v. Mosely

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 12, 2019
2019COA143

No. 16CA0218, People v. Mosely — Criminal Law — Juries —
Unanimity — Jury Instructions — Defense of Person;
Affirmative Defenses — Self-Defense; Constitutional Law — Due
Process

A division of the court of appeals considers whether a jury

must unanimously decide which element of self-defense the

prosecution disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. The division

concludes it must, based on Colorado law granting defendants the

right to a unanimous jury instruction. § 16–10–108, C.R.S. 2018.

It reasons that, by not requiring the jury to agree on which

element of self-defense the prosecution disproved, the trial court

impermissibly lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof and leaves

open the possibility of a conviction based on competing theories of

the law. The division concludes that, because this violates a
defendant’s right to due process of law, such an error is not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA143

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0218
Arapahoe County District Court No. 15CR499
Honorable Carlos A. Samour, Jr., Judge
Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Clarence Mosely,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
Hawthorne and Grove, JJ., concur

Announced September 12, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Meredith E. O’Harris, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Clarence Mosely, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second

degree assault and felony menacing. He contends that the district

court violated his right to due process when, in response to a juror’s

question, it erroneously instructed the jurors that they need not

unanimously agree on the basis on which the prosecution disproved

Mosely’s affirmative defense of self-defense. Because we agree with

that contention, we reverse his felony menacing conviction and

remand to the district court for a new trial. However, we affirm the

conviction for second degree assault because the instruction did not

apply to that charge and Mosely’s other convictions fail.

I. Background

¶2 Police officers removed Mosely from Shotgun Willie’s, a strip

club in Glendale, Colorado, in February 2015 after he exhibited

confrontational and aggressive behavior toward other patrons.

¶3 Ten to twenty minutes after his ejection from the premises,

around 1 a.m., the victim, T.K., and a group of men celebrating a

bachelor party encountered Mosely in the parking lot as they left

the strip club to board their party bus. After an aggressive verbal

1
 exchange between Mosely and another member of the party, T.K.

intervened, and a physical altercation erupted. During the fight,

Mosely stabbed T.K. in the abdomen with a small folding knife.

Members of the party restrained and purportedly hit Mosely until

off-duty law enforcement officers inside the strip club gained control

of the situation. T.K. was transported to a nearby hospital.

II. Jury Instructions

¶4 Mosely asserts that the trial court erred in answering a juror’s

question by explaining that the jury need only unanimously agree

that the prosecution disproved beyond a reasonable doubt at least

one of the exceptions to self-defense to felony menacing; 1 it need

not agree which of the exceptions was disproved. We agree and

conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

1 The self-defense instruction also pertained to a charge of first
degree assault for which Mosely was acquitted; it did not apply to
the second degree assault charge of which he was convicted.
However, for the first time in the reply brief, defense counsel asserts
that the jury instructions and response to the question also
impacted Mosely’s second degree assault conviction. We do not
address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See
People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1107 (Colo. 1990).

2
 A. Relevant Facts

¶5 The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the

offense of menacing:

The elements of the crime of Menacing, as
charged in this case, are:

1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the
date and place charged,
3. knowingly,
4. by any threat or physical action,
5. placed or attempted to place another person
in fear of imminent serious bodily injury,
6. and that the defendant’s conduct was not
legally authorized by the affirmative defense [of
self-defense] in Instruction No. 17.

After considering all the evidence, if you decide
the prosecution has proven each of the
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant guilty of
Menacing . . . .

¶6 The court also instructed the jury on self-defense:

The evidence presented in this case has raised
the affirmative defense of “defense of person”
or “self-defense,” as a defense to . . . Menacing.
The defendant was legally authorized to use
physical force upon another person without
first retreating if:
1. he used that physical force in order to
defend himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believed to be the use or imminent
use of unlawful physical force by that other
person, and

3
 2. he used a degree of force which he
reasonably believed to be necessary for that
purpose, and
3. he did not, with intent to cause bodily injury
or death to another person, provoke the use of
unlawful physical force by that other person,
and
4. he was not the initial aggressor, or, if he
was the initial aggressor, he had withdrawn
from the encounter and effectively
communicated to the other person his intent
to do so, and the other person nevertheless
continued or threatened the use of unlawful
physical force. The prosecution has the
burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant’s conduct was not legally
authorized by this defense. In order to meet
this burden of proof, the prosecution must
disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least
one of the above numbered conditions . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

¶7 The court also provided the jury with other instructions, as

well as the standard unanimity instruction, which stated in part:

The verdict for each charge must represent the
considered judgment of each juror, and it must
be unanimous. In other words, all of you must
agree on all parts of it. This requirement also
applies to any determination that you make in
response to a verdict question which you
conclude should be answered.

¶8 During deliberations, a juror submitted a question to the

court, asking,

4
 With regard to [the self-defense instruction],
[do] we have to unanimously agree on at least
one of the factors, e.g. #1[,] or do we need to
unanimously agree that individually at least
one of the factors 1-4 was disproved[?]

The trial court discussed the question with defense counsel

and the prosecutor. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial

court responded to the juror’s question as follows:

Dear Members of the Jury, . . . . In order for
you to decide that the prosecution has met its
burden of proof with respect to the affirmative
defense of defense of person or self-defense,
you have to unanimously agree that the
prosecution has disproven at least one of the
numbered conditions. However, there is no
requirement that you unanimously agree on
which numbered condition or conditions have
been disproven.

B. Standard of Review

¶9 We review jury instructions and a court’s response to juror

questions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they

accurately informed the jury of the governing law. Riley v. People,

266 P.3d 1089, 1092-93 (Colo. 2011). Whether and how to answer

a juror’s question lie within the trial court’s discretion, and we do

not reverse absent a determination that the trial court abused its

5
 discretion. People v. Gwinn, 2018 COA 130, ¶ 31, 428 P.3d 727,

735.

C. Applicable Law

¶ 10 The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every

element of a charged offense. People v. Griego, 19 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo.

2001). A defendant asserting an affirmative defense does not deny

the commission of the charged offense; rather, he or she concedes

committing the charged act but claims legal justification in doing

so, given the circumstances. Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 20,

399 P.3d 702, 705. In Colorado, the court treats the defense as

another element of the charged offense. People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d

775, 784 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 11 When a defendant presents sufficient evidence to raise an

affirmative defense, the prosecutor must prove not only that the

defendant committed the charged offense, but also the nonexistence

of the affirmative defense. People v. Reed, 932 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo.

App. 1996). If the prosecution does not disprove the affirmative

defense beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is “exempt from

criminal responsibility for the consequences of the conduct.”

6
 Roberts, ¶ 20, 399 P.3d at 705 (quoting People v. Huckleberry, 768

P.2d 1235, 1239 (Colo. 1989)).

¶ 12 As relevant here, self-defense is an affirmative defense to

felony menacing under section 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2018. See Riley,

266 P.3d at 1093. Colorado law entitles a defendant to a

unanimous jury verdict and due process of law. See Colo. Const.

art. II, § 25; § 16-10-108, C.R.S. 2018; Crim. P. 31(a)(3); Griego, 19

P.3d at 7. “Unanimity means only that each juror agrees that each

element of the crime charged has been proved to that juror’s

satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Linares-Guzman,

195 P.3d 1130, 1134 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 13 To facilitate a jury’s decision-making, the trial court is

obligated to clarify any confusion the jury expresses regarding any

element of the offense charged or law bearing on the defendant’s

innocence or guilt. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Colo.

1986). “When a jury inquires about the meaning of a particular

instruction, the court should provide a supplemental instruction

sufficient to clarify the jury’s uncertainty.” People v. Harding, 17

P.3d 183, 186 (Colo. App. 2000).

7
 D. Analysis

¶ 14 As noted, the prosecution must prove every element of an

offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and self-defense must be

treated as an additional element to be disproved.

¶ 15 While the jury must unanimously agree on all elements of a

crime, it is not required to unanimously agree on the evidence or

theory by which a particular element is established. People v.

Palmer, 87 P.3d 137, 140 (Colo. App. 2003); see also People v.

Davis, 2017 COA 40M, ¶ 21, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (“Though the

prosecution alleged numerous overt acts in furtherance of the single

conspiracy, that did not require unanimous agreement by the jurors

as to the precise overt act defendant committed.”).

¶ 16 Though no Colorado court has addressed the specific issue

before us, our jurisprudence reveals that, to establish a self-defense

exception — such as mutual combat or provocation — the

prosecution must prove the elements of the exception beyond a

8
 reasonable doubt. 2 See Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542, 561

(Colo. 2009) (detailing the prosecution’s burden to prove mutual

combat as an exception to self-defense). Similarly, in People v. Rios,

2014 COA 90, ¶ 51, 338 P.3d 495, 504, a division of this court held,

in considering the combat-by-agreement exception to self-defense,

that

a combat-by-agreement instruction that does
not state the elements that must be
established or that the prosecution has the
burden to prove these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt is erroneous because it does
not adequately inform the jury how to apply
the statutory exception to the facts of the case.

¶ 17 In this regard, People v. Silva, 987 P.2d 909 (Colo. App. 1999),

is instructive. There, as here, the division considered the

provocation and initial aggressor exceptions to self-defense. The

division explained that under section 18-1-704(3)(a), C.R.S. 2018,

“a defendant’s assertion of self-defense is lost if he or she acted with

intent to provoke the victim into attacking first in order to provide

2In some instances, the prosecution must prove the existence of an
exception to self-defense to carry its burden to disprove self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.

9
 the defendant with the excuse to injure or kill the defendant.” Id. at

914. Significantly, the division added, “[i]n contrast to the initial

aggressor limitation, the provocation limitation applies in situations

where the defendant was not the initial aggressor.” Id. Because the

Silva division concluded that no evidence showed that the

defendant intended to provoke the victims or their friend, it held

that giving the provocation instruction to the jury constituted

reversible error.

¶ 18 Accordingly, when the division considered the propriety of

instructing the jury on the initial aggressor instruction to

self-defense, it did not need to address the issue presented here —

whether jurors can be instructed on both the provocation and initial

aggressor exceptions to self-defense without a requirement that

they unanimously agree on one of those exceptions.

¶ 19 First, we conclude that absent the juror question here, the

unanimity instruction given to the jurors was sufficient to advise

them that they had to agree unanimously as to the applicability of

either the provocation or initial aggressor exception to self-defense.

Based on the unanimity instruction, the jurors also could have

10
 concluded that neither exception applied, but that the prosecution

had disproved beyond a reasonable doubt one or both of the first

two elements of the self-defense instruction. That is, without

reaching the self-defense exceptions, the jurors could have

concluded that Mosely (1) did not use physical force to defend

himself from what he reasonably believed to be the use or imminent

use of unlawful physical force by another person, or (2) did not use

a degree of force which he reasonably believed to be necessary to

defend himself.

¶ 20 We reach this conclusion because the unanimity instruction

told the jurors that “all of you must agree on all parts of it.” We

interpret this to mean that absent the juror’s question, the jurors

would be required to unanimously agree as described above.

Nevertheless, because the trial court answered the juror’s question

in a manner that conflicted with the unanimity instruction, some

jurors might have concluded that the provocation exception applied,

while others concluded that the initial aggressor instruction

applied. This was improper.

11
¶ 21 In determining whether jurors must be instructed that they

must unanimously agree on one of these exceptions, we consider

significant the Silva division’s observation that the provocation

exception to self-defense applies when the defendant was not the

initial aggressor. This statement implies that the provocation and

initial aggressor exceptions are mutually exclusive.

¶ 22 That these exceptions to self-defense are mutually exclusive is

supported by examination of section 18-1-704(3), which sets forth

three exceptions to self-defense — provocation, initial aggressor,

and mutual combat. 3 These exceptions are set forth in the

disjunctive, indicating that only one of them must be satisfied for

the prosecution to disprove the self-defense exception.

¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecution did not

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors unanimously

agreed as to how the prosecution disproved the affirmative defense

of self-defense. Our conclusion is supported by case law in a

3Because the mutual combat exception is not involved here, we
need not determine whether it and the other two exceptions are
mutually exclusive.

12
 related context that while factually inconsistent verdicts are

permissible, when a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes

with legally and logically inconsistent elements, the verdicts should

not be sustained. See People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 569 n.13 (Colo.

1995); People v. Delgado, 2016 COA 174, ¶¶ 15-16, 410 P.3d 697,

700 (cert. granted Dec. 11, 2017).

¶ 24 Nevertheless, the People urge us to adopt the reasoning of the

Court of Appeals of Texas in Harrod v. State, 203 S.W.3d 622, 628

(Tex. App. 2006), in which the court held that “the jury is not

required to agree unanimously on the specific component of

self-defense on which it is not persuaded.” However, Texas’

self-defense statute differs significantly from Colorado’s: Texas

treats self-defense as a justification, not an affirmative defense.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (West 2007).

¶ 25 Texas law requires a defendant to prove an affirmative defense

by a preponderance of the evidence, and the state “has a burden

requiring it to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Harrod,

203 S.W.3d at 627. “A jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding

rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory.” Id. Thus, a

13
 defendant’s assertion of self-defense in Texas legally operates more

like a traverse operates in Colorado.

¶ 26 Under Colorado law, a traverse “effectively refutes the

possibility that the defendant committed the charged offense by

negating one or more elements of that offense.” Roberts, ¶ 21, 399

P.3d at 705. When evidence presented raises the issue of a

traverse, “‘the jury may consider the evidence in determining

whether the prosecution has proven the element implicated by the

traverse beyond a reasonable doubt’ . . . [and] proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of the element implicated by the traverse, by

definition, disproves the traverse.” Id. at ¶ 22, 399 P.3d at 705

(citation omitted).

¶ 27 Conversely, when self-defense is used as an affirmative

defense in Colorado, “[d]isproving the existence of self-defense

becomes an additional element of the offense that the prosecution

has to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Castillo v. People,

2018 CO 62, ¶ 39, 421 P.3d 1141, 1148. Thus, unanimity on each

element of a traverse is unnecessary, as the Texas court

14
 determined, because a guilty verdict implicitly rejects self-defense

under Texas law.

¶ 28 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in permitting the prosecution to prove felony menacing

without instructing the jury that it must unanimously agree on

which exception to self-defense it relied.

¶ 29 However, our analysis does not end here. Since the error is of

constitutional magnitude, the constitutional harmless error

standard of reversal applies. We reverse the trial court’s judgment

unless we are confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

did not contribute to the conviction. Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184,

200 (Colo. 2002). Although the People argue that the instructional

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we disagree.

¶ 30 As the juror’s question suggests, some jurors may have

believed Mosely was the initial aggressor, while others may have

believed that he goaded members of the bachelor party into fighting

with him. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s answer to

the juror’s instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and the jury’s menacing conviction cannot stand.

15
 E. Instructions on Remand

¶ 31 On retrial, provided that the same or similar evidence is

presented, the trial court may instruct the jurors on self-defense

and must give the standard unanimity instruction. The jurors may

also be instructed regarding the self-defense exceptions of

provocation and initial aggressor. However, if the prosecution

argues the applicability of both exceptions, the trial court in its

discretion may also provide the jurors with special verdict forms

indicating whether they unanimously agree that the prosecution

disproved one exception or the other or neither. The trial court may

also give special verdict forms on the first two elements of self-

defense, whether Mosely reasonably believed physical force was

necessary and whether he used a degree of force which he

reasonably believed was necessary under the circumstances.

III. Res Gestae Evidence

¶ 32 Mosely contends that the trial court erred in admitting as res

gestae evidence an incident that took place inside the strip club

before the altercation at issue. Because this issue applies to

16
 Mosely’s second degree assault conviction and may arise on retrial

of the felony menacing charge, we address it now. We disagree.

A. Relevant Facts

¶ 33 Over Mosely’s objection, the trial court admitted evidence of

his conduct inside the strip club as res gestae evidence of the

charged offenses. The prosecutor’s offer of proof explained that an

initial altercation inside the strip club caused by Mosely “being rude

or hitting on a female patron who happened to be the wife of

another patron” provided context for the charged crimes. The

prosecutor supported this explanation by asserting that, after the

altercation, security personnel asked Mosely to leave the club, and

he became confrontational and aggressive. Moreover, Mosely told

detectives that he believed the bachelor party was the same group

he confronted inside the strip club. The prosecutor argued that,

because Mosely believed the incidents were related and his

aggression — though not physical — was similar to the aggression

exhibited toward the bachelor party, the evidence was res gestae.

17
¶ 34 The trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s arguments,

concluding that Mosely’s conduct in the strip club contextualized

the altercation in the parking lot.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 35 We affirm a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of

discretion. People v. Zapata, 2016 COA 75M, ¶ 37, 443 P.3d 78, 84,

aff’d, 2018 CO 82, 428 P.3d 517. We only discern an abuse of

discretion where the trial court rendered a manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair decision, or it misapplied the law. People v.

Jefferson, 2017 CO 35, ¶ 25, 393 P.3d 493, 498-99.

C. Applicable Law

¶ 36 We review the admissibility of relevant res gestae evidence

assuming the maximum probative value of the evidence and the

minimum unfair prejudice reasonably expected by its introduction.

People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762, 768 (Colo. App. 2010). When, as

here, a defendant has preserved an objection to the admission of

evidence, we review for harmless error. See Yusem v. People, 210

P.3d 458, 469 (Colo. 2009); People v. Reed, 2013 COA 113, ¶ 32,

338 P.3d 364, 370. Under this standard, the prosecution must

18
 prove that any error did not affect the defendant’s substantial

rights. James v. People, 2018 CO 72, ¶¶ 18-19, 426 P.3d 336,

340-41.

¶ 37 Res gestae evidence is

matter incidental to the main fact and
explanatory of it, including acts and words
which are so closely connected therewith as to
constitute a part of the transaction, and
without a knowledge of which the main fact
might not be properly understood. They
are . . . the circumstances, facts and
declarations which grow out of the main fact,
are contemporaneous with it and serve to
illustrate its character.

Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188, 190 n.3 (Colo. 1991) (quoting

Martinez v. People, 55 Colo. 51, 53-54, 132 P. 64, 65 (1913)). Trial

courts may admit res gestae evidence to provide context and a fuller

understanding of the conditions attendant to the charged crime.

People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo. 1994). It is

generally so intertwined with the time and circumstances of the

offense that its exclusion would leave a void in the account. Id.

However, res gestae evidence may be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

19
 confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. See CRE 403;

Gladney, 250 P.3d at 768.

D. Prior Incident

¶ 38 Mosely’s belief that the bachelor party members who entered

the parking lot after leaving the strip club were related to the group

he encountered inside the strip club supports the trial court’s

ruling. Importantly, the two incidents were estimated to have taken

place between ten and twenty minutes apart, and the evidence was

relevant to establish the character of Mosely’s actions. See

Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1374. Thus, evidence of his aggression,

though not physical, toward the group inside the strip club could

reasonably be expected to aid the jury’s understanding of the

circumstances surrounding the charged offenses. For instance, it

explained why Mosely left the strip club and gave the jury some idea

of why he verbally confronted the bachelor party members in the

parking lot.

E. Racial Animus

¶ 39 Mosely contends that the court erred in allowing testimony

describing the altercation in the club as occurring between two

20
 black men and a group of “Latin gentlemen and females.” He

argues that such evidence was not res gestae and, instead, injected

racial bias in order to gain traction with the jury. We disagree.

¶ 40 On appeal, Mosely contends that the “focus on [Mosely], who

is African American, ‘coming on’ to a group of married women not of

his race harkened back to the historically-rooted animus toward

black men relating to nonblack women.” However, the People point

out that the prosecutor did not highlight racial differences between

the groups in opening or closing arguments and, instead, relied on

the description only to identify the parties involved in the incident. 4

¶ 41 We note that Mosely rests his argument on a mistaken

premise, asserting that the above testimony was an appeal to racial

prejudice. However, the present case does not parallel the

circumstances presented in People v. Robinson, 2017 COA 128M,

¶ 17, __ P.3d___, ___ (cert. granted, June 11, 2018), in which a

division of our court concluded that “the prosecutor’s words

4 We recognize that while these terms were used to identify the two
groups, they are not necessarily accurate. Some Hispanic
individuals are also black, and other Hispanics may appear to be
white.

21
 invoked some of the most damaging historical racial stereotypes”

when the prosecutor said,

You’re going to hear that [one of the victims,
A.M.,] is white. And she’s actually pretty
pasty. She’s pasty white. And you obviously
have seen Mr. Robinson is dark. He is an
African American of dark complexion. [The
other victim, E.G.,] looks over and she can see
a dark penis going into a white body. That’s
how graphic she could see [sic].

Id. at ¶ 1, ___ P.3d at ___.

¶ 42 In any event, the brief testimony concerning race only

identified the parties involved in the incident inside the strip club.

Importantly, the prosecutor did not embellish the eyewitnesses’

racial identification during opening or closing statements. Nor did

the prosecutor suggest any racial bias in two black males “hitting

on” females of another race. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the

jury could have perceived the witnesses’ testimony as provoking

racial animus.

¶ 43 We conclude that any probative value in admitting testimony

identifying the races of the parties involved in the initial incident

was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

22
 IV. Conclusion

¶ 44 Accordingly, the judgment for felony menacing is reversed, the

second degree assault conviction is affirmed, and the case is

remanded for a new trial on the conviction for felony menacing.

JUDGE HAWTHORNE and JUDGE GROVE concur.

23