IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 78532-0-I
Respondent, )
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DEWITT, MARC JAMES, )
Appellant. ) FILED: November 12, 2019
SCHINDLER, J. — Marc James Dewitt appeals the decision to revoke the “Special
Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative” (SSOSA) suspended sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 3, 2012, 21-year-old Marc James Dewitt pulled the covers off a 7-year-
old girl while she was sleeping, placed his hand inside of her clothing, and rubbed her
vagina. Dewitt admitted he was sexually aroused by touching the vagina of a 7-year-old
girl.
The State charged Dewitt with attempted child molestation in the first degree in
violation of RCW 9A.28.020 and RCW 9A.44.083.
Dewitt pleaded guilty. Before pleading guilty, Dewitt had completed a SSOSA
evaluation. The evaluation recommended community based treatment with a sexual
offender treatment program (SOTP) provider.
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The Department of Corrections (DOC) submitted a presentence investigation
assessment. DCC recommended a SSOSA, provided Dewitt fully engages in the
associated treatment process,” “complies with the requirements of treatment and
community custody,” and is subject to imposition of a number of conditions. With an
offender score of 0, the standard range was 51 to 68 months.
At sentencing, the court exercised its discretion to impose a SSOSA. The court
sentenced Dewitt to 51 months suspended and compliance with conditions. The
judgment and sentence states:
Revocation of Suspended Sentence. At any time during the period of
community custody, if the defendant violates the conditions of the
suspended sentence or the court finds that the defendant is failing to
make satisfactory progress in treatment, the court may revoke the
suspended sentence and order execution of the sentence, with credit for
any confinement served during the period of community custody. RCW
9. 94A.670.
The community custody conditions state:
The defendant shall comply with all rules, regulations and requirements of
DOC and shall perform affirmative acts as required by DCC to confirm
compliance with the orders of the court. The defendant shall abide by any
additional conditions of community custody imposed by DOC under RCW
9.94A.704 and .706.
Additional conditions of community custody include:
Participate and make progress in sexual deviancy treatment with a
certified provider. Follow all conditions outlined in your treatment contract.
Do not change therapists without advanced permission of the supervising
Community Corrections Officer.
Another condition also prohibits Dewitt from possessing or accessing “depictions of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”
Dewitt entered into a contract with SOTP provider Stephanie Overton at Family
First Family Services LLC and agreed to comply with a number of conditions, including
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that he not “engage in the use of or possess pornography or sexually explicit materials
in any form. This includes but is not limited to the Internet, magazines, books, movies,
stores, and establishments.”
Dewitt repeatedly violated conditions of his SSOSA and treatment plan. For
example, in August 2014, DCC issued a notice of violation alleging Dewitt violated the
conditions of supervision by “[hjaving contact with a minor on or about 8/10/2014.” In
March 2016, DCC issued a notice of violation alleging Dewitt violated the following
conditions:
(1) Failing to comply with sexual deviancy treatment by viewing
pornographic videos and pictures in violation of his treatment contract in or
around February 2016 in King County, WA; (2) Failing to comply with
sexual deviancy treatment by accessing the Internet without CCOt1J
Isaacs’ permission in violation of his treatment contract in or around
February 2016 in King County, WA; and (3) failing to comply with sexual
deviancy treatment by consuming marijuana in violation of his treatment
contract on or about 3/10/2016 in King County, WA.
The State requested the court modify or, in the alternative, revoke Dewitt’s
SSOSA. Dewitt argued the pornography condition in his treatment contract was
unconstitutionally vague. The court found Dewitt violated the terms of his treatment
contract with Overton, accessed the Internet without his CCC’s permission, and
consumed marijuana in violation of his treatment contract. The court entered an order
modifying the SSOSA judgment and sentence. The April 11,2016 order states:
The sentence previously entered in the above entitled matter, including
any previous modifications, is still in effect but MODIFIED in the following
manner:
Shall comply with the conditions as set forth by Ms. Overton in her letter
dated April of 2016 including a chemical dependency & psychological
eval[uation]. Also:
1 Community corrections officer.
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No. 78532-0-1/4
(1) No use, possession, or viewing of sexually explicit conduct as defined
in ROW 9.68A.01 1. (2) No use of marijuana unless prescribed by a
treatment provider.
Confinement is IMPOSED. The defendant shall serve 28 days of.
confinement in the Snohomish County Jail.
The court imposed a sentence of credit for time served.
In January 2017, Dewitt stipulated to not complying with sex offender treatment.
The notice of violation states:
On 1/4/2017, Mr. Dewitt was addressed with a Court Jurisdiction Only
Notice of Violations/Stipulated Agreement for (1) Failing to comply with
Sex Offender Treatment by accessing the [I]nternet without the approval
of the treatment provider or Community Corrections Officer approximately
four times between 6/1/2016 and 6/30/2016; and (2) Failing to comply with
Sex Offender Treatment by engaging in the use of pornography on or
about 7/4/2016.
Dewitt agreed to attend and complete cognitive therapy sessions.
On October 10, 2017, Dewitt stipulated to violating the conditions of his SSOSA
by failing to comply with sexual deviancy treatment when he used another individual’s
computer. Dewitt agreed to increase SOTP therapy sessions to every week for three
months as a sanction.
On December 28, 2017, Overton terminated Dewitt from the SOTP. At the
hearing on March 16, 2018, the court found Dewitt violated the SSOSA conditions. The
court ordered Dewitt to participate in SOTP therapy sessions with Randy Green and
imposed 23 days confinement with credit for time served.
On March 18, Dewitt entered into an SOTP contract with Green. Dewitt agreed
to a number of conditions, including that he “must not view or possess pornography and
erotic material. This includes sexually explicit computer or Internet images.”
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On May 3, DOC issued a notice of violation. The notice of violation alleged that
on March 28, 2018, Dewitt told his COO that he watched an anime2 movie with nudity in
it. The CCC told Dewitt that “he was to not use the [l]nternet at all.” During a polygraph
examination on April 25, Dewitt “admitted that he was aware he was not supposed to
use the [Ijnternet, but has done so daily, since given the verbal directive on 3/28/20 18.”
Dewitt also admitted that he “viewed pornography on other people’s computers
approximately 50 times since his last polygraph” in October 2017. DCC found
pornography on Dewitt’s cell phone with titles such as, “Real Defloration Porn Video,”
“Teens Virgin First Time,” and “Blonde Pigtailed Virgins.” The notice of violation states
that based on this evidence, “[c]learly Mr. Dewitt’s viewing of pornographic materials on
his phone was contrary to his SOTP treatment contact with Randy Green as well as
using the [I]nternet without approval from his treatment provider.”
The notice of violation also alleged Dewitt had “made little to no progress in
SOTP,” “gives the impression to have no goal oriented behaviors or motivation,” and
“appears to be in total{] noncompliance with his SOTP treatment.”
The State filed a petition to revoke Dewitt’s SSOSA. The State specifically
alleged Dewitt violated the following conditions:
1. Failing to follow a Community Corrections Officer’s verbal or written
directive since on or about March 28, 2018;
2. Failing to comply with sexual deviancy treatment by viewing
pornographic videos in violation of his treatment contract on or
about April 11,2018; and,
3. Failing to comply with sexual deviancy treatment by accessing the
[l]nternet without the approval of the treatment provider or
2 “Anime” is defined as “a style of animation originating in Japan that is characterized by stark,
colorful graphics depicting vibrant characters usually drawn with large eyes in action-filled plots often with
fantastic or futuristic themes.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www. merriam-webster. com/dictionary/anime
(last visited Nov. 5,2019).
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No. 78532-0-1/6
Community Corrections Officer’s permission in violation of his
treatment contract since on or about March 28, 2018.
In response to the notice of violation and petition to revoke the SSOSA, Dewitt
filed a report from Green. Green concedes Dewitt violated his treatment contract by
viewing pornography. However, Green recommended continuing SOTP:
Revocation of Marc’s SSOSA agreement is being considered. Given the
repeated nature of these violations, that would seem a reasonable
conclusion. However, I am unable to support revocation at this time. .
[lit is my position that he would be better served by enhanced services
in the community that would provide him the extensive support he will
require to successfully negotiate not only the stringent requirements of
community supervision, but to also begin forward progress in life.
At the May 11 hearing on the motion to revoke Dewitt’s SSOSA, the prosecutor
emphasized the repeated violations and Dewitt’s lack of corrective behavior. The
prosecutor argued that given the crime Dewitt was convicted of, ‘this does cause .
concern that he is not making any progress in his treatment . . . [ajs noted in the notice
of violation.”
The court revoked the SSOSA. The court found Dewitt repeatedly violated the
SSOSA conditions. The court noted the “individuals involved have truly gone the extra
mile to try to work with Mr. Dewitt” to no avail. The court found Dewitt committed the
three alleged violations and “on an independent basis,” given the “totality of this record,”
Dewitt failed to make satisfactory progress in treatment. The court stated, “Regardless
if one views this action in terms of viewing these porn[ography] sites as a violation or
not, it does raise anew serious concerns of whether Mr. Dewitt is making, in fact,
satisfactory progress.”
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No. 78532-0-1/7
The court rejected the defense request to call Green as a witness to address
whether Dewitt failed to make satisfactory progress. The court ruled that under RCW
9.94A.670(11)(b), it has “overarching authority’ to find “an individual is not making
satisfactory progress to ultimately decide that a SSOSA is no longer the appropriate
option.” Dewitt appeals the decision to revoke the SSOSA suspended sentence.
ANALYSIS
Due Process
Dewitt contends the court violated his right to due process by revoking the
SSOSA. Dewitt asserts he did not have notice that the court would consider his
progress in treatment at the revocation hearing.
We review alleged due process violations de novo. State v. Simpson, 136 Wn.
App. 812, 816, 150 P.3d 1167 (2007). “The revocation of a suspended sentence is not
a criminal proceeding.” State v. DahI, 139 Wn.2d 678, 683, 990 P.2d 396 (1999). In
SSOSA revocation hearings, offenders are entitled to minimal due process rights
afforded in probation or parole revocation hearings. DahI, 1 39 Wn.2d at 683.
Minimal due process requires (a) written notice of the claimed violations, (b)
disclosure to the defendant of the evidence against him, (c) the opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses (unless there is good cause for not allowing
confrontation), (e) a neutral and detached hearing body, and (f) a written statement by
the court as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the revocation. Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). “Courts have
limited the right to confrontation afforded during revocation proceedings by admitting
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No. 78532-0-1/8
substitutes for live testimony, such as reports, affidavits and documentary evidence.”
DahI, 139 Wn.2d at 686.~
The court found that under RCW 9.94A.670(1 1)(b), Dewitt failed to make
satisfactory progress in treatment based on the facts contained in the notice of violation.
Dewitt contends that because the notice did not explicitly seek revocation based on
unsatisfactory progress in treatment, Dewitt was not afforded his due process right to
notice. We disagree.
The court may revoke a SSOSA sentence at any time if there is sufficient proof to
reasonably satisfy the court that “(a) [t]he offender violate[d] the conditions of the
suspended sentence, or (b) the court finds that the offender is failing to make
satisfactory progress in treatment.” RCW 9.94A.670(11); State v. McCormick, 166
Wn.2d 689, 705, 213 P.3d 32 (2009); State v. Miller, 180 Wn. App. 413, 416, 325 P.3d
230 (2014); State v. Ramirez, 140 Wn. App. 278, 291-92, 165 P.3d 61(2007).
In addition to the three violations, the notice of violation describes a lengthy
history of noncompliance with treatment requirements. The notice also alleges Dewitt
has made “little to no progress” in treatment and “appears to be in total[]
noncompliance with his SQTP treatment.”
The uncontroverted evidence shows Dewitt committed the three alleged
violations. The record shows the court found that the violations, coupled with Dewitt’s
~ Dewitt cites the civil commitment case In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 382-85, 662 P.2d 828 (1983),
to argue the State must provide written notice of all alternative grounds on which it seeks to revoke a
SSOSA. Dewitt contends if he had adequate notice his treatment progress was at issue, he would have
called Green as a witness. Cross is inapposite. However, we note an offender’s due process rights are
not violated where, as here, documentary evidence is presented in lieu of live testimony in a revocation
proceeding. .~J, 139 Wn.2d at 686.
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No. 78532-0-1/9
failing to make progress in treatment and his lengthy history of violating conditions,
justified the decision to revoke the SSOSA under ROW 9.94A.670(1 1 )(b):
[T]he Court is finding not only the specific violations but also this
overarching finding which is kind of implicit in I think the violations that
were asserted, but the Court is finding pursuant to statute that the Court
ultimately concludes in looking at the totality of these circumstances that
the offender is failing to make satisfactory progress in treatment.
Further, the judgment and sentence unambiguously informed Dewitt that if “[a]t
any time during the period of community custody” he violates the conditions of the
suspended sentence or the court finds” he “is failing to make satisfactory progress in
treatment,” the court “may revoke the suspended sentence and order execution of the
sentence, with credit for any confinement served during the period of community
custody. ROW 9.94A.670.”
The notice of violation adequately informed Dewitt that he was not making
satisfactory progress in treatment.
“Sexually Exjlicit Conduct” Condition
The court found Dewitt violated the community custody condition that prohibits
him from possessing or viewing “sexually explicit conduct as defined in ROW
9.68A.01 1 .“ Dewitt claims the court abused its discretion in revoking his SSOSA for
violating the sexually explicit conduct condition because the condition is
unconstitutionally vague.
We review a court’s decision to revoke a SSOSA suspended sentence for abuse
of discretion. State v. Badger, 64 Wn. App. 904, 908, 827 P.2d 318 (1992). ‘A trial
court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on
untenable grounds.” State v. Partee, 141 Wn. App. 355, 361, 170 P.3d 60 (2007). A
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No. 78532-0-1/10
court exceeds its authority when it sanctions a defendant for the violation of a condition
not imposed. State v. Johnson, 184 Wn. App. 777, 779, 340 P.3d 230 (2014). We
review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. Miller, 180 Wn. App. at
425. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of
the truth of the asserted premise. Miller, 180 Wn. App. at 425. We treat unchallenged
findings as verities on appeal. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d
801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution along with article
I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution require that citizens be afforded fair
warning of proscribed conduct.” State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 678, 425
P.3d 847 (201 8). A community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if (1) it
does not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can
understand the prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards
to protect against arbitrary enforcement. State v. BahI, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752-53, 193
P.3d 678 (2008).
When determining whether challenged language is sufficiently definite to provide
fair warning, the court must read the language in context and give it a “sensible,
meaningful, and practical interpretation.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171,
180, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). “‘[Al community custody condition is not unconstitutionally
vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point
at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’ “ State v. Sanchez
Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)~ (quoting State v. Sanchez
Valencia, 148 Wn.App. 302, 321, 198 P.3d 1065 (2009), rev’d by 169 Wn.2d 782).
“Internal quotation marks omitted.
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“‘[l]mpossible standards of specificity’ or ‘mathematical certainty’ are not required” to
avoid a finding of unconstitutional vagueness “because some degree of vagueness is
inherent in the use of language.” State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118, 857 P.2d 270
(1993) (citing City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26-27, 759 P.2d 366 (1988); Haley
v. Med. Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wn.2d 720, 740, 818 P.2d 1062 (1991)).
We presume a statute is constitutional, and Dewitt bears the heavy burden of
proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Myles, 127 Wn.2d 807,
812, 903 P.2d 979 (1995). A community custody condition that implicates material
protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is held to a
stricter standard of definiteness to avoid a “chilling effect” on the exercise of First
Amendment rights. BahI, 164 Wn.2d at 753.
Here, the community custody condition prohibiting Dewitt from possessing or
viewing, in particular, simulated sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW
9.68A.01 1(4) is not unconstitutionally vague. The condition is narrowly defined by citing
a specific statute that notifies an ordinary person of what behavior is proscribed. RCW
9.68A.01 1(4) defines actual or simulated “sexually explicit conduct”:
“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated:
(a) Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-
genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex or between humans and animals;
(b) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object;
(c) Masturbation;
(d) Sadomasochistic abuse;
(e) Defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual stimulation of
the viewer;
(f) Depiction of the genitals or unclothed pubic or rectal areas of
any minor, or the unclothed breast of a female minor, for the purpose of
sexual stimulation of the viewer. For the purposes of this subsection
(4)(f), it is not necessary that the minor know that he or she is participating
in the described conduct, or any aspect of it; and
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No. 78532-0-1/12
(g) Touching of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic
area, buttocks, or breast area for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the
viewer.
The statutory definition of simulated “sexually explicit conduct” provides substantial
direction as to what falls within the condition’s scope, such as certain qualifying
behaviors, and therefore the condition is not unconstitutionally vague.
The case Dewitt cites, State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 416 P.3d 712 (2018), is
distinguishable. In Padilla, the condition prohibiting access and possession of
pornographic materials “include[dj a definition of the term ‘pornographic materials’ as
‘images of sexual intercourse, simulated or real, masturbation, or the display of intimate
body parts.’” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 678-79. The Washington Supreme Court agreed
that the prohibition against viewing depictions of “simulated” sexual intercourse as
defined in “pornographic materials” would unnecessarily encompass movies and
television shows not created for the sole purpose of sexual gratification, “such as Game
of Thrones.” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 679, 681.
Unlike in Padilla, RCW 9.68A.01 1(4) is a narrow and more precise definition that
eliminates the concerns expressed by the court in Padilla. See ~dso State v. Alcocer, 2
Wn. App. 2d 918, 922, 413 P.3d 1033 (2018) (“remand for the court to change the
restriction to limit use or possession of materials depicting ‘sexually explicit conduct’ as
defined in RCW9.68A.011(4)”), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1017, 433 P.3d 814 (2019),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 4 Wn. App. 2d 352, 421 P.3d 969,
review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1003, 430 P.3d 260 (2018).~
~ We also note the record shows Dewitt was able to identify what qualified as simulated” sexually
explicit conduct.
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RCW 9.68A.01 1(4) is not unconstitutionally vague and provides substantial
guidance about what falls within its scope. The court did not abuse its discretion in
finding Dewitt violated the condition that prohibits him from possessing or viewing
simulated sexually explicit conduct as defined by RCW 9.68A.01 1(4).
Treatment Conditions
Dewitt challenges the court’s finding that he “[f]ail[edj to comply with sexual
deviancy treatment by accessing the [l]nternet without the approval of the treatment
provider or Community Corrections Officer’s permission in violation of his treatment
contract since on or about March 28, 2018.” Dewitt asserts the judgment and sentence
does not require compliance with SOTP conditions. The judgment and sentence does
not support his assertion.
The judgment and sentence states Dewitt shall “comply with all rules, regulations
and requirements of DOC and shall perform affirmative acts as required by DOC to
confirm compliance with the orders of the court.” The treatment contract forbids Dewitt
from viewing or possessing pornography or erotic material, including “sexually explicit
computer or Internet images.” The treatment contract requires “[a]dherence to
additional rules [that] may be required by treatment provider or community corrections
officer as determined necessary for community safety.”
The notice of violation alleged Dewitt failed “to comply with sexual deviancy
treatment by accessing the [l]nternet without the approval of the treatment provider or
Community Corrections Officer’s permission in violation of his treatment contract since
on or about 3/28/20 1 8.” There is no dispute Dewitt watched the anime with nudity
movie on his cell phone. Dewitt admitted the movie had nudity. The uncontroverted
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record establishes Dewitt did not follow the CCO directive on March 28, 2018 not to
access the Internet in violation of the judgment and sentence and the treatment contract
conditions.
We affirm the decision to revoke the SSOSA suspended sentence.
~
WE CONCUR:
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