MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 31 2019, 5:41 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Daniel Hageman Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency Sierra A. Murray
– Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jacqueline Dejournett, October 31, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-63
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Amy M. Jones,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G08-1803-CM-7238
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Jacqueline Dejournett (“Dejournett”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court
of Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration
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equivalent to 0.15 or more. She was ordered to serve 365 days in the county jail
with 357 days suspended to probation and pay $340.00 in probation fees.
Dejournett appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered her to pay probation fees without conducting an indigency hearing.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On February 20, 2018, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department Officer Cooper Dinges (“Officer Dinges”) responded to a
report of an intoxicated driver near the intersection of English and Southeastern
Avenues. In a parking lot near that intersection, the officer observed a black
vehicle without a license plate circling the lot. Officer Dinges activated his
emergency lights, shined his spotlight on the vehicle, and it came to a stop.
[4] Dejournett was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Officer Dinges
smelled alcohol and saw numerous beer cans inside the vehicle. He also noted
that Dejournett’s speech was slurred.
[5] Officer Adam Jones (“Officer Jones”) arrived on the scene shortly thereafter to
conduct sobriety tests on Dejournett. Officer Jones observed the smell of
alcohol, Dejournett’s bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech. He then administered
a horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test during which Dejournett
displayed all six signs of intoxication. After Dejournett refused a chemical test,
Officer Jones obtained a search warrant, and Dejournett was transported to
Eskenazi Hospital for a blood draw. The results indicated that her whole blood
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-63 | October 31, 2019 Page 2 of 5
ethyl alcohol concentration was in the range of .198 to .237% gram of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of her blood.
[6] On December 12, 2018, Dejournett was convicted in a bench trial of Class A
misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to
.15 or more. During the sentencing hearing, Dejournett informed the court that
she relied on her fiancé for financial support and had filed a disability claim.
The trial court ordered Dejournett to serve 365 days at the county jail with 357
days suspended to probation.
[7] The trial court further ordered Dejournett to undergo a substance abuse
evaluation and treatment with random drug and alcohol testing. The court
imposed a $200.00 countermeasure fee, a $400.00 alcohol drug services fee, and
a $340.00 fee for the costs of probation and drug and alcohol tests. The trial
court found Dejournett indigent for the purposes of court costs.
[8] Dejournett now appeals.1
1
As the apparent result of a probation violation, on April 4, 2019, Dejournett and the State entered into an
agreement, which was approved by the trial court, modifying her sentence to be served in the Behavioral
Health Alternative Court program. Appellant’s App. p. 7. Dejournett agreed to serve a minimum of twelve
months in the program and to abide by its rules and conditions. Id. at 91–95. The trial court lacked
jurisdiction to approve the agreement as our court obtained jurisdiction over this case on January 17, 2019.
Therefore, the agreement is arguably void. However, neither party has addressed the enforceability of the
agreement in this appeal, and the placement modification does not change the outcome here.
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Discussion and Decision
[9] Dejournett argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her
to pay the “maximum amount of probation fees” but failed to conduct an
indigency hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 7. “‘Sentencing decisions include
decisions to impose fees and costs,’ and a trial court’s sentencing decision is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” De La Cruz v. State, 80 N.E.3d 210, 213 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the sentencing decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.
[10] A trial court may order a person convicted of a misdemeanor to pay costs. See
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1. If a trial court imposes costs or fines as a condition of
probation, the court is statutorily required to conduct an indigency hearing. See
Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3(a) (costs); Ind. Code § 35-38-1-18(a) (fines). Although the
hearing must be conducted after a judgment of conviction, see id., the relevant
statutes do not otherwise dictate when the hearing is to be held, see Berry v. State,
950 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Accordingly, unless the State files a
petition to revoke a defendant’s probation for nonpayment of fines, costs, or
fees, the trial court is free to postpone the hearing until the completion of the
defendant’s sentence. See Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 795 & n.1 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (“A trial court acts within its authority when it chooses to wait and
see if a defendant can pay probation fees before it finds the defendant
indigent.”).
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[11] Moreover, “[a] defendant’s indigency does not shield [her] from all costs or fees
related to [her] conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the
defendant from being imprisoned for her inability to pay. Henderson v. State, 44
N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasizing that “the trial court may in
its discretion fine [the defendant] whether or not he is found to be indigent”); see
also Berry, 950 N.E.2d at 803 n.6 (noting the imposition of costs is an issue
separate from the sanctions imposed for nonpayment).
[12] For these reasons, we conclude that Dejournett is mistaken.
Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in
Indiana Code sections 33-37-2-3(a) and 35-38-1-18(a), a trial
court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an
indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to
inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid
both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other
defendants must always suffer one or the other[.]”
Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970)).
[13] Affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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