FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 23, 2019
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PATRICIA MISCHEK, individually and
on behalf of all persons similarly situated;
SKUYA CHRISTENSEN, individually and
on behalf of all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
No. 18-1156
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:16-CV-03208-PAB-MLC &
1:17-CV-00041-PAB-MLC)
STATE FARM MUTUAL (D. Colo.)
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before HOLMES, McKAY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
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This is an appeal from two putative class action cases that were consolidated in
the district court. Plaintiffs contend that State Farm impermissibly reduced its
insureds’ uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits by the amounts it paid under
medical payments coverage. State Farm sought summary judgment on the ground
that Plaintiffs had previously “settled and/or reached an accord and satisfaction” on
their disputed insurance claims against State Farm. (Appellants’ App. at 170.) The
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
district court agreed and accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of State
Farm. We review the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. See
McCracken v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 896 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiffs raise two main arguments on appeal: (1) they did not truly settle their
claims with State Farm because they never signed a written release, and (2) even
assuming they reached a settlement agreement with State Farm, this agreement is
unenforceable based on public policy and retroactive application of the Colorado
Supreme Court’s decision in Calderon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
383 P.3d 676 (Colo 2016). Plaintiffs’ second argument is foreclosed by our recent
opinion in McCracken, 896 F.3d at 1172–73, in which we rejected a virtually
identical argument brought by other Colorado insureds following the Calderon
decision. As for Plaintiffs’ first argument, we agree with the district court that the
facts in this case, even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that
Plaintiffs’ claims are precluded by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ representations, it is immaterial that they did not sign a
written release. Colorado law does not require a written release to settle claims.
Rather, “to constitute an accord and satisfaction, . . . money should be offered in full
satisfaction of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and declarations as
amount to a condition that the money, if accepted, is accepted in satisfaction,” and
“such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that, if he
takes it, he takes it subject to such conditions.” Pitts v. Nat’l Indep. Fisheries Co.,
206 P. 571, 571 (Colo. 1922). In R.A. Reither Construction, Inc. v. Wheatland Rural
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Electric Ass’n, 680 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Colo. App. 1984), a Colorado court found these
requirements to be met where the plaintiff simply deposited two checks which “bore
notations indicating that they were being offered in satisfaction of the entire
outstanding obligation . . . [and] were followed by a letter from [the defendant]
stating that the checks were offered in full settlement of the dispute.” The undisputed
facts of this case similarly establish that each Plaintiff accepted a payment in full
satisfaction of her disputed insurance claim against State Farm. For instance, the
record reflects that Ms. Mischek’s attorney engaged in settlement negotiations with
State Farm that resulted in Ms. Mischek receiving a “payment in the amount of
$70,531.89 for settlement of [her] Underinsured Motorist claim,” which State Farm
“confirm[ed] . . . settles any and all claims under the Underinsured Motorist
Coverage.” (Appellee’s Suppl. App. at 292.) The check stub for this payment bore
the notation, “Full and final UIM settlement.” (Id. at 552.) Ms. Mischek did not
dispute the amount of payment or return the check; rather, as in R.A. Reither, the
settlement check was accepted and deposited, which is sufficient under Colorado law
to “discharge[] the underlying obligation,” 680 P.2d at 1345. Ms. Christensen
likewise accepted a $16,000 payment made by State Farm based on the parties’
“agree[ment] to settle [her] underinsured motorist claim for $16,000, inclusive of all
liens.” (Appellants’ App. at 167.) Plaintiffs have cited no persuasive reason why
their acceptance of State Farm’s settlement checks would not meet the elements of
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction under Colorado law.
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As the district court correctly explained, “[b]ecause both Ms. Mischek and
Ms. Christensen accepted payment from State Farm to settle their UIM claims, the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction bars them from seeking additional UIM benefits
that they allege were unlawfully withheld.” (Id. at 330.) We therefore AFFIRM the
district court’s summary judgment decision.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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