People v. Cohen

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
March 21, 2019

2019COA38

No. 15CA0982, People v. Cohen — Evidence — Admissibility —
Opening the Door Doctrine — Hearsay — Relevancy and Its
Limits; Constitutional Law — Sixth Amendment —
Confrontation Clause

A division of the court of appeals addresses the limits of the

“opening the door” doctrine — a fairness-related trial doctrine via

which one party may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence

after the other party first “opens the door” to it. The division holds

that this doctrine is limited; any otherwise inadmissible evidence

introduced after one party opens the door must be confined to

preventing any unfair prejudice or misleading impression that

might otherwise result. The division also holds that certain

statements introduced in defendant’s trial went far beyond anything

allowed by the opening the door doctrine; were inadmissible on

hearsay, relevance, and undue prejudice grounds; and violated her
Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause. Because

the error in allowing this evidence was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt (or harmless), the division reverses defendant’s

convictions and remands for a new trial.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA38

Court of Appeals No. 15CA0982
Boulder County District Court No. 14CR437
Honorable Andrew Hartman, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Emily Elizabeth Cohen,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Terry and Grove, JJ., concur

Announced March 21, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Emily Elizabeth Cohen, a formerly licensed

Colorado lawyer, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury

verdicts finding her guilty of thirteen counts of theft. Among the

issues we address is whether defendant opened the door to

extensive evidence of the investigations the Colorado Office of

Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) conducted on her, and the

results of those investigations. We conclude that while some

evidence of the fact of and basis for the investigations could come

in, much of the evidence about the investigations, and OARC’s

findings, shouldn’t have. In so concluding, we reject the People’s

argument that defendant opened the door to all of the admitted

evidence, and discuss the limits of the opening the door doctrine.

In the end, we hold that the district court erred in admitting three

OARC complaints against defendant, and that the error wasn’t

harmless. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and

remand the case for a new trial.

I. Background

¶2 Defendant practiced law in Boulder, specializing in

immigration law. The People charged her with fifty-four counts of

theft, each relating to her alleged mishandling of client funds. More

1
 specifically, the People alleged that defendant took cash payments

up front and then didn’t do the work she had agreed to do, became

difficult or impossible to contact, and didn’t provide her clients with

refunds.

¶3 The People ultimately tried defendant on twenty-one of the

charges. The prosecution called over a dozen witnesses, including

several of defendant’s former clients, many of whom testified as to

their payments, defendant’s failure to perform services, and their

difficulty getting in touch with her.

¶4 But a significant portion of the eleven-day trial focused on

defendant’s ethical obligations under the Colorado Rules of

Professional Conduct (RPC) and her failure to comply with those

obligations. For example, the prosecution presented evidence that

defendant spent client payments before earning them and often

deposited as yet unearned payments into her personal accounts

rather than into her attorney trust (COLTAF) account. 1 OARC

1 A COLTAF account is a type of trust account an attorney may use
for all fees not yet earned (among other things). See Colo. RPC
1.15B. “COLTAF” stands for Colorado Lawyer Trust Account
Foundation.

2
 employees testified concerning attorneys’ ethical obligations under

the RPC and that defendant had been under investigation since

2012 for possible ethical violations. The court admitted into

evidence letters that defendant had received from OARC informing

her of the investigation. Over defense counsel’s objections, the

court also admitted three of the complaints that OARC had filed

against her. And the district court allowed another attorney to

testify at some length about her concerns that defendant hadn’t

behaved honestly and ethically in a variety of ways, none of which

related to the handling of client funds.

¶5 The district court instructed the jury on the elements of theft

and gave an instruction containing language from one of the Rules

of Professional Conduct relating to the handling of client funds.

That instruction (Instruction 11) quoted Colo. RPC 1.15A: “A lawyer

shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in the lawyer’s

possession in connection with a representation separate from the

lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in trust accounts[.]” It

also included other language, not directly quoting the RPC,

explaining that client funds are not the attorney’s property until the

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 attorney earns them by “provid[ing] some benefit or service in

exchange for the fee . . . .”

¶6 After some deliberation, the jurors asked the court whether

they could use the OARC RPC charging decisions to inform their

decision-making; whether the OARC’s standard for verifying the

receipt of money by an attorney was the standard they should

apply; whether failure to deposit client funds into a COLTAF

account before earning fees constitutes “intent to permanently

deprive” (one of the elements of theft); and whether earning fees at a

later time can undo a prior COLTAF violation. The jurors also

indicated that they were deadlocked on at least one charge.

Perhaps without consulting defense counsel (the record isn’t clear

whether the attorneys were even in the room; defendant claims they

weren’t), and without defendant present, the court responded to the

jurors’ questions noted above by merely telling them they had all

the evidence they were to consider, they should follow the

instructions, and these were issues for them to decide. The court

(also apparently without consulting counsel and outside counsel’s

4
 and defendant’s presence) also read the jurors a modified Allen

instruction. 2

¶7 The jury continued deliberating and returned guilty verdicts

on thirteen counts. It hung on one and acquitted on the remaining

seven.

II. Discussion

¶8 Defendant contends the district court erred by (1) admitting

the OARC complaints; (2) including the instruction about an

attorney’s ethical obligations vis-a-vis earning fees and handling

client funds; (3) allowing another immigration attorney to respond

at length to a juror’s question about defendant’s “red flags”; (4)

responding to jurors’ questions without consulting with her counsel

and outside her and her counsel’s presence; and (5) giving the jury

a modified Allen instruction without consulting her counsel and

outside her and her counsel’s presence. We agree with defendant

that reversal is required based on the court’s erroneous admission

2 A modified Allen instruction is a supplemental jury instruction
that the court may provide when the jury indicates that it can’t
come to unanimous agreement. In essence, it urges jurors to do so
without sacrificing their independent judgment. Gibbons v. People,
2014 CO 67, ¶ 1.

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 of the OARC complaints. We also address the jury instruction issue

because it’s likely to arise again on remand.

A. OARC Complaints

¶9 First, defendant contends that the district court erred by

admitting the three OARC complaints into evidence. She argues

that the complaints were inadmissible for a number of reasons. We

conclude that while certain facts pertaining to the complaints had

some relevance to the charges, the complaints themselves are

replete with inadmissible hearsay. We also conclude that allowing

all this hearsay into evidence violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to confrontation, and that, on the whole, the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury

substantially outweighed the complaints’ limited probative value.

Because the error in admitting the totality of these complaints

wasn’t harmless, we must reverse defendant’s convictions.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Ordinarily, we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for

an abuse of discretion. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1097

(Colo. 2007); People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶ 14. But to the extent

such rulings impact a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation

6
 Clause, we review challenges to them de novo. Bernal v. People, 44

P.3d 184, 198 (Colo. 2002).

¶ 11 The People concede that defendant preserved hearsay,

Confrontation Clause, and relevance/undue prejudice objections to

the complaints. So if we conclude that the court erred in applying

the Colorado Rules of Evidence, we must then reverse unless the

People show that the error was harmless, meaning that there is no

reasonable possibility that it contributed to defendant’s convictions.

Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶ 22; see James v. People, 2018 CO

72, ¶ 18. If we conclude that the court violated defendant’s

constitutional right of confrontation, we must reverse unless the

People show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71, ¶ 17; Hagos v. People, 2012

CO 63, ¶ 11. 3

3 The supreme court has recently articulated the tests for
determining harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt and
harmlessness in identical terms: whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. E.g., Zoll v.
People, 2018 CO 70, ¶ 18 (citing Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11)
(harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Pernell v. People, 2018 CO
13, ¶ 22 (harmless). With all due respect, given that the
prosecution has the burden under either standard, that can’t be
right. As a matter of logic, and as the court recognized in Hagos,

7
 2. Applicable Law

¶ 12 Hearsay — a statement by one other than the declarant while

testifying that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted —

is generally inadmissible. CRE 801(c); CRE 802; People v. Phillips,

2012 COA 176, ¶ 61. Such statements are “presumptively

unreliable.” Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 937 (Colo. 1998). But

a statement isn’t hearsay if it’s offered for a purpose other than to

prove the truth of the matter asserted — for example, to show its

effect on the listener. People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1151

(Colo. App. 2009). In such circumstances, the statement may be

admissible.

¶ 13 The Confrontation Clause says that in “all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The

United States Supreme Court has held that this clause bars out-of-

court testimonial statements unless the declarant is available to be

¶ 12, reversal must be more difficult to obtain under the harmless
error standard than under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. Perhaps the supreme court should resolve this
conundrum.

8
 cross-examined or the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-

examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-

54 (2004). Generally, a statement is testimonial if its primary

purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a

later trial. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.

¶ 14 Even apart from hearsay and Confrontation Clause

limitations, evidence must, of course, be relevant — that is, it must

have some tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence

more or less probable. CRE 401; CRE 402. But even if evidence is

relevant, the court must still exclude it if the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury

substantially outweighs that evidence’s probative value. CRE 403.

3. The Complaints

¶ 15 OARC filed its first complaint against defendant in February

2011. That complaint alleged that defendant had failed to disclose

information on her application to the Colorado bar, including her

maiden name, certain employment history, and past due debts; that

she had practiced law without a license; that she had testified

9
 falsely that she was licensed in Texas; and that she had filed false

affidavits with the Denver County Court.

¶ 16 During defendant’s trial in this case, the prosecutor sought to

admit a copy of this complaint. Defense counsel objected based on

relevance, hearsay, and confrontation. The court admitted the

complaint over these objections but didn’t say why.

¶ 17 OARC filed two more complaints against defendant in 2013

and 2014, respectively. These complaints included information

similar to the criminal allegations against defendant (that she had

kept clients’ money despite doing little or no work on their cases),

but discussed former clients not named in the criminal charges for

which she was on trial. 4 In total, the second and third complaints

alleged seventy-eight RPC violations. But in addition to the

information that tracked allegations in this case, the OARC

complaints contained other negative allegations against defendant,

4 The People had charged defendant with theft in relation to three of
the clients mentioned in these complaints. But before trial, they
had dismissed two of those charges without prejudice. So only one
of the allegations in the complaints involved the specific conduct for
which defendant was on trial at the time.

10
 including that she had incorrectly advised clients on how to qualify

for certain visas.

¶ 18 Defense counsel objected to the admission of the second and

third complaints on grounds of prejudice, relevance, CRE 404(b),

and confrontation. The prosecutor responded that the complaints

were relevant because they addressed “exactly the same kind of

client handling issues” as those in the criminal case, and because

they showed defendant’s mental state. The court then admitted the

complaints because they “put the defendant on notice of her

obligations, and that definitely impacts the intent element in the

pending complaint.”

4. Analysis

a. Hearsay

¶ 19 The complaints are replete with OARC’s and defendant’s

former clients’ assertions of unethical conduct; many of the

assertions don’t have any bearing on whether defendant committed

theft. To be sure, the fact that OARC had informed defendant of

her ethical obligations concerning handling of client funds bore

somewhat on defendant’s knowledge and intent, but the lengthy

complaints went far beyond those issues. Indeed, the first

11
 complaint didn’t bear on those issues at all. And contrary to the

People’s assertion, the prosecution used the complaints for the

truth of the matters asserted therein. For example, during cross-

examination, the prosecutor asked defendant to confirm aspects of

the first complaint (primarily relating to her honesty) and asked

whether she agreed that “this is what [OARC] concluded after their

investigation . . . .” During rebuttal closing, the prosecutor argued

that the complaints showed that defendant had “committed

perjury” before another judge and had in fact been untruthful on

several occasions. The prosecutor also argued, by clear implication,

that because the allegations in the latter two complaints were

similar to those in this case, the jury could see there was truth in

the criminal charges.

¶ 20 We aren’t persuaded by the People’s contention that the

complaints weren’t hearsay because they were admitted to show

defendant’s intent. The first complaint had nothing to do with

mishandling client funds. It’s true that defendant’s receipt of the

second and third OARC complaints put her on notice of her ethical

obligations, and therefore cast some light on her intent. But the

complaints themselves weren’t necessary to make that point and, as

12
 discussed, weren’t actually used to make it. By the time the

prosecutor moved to admit each complaint, the jury had already

heard testimony from OARC attorneys and defendant herself about

the fact and bases of the investigations and establishing that

defendant had received the complaints. So admitting the actual

complaints added nothing of relevance to the prosecution’s theory

that defendant knew she was mishandling client funds.

¶ 21 Nor are we persuaded by the People’s argument that the OARC

complaints were admissible because defense counsel opened the

door to them during opening statements. Otherwise inadmissible

evidence can become admissible if the defendant first “opens the

door” to it. See Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008)

(“When a party opens the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence,

his opponent may then inquire into the previously barred matter.”).

¶ 22 Defense counsel had implied during opening that the OARC

investigations began because of “an inflammatory letter” sent by

defendant’s child’s father and that the investigator was biased

against her. And so, the People say, the complaints could come in.

We aren’t persuaded.

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¶ 23 The concept of “opening the door” isn’t unlimited. It

“represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a criminal

trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the

selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or

placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression.”

Id. So otherwise inadmissible rebuttal evidence “is permitted ‘only

to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might

otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.’” United States v.

Martinez, 988 F.2d 685, 702 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States

v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); accord, e.g.,

State v. Groce, 111 A.3d 1273, 1277 (Vt. 2014); see generally

1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence

§ 1:12, at 70-75 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the necessary “fit”

between the initial proof and the proposed counterproof). The

opening the door doctrine, therefore, can be used only to prevent

prejudice; it can’t be used as an excuse to inject prejudice into the

case. United States v. Johnson, 502 F.2d 1373, 1376 (7th Cir.

1974); United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1963);

State v. Batchelor, 376 A.2d 737, 740 (Vt. 1977) (the doctrine isn’t a

tool for “prosecutorial ‘over-kill’”); see Mueller & Kirkpatrick, § 1:12,

14
 at 73 (the doctrine is “supposed to prevent prejudice (not to

introduce or exacerbate it)”). And in like vein, it doesn’t “give an

opponent unbridled license to introduce otherwise inadmissible

evidence into the trial, nor does it justify receipt of rebuttal evidence

merely because it is in the same category of excludable evidence as

the evidence previously offered.” Martinez, 988 F.2d at 702.

“Where the rebuttal evidence does not directly contradict the

evidence previously received, or goes beyond the necessity of

removing prejudice in the interest of fairness,” it shouldn’t be

admitted. Id.; accord United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 271 (7th

Cir. 2018) (and noting that “[t]he gist of the doctrine is

proportionality and fairness”); see Mueller & Kirkpatrick, § 1:12, at

75 (“The question in each case is not whether initial proof shares

some common quality with proof offered in response. Rather, it is

whether the latter answers the former, and whether it does so in a

reasonable way without sacrifice of other important values.”).

¶ 24 This limited purpose is evident in the supreme court’s

reasoning in People v. Tenorio, 197 Colo. 137, 590 P.2d 952 (1979).

In that case, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked an

officer if he had drawn his gun when he approached the defendant.

15
 The officer said “yes.” On redirect, the prosecutor asked the officer

why he had drawn his gun, and the officer explained that the

defendant was reported to have a weapon. The court had

previously ruled this information inadmissible. The supreme court

held that even though the information was otherwise inadmissible,

the defense had opened the door to the topic by asking if the officer

had drawn his gun. Id. at 145, 590 P.2d at 958. This is because

the prosecutor “had a right to explain or rebut any adverse

inferences which might have resulted” from that question. Id. at

146, 590 P.2d at 958.

¶ 25 Similarly, in People v. Davis, 312 P.3d 193 (Colo. App. 2010),

aff’d on other grounds, 2013 CO 57, defense counsel asserted

during his opening statement that a prosecution witness only

provided helpful information to the police officer after her interview

had become confrontational (suggesting that she had been coerced

into changing her story). Id. at 196-97. A division of this court held

that this opened the door to the officer’s response to the

16
 prosecutor’s question why the officer began questioning the witness

in a more confrontational manner. Id. at 197.5

¶ 26 These cases tell us, consistent with the out-of-state authority

cited above, that when one party injects a particular issue into a

case, the opposing party may introduce otherwise inadmissible

evidence only to the extent necessary to “rebut any adverse

inferences which might have resulted,” Tenorio, 197 Colo. at 146,

590 P.2d at 958, or to correct “an incorrect or misleading

impression.” Golob, 180 P.3d at 1012.

¶ 27 In this case, the prosecutor actually discussed the OARC

investigations before defense counsel did. But in light of the

purpose of the “opening the door” rule, we’ll assume that the

defense’s implicit characterization of the investigations as grounded

in bias opened the door to further evidence on the matter.

¶ 28 Evidence that the complaints existed and evidence of why they

were filed was admissible to rebut the implication that OARC had a

5 See also People v. Pernell, 2014 COA 157, ¶ 37 (upholding the
admission of a victim’s (prior consistent) hearsay statements to
rehabilitate her credibility after the defense claimed that she had
fabricated her allegations), aff’d on other grounds, 2018 CO 13.

17
 vendetta against defendant. See id.; Tenorio, 197 Colo. at 146, 590

P.2d at 958. (And for reasons discussed above, limited testimony

about the complaints was admissible to show defendant’s

knowledge and intent.) Even so, the fact that defense counsel

mentioned the OARC investigations and the investigator’s supposed

bias didn’t give the prosecution carte blanche to introduce any and

all evidence related to the investigations, including the entire

complaints themselves, which contained a great deal of additional

irrelevant and prejudicial information as well as OARC’s

conclusions that defendant had acted unethically. Nor did it give

the prosecutor license to argue that the allegations in the

complaints — many of which had nothing to do with client funds —

were true. And we note that the court didn’t do anything to limit

the jury’s consideration of the complaints to the issues of bias,

knowledge, and intent.

¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the complaints were, in very large

part, inadmissible hearsay. It follows that the court erred in

admitting the complaints, or at least in admitting them in their

entirety.

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 b. Confrontation Clause

¶ 30 A statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes

if it was made under circumstances that would lead an objective

witness to believe that the statement would be available for use at a

later trial. United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1301-02 (10th

Cir. 2005); Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 880 (Colo. 2005),

overruled on other grounds by Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71.

¶ 31 The hearsay statements in the complaints by witnesses were

testimonial. The declarants volunteered information to OARC

knowing that their statements could be used to support an

investigation of — and possible sanctions against — defendant.

And they could have anticipated that a criminal investigation and

criminal charges would result. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; People

v. Cevallos-Acosta, 140 P.3d 116, 129 (Colo. App. 2005) (the

declarant’s intent should be considered when determining whether

a statement is testimonial). The People don’t argue otherwise.

¶ 32 Only one of the declarants testified at trial. Defendant

therefore didn’t have an opportunity to question most of them about

statements in the complaints. As a result, admitting the complaints

19
 in their entirety violated defendant’s constitutional right to

confrontation.

c. Danger of Unfair Prejudice

¶ 33 We also conclude that, even if we assume portions of the

complaints had some relevance, that relevance was substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As discussed,

admitting the complaints themselves wasn’t necessary to show

defendant’s knowledge and intent or to rebut any implication of

bias. And they contained a great deal of information about

unrelated alleged ethical violations. Perhaps more importantly, the

complaints added to the impression, clearly conveyed by the

prosecution, that the case was about whether defendant had

practiced law in accordance with her ethical obligations. Those

ethical obligations, however, didn’t set the standard for criminal

culpability. As discussed below, the complaints, and much of the

other evidence, actually confused the jurors; they didn’t know

whether a breach of ethical obligations established elements of the

theft charges. Though we must assume the maximum probative

value and minimum unfair prejudice of the evidence, see People v.

Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002), the balance in this case

20
 clearly weighs against the admissibility of the complaints (again, at

least in their entirety).

d. Harmlessness

¶ 34 Having determined that the district court erred, we must

consider whether the People have shown that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. They haven’t. 6

¶ 35 No doubt, there was sufficient admissible evidence that would

support the guilty verdicts. But the prosecution spent a

considerable amount of time, both during the evidentiary part of the

trial and in closing, using the OARC complaints to demonstrate that

defendant routinely lied and violated ethical rules. That evidence

and argument painted defendant as dishonest and unethical.

Indeed, the first complaint, which didn’t have anything to do with

alleged mismanagement of clients’ money, established only that

OARC believed defendant had lied repeatedly in unrelated matters.

¶ 36 The jurors asked a number of questions indicating that the

OARC evidence deeply impacted their view of the case; they seemed

6Nor have the People shown that the nonconstitutional error was
harmless.

21
 to think that the ethical standards equated to some of the elements

of theft. The trial’s focus on the ethical violations no doubt led to

their confusion about how to apply the law and reach a verdict.

¶ 37 True, the jury acquitted defendant of some charges. But,

contrary to the People’s suggestion, that doesn’t preclude the

existence of a reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence

influenced the jury’s guilty verdicts. And we conclude that there is

such a possibility. We must therefore reverse the judgment.

B. Jury Instructions

¶ 38 We address defendant’s contention regarding the instruction

on handling client funds because the issue whether such an

instruction is appropriate is likely to arise in the event of a retrial.

¶ 39 As noted, in addition to the instructions defining the elements

of theft, the court gave the jury an instruction — Instruction 11 —

quoting provisions of the RPC and defining when an attorney

“earns” the money her clients pay her. The court provided no

explanation of how the jury was to apply that instruction. And the

jury indicated it didn’t understand how to apply it: the jurors

submitted a question to the court asking whether failure to deposit

client funds into a COLTAF account established the intent element

22
 of theft. In response, the court merely referred the jury back to the

instructions.

¶ 40 A court must accurately instruct the jury on the law relevant

to each issue presented, but it must not give an instruction that

misstates the law or “unduly emphasizes some part of the

evidence.” People v. Ellsworth, 15 P.3d 1111, 1116 (Colo. App.

2000). If the court gives the jury an instruction that contains

technical information separate from the elements of the crimes at

issue, the court should explain the instruction so that the jury can

understand what it means and how to apply it. See Pueblo Bank &

Tr. Co. v. McMartin, 31 Colo. App. 546, 549, 506 P.2d 759, 761

(1972) (it was reversible error to include language of a highly

technical statute in the jury instructions without sufficient

explanation how the jury could properly interpret its meaning and

apply it). And, when a jury asks a question, an additional

instruction is appropriate unless

(i) the jury may be adequately informed by
directing [its] attention to some portion of the
original instructions; (ii) the request concerns
matters not in evidence or questions which do
not pertain to the law of the case; or (iii) the
request would call upon the judge to express

23
 an opinion upon factual matters that the jury
should determine.

Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Colo. 1986).

¶ 41 The language of Instruction 11 wasn’t objectionable. The

instruction accurately stated Colorado’s ethical rules on how an

attorney should handle client funds. And it could have helped the

jurors understand the elements “without authorization” and

“intent” in the context of the case. But the instruction was, at best,

incomplete: the district court didn’t tell the jurors how to use the

instruction and what its limits were. In not doing so, the court

erred.

¶ 42 The jury’s confusion about how to apply Instruction 11 was

evident. Even after hearing all the instructions and deliberating, we

know that at least one juror was unclear on how a violation of

attorney ethical rules would impact the determination of

defendant’s guilt. At that point, the district court had another

opportunity to tell the jury how it could consider defendant’s failure

to deposit client funds into her COLTAF account. The court should

have done so.

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¶ 43 On remand, in the event of a new trial, any instruction along

these lines must be accompanied by an explanation of how it bears

on the issues that the jury must resolve and must make clear that

violations of ethical rules don’t, by themselves, prove any of the

elements of theft.

III. Conclusion

¶ 44 We reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

In the event of a new trial, the court should maintain a tight rein on

what evidence is introduced and how the jury is instructed so that

the trial doesn’t again devolve into largely an extended inquiry into

defendant’s compliance with her ethical obligations.

JUDGE TERRY and JUDGE GROVE concur.

25