IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES A. THOMAS,1 §
§ No. 240, 2019
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 93K01153DI
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: September 5, 2019
Decided: October 14, 2019
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, James A. Mapp, Jr., filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State has moved
to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Mapp’s
opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In 1993, Mapp pleaded guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First
Degree and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Second Degree. After a presentence
1
It appears that after the appellant filed this appeal, he officially changed his name to James A.
Mapp, Jr. We therefore refer to the appellant as “Mapp” in the text of this order.
investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Mapp to life in prison, plus twenty years.
He did not file a direct appeal. Since then, Mapp has filed multiple motions for
postconviction relief or for correction or reduction of his sentence, as well as a
federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.2
(3) In April 2019, Mapp filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). As he had in several of his prior motions,
Mapp again challenged his conviction and sentence on the basis that he was not
legally competent when he entered his guilty plea because he was under the influence
of certain medications. The Superior Court denied Mapp’s motion for correction of
sentence on the basis that the issues set forth in his motion had already been litigated
and decided. This appeal followed.
(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence for abuse
of discretion. 3 To the extent that the claim involves a question of law, we review the
claim de novo.4 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double
jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be
served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is
2
E.g., Thomas v. Snyder, 2001 WL 1297812 (D. Del. Oct. 3, 2001); Thomas v. State, 2019 WL
211812 (Del. Jan. 15, 2019); Thomas v. State, 2015 WL 3551981 (Del. June 5, 2015); Thomas v.
State, 1997 WL 45063 (Del. Jan. 23, 1997).
3
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
4
Id.
2
uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not
authorize. 5
(5) The Superior Court did not err in denying Mapp’s motion for correction
of sentence. Mapp’s attempt to use a motion for correction of sentence as a means
to withdraw his guilty plea is outside the limited scope of Rule 35(a).6 As the
Superior Court recognized, Mapp’s arguments have previously been considered, and
the Superior Court and this Court have held that his guilty plea was entered
knowingly and voluntarily.7 He cannot relitigate these issues, which are barred by
the procedural hurdles of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, in the guise of a motion
for correction of sentence.8
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice
5
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
6
Warnick v. State, 2017 WL 1056130 (Del. Mar. 20, 2017).
7
See Thomas, 1997 WL 45063 (affirming denial of motion for postconviction relief on the basis
of and for the reasons set forth in the Superior Court Commissioner’s report dated February 22,
1996); Motion to Affirm, Exhibit H (Commissioner’s 1996 report).
8
See Cook v. State, 2015 WL 6322220 (Del. Oct. 21, 2015) (affirming Superior Court’s conclusion
that a motion for correction of illegal sentence was not, in fact, challenging the legality of the
appellant’s sentence but instead was challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea; the motion
was properly considered as a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61, and it did not
overcome the procedural bars).
3