NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: COMPLAINT AND PETITION OF No. 18-15006
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC. AS
OWNER OF A CERTAIN 2004 YAMAHA D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00653-JAM-EFB
WAVE RUNNER FX 140 (CF 5408 LE)
FOR EXONERATION FROM OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, MEMORANDUM*
______________________________
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC., as
Owner of a Certain 2004 Yamaha
Waverunner FX 140,
Petitioner-counter-
respondent-Appellee,
v.
MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS, on behalf of
the Estate of Raeshon Williams,
Respondent-counter-
claimant-Appellant..
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 13, 2019
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and IKUTA, Circuit Judge, and MOLLOY, **
District Judge.
Marian Willis appeals the dismissal of her maritime wrongful death claim
against Williams Sports Rentals, Inc. She argues the district court erred by
denying her motion to lift the anti-suit injunction, denying her motion for a stay
pending her interlocutory appeal of that denial, and dismissing her wrongful death
claim with prejudice. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate
and remand.
1. Willis’s motion to stay the limitation proceeding pending her
interlocutory appeal was mooted by the district court’s final judgment on the
merits and is not properly before us. See Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“If there is no longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for
his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”); see
also Order, Williams Sports Rentals, Inc. v. Willis, No. 17-16981 (9th Cir. Apr. 25,
2018) (dismissing Willis’s interlocutory appeal as moot).
2. We review a district court’s decision to maintain or dissolve an injunction
under the Limitation of Liability Act for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lewis &
Clark Marine, 531 U.S. 438, 449 (2001); Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d 959, 961
**
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
2
(9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). As the Supreme Court instructed in Lewis, the
decision depends on whether the vessel owner’s limitation right is “adequately
protected.” 531 U.S. at 454. Consistent with Lewis, this Court recognizes that
“[w]here, however, a single claim is involved or where multiple claims do not
exceed the limitation fund, the court’s discretion is narrowly circumscribed and the
injunction must be dissolved unless the owner can demonstrate that his right to
limit liability will be prejudiced.” Newton, 718 F.2d at 961 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether
Williams Sports Rentals’s limitation right would be prejudiced if the injunction
were lifted. See Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.
2014) (“[A] district court abuses its discretion if the court rests its decision on an
erroneous legal standard.”). Though we “may affirm on any basis supported by the
record, whether or not relied upon by the district court,” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710
F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013), Willis never formally proffered her stipulations to
the district court, and thus they are not part of the record. Accordingly, we vacate
and remand for the district court to conduct the proper prejudice inquiry under
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. and Newton v. Shipman in the first instance.
3
VACATED AND REMANDED.1
1
Willis’s motion for judicial notice is DENIED because the facts at issue are “not
relevant to the resolution of this appeal.” Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of
Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
4