NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0289n.06
Case No. 18-4122
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jun 04, 2019
GLORIA ESPERANZA AGUILAR- ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
GALDAMEZ, )
)
Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
) FROM THE UNITED STATES
v. ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
) APPEALS
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, )
) OPINION
Respondent. )
)
BEFORE: GILMAN, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. An immigration court ordered the removal of Gloria
Esperanza Aguilar-Galdamez, a native of El Salvador who entered the United States without
permission in 1999. She asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to terminate the proceeding for
lack of jurisdiction. The Board rejected her request and affirmed the immigration court’s order.
She now petitions for review of that decision, and we affirm.
The Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear on April 18, 2014,
charging Aguilar-Galdamez with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). The Notice
ordered Aguilar-Galdamez to appear before an immigration judge in Memphis, Tennessee. But it
did not specify a date or time for the hearing. That happened later, when the immigration court
sent out two follow-up notices. The first scheduled the hearing for November 18, 2014, and the
second rescheduled the hearing to February 4, 2015.
No. 18-4122, Aguilar-Galdamez v. Barr
Aguilar-Galdamez showed up for the February 4 hearing. The immigration judge continued
the proceeding so that Aguilar-Galdamez could have time to obtain counsel. Then, about one year
later, Aguilar-Galdamez conceded the charge and asked for cancellation or withholding of
removal. The immigration judge denied both requests. Aguilar-Galdamez appealed.
While her case was pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, Aguilar-Galdamez
moved to terminate the proceedings. She argued that under the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court never obtained jurisdiction
over her case. That’s because, she argued, the Notice to Appear lacked the time and date of her
hearing. But the Board found that Pereira did not control, denied her motion, and affirmed the
immigration court’s decision.
Aguilar-Galdamez filed a petition for review. The only issue she raises is whether the
immigration court has jurisdiction over a case when the Notice to Appear did not provide the date
and time of the hearing.
Immigration courts obtain jurisdiction when “a charging document is filed.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.14(a). A charging document can be one of three things: a Notice to Appear, a Notice of
Referral to Immigration Judge, or a Notice of Intention to Rescind and Request for Hearing by
Alien. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13. In Pereira, addressing a different issue, the Supreme Court held that a
Notice to Appear must contain the place and time of the hearing to trigger what’s known as the
“stop-time rule” for cancellation of removal. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109–10; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(d)(1)(A). It explained that a Notice to Appear is deficient under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)
without this information. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2114–15. So, Aguilar-Galdamez argues, a Notice
lacking the time must also be deficient for vesting jurisdiction with the immigration court.
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No. 18-4122, Aguilar-Galdamez v. Barr
There are several problems with this argument, only one of which we must address today:
our precedent squarely forecloses it. We rejected this argument first in Hernandez-Perez v.
Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2018), and again in Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486 (6th Cir.
2019). In those cases, we distinguished Pereira because the jurisdictional regulations impose
different requirements than the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. Hernandez-Perez,
911 F.3d at 314–15; Santos-Santos, 917 F.3d at 489–90. And we held that jurisdiction vests in the
immigration court so long as the agency follows up with a notice of hearing that includes the time
and place.
Aguilar-Galdamez does not dispute that these cases control. She instead asks us to
reconsider for several reasons. But we are bound by our circuit’s precedent.1 See Gaddis ex rel.
Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 770 (6th Cir. 2004). So we affirm.
1
Though Aguilar-Galdamez does not raise the issue, we note briefly that our precedent might be
thrown into some doubt by a decision from the Supreme Court in Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15,
petition for cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 657 (Dec. 10, 2018). That’s because Hernandez-Perez
depended in part on an application of Auer deference. See Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 312. So
if the Court limits the reach of Auer, we might need to revisit the regulatory text again.
3