MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Apr 25 2019, 6:29 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marielena Duerring Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles D. Grays, April 25, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1994
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-1708-F2-29
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 1 of 21
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a traffic stop, Charles Grays was charged with dealing in cocaine,
unlawful possession of a firearm, resisting law enforcement, and operating a
vehicle with a suspended license. At the pre-trial hearing, ten days before trial,
Grays asked to waive counsel and proceed pro se. After Grays completed a
waiver of attorney form, the trial court held a hearing on his request, which it
ultimately denied. The case proceeded to trial and Grays was convicted of all
charges. Grays now presents two issues for our review which we restate as: (1)
whether Grays’ request to proceed pro se was timely, and (2) whether the trial
court deprived Grays of his right to self-representation. Concluding that Grays’
request was timely and the trial court denied Grays the right to represent
himself, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Around 1:32 a.m. on August 5, 2017, Corporal Travis Hamlin of the Elkhart
Police Department was patrolling when he observed a white Chevy Impala near
the intersection of Chester Avenue and Chapman Avenue. As Corporal
Hamlin approached, the Impala quickly turned on its signal and turned right
onto Chapman Avenue. Noting that the driver of the Impala failed to signal
200 feet prior to turning, Corporal Hamlin followed the vehicle, which “quickly
pulled off to the right side of the road” and the driver, later identified as Grays,
opened the door and exited the vehicle. Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 2 of 21
Corporal Hamlin activated his overhead lights and advised Grays to stand by
the rear bumper of the Impala.
[3] Corporal Hamlin explained to Grays why he stopped him and Grays stated that
“there was something going on with his engine[.]” Transcript, Volume II at
197. Grays returned to the driver’s seat of his vehicle and pressed the
accelerator to demonstrate his car troubles. As Corporal Hamlin was standing
near the Impala, he observed a “small, white, rock-like substance that [he]
recognized to be crack cocaine” inside the driver’s door of the Impala. Id. at
198. Corporal Hamlin asked Grays if he had anything on his person that he
needed to know about and Grays responded “no.” Id. at 199. Corporal
Hamlin then asked whether there was anything in Grays’ car he needed to
know about and Grays “took off running[.]” Id. Grays was later arrested and
police discovered cocaine and a handgun during an inventory search of Grays’
vehicle. See id. at 248-49.
[4] On August 8, 2017, the State charged Grays with the following: Count I,
dealing in cocaine, a Level 2 felony; Count II, unlawful possession of a firearm
by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; Count III, resisting law
enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count IV, operating while license
suspended, a Class A misdemeanor. At the initial hearing, the trial court found
Grays indigent and appointed a public defender. A jury trial commenced on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 3 of 21
March 5, 2018, but a mistrial was declared.1 The trial was rescheduled for June
25, 2018.
[5] At the final pretrial conference on June 14, 2018, in front of a senior judge,
Grays requested to proceed pro se:
[Grays]: I wish to waive counsel. I wish for him to remove
hisself [sic] from my case. I’ll go pro se. I’ll go pro
se.
[Court]: If you want to proceed pro se, that is your right;
however, you should understand that there are a
number of disadvantages to proceeding pro se. First
of all, you can’t evaluate your case objectively since
you’re a party to it. Secondly, you can’t investigate
your case while incarcerated . . . with the same
ability as the public defender is able to investigate
the case. [Number three], if you are – if you
proceed pro se, you will be held to the same
standards and rules that a practicing attorney would
have to abide by. In other words, if you make an
objection, it has to be based upon a proper legal
ground. If you choose a jury and say things that
you shouldn’t say during the voir dire portion of the
trial, you’ll be stopped and admonished. I can tell
you that I have been a practicing lawyer since 1973.
I was a deputy prosecutor for 20 years. . . . I was a
public defender for two years. I was a superior
court judge in this very court for 18 years. I know a
lot about Indiana criminal law, I would venture to
1
The jury was selected and sworn and the trial court adjourned for the evening. The next day, the trial court
became aware of a conflict and the presiding judge was unable to preside in the case. Thus, the case was
transferred to a special judge pursuant to Local Rules.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 4 of 21
say a lot more than you do. But if I were charged
with a serious crime, I would hire a lawyer to
represent me. I would not attempt to represent
myself. You say you want to represent yourself;
that isn’t going to change the trial date.
[Grays]: I’m fine with that.
Tr., Vol. II at 85-86.
[6] The senior judge then asked Grays to sign a waiver of attorney form but did not
rule on the request. Grays initialed next to each paragraph of the waiver and
signed the form, which was filed with the court on June 20. After learning of
Grays’ request to proceed pro se, the trial court judge scheduled an additional
hearing on its own motion for June 21 to “insure that Gray[s] was indeed
intending on proceeding pro se.” Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 79. At the
hearing, the trial court engaged Grays in the following colloquy:
[Court]: Mr. Grays, it’s my understanding you met my
predecessor, Judge Biddlecome, when I was not
here last week; and from the notes that he left me, it
indicated that you wanted to proceed pro se in the
jury trial that commences on Monday. Is that
correct?
[Grays]: Yes.
***
[Court]: Mr. Grays, I’m not sure what . . . Judge Biddlecome
informed you about proceeding pro se, and I have
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 5 of 21
my own little spiel that I do that I’m going to give
you the benefit of. So even though you have this
filed – and I read the letter attached with that signed
motion and it seems that we are going over the
same things, . . . first of all, your suppression
hearing has already taken place. That was ruled on
by Judge Christofeno; and your – I’ll give you an
opportunity to speak in a moment. So, in addition,
Mr. Grays, what legal training have you had, if any?
[Grays]: Well, I can read the material and I understand.
[Court]: Okay. That’s not what I asked you.
[Grays]: I have no legal training.
[Court]: Okay. You have no legal training.
[Grays]: No.
[Court]: Do you understand what a motion in limine is?
[Grays]: Yes.
[Court]: Okay. Please explain to the court what your version
of a motion in limine is.
[Grays]: A motion in limine is something when the State files
something saying that something cannot be spoken
of, whatever the subject is, at trial.
[Court]: So it’s your understanding that the State can only
file a motion in limine?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 6 of 21
[Grays]: Well, I guess, my attorney can file a motion in
limine[.]
[Court]: Okay. But if you’re acting on [sic] your own
attorney[,] . . . which is what you desire to do –
[Grays]: Yes.
[Court]: -- correct?
[Grays]: Yes.
[Court]: So do you . . . think that this case is ripe for a
motion in limine? Do you think a motion in limine
should be filed? Do you know what the deadlines
are to file a motion in limine?
[Grays]: Well, if I’m provided the legal material, I can –
[Court]: We’re going to trial on Monday, which is, what,
four days from now?
[Grays]: Yes.
[Court]: Four days.
[Grays]: Yes. I understand that.
[Court]: So you’re asking this court to allow you to proceed
pro se on Monday?
[Grays]: Yes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 7 of 21
***
[Court]: . . . Do you know the Indiana Rules of Evidence?
[Grays]: I get the book, yes. . . . I’ll know what it is.
[Court]: Okay. I cannot provide you with any
documentation. So how do you plan on obtaining
that book?
***
[Court]: . . . So, Mr. Grays, how do you feel that you will be
prepared to represent yourself at trial? Do you
know anything about jury selection?
[Grays]: I’ll know Monday. . . .
[Court]: We’re making a decision right now.
[Grays]: And I said I’ll know Monday.
[Court]: . . . Right now as it stands, I am denying your
motion to proceed pro se based on the fact that you
are not equipped to represent yourself at a jury
trial[.]
Tr., Vol. II at 90, 92-93, 102, 104.
[7] After orally denying Grays’ motion, the trial court filed a written order on the
morning of his jury trial. In its order, the trial court explained that it was clear
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 8 of 21
that “Grays does not have a clear grasp of the legal ramifications of proceeding
pro se even after [the court] has attempted to explain them to him and that
Grays repeatedly interjects his version of the law and misstates legal concepts.”
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 84. Citing Grays’ lack of legal training and inability
to “comport himself in a manor [sic] that complies with relevant rules of
procedure and substantive law[,]” the trial court concluded that Grays did not
make a knowing, intelligent, voluntary, or timely waiver of counsel. Id. at 86.
Ultimately, it found that Grays “did not present a clear and unequivocal request
to proceed pro se, and it was not presented to the [c]ourt within a reasonable
time prior to jury trial[.]” Id. At trial, Grays objected to the trial court’s denial
of his motion. The jury found Grays guilty on all counts. Grays now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[8] Grays asserts that the trial court denied him the right to self-representation and
he is therefore entitled to a new trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution
guarantee a defendant the right to be represented by counsel. Kowalskey v. State,
42 N.E.3d 97, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “The purpose of the constitutional
guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting
from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights[.]” Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). And a defendant’s right to self-representation
is implicit in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Faretta v. California, 422
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 9 of 21
U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975) (“[T]he right to self-representation – to make one’s own
defense personally – is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth]
Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he
who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”) “[F]orcing a lawyer upon
an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly
wants to do so.” Id. at 817.
[9] The right to counsel may be waived by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver. Kowalskey, 42 N.E.3d at 102. We note that although a defendant need
not have the skill and experience of an attorney, he or she must be competent to
stand trial. Osborne v. State, 754 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Ind. 2001) (citing Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993)). Whether the trial court violated a
defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation is a question of law which
we review de novo. Hill v. State, 773 N.E.2d 336, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
trans. denied, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003). Before claiming that his right to
self-representation has been denied, a defendant must timely, clearly, and
unequivocally assert that right. Osborne, 754 N.E.2d at 921. When a defendant
has been deprived of the right to self-representation, “a new trial is warranted
because this right is not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.
II. Waiver of Counsel
[10] In determining whether a defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived
counsel, we look to the “particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 10 of 21
Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at
464). There are no “prescribed talking points” that a trial court is required to
include when advising a defendant. Id. at 1126. Instead, a trial court need only
determine that the defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver of counsel. Id. And the law indulges every reasonable presumption
against a waiver of this fundamental right. Id. To determine whether a
defendant’s waiver is knowing and intelligent, we employ a four-factor test:
(1) the extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision,
(2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the
defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, (3) the background and experience of the
defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to
proceed pro se.
Id. at 1127-28; Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Ind. 2011). When applying
these factors, we acknowledge that the trial court “is in the best position to
assess whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived counsel[.]”
Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128. In addition,
we will most likely uphold the trial judge’s decision to honor or
deny the defendant’s request to represent himself where the judge
has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper
information, and reached a reasoned conclusion about the
defendant’s understanding of his rights and voluntariness of his
decision.
Id. We have provided several guidelines for what a court should advise the
defendant when he considers self-representation, including:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 11 of 21
The defendant should know of the nature of the charges against
him, the possibility that there may be lesser included offenses
within these charges, and the possibility of defenses and
mitigating circumstances surrounding the charges. The
defendant should be aware that self-representation is almost
always unwise, that the defendant may conduct a defense which
is to his own detriment, that the defendant will receive no special
indulgence from the court and will have to abide by the same
standards as an attorney as to the law and procedure, and that
the State will be represented by experienced professional legal
counsel.
Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 861 (1991); see also Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003).
However, these guidelines “do not constitute a rigid mandate setting forth
specific inquiries that a trial court is required to make before determining
whether a defendant’s waiver of right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.” Jones, 783 N.E.2d at 1138 (internal quotation omitted).
A. Timeliness of Request
[11] The State focuses its argument on the timing of Grays’ request to proceed pro
se. The right to self-representation must be asserted within a reasonable time
prior to the day of trial. Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 62, 383 N.E.2d 309, 314
(1978). A “reasonable” time before trial depends on the facts of each case. Id.
at 63-64, 383 N.E.2d at 315.
Respect must be accorded to the defendant’s constitutional right
of self-representation in the construction of this requisite. By
requiring a “reasonable” time before day of trial, we intend only
to prohibit those assertions of the self-representation right by
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 12 of 21
which the defendant merely seeks delay for its own sake. This
can best be judged with reference to the type of trial at hand, and
the nature and involvement of the pre-trial proceedings. The
more complicated the case, and the more involved the pre-trial
proceedings, the earlier a “reasonable” assertion will naturally
be, and vice-versa.
Id.
[12] The trial court found that Grays’ request to proceed pro se was untimely. The
State argues that the trial court “properly viewed [Grays’] request as a
spontaneous offer once he realized he would not be appointed replacement
counsel as he had requested[.]” Brief of Appellee at 24. In Burton v. Collins, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request to proceed
pro se as it was a “spontaneous response offered at a point when [he] realized
he was not going to get a new lawyer.” 937 F.2d 131, 133 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1006 (1991).
[13] However, Burton is distinguishable from the case at hand because there, the
defendant’s request came after voir dire. Id. at 132-33. Here, Grays requested
to proceed pro se ten days before trial after expressing dissatisfaction and
conflict with his attorney. It does not appear that Grays requested to proceed
pro se “merely seek[ing] delay for its own sake.” Russell, 270 Ind. at 64, 383
N.E.2d at 315. Indeed, Grays repeatedly affirmed that he would proceed to
trial as planned and we view the trial court’s decision to hold a separate hearing
on his request as support that Grays made a timely request.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 13 of 21
B. Poynter Factors
[14] Having determined that Grays made his request within a reasonable amount of
time before trial, we turn to whether Grays knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. In so doing, we apply the four Poynter
factors:
(1) the extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision,
(2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the
defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, (3) the background and experience of the
defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to
proceed pro se.
749 N.E.2d at 1127-28.
[15] The State argues that the trial court properly denied Grays’ request because he
did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel “given that [Grays]
only made his request when he learned that he would not get replacement
counsel as he had requested, that he lacked legal expertise, and that he refused
to listen to warnings given regarding the dangers of self-representation.” Br. of
Appellee at 14.
[16] The first two Poynter factors focus on whether the defendant had sufficient
information about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, one
through the trial court’s inquiry, and the other through any other evidence in
the record. Drake v. State, 895 N.E.2d 389, 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In its
order denying Grays’ request, the trial court analyzed these two factors and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 14 of 21
explained that it appeared that Grays’ decision to proceed pro se was based on
his belief that his counsel would not attempt to relitigate his motion to suppress
that was previously decided by the trial court. It also concluded that Grays
“does not have . . . a clear grasp of the legal ramifications of proceeding pro se
even after [the judge] has attempted to explain them to him and that Grays
repeatedly interjects his version of the law and misstates legal concepts.”
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 84.
[17] At the June 14 hearing, in response to Grays’ request to proceed pro se, the trial
court warned Grays of a “number of disadvantages” of self-representation,
including the inability to objectively evaluate the case, difficulty investigating
the case while incarcerated, and that he would be held to the same standards as
a licensed attorney. Tr., Vol. II at 85-86. The trial court judge further
explained to Grays that although he had been a practicing attorney since 1973,
he would hire a lawyer if charged with a serious crime. Grays was also advised
that if he proceeded pro se, his trial date would not change.
[18] Similarly, the waiver of counsel form initialed and signed by Grays cautioned
that “it is rarely in a defendant’s best interest to represent himself or herself in a
criminal case . . . [and a defendant] will be held to the same procedural and
substantive stand[ard]s that apply to licensed attorneys[.]” Appellant’s App.,
Vol. 2 at 78. At the hearing on Grays’ request to proceed pro se, the trial court
further advised Grays that if he represented himself, he could not come back on
a post-conviction relief and claim ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tr., Vol.
II at 96.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 15 of 21
[19] Notably, the competency reports filed with the trial court before Grays made
his request indicated that “Mr. Grays makes it clear that he is at odds with his
attorney who he feels is not representing him properly.” Appellant’s App., Vol.
2 at 68. “He appears to have a decent understanding of the charges against
him, their seriousness, and also has a decent understanding of the judicial
process[.]” Id. at 69. For these reasons, we conclude that the first two factors
weigh in favor of a finding that Grays knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel.
[20] We now turn to the remaining Poynter factors. The third factor concerns
whether the defendant has the background and experience necessary to make a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his or her right to counsel. Drake,
895 N.E.2d at 394. The State asserts that Grays “lacked the understanding of
nearly every legal issue he attempted to argue.” Br. of Appellee at 23. In its
written order, the trial court addressed this factor and concluded only that
Grays lacked legal training. Citing excerpts from the hearing on Grays’ request,
the trial court concluded that Grays “does not have a clear grasp of the legal
ramifications of proceeding pro se even after [the trial court judge] has
attempted to explain them to him and that Grays repeatedly interjects his
version of the law and misstates legal concepts.” Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at
84.
[21] The record reveals that the only specific inquiry by the trial court into Grays’
background was whether he had any legal training, including the extent of his
knowledge of a motion in limine and the Indiana Rules of Evidence. However,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 16 of 21
Grays indicated on his waiver of attorney form that he had an eleventh-grade
education, he had earned his G.E.D., and acknowledged that he “can read,
write, and understand English.” Id. at 77. Furthermore, the presentence
investigation report confirms that Grays completed the eleventh grade and
earned his G.E.D, and also reveals he attended Brown Mackie College for one
semester before the school closed. Id. at 148, 155. Grays’ adult criminal
history is comprised of one misdemeanor conviction and five felony
convictions. Thus, Grays “was no stranger to the criminal justice system.”
Taylor v. State, 944 N.E.2d 84, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We also note that
Grays was determined to be competent to stand trial based on two competency
evaluations filed with the court. See Tr., Vol. II at 80; Appellant’s App., Vol. 2
at 68-73.
[22] The evidence in the record illustrates that Grays had the requisite background,
education, and experience to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver
of counsel. Instead, the trial court focused solely on Grays’ lack of legal
training. It is improper for a trial court to deny a defendant’s request for self-
representation due to the defendant’s lack of legal knowledge. See Faretta, 422
U.S. 806 at 836 (holding that a defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” was
irrelevant in assessing whether he knowingly exercised the right to defend
himself). Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of counsel.
[23] Finally, we evaluate the context of Grays’ decision to represent himself. If a
defendant’s decision to proceed without counsel appears tactical, then this
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 17 of 21
factor weighs in favor of finding a knowing and intelligent waiver. Drake, 895
N.E.2d at 395. It appears that at the June 14 pretrial hearing, the trial court
found Grays competent to stand trial based on several reports. Grays stated he
was not ready to proceed to trial because he had not discussed a strategy with
his attorney, “there’s [been] a lot of conflict going on between” him and his
attorney, and he tried to file for replacement counsel. Tr., Vol. II at 81. Grays’
counsel stated that Grays wanted him to file an interlocutory appeal regarding
the motion to suppress, which would not be necessary and explained that was a
“[t]actical decision by defense.” Id. at 85. After the State notified the court it
was prepared for trial, the trial court asked Grays if there was anything else he
would like to say, to which he responded he would like to waive counsel. It
appears that Grays was dissatisfied with his attorney and likely believed he
would be better off representing himself. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor
of a knowing and voluntary waiver.
[24] We again acknowledge our standard of review and the presumption against
waiver of counsel; however, we conclude all four Poynter factors weigh in favor
of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel. Grays was an
experienced criminal litigant and had been sufficiently informed of the dangers
and disadvantages of representing himself at the hearings and in the waiver of
attorney form. He was competent and possessed the requisite education,
experience, and background to enable him to knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive counsel. Although the State and trial court pointed to Grays’
flawed arguments, misunderstanding of the law, and lack of preparation for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 18 of 21
trial, “[i]t is the defendant . . . who must be free personally to decide whether in
his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct
his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored
out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” Faretta,
422 U.S. at 834 (quotation omitted). Based on our evaluation of the Poynter
factors, we conclude Grays made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of counsel and the trial court improperly denied his request to proceed pro se.
And because Grays was denied the fundamental right to self-representation, he
is entitled to a new trial. See Osborne, 754 N.E.2d at 921.
Conclusion
[25] For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Grays’ request to proceed pro
se was timely and he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right
to counsel. Because the trial court denied Grays’ fundamental right to represent
himself, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
[26] Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., concurs.
Riley, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 19 of 21
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles D. Grays, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1994
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Riley, Judge dissenting.
[27] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court deprived
Grays of his right to self-representation. The trial court concluded that Grays
had not made a timely, unequivocal request to proceed pro se, Grays did not
understand the legal consequences of proceeding pro se, and Grays was unable
to proceed in a manner consistent with the rules of trial procedure and
substantive law. In light of these circumstances, the trial court concluded that
Grays had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 20 of 21
[28] As acknowledged by the majority, we review a trial court’s decision on the
waiver of the fundamental right to counsel with deference, as the trial court is in
the best position to make those determinations. Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128.
We also indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of the right to
counsel. Id. at 1126. Given our standard of review, the presumption against
the waiver of counsel, and the facts and circumstances of this case, I would
affirm the trial court’s determination. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1994 | April 25, 2019 Page 21 of 21