[Cite as Hack v. Keller, 2019-Ohio-1393.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
PEGGY HACK C.A. No. 18CA0012-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
KARL KELLER COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 11CIV1455
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 15, 2019
TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Karl Keller appeals the February 5, 2018, judgment of the Medina County Court
of Common Pleas. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} We have previously set forth the factual background of this matter as follows:
Appellee Peggy Hack filed a complaint for partition of premises which appellant
Karl Keller and she owned. Mr. Keller answered and filed counterclaims for
partition, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Ms. Hack amended her complaint to
allege claims for partition, contribution from rents Mr. Keller collected and
retained from leasing the property, and for an accounting. The parties later filed a
“Stipulated Order for Partition,” wherein they settled their respective claims for
partition and consented to partition of the property. A writ of partition issued to
the sheriff, and a commissioner was appointed to determine the value of the
property. The trial court approved the commissioner’s report and ordered the
parties to notify the court within thirty days whether either party elected to
purchase the property at the appraised value.
After neither party elected to purchase the property within the allotted time, Ms.
Hack moved the trial court to order a sheriff’s sale. Mr. Keller objected, asserting
that not only was a sheriff’s sale premature, but so was any election to purchase,
until the trial court heard the issue of the parties’ respective proportionate interests
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in the property. Mr. Keller then moved for a trial to determine the parties’
proportionate interests and to designate its determination on that issue as a final,
appealable order.
The magistrate held a hearing on the pending motions and issued a decision,
finding that the parties’ stipulated order for partition resolved the issue of the
respective interests and that, by the terms of the stipulation, each presumptively
held an equal interest in the property. The magistrate further concluded, based on
uncited case law from the Third and Seventh District Courts of Appeals, that the
stipulated order of partition was a final, appealable order that the court had no
authority to revisit or modify. Accordingly, the magistrate denied Mr. Keller’s
motion to schedule a hearing to determine the parties’ proportionate interests in
the property. The magistrate further wrote that the court would grant Ms. Hack’s
motion for a sheriff’s sale later, after all remaining claims were resolved. The trial
court denied Mr. Keller’s motion to designate this magistrate’s decision a final,
appealable order, reasoning that only the appellate court had authority to
determine its jurisdiction. Mr. Keller did not file objections to the magistrate’s
decision.
Nearly four months later, however, Mr. Keller moved the court for a pretrial to
clarify whether he could still assert his claim of a greater proportionate interest in
the property at the ultimate trial on all pending claims. One month later, the trial
court adopted and affirmed the magistrate’s decision after noting that no
objections had been filed.
***
More than a year and a half after the parties filed their stipulated order for
partition, Mr. Keller filed a motion to vacate that stipulated order, alleging
grounds pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Ms. Hack opposed the motion to vacate. The
trial court held an oral hearing and subsequently denied the motion to vacate on
alternative grounds. First, the trial court concluded that the parties’ stipulated
order for partition was a final, appealable order and that Mr. Keller was
improperly attempting to use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate as a substitute for
appeal. Alternatively, the trial court rejected Mr. Keller’s substantive argument
that the stipulated order must be vacated because of a difference of interpretation
whether the issue of the parties’ proportionate interests had been resolved.
Finding that the language of the stipulated order, drafted and signed by the
parties’ attorneys, fully resolved the issue, the trial court concluded that Mr.
Keller could not obtain relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5). The trial court denied
the motion to vacate and scheduled the parties’ remaining causes of action for
trial.
Hack v. Keller, 9th Dist. Medina No. 14CA0036-M, 2015-Ohio-4128, ¶ 2-7. We dismissed the
attempted appeal for lack of a final, appealable order after concluding that “the trial court’s
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journal entry denying Mr. Keller’s motion to vacate the parties’ stipulated order for partition was
an interlocutory order reconsidering an underlying interlocutory order, [and did] not constitute a
final, appealable order.” Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶3} A jury trial commenced in March 2016 on Mr. Keller’s remaining causes of
actions for unjust enrichment and conversion, with the trial court entering a directed verdict on
both claims in favor of Ms. Hack. Mr. Keller again appealed to this Court in April 2016 and
September 2016, with both attempted appeals being dismissed for lack of a final, appealable
order. See Hack v. Keller, 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0037-M (June 22, 2016); Hack v. Keller,
9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0072-M (Dec. 20, 2017). On February 5, 2018, the trial court
entered judgment, finding that neither party had elected to purchase the subject premises at the
appraised value and ordering that it be sold at public auction. Mr. Keller now appeals, raising
four assignments of error. We affirm.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
VACATE A STIPULATION BASED ON MISTAKE.
{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Keller argues the trial court erred in failing to
vacate the stipulated order for partition of August 23, 2012. We disagree.
{¶5} Mr. Keller’s motion to vacate was brought for consideration by the trial court
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5), and he likewise bases this assignment of error on Civ.R. 60(B). Mr.
Keller contends that because he did not understand that the stipulated order would preclude
evidence of unequal contribution at trial, this Court should reverse the trial court’s denial of his
Civ.R. 60(B) motion.
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{¶6} We stated in Mr. Keller’s previously attempted appeal: “Because Civ.R. 60(B)
may only be used to obtain relief from final judgments, Mr. Keller’s purported motion to vacate
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) was a mislabeled motion for reconsideration.” Hack v. Keller, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 14CA0036-M, 2015-Ohio-4128, ¶ 15. Despite our apprisal, Mr. Keller again raises
an assignment of error based upon Civ.R. 60(B). As a consequence, Mr. Keller’s assignment of
error is premised upon an incorrect theory of law from the outset.
{¶7} Moreover, without developing any analysis in support of his argument that the
trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion, Mr. Keller asks this Court to conclude,
axiomatically, that the trial court abused its discretion by not providing relief for an alleged error
in understanding made by Mr. Keller himself. We decline to do so. Accordingly, we cannot find
an abuse of discretion by the trial court in declining to vacate the stipulated order.
{¶8} Mr. Keller’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE STIPULATION AS VOID AB INITIO
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ENTERED INTO KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY BY APPELLANT.
{¶9} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Keller argues the trial court erred by failing
to recognize the stipulated order as void ab initio because Mr. Keller did not enter into it
knowingly and voluntarily. We disagree.
{¶10} As in the first assignment of error, Mr. Keller contends that because he
misunderstood the meaning of the stipulated order, the trial court erred in declining to vacate the
order. To the extent, if any, that this assignment of error asserts a separate argument from the
first assignment of error, it does so under a theory that the stipulation was void ab initio and
should be vacated under the precedent established in Vengrow v. Vengrow and Uphouse v.
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Uphouse. See Vengrow v. Vengrow, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24907, 2010–Ohio–2568; Uphouse v.
Uphouse, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27057, 2014-Ohio-2514.
{¶11} In Uphouse, we concluded the trial court erred because the decree of divorce
omitted several terms that were stipulated to on the record by the parties. Uphouse at ¶ 6-7. We
likewise remanded the case in Vengrow based upon the conclusion that the trial court’s attempt
to incorporate a stipulated agreement between the parties into a journal entry contained several
misstated terms. Vengrow at ¶ 14. Neither of these scenarios is applicable to the present case,
where the stipulated order was signed by the attorneys for both parties and there was no omission
or misstatement by the trial court.
{¶12} Mr. Keller’s second assignment of error is therefore overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ISSUING A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE
CONVERSION CLAIM AS THERE WAS TESTIMONY REGARDING
OWNERSHIP, VALUE, AND ACTIONS INCONSISTENT WITH RIGHTFUL
OWNERSHIP.
{¶13} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Keller argues the trial court erred by issuing a
directed verdict on his claim for conversion. We disagree.
{¶14} In its entry of March 28, 2016, the trial court journalized its March 21, 2016,
ruling of a directed verdict on Mr. Keller’s claim for conversion, stating that it had considered all
evidence submitted by Mr. Keller, as well as all inferences and conclusions reasonably drawn
from that evidence, in the light most favorable to Mr. Keller, and found the evidence insufficient
to entitle Mr. Keller to recover on his claim for conversion.
{¶15} “Because a motion for a directed verdict presents a question of law, appellate
review of a trial court’s decision on the motion is de novo.” Jones v. MTD Consumer Group,
Inc., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0093-M, 2015–Ohio–1878, ¶ 21, quoting Bennett v. Admr.,
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Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 134 Ohio St.3d 329, 2012–Ohio–5639, ¶ 14. “Under Civ.R.
50(A)(4), a motion for a directed verdict should be granted if ‘the trial court, after construing the
evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon
any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence
submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party.’” Id., quoting Bennett at ¶ 14, quoting
Civ.R. 50(A)(4).
{¶16} Nonetheless, “if there is substantial competent evidence to support the party
against whom the motion is made, upon which evidence reasonable minds might reach different
conclusions, the motion must be denied.” Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 115 (1977). “A
motion for a directed verdict assesses the sufficiency of the evidence, not the weight of the
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” Jarvis v. Stone, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23904, 2008-
Ohio-3313, ¶ 7, citing Strother v. Hutchinson, 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284 (1981).
{¶17} “Conversion is ‘the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the exclusion
of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his possession under a claim inconsistent with
his rights.’” Allan Nott Ents., Inc. v. Nicholas Starr Auto, L.L.C., 110 Ohio St.3d 112, 2006-
Ohio-3819, ¶ 36, quoting Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1990). “To prevail
on a claim of conversion, a plaintiff must prove (1) that it owned or had the right to control the
property at the time of the conversion, (2) the defendant’s wrongful act or disposition of the
plaintiff’s property rights, and (3) damages.” Pelmar USA, L.L.C. v. Mach. Exchange Corp., 9th
Dist. Summit No. 25947, 2012-Ohio-3787, ¶ 12. When property is otherwise lawfully held, “‘[a]
demand and refusal * * * are usually required to prove the conversion * * *.’” Ferreri v.
Goodyear Local No. 2 United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am. Home Assn.,
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9th Dist. Summit No. 16311, 1994 WL 45740, *2 (Feb. 9, 1994), quoting Ohio Tel. Equip. &
Sales, Inc. v. Hadler Realty Co., 24 Ohio App.3d 91, 94 (10th Dist.1985).
{¶18} Mr. Keller first argues “the trial court made a legally erroneous ruling when it
suggested that demand and failure to return property is always required to defeat a directed
verdict on a claim for conversion.” This argument is not supported by the record. In its ruling
for a directed verdict at the March 2016 hearing, the trial court found “that a demand and a
refusal were not made in this case, that the property was not being held exclusively by [Ms.
Hack] and against [Mr. Keller’s] interest, and that the damages [were] wholly speculative.”
Contrary to Mr. Keller’s assertion, this statement by the trial court contains no suggestion that a
demand and a failure to return property are always required for a successful conversion claim,
nor does it appear otherwise contrary to law.
{¶19} Mr. Keller next argues that “[t]he trial judge erroneously stated ‘[s]peculation
isn’t good enough’ and ‘[j]uries aren’t allowed to speculate []’” and that “[t]he trial court also
mischaracterized [Mr.] Keller’s testimony by declaring ‘[] he had no idea of the value of those
coins * * *[.]’” Regardless of the correctness of these statements, none of them were made by
the trial court; rather, as noted by the transcript and as is clear by their context, these statements
were made by Attorney William B. Young in arguing for a directed verdict on behalf of Ms.
Hack.
{¶20} Mr. Keller further argues that there was evidence of acts inconsistent with rightful
ownership and that the evidence met the burden of satisfying the element of wrongful control
and dominion over Mr. Keller’s property. In support of this argument, he points to Mr. Keller’s
testimony that containers filled with coins that had previously been in a closet of the house were
not in the closet when he returned to the house to pick up some clothing. He testified his
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response to this event was: “Peggy needed it worse than I did, so I just walked away. I thought,
‘Fine, let her have it. If that’s going to make her happy, let her have it.’” Mr. Keller further
points to his testimony that he believes that both Ms. Hack and her son have keys to the house.
Finally, he points to his testimony that Ms. Hack “made accusations that I was burying [missing
items] in a manure pile * * *.”
{¶21} Contrary to Mr. Keller’s contention, this testimony provides little, if any,
evidence of wrongful control and dominion over Mr. Keller’s property. We cannot conclude that
this testimony constitutes substantial competent evidence to support Mr. Keller’s claim for
conversion, upon which evidence reasonable minds might reach different conclusions. See
Hawkins at 115.
{¶22} Mr. Keller’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT’S JOURNAL ENTRY GRANTING A DIRECTED
VERDICT ON THE CLAIMS FOR CONVERSION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT CONTAINS NO LEGAL
REASONING.
{¶23} In his fourth assignment of error (mistakenly captioned as his sixth assignment of
error in the brief to this Court), Mr. Keller argues the trial court erred because its journal entry
granting a directed verdict contains no legal reasoning. We disagree.
{¶24} Mr. Keller cites to no authority in support of his argument, and instead references
a case whereby this Court remanded matters back to the trial court because the trial court’s entry
granting summary judgment was devoid of analysis for our review. See Schutte v. Summit Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28203, 2017-Ohio-4172, ¶ 11.
{¶25} Although Mr. Keller fails to support his argument with any reference to Civ.R.
50(E), said rule provides: “When in a jury trial a court directs a verdict * * *, the court shall state
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the basis for its decision in writing prior to or simultaneous with the entry of judgment. Such
statement may be dictated into the record or included in the entry of judgment.” An appellant
forfeits the right “to protest the absence of this requirement by failing to timely raise the error to
the trial court.” Darcy v. Bender, 68 Ohio App.2d 190, 192 (9th Dist.1980). Mr. Keller has
failed to establish that he raised the alleged error to the trial court, and therefore the issue has
been forfeited.
{¶26} Mr. Keller’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶27} Mr. Keller’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
DONALD GALLICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
WILLIAM B. YOUNG, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.