In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
GREG HALDERMAN, )
Respondent, )
v. ) WD82668
)
CITY OF STURGEON, et al., ) FILED: January 21, 2020
Appellants. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOONE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JEFF HARRIS, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION THREE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,
ALOK AHUJA AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, JUDGES
The City of Sturgeon, Mayor Gene Kelly, and Board of Aldermen members Tyler
Patterson, Rhonda Dawson, Travis Sutton, and Danny Joiner, (collectively, “the City”)
appeal the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Greg Halderman
on his petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, which he filed after he
was removed as Chief of the Sturgeon Police Department. The City contends the court
erred in holding that the removal proceeding was a contested case and that the City
violated Halderman’s right to due process under the Missouri Constitution when it
removed him from office without holding a contested case hearing. The City further
argues that, even if the court properly found that this was a contested case, the court
erred in ordering Halderman to be reinstated with back pay because those were
improper remedies. Because the judgment is not final and this case is not eligible for
interlocutory appeal under Rule 74.01(b), we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Halderman was appointed Chief of the Sturgeon Police Department in October
2013. On March 15, 2017, Mayor Kelly sent Halderman a notice of a meeting during
which the Board of Aldermen was going to consider removing him as police chief. The
notice alleged that just cause existed for Halderman’s removal because he was unable
to perform his duties with reasonable competence or safety as a result of alcohol abuse;
he committed acts that constituted a reckless disregard for the safety of the public or
another law enforcement officer; and he was in violation of the written established
employment policy. The notice identified four specific events over a three-year period
that the City alleged constituted just cause for Halderman’s removal. Enclosed within
the notice of meeting were several documents related to the four specific instances of
alleged misconduct. The notice stated that the Board of Aldermen would consider his
removal at a closed meeting on March 27, 2017, at which time Halderman would be
afforded the opportunity to be heard, together with any witnesses, evidence, and
counsel of his choosing.
During the Board of Aldermen’s closed meeting on March 27, 2017, the City did
not call any witnesses to testify. Halderman, who was represented by counsel, testified
and presented eleven witnesses. The Board of Aldermen voted 3-1 to remove
Halderman from office. Halderman was given written notice of the grounds of his
removal on April 4, 2017.
2
Halderman subsequently filed a petition against the City, Mayor Kelly, and the
Board of Aldermen for judicial review of the decision, damages, and injunctive relief. In
Count I, Halderman asked the court to review the removal decision as a contested case,
and he asserted that the removal decision violated his due process rights, was
unsupported by competent and substantial evidence, was made upon unlawful
procedure, was arbitrary and unreasonable, and constituted an abuse of discretion. As
an alternative to Count I, Halderman requested in Count II that the court review the
removal decision as a non-contested case. In Count III, Halderman alleged that the
removal decision violated his right to due process under the Missouri Constitution
because the removal hearing was “devoid of the procedural protections guaranteed to
him under” the Missouri Constitution. In Count IV, Halderman alleged that the City
wrongfully discharged him in violation of public policy because his removal was
retaliatory. In Count V, Halderman alleged Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen
wrongfully terminated him because his removal was retaliatory. In Count VI, Halderman
alleged that Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen tortiously interfered with his
employment contract with the City by causing the City to breach the contract by
removing him without just cause. Counts I, II, and IV were asserted against the City
only; Count III against the City, Mayor Kelly, and the Board of Aldermen 1; while Counts
V and VI were asserted against only Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen, but not
the City.
In each individual count, Halderman alleged that he suffered damages, including
lost wages and benefits, emotional distress, and injury to his reputation. For all claims,
1 Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen were sued in both their personal and official capacities.
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he requested the relief of: (1) an order reversing the removal decision or, alternatively,
a de novo hearing of the Board of Aldermen’s decision as a non-contested case; (2) his
reinstatement as chief of police and the removal of all documents related to his removal
proceeding from his personnel file; (3) back pay and lost benefits; (4) compensatory
damages for his injuries, including lost wages and benefits, emotional distress, and
injury to his reputation; (5) punitive damages; and (6) costs and attorneys’ fees.
Halderman moved for partial summary judgment on Counts I and III. After
briefing and argument, the court granted the motion on February 15, 2019, concluding
that the removal of a chief municipal law enforcement officer under Section 106.273,
RSMo 2016, 2 is a contested case under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (“the
Act”); that Halderman’s removal hearing did not comply with the required procedures for
contested cases; and that the City’s failure to comply with the requirements of a
contested case proceeding deprived Halderman of due process. The court ordered
Halderman to be reinstated with back pay. The court advised that parties that, if the
City decided to remove Halderman following his reinstatement by the court, the City had
to comply with and conduct removal proceedings in accordance with Section 106.273
and Section 536.010, et seq.
Halderman’s counsel informed the City on February 17, 2019, that Halderman
would be returning to work on February 19, 2019. On February 18, 2019, the City
informed Halderman that he was being placed on administrative leave without pay
pending a formal hearing on his position as chief of police. The City filed a motion to
stay, amend, or clarify the circuit court’s February 15, 2019 partial summary judgment to
2 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016.
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address when Halderman was to be reinstated. In response, Halderman filed a motion
for an order to show cause as to why the City should not be held in contempt for
violating the court’s order to reinstate Halderman with back pay. The court did not rule
on the motion for an order to show cause and allowed the parties to come to an
agreement regarding the logistics and details surrounding Halderman’s reinstatement.
The court issued a judgment on March 11, 2019, to reiterate that its partial summary
judgment on Counts I and III was a distinct judicial unit that should be considered final
for purposes of appeal and that no just reason existed for delaying an appeal. The City
filed this appeal. 3
APPEALABILITY OF JUDGMENT
Before we can reach the merits of the issues in the appeal, we have a duty to
determine, sua sponte, whether we have the authority to hear this appeal. First Nat’l
Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo.
banc 2017). “The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give
a right to appeal, no right exists.” Id. (citation omitted). “A prerequisite to appellate
review is that there be a final judgment.” Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo.
banc 1997) (citation omitted); § 512.020(5). A final judgment “resolves ‘all issues in a
case, leaving nothing for future determination.’” First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515
S.W.3d at 221 (citation omitted).
Rule 74.01(b) “provides a limited exception to this finality requirement.” Id.
Where multiple claims are presented in an action, “Rule 74.01(b) authorizes a trial court
3While this appeal was pending, the City held another removal hearing on April 30, 2019, during which it
afforded Halderman all of the procedures required for contested cases under the Act. Again, the Board of
Aldermen voted 3-1 to remove Halderman from office. Halderman did not seek judicial review of that
decision.
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to enter judgment on one or more – but fewer than all – of the claims in an action and
make that judgment a ‘final judgment’ for purposes of section 512.020(5) by certifying
that there is no just reason to delay the appeal of that judgment.” Id. at 221-22. The
circuit court’s designation is not conclusive, however. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244.
Instead, “[i]t is the content, substance, and effect of the order that determines finality
and appealability.” Id. The court’s “designation is effective only when the order
disposes of a distinct ‘judicial unit.’” Id.
The Supreme Court has explained what constitutes a distinct judicial unit:
A distinct “judicial unit” is defined as the final judgment on a claim,
and not a ruling on some of several issues arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence which does not dispose of the claim. Further,
an order addressing some of several alternative counts, each stating only
one legal theory to recover damages for the same wrong, is not
considered an appealable judgment while the other counts remain
pending because the counts are concerned with a single fact situation. It
is “differing,” “separate,” “distinct” transactions or occurrences that
permit a separately appealable judgment, not differing legal theories
or issues presented for recovery on the same claim.
First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
Applying these principles to this case, the six counts set forth in Halderman’s
petition are merely different legal theories seeking to recover the same relief (reversal of
the removal decision, reinstatement, back pay and lost benefits, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and costs and attorneys’ fees) for the same underlying
wrong – his removal as chief of police. The only distinction between the six counts is
that the appealed counts challenge the removal decision on procedural grounds, while
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the pending counts challenge the removal decision on substantive grounds. 4 All of the
counts, however, are concerned with the single fact situation of Halderman’s removal.
Moreover, the circuit court’s disposition of Counts I through III did not have the effect of
fully resolving all claims against any of the defendants; Count IV remained pending
against the City, while claims remained pending against Mayor Kelly and the Board of
Aldermen in Counts V and VI.
The pending counts in this case “clearly arise from the same set of facts, and the
same transactions and occurrences, as the counts supposedly appealed.” See Gibson,
952 S.W.2d at 244. Because the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment “did
not resolve a single, distinct judicial unit,” the partial summary judgment was neither a
final nor appealable judgment. First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 223.
Therefore, we have no authority to hear Halderman’s appeal. Id.
CONCLUSION
The appeal is dismissed.
_____________________________________
LISA W HITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
4We recognize that Count I challenges the removal decision on both procedural and substantive grounds.
The court relied on only the procedural grounds to grant summary judgment in favor of Halderman on this
count.
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