IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 78857-4-I
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
CURTIS RASHAD HASKINS, )
Appellant. )
) FILED: November 25, 2019
ANDRUS, J. — Curtis Rashad Haskins challenges the requirement that he
participate in a sexual deviancy evaluation as a condition of his criminal sentence,
arguing the evaluation is not related to his crime of conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Haskins with one count of first degree child molestation
in connection with the alleged sexual assault of his girlfriend’s four-year-old
daughter. The State agreed to amend the charge to one count of third degree
assault in exchange for Haskins’ agreement to plead guilty to that charge. In his
plea statement, Haskins admitted:
I understand and agree that based upon the police reports, there is
a factual basis to support the original charge of Child Molestation in
the First Degree. I believe that if this matter proceeded to trial on the
original charge, there is a substantial likelihood I would be convicted
of the charge. . One reason that I am willing to plead guilty to these
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reduced charges is that I have served the standard range and I will
not be required to register [as] a sex offender.
I agree that the court can review the Certification for
Determination of Probable Cause for the purpose of determining that
there is a factual basis for the original charge.
At his plea hearing, the trial court found that the probable cause certification
provided a factual basis to support the original charge of first degree child
molestation and accepted Haskins’ guilty plea to third degree assault.
Haskins also stipulated in the felony plea agreement that the facts set out
in the probable cause certification and the prosecutor’s summary were the “real
and material facts” on which the trial court could rely for sentencing purposes,
pursuant to RCW 9.94A.530.1
Haskins agreed to the State’s recommended 16-month sentence but
contested the recommendation that he undergo a sexual deviancy evaluation.
Haskins argued that although he stipulated to the real facts of the case, he did not
plead guilty to a sex offense. He contended there was no nexus between the crime
of conviction and the recommended evaluation.
The trial court rejected Haskins’ argument and required him to participate in
a sexual deviancy evaluation. The trial court expressly “recognize[d] that I am
looking at the certification for determination of probable cause and the facts
therein. And, based on that information, I do believe that there is a factual basis
1 ~ 9.94A.530(2) provides that in determining any sentence, the trial court may rely on
information that a defendant admits in the plea agreement or admitted at trial or at sentencing.
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that this [c]ourt impose th[e] sexual deviancy evaluation and I am doing so for that
reason.”
Haskins appeals the sexual deviancy evaluation requirement.
ANALYSIS
Haskins argues the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by requiring
him to participate in a sexual deviancy evaluation because the evaluation is not
directly related to his crime of conviction.
Generally, we review a trial court’s imposition of crime-related community
custody conditions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Zimmer, 146 Wn. App. 405,
413, 190 P.3d 121 (2008). But because Haskins’ challenge involves construction
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, our review is
de novo. State v. Warnock, 174 Wn. App. 608, 611, 299 P.3d 1173 (2013); see
also State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).
Community custody conditions must be statutorily authorized. Warnock,
174 Wn. App. at 611. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(c) authorizes courts to order, as a part
of a sentence for a term of community custody, participation in “crime-related
treatment or counseling services.” Haskins argues that a sexual deviancy
evaluation is not “crime-related treatment or counseling services” under RCW
9.94A.703(3)(c) because he was not convicted of a sex crime.
But the trial court’s authority is not limited to that provision. RCW
9.94A.703(3)(d) authorizes a trial court to require a defendant to “perform
affirmative conduct reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense.” The
“circumstances” of Haskins’ offense are described in the probable cause certificate
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and detail his sexual molestation of a four-year-old child. Haskins affirmatively
agreed that the trial court could rely on these facts as true for purposes of
sentencing.
Haskins’ reliance on State v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 76 P.3d 258 (2003),
is misplaced. In that case, because there was no evidence that alcohol contributed
to his crime of conviction—first degree burglary—Jones challenged the court’s
order that he participate in alcohol counseling. k1. at 202, 207. This court agreed,
holding that to satisfy the “crime-related” statutory requirement, court-ordered
counseling or treatment must address a deficiency that contributed to the offense
at issue. jç~. at 207-08; see also Warnock, 174 Wn. App. at 612-13. But in Jones,
the defendant did not stipulate to “real and material facts” as described in the
probable cause certification. This distinction is key.
Moreover, Jones affirmed the proposition that alcohol treatment is
authorized by RCW 9.94A.703(3)(d) and “reasonably relates” to the circumstances
of a defendant’s offense if the evidence shows that alcohol “contributed to the
offense.” 118 Wn. App. at 208. By analogy, the question here is whether the
evidence shows that sexually deviant behavior contributed to Haskins’ assault.
In this case, Haskins pleaded guilty to third degree assault to avoid the
possible consequences of going to trial and being convicted of child molestation in
the first degree. Haskins admitted that there was a substantial likelihood he would
be convicted of this crime if he went to trial. As required by CrR 4.2(d), State v.
Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 137 P.3d 835 (2006), and In re Pers. Restraint of Barr, 102
Wn.2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984), the trial court found that the probable cause
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certification provided a factual basis supporting the original first degree child
molestation charge. Haskins also admitted the trial court could rely on the
information in the probable cause certification to craft an appropriate sentence.
The facts laid out in the probable cause certificate show that Haskins engaged in
sexually deviant conduct when he assaulted his victim. The trial court did not err
in concluding that this conduct contributed to the offense to which Haskins pleaded
guilty.
We conclude that the trial court did not exceed its statutory authority in
ordering Haskins to participate in a sexual deviancy evaluation.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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