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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JENNIFER ANNE MEDZIE,
Appellant No. 694 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 6, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000771-2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2019
Appellant, Jennifer Anne Medzie, appeals from the judgment of sentence
of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury convicted her of third-
degree murder and related offenses. Appellant challenges the discretionary
aspects of her sentence, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
her convictions. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts of this case, as follows:
The case at bar involved the death of [a] two-year-old
[female] (hereinafter, “Victim”) on November 18, 2013.
Immediately prior to Victim’s untimely death, she was under the
care and supervision of … [Appellant]. [Appellant] met Victim’s
biological father, Cody Lauder (hereinafter, “Lauder”), in July of
2013. [Appellant] moved in with Lauder in September of the same
year. Because of Lauder’s work schedule, [Appellant] became the
primary caretaker of Victim during the day. In the 4 (four) to 6
(six) weeks prior to her death, Victim began losing her hair, and
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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developed dark circles … under her eyes. On November 14, 2013,
Victim began to vomit. Lauder and [Appellant] then took Victim
to the Dubois Hospital Emergency Room, where she was released
thereafter with flu-like symptoms.
On November 15, 2013, Lauder checked on … Victim before
leaving for work. Lauder report[ed] that Victim was asleep and
well in her pack n’ play. [Appellant] report[ed] that she went to
get Victim out of the pack n’ play at approximately 7:30 a.m., at
which time Victim “appeared to be normal and showed no signs of
being sick.” [Appellant] stated that as she was dressing her,
Victim went limp and “fainted in her arms.” She thereafter called
paternal grandmother Brandi Lauder and [Appellant’s] friend,
Krisandra Evans (hereinafter, “Evans”). She report[ed]
attempting to call 911 and not being able to get through. At this
point, Evans called 911, [and emergency personnel] arrived at
approximately 9 a.m. Approximately one hour and 15 minutes
elapsed between the inception of Victim’s symptoms and calling
911.
At no point in time did [Appellant] admit to knowing what
was wrong with … Victim. … Victim was ultimately life-flighted
from Clearfield Hospital to Pittsburgh Children’s Hospital; she was
pronounced brain dead on November 18, 2013. Medical personnel
attempted to gather information from [Appellant] and Lauder. As
noted, [Appellant] never gave any information or admitted to
knowing what was wrong with Victim. Uncontested testimony
from three medical experts revealed that [Victim] died from global
hypoxic[]ischemic encephalopathy resulting from blunt force
trauma to the head, or, “Shaken Baby Syndrome.”
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/30/18, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third-degree murder,
aggravated assault, endangering the welfare of children (EWOC), simple
assault, and recklessly endangering another person (REAP). On November 6,
2017, she was sentenced to 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for her third-degree
murder conviction, and a concurrent term of 1 to 2 years’ incarceration for her
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EWOC offense. Appellant’s remaining convictions merged for sentencing
purposes.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied.
She then filed a timely notice of appeal, and she also complied with the trial
court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. The court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on
November 30, 2018. Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:
I. Whether the sentence imposed, which was the statutory
maximum, was excessive and focused too much on the punitive
nature of the sentence and did not place enough emphasis on
rehabilitation[,] especially in light of [] Appellannt’s [sic] young
age?
II. Whether the evidence was sufficient enough to prove []
Appellant committed murder of the third degree, aggravated
assault, [EWOC], simple assault and [REAP,] as the nexus
connecting the death of the child to [] Appellant was weak at best;
as the evidence showed the child was sick for at least six weeks
prior to her death, and [she] went to the emergency room the day
before her death and was released and sent home?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant’s first issue implicates the discretionary aspects of her
sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
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appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006). Objections to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if
they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to
modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820
A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831
A.2d 599 (2003).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Sierra, supra at 912–13.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
In this case, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and she included
a Rule 2119(f) statement in her appellate brief. Therein, she alleges the
following:
The sentencing [court] did not state [its] reasons on the
record for the sentence[] imposed and the … [court] gave an
unreasonable sentence under the circumstances, although the
sentence was within the guidelines.
The sentencing court must state its reasons on the record
for the sentence imposed. The sentencing court did not state its
reasons for the sentence on the record and relied solely on the
recommendation from the probation office. Although within the
guidelines, because the guidelines go up to the statutory
maximum for [t]hird[-d]egree [m]urder, the maximum sentence
was unreasonable even though [it is] within the guidelines. The
sentencing court stated that it had to “balance” the death of a two
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year old versus the request for leniency from [] Appellant. ([N.T.]
Sentencing[, 11/6/17, at] 25). There was no “balancing” as the
court went completely one way without stating its reasons for
doing so on the record as required and the court ignored
sentencing factors other than punishment.
Appellant’s Brief at 9.
Initially, Appellant did not assert, in her post-sentence motion or at the
sentencing proceeding, that the court failed to state its reasons for her
sentence on the record, or that it relied solely on the recommendation of the
probation department. See Post-Sentence Motion, 11/16/17, at 2. Instead,
Appellant argued only that the court failed to “adequately consider”
Appellant’s “age and family history[,]” her rehabilitative needs, and the
protection of the public. Id. Thus, Appellant waived the arguments she now
raises on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818 (Pa. Super.
2008) (stating that a discretionary aspect of sentence claim is waived if the
appellant does not challenge it in post-sentence motions or by raising the
claim during the sentencing proceedings).1
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1 Additionally, we observe that Appellant did not raise, in her Rule 1925(b)
statement, her assertions that the court failed to state adequate reasons for
her sentence, and that it relied solely on the probation department’s
sentencing recommendation. However, our review of the record reveals that
the trial court did not inform Appellant, in its Rule 1925(b) order, that any
issue(s) not raised would be deemed waived. See Order, 5/14/18, at 1 (single
page); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv) (directing that the Rule 1925(b)
order state “that any issue not properly included in the Statement … shall be
deemed waived”). Therefore, we would not deem Appellant’s issues waived
based on her omitting them from her Rule 1925(b) statement. See Greater
Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225
(Pa. Super. 2014) (“In determining whether an appellant has waived his issues
on appeal based on non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial court’s
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Additionally, Appellant’s bald claim that her sentence is unreasonable,
and her assertion that the court ignored sentencing factors, do not constitute
substantial questions for our review. Appellant does not identify in what
way(s) her sentence is unreasonable, nor what factors the court failed to
consider. She also does not explain, or cite any legal authority to support,
why the sentencing judge’s actions were inconsistent with a specific provision
of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the
sentencing process. Thus, Appellant has failed to demonstrate a substantial
sentencing question for our review.2
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order that triggers an appellant’s obligation[;] … therefore, we look first to the
language of that order.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
2 In any event, we would deem Appellant’s sentencing assertions meritless,
as it is clear from the record that the court did not focus solely on punishing
her without considering other factors, such as her age and need for
rehabilitation. Initially, the court had the benefit of a pre-sentence report.
N.T. Sentencing at 15. It also stated that it had considered a sentencing
memorandum prepared by defense counsel, as well as numerous letters
written by friends and family of Appellant that were attached thereto. Id. at
10-13. Additionally, the court heard statements at the sentencing hearing
from Appellant’s aunt and father, who stressed Appellant’s young age at the
time of her crimes. Id. at 17, 23. Appellant’s pastor also spoke, claiming that
she had been counseling Appellant, and asking the court for a lenient
sentence. Id. at 18-19. Ultimately, however, the court found that Appellant
had made the choice to move in with Victim’s father and care for Victim every
day, although Appellant was only 18 years old at the time. Id. at 24. The
court also stressed that while the individuals who wrote or spoke on
Appellant’s behalf believed “that she was innocent and that somebody else
should be held responsible[,]” that was “not what the evidence showed.” Id.
at 25. Instead, “the evidence that was presented to the jury was very clear
that on that fateful morning, for whatever reason, … [Appellant] shook and
beat that two-year-old girl to death.” Id. After carefully balancing the
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In Appellant’s second issue, she challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain her convictions. To begin, we note our standard of review
for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreno, supra at 136.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Here, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
her convictions because the Commonwealth failed to prove that she “caused
an injury to [Victim] which resulted in her death.” Appellant’s Brief at 14.
Appellant stresses that “on the initial death certificate[, the medical examiner,
Abduurezak Shakir, M.D.,] stated that the manner of death … ‘cannot be
determined.’” Id. at 13 (citing N.T. Trial, 8/22/17, at 36). Dr. Shakir “also
testified that the blunt force trauma on the child’s body and contusions to the
child’s body could have been caused after her death when [her] organs were
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seriousness of Appellant’s offense against the mitigating circumstances of her
case, the court determined that the statutory maximum term of incarceration
(which, for third-degree murder, is also a standard range sentence) was
appropriate. In sum, even had Appellant preserved her sentencing claim for
our review, we would conclude that she has not demonstrated an abuse of
discretion in the court’s sentencing decision.
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harvested[,]” or “during the medical treatment of the child.” Id. at 14 (citing
N.T. Trial, 8/22/17, at 39). Appellant insists that
[t]he Commonwealth wants to stretch all this into a finding that …
Appellant caused these injuries to the child[] when[,] in fact[,]
there is no direct evidence thereto[,] and even the medical
evidence presented indicates that trauma caused to the child could
have been caused by the medical personnel working on the child.
Further, no blood testing, x-rays, or any other tests were
performed on the child the very day before she died when she was
at the emergency room.
Id. Therefore, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate that she caused the injuries to Victim that resulted in Victim’s
death.
We disagree. Dr. Shakir opined that Victim’s cause of death was “global
hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy resulting from blunt force trauma of the
head.” N.T. Trial, 8/22/17, at 36. The doctor explained that he listed the
manner of death on Victim’s death certificate as “could not be determined”
because it was unclear, at that time, “whether this [was] a homicide or
whether … [it was] accidental.” Id. Additionally,
[Dr.] Shakir further testified that [Appellant’s] description of
events immediately preceding Victim’s symptoms was not
consistent with the autopsy findings. [Dr.] Shakir stated that
based on the autopsy and examination, [Appellant’s] description
of events indicated [Appellant] was not describing “exactly what
happened.”
TCO at 7.
Furthermore, Dr. Shakir was not the sole medical expert presented by
the Commonwealth. Instead,
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[Dr.] Shakir’s findings regarding cause of death were
corroborated by two different medical experts. Adelaide Eichman
(hereinafter, “[Dr.] Eichman”) at the time of trial worked as a
pediatrician at Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh in the Child
Advocacy Center. Specifically, [Dr.] Eichman conducted
evaluations for children to determine if there has been abuse
and/or neglect. [Dr.] Eichman performed a consultation and
examination of Victim on November 15, 2013. Based on medical
history, her examination of Victim and interviews with Victim’s
family and [Appellant], [Dr.] Eichman concluded that Victim
suffered from Abusive Head Trauma (Shaken Baby Syndrome).
[Dr.] Eichman stated that “... this Child was in the intensive care
unit because she had been abused ... somebody taking care of her
had hurt her and basically put her in critical condition.”
Pathologist Harry Kamerow (hereinafter, “[Dr.]
Kamerow”)[,] of Centre Pathology Associates[,] testified that
Victim died of global hypoxic ischemia encephalopathy due to
blunt force trauma to the head. [Dr.] Kamerow further testified
that the manner of death was homicide. [Dr.] Kamerow stated
that, “this clinical history overwhelmingly indicates homicide.”
Additionally, [Dr.] Kamerow testified that the individual present
with Victim would know that something was wrong immediately.
She would have been “symptomatic in terms of intense head pain
within multiple minutes ... greater than one and less than ten.”
Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
The testimony of these medical experts was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that Victim died of blunt force trauma to her head, and that her
injuries were caused intentionally, not accidentally. Additionally, Appellant
“admitted that she was the only one present with Victim. Lauder had left for
work, leaving [Appellant] and Victim alone on the morning of November 15,
2013.” TCO at 8. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s circumstantial evidence
was adequate to establish that Appellant caused the injuries to Victim that
resulted in her death. Consequently, her challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support her convictions is meritless.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/9/2019
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