants, and a
fence around a swimming pool that remained
unrepaired. During an announced visit on
November 20, 2013, Mother refused to show the
caseworker where the Children slept. During an
unannounced visit on August 4, 2015, the caseworker
discovered the family was sleeping in the basement
due to oppressive odors upstairs in the home. The
inability to breathe clean air in the home was always
of particular concern to the Agency due to both
Children suffering from asthma.
Ms. Way testified about exposed nails in the home,
choking hazards on the floor, cleaning products and
spray paint within reach of the Children, and medicine
bottles not safely situated. During one visit a
caseworker had to step outside the home and became
ill due to the extremely foul odor inside. One week
later, on September 1, 2016, the caseworker arrived
for a scheduled visit and observed a basement that
smelled of urine, no sheets on the beds, debris all over
the floors, and urine filled bottles into which Mother
had the Children urinate. Mother refused to allow the
caseworker to photograph the conditions. The
caseworker attempted an unannounced visit on
February 28, 2018. Although no one answered the
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door, the caseworker recognized a strong smell of
urine from outside the door.[Footnote 5] Ms. Way
testified Mother has never informed the Agency that
she cleaned the home and requested the Agency to
reassess the living conditions, nor did she inform the
Agency that she was living elsewhere, in a cleaner and
safer environment for her and the Children.
[Footnote 5] During this period Mother,
and when relevant, the Children, lived
with the maternal grandfather and
great-grandfather. The Agency
caseworkers encountered similar
unacceptable, unsanitary conditions
wherever Mother resided with her
Children.
We also heard the testimony of Desiree Mullen, the
Agency supervisor involved in this case between
February 2016 and February 2018. Ms. Mullen
testified that the most significant concern to the
Agency was that for years, Mother did not have an
appropriate living environment for the Children, and
that for many months Mother refused to allow the
Agency to enter her home. The poor condition of the
home was so extreme that it was referenced in Agency
notes as “deplorable.” Ms. Mullen testified that
Mother had discussed obtaining full-time employment
for herself and new housing for the Children since
2014, but had accomplished neither.[Footnote 6]
Despite the Agency repeatedly informing Mother
during eight (8) years of Agency involvement, that
she could and should improve the environment in
which Children lived by cleaning the home, Mother
failed to do so. Ms. Mullen testified that the only
explanation Mother shared during the time the
Children lived in her father’s home, was that no one
else helped her with housecleaning.
[Footnote 6] Mother gave birth to another
child in November 2017, about two weeks
after she had informed the Agency of her
pregnancy. That child is being cared for
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by the paternal grandmother and great-
grandmother.
The Agency was concerned that Mother’s conduct may
have been associated with mental health issues, and
suggested to Mother as early as 2012 that she should
pursue a mental health evaluation. Mother failed to
consistently participate in mental health treatment.
Mother would provide the Agency a verification of an
evaluation but then no further proof of treatment.
Mother refused to sign releases for the Agency to
access any related mental health information.
Ms. Mullen testified that twice Mother failed to appear
for treatment appointments. In June 2014 Mother
informed the Agency that she was not receiving any
treatment.
In September 2014, Mother agreed in Dependency
Court to seek a psychological evaluation. In 2016,
Mother reported attending counseling, but she would
not sign a release or inform the caseworker where she
was allegedly receiving treatment. In 2017, Mother
informed the Agency that she was not receiving
counseling, and in February 2018, she reported
receiving therapy at Penndel Mental Health. Given
Mother’s unwillingness to comply in this regard, the
Agency has no better insight today than it did in 2012
as to whether or not Mother’s mental health status
impacts her ability to obtain and maintain appropriate
housing.
Ms. Mullen testified about the services the Agency has
provided Mother at various times during the past
eight (8) years. Those services included assistance
with housing, employment, and family services to aid
in prevention of the Children having to be removed
from the home.
One example about which Ms. Mullen testified was
Mother’s noncompliance at a housing group shelter to
which the Agency had referred Mother in 2013.
Mother was discharged from that program due to the
lack of cleanliness of her room which rendered the
conditions inappropriate and unsafe for the Children.
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Additionally, Mother had not followed through with
expectations regarding her own mental health and
services for the Children.
Mother also failed to effectively engage in parent
education. Ms. Mullen testified that “most, if not all”
of the parenting referrals for Mother were not
successfully completed by her, and were terminated
by the Agency’s contractor due to Mother’s refusal to
participate. Ms. Mullen observed that Mother
participated in the LINKS Family Services Association
program “intermittently.”
Mother has represented to the Agency that she has
part-time employment. Mother did not provide
documentation of that employment to the Agency, nor
has she ever reported full-time employment.
Ms. Mullen also testified about the family group
decision making meetings that were conducted in this
case. She believed at least two meetings occurred
which were attended by her and the caseworker,
along with Mother, Mother’s brother and his
fiancé/wife, and Mother’s father. The causes that
brought the Children into the care of the Agency, and
how those circumstances could be improved, were
discussed. Included were the need for Mother to
make the home safe for the Children, and for Mother
to increase her hours of employment. Mother
understood the tasks she needed to accomplish in
order for the Children to potentially return to Mother’s
home in August 2016, and she acknowledged that this
was an important opportunity for her to exhibit
improvement. Ms. Mullen recounted the tasks as
follows: “[t]o keep the house clean and appropriate,
free of clutter, trash, urine, feces, to increase her work
hours which were floating around 10 hours a week . . .
for her to follow through with mental health.” Mother
was also to enroll L.D.G., Jr. in daycare and J.D.G. in
school. In anticipation of the Children’s return to
Mother’s home, the assigned Agency caseworker
assisted Mother in cleaning the home, disposing of
trash and clutter, removing unsafe items, and
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discarding uneaten food that remained around the
home.
Ms. Mullen testified that the caseworker visited
Mother’s home shortly after the Children returned
there in August 2016. Mother had not enrolled the
Children in school or daycare, despite the Agency
providing funding for the daycare. Mother had
returned the Children to wearing pull-ups and
urinating into bottles, and again there was food and
garbage strewn about the floors.
Due to significant concerns regarding the Children’s
well-being during this six (6) week return to Mother’s
care, an emergency Order was entered returning the
Children to the care of the Agency. The Children were
returned to the foster family with whom they had
previously resided. The Children’s physical health,
cleanliness, and social skills had deteriorated during
their return to Mother’s care. The foster mother had
to re-educate the Children on properly using a
bathroom, not throwing trash on the floor, eating
properly, and using utensils. Additionally, J.D.G. was
enrolled in school.
Id. at 7-12 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
Mother frames her issues on appeal as follows:
1. [Did the orphans’] court abuse its discretion
when it determined that Mother’s failure to
clean proves incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refuse [sic] so as to cause the children to be
without essential parental care, control, or
subsistence necessary for the children’s physical
or mental well being as required under Section
2511(a)(2)?
2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion
when it determined that termination of parental
rights best served the needs and welfare of the
children as required under Section 2511(a)(5)
and Section 2511(a)(8)? [sic]
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Mother’s brief at 8.
At the outset, we note that Mother fails to specifically challenge the
orphans’ court’s determination under Section 2511(b) in her statement of
questions presented. In light of the requisite bifurcated analysis set forth in
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, however, we excuse Mother’s inartfully
framed issues because that statute requires us to review the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child in termination cases.
We, therefore, begin our review.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If
the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of
law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may
be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different
result. Id. at 827. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.,
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855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent
evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record
could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d
387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
As previously stated, the termination of parental rights is guided by
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the
grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511,
the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to
terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on
the conduct of the parent. The party seeking
termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in
Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her
parental rights does the court engage in the second
part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child
under the standard of best interests of the child. One
major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to
the effect on the child of permanently severing any
such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
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In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long
held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only
agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as
well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to
Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not
be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect
to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first
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initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of
the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015),
quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.”
In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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Here, Mother claims that the orphans’ court abused its discretion when
it terminated her parental rights “for allegations of bad housekeeping and
poverty related to inability to obtain Agency approved housing for herself and
the Children.” (Mother’s brief at 16.) Despite Mother’s contention, the
orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights because it:
found that there was ample evidence to justify the
termination of Mother’s parental rights to the
Children, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The period
during August-September 2016, when the Children
returned to Mother’s home, strikingly demonstrated
Mother’s “incapacity” under (a)(2) as to remedying
the significant parenting problems that brought the
family to the Agency’s attention eight (8) years prior,
in 2010, and which later required the Children to be
brought into Agency care in 2013. These incapacity
factors included, most significantly, Mother’s unsafe
housing, along with her reluctance to obtain full-time
employment, and her failure to address potential
mental health issues.
Mother failed to cooperate with the many services
provided by the Agency over many years.
Additionally, Mother failed to utilize the assistance
provided by the Agency as a catalyst for improved
parenting, such as being provided with cleaning
supplies and the caseworker physically assisting in
cleaning the home. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter,
Mother allowed the home to lapse into unsafe and
unhealthy conditions.
Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 12-13.
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that it supports the
orphans’ court’s factual findings and that the orphans’ court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2).
The record demonstrates that the conditions that existed upon removal
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establish repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of
Mother that caused the Children to be without essential parental care, control,
or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being, the causes of
which Mother cannot or will not remedy.
We now turn to whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
As to that section, our supreme court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 620
A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the
determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M.,
53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below,
evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy
task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
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well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child
might have with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that
courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in
a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
T.S.M., 73 A.3d at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court observed,
“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation
to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result,
all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
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In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored
Children’s needs and welfare, the orphans’ court opined:
The court-appointed legal directed counsel for
Children shared that J.D.G. wanted this Court to be
aware that he enjoys his visits with Mother and would
like to see her more. Though legal directed counsel
expressed that J.D.G. did not seem to appreciate the
full meaning of termination or adoption, counsel
stated: “I was able to glean that [J.D.G.] didn’t think
it was particularly a good idea . . . to go home and live
with Mom at this time.” Counsel expressed that the
younger child, L.D.G., Jr., did not seem to
comprehend these proceedings and any impact on his
future. He did state that he enjoyed living with the
foster family, but like J.D.G., enjoyed his visits with
Mother and would enjoy being able to visit more.
We have no doubt that Mother loves the Children and
that they love her. Unfortunately, the record contains
clear and convincing evidence that Mother has not
made reasonable or responsible strides toward
adequately being able to parent the Children. The
evidence presented overwhelmingly suggests that
Mother, over the course of many years with the
Agency’s active involvement, has refused or been
otherwise incapable of providing adequate housing
and support for herself or the Children.
“[T]he court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability
to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.” See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the
parent will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.”) (citations omitted).
Here, Mother has repeatedly failed to remedy her
parental incapacities. When these considerations are
balanced against the Children’s needs for permanence
and stability, this Court reluctantly but firmly
concluded that it was in the best interests of L.D.G.,
Jr. and J.D.G. to grant the Agency’s Petition to
Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights.
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Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 16-17 (footnote 9 omitted; record
citations omitted).
Additionally, our review of the record demonstrates that Desiree Mullen,
the case supervisor from February 2016 to February 2018, testified at the
termination hearing. (Notes of testimony, 7/17/18 at 9-10.) Ms. Mullen
testified that after the Children were adjudicated dependent, they were placed
in the custody of their paternal aunt in August 2014. (Id. at 19-20.) On
September 8, 2014, an emergency custody order was entered and the
Children were placed into the Agency’s care. (Id. at 20.) They remained in
Agency care for 23 months where they spent time in two different foster
homes. (Id. at 22-24) On August 3, 2016, the Children were returned to
Mother. (Id.) On September 13, 2016, the Children were returned to Agency
care, where they have remained. (Id.)
In September 2016, the Children were returned to the foster home that
they had been in prior to being returned to Mother. (Id. at 23-24.) They
remained in that foster home until approximately June 2017. (Id.) At
Mother’s suggestion and following vetting, the Children were placed into the
home of a kinship resource. (Id. at 24-25.) Less than two months later, that
kinship resource returned the Children to the Agency due to the Children’s
behavioral issues. (Id. at 26.) The Children were then returned to the prior
foster home where they remained until June 2018. (Id.) In June 2018, the
Children were placed in a long-term resource foster home. (Id.)
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Ms. Mullen testified that the Children are flourishing in their current
foster home and that the foster family is committed to meeting the Children’s
needs and have expressed their desire to be an adoptive resource. (Id. at
29, 31-32.) Ms. Mullen further testified that termination of Mother’s parental
rights would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare, as well as solidify
their relationship with their foster family. (Id. at 32-33.) Ms. Mullen also
testified that even though the Agency recognizes that the Children have a
connection to their Mother, the Children have been in Agency care for nearly
four years and the Agency believes that their need for permanence outweighs
that connection. (Id. at 35-36.)
The record further reflects that the Children’s legal representative,
Timothy Barton, Esq., met with the Children individually and together on
July 11, 2017. (Id. at 142.) J.D.G. stated that he enjoys spending time with
Mother and that he also enjoys living with his foster family. (Id. at 143.) On
the basis of the answers J.D.G. provided to Mr. Barton’s questions, Mr. Barton
concluded that J.D.G. did not believe it was a good idea that he be returned
to his Mother. (Id. at 143-144.) L.D.G. stated that he “love[s]” to see his
Mother but that he liked living with his foster family. (Id. at 144.)
In balancing the Children’s needs for permanence and stability against
Mother’s claims of progress and hopes for the future, the orphans’ court
“reluctantly but firmly” concluded that the Children’s needs and welfare were
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J. S02001/19
best served by termination of Mother’s parental rights. After carefully
reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the orphans’ court appropriately terminated
Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/21/19
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