In the Matter of M.K., (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services and V.K. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 30 2020, 9:22 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
Steven J. Halbert INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
Indianapolis, Indiana CHILD SERVICES
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
CHILD ADVOCATES, INC.
DeDe Connor
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of M.K., (Minor March 30, 2020
Child), Child in Need of Court of Appeals Case No.
Services, 19A-JC-2355
and Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
V.K. (Father), The Honorable Diana Burleson,
Appellant-Respondent, Magistrate
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v. Trial Court Cause No.
49D15-1905-JC-1260
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner,
and
Child Advocates, Inc.,
Guardian ad Litem.
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] V.K. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating his minor child,
M.K. (the “Child”), as a child in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.
Issue
[2] Father raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that the Child is a CHINS.
Facts
[3] The Child was born in 2002 to V.J. (“Mother”), who died in 2018, and Father.
The Child lived at Father’s home with Father’s wife (“Stepmother”), the
Child’s sister, and three step-siblings.
[4] On May 2, 2019, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report
the Child did not return home from school, and Father told DCS that the Child
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was no longer welcome at his home. The same day, Father agreed to a safety
plan for the Child, and the Child was sent to a Stop Over home 1 from May 3,
2019, to May 13, 2019. 2 On May 13, 2019, Father reluctantly allowed the
Child to return home because the Child had nowhere else to go; however, the
Child said she would commit suicide if she had to return to Father’s home.
[5] On May 13, 2019, DCS removed the Child from Father’s home because
the Child’s “physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously
endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian to supply the [C]hild with necessary food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, education or supervision.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 24.
Shortly thereafter, Deja Thomas, an assessment family case manager (“FCM”)
with DCS, conducted an assessment with the Child and Father. Father stated
to FCM Thomas that: (1) he did not want the Child to return home until she
received services outside of the home and he denied he needed services; and (2)
Father reported the Child was acting out sexually and she did not want to
follow the rules at home.
[6] On May 15, 2019, DCS filed a petition alleging the Child was a CHINS
pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. Specifically, DCS alleged: (1)
Father has failed to provide the child with a safe and stable home; (2) the Child
1
Stop Over is not defined in the record; however, the Child described Stop Over as a “shelter” for “teens and
young adults.” Tr. Vol. II p. 20.
2
It appears that Father also attempted to get the Child in a Stop Over home previously.
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has a history of running away and has not been provided adequate supervision
by Father; (3) the Child has threatened to commit suicide if she is to return
home to Father; (4) Father was unwilling to meet the Child’s needs as Father
was not allowing the Child to return home; and (5) Father has not created an
appropriate, alternative plan for the Child’s care.
[7] Tracy Johnson, an outpatient therapist at Park Center, conducted an
assessment on the Child on July 22, 2019. Johnson diagnosed the Child with
post-traumatic stress disorder, moderate cannabis abuse disorder, and
unspecified depression. At the time of the July 22 assessment, the Child was
already seeing a therapist, Katherine Devinney. 3
[8] The trial court held a CHINS fact finding hearing on September 10, 2019. At
the time of the fact finding hearing, the Child was in foster care. Witnesses
testified to the foregoing events. FCM Thomas testified about her concerns for
the Child, and specifically, that Child did not feel safe in the home and the
Child reported physical abuse in the home. Devinney testified that, based on
disclosures the Child made to Devinney during therapy, she had concerns
regarding returning the Child to Father. The only services Devinney
recommended for the Child was continued therapy with Devinney.
3
Katherine Devinney, a therapist at Lifeline Youth and Family Services in Fort Wayne, has been the Child’s
therapist since early July 2019 pursuant to a DCS referral.
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[9] The Child testified at the fact finding hearing as follows: (1) her relationship
with Father is “non[]existent” and the Child does not want anything to do with
Father, tr. vol. II p. 23; (2) the Child does not get along with her other family
members; (3) the Child has tried to harm herself as a result of those poor
relationships; (4) the Child and Father previously smoked marijuana daily; (5)
the Child does not feel safe returning home; and (6) the Child was willing to
continue working with her therapist and other service providers.
[10] Elizabeth Davids, a permanency FCM with DCS, testified as follows: (1)
Father stated that he has done all he can do to help the Child; (2) Father
believes the Child is the issue; (3) Father is concerned with the way the Child
“uses her body,” and the fact that the Child’s former boyfriend vandalized
Father’s vehicle, tr. vol. II p. 36; (4) Father does not believe that he needs any
services and believes there are no issues with regard to his parenting of the
Child; and (5) Father does not want the Child to return home until she receives
help with her issues. Father was not able to give FCM Davids specific
information about what Father has done in the past to assist the Child.
[11] FCM Davids did not recommend the Child be placed with Father because the
Child is a runaway risk; the Child’s underlying needs would not be addressed;
and Father does not have the willingness to learn about the Child’s needs.
FCM Davids did not believe Father would even allow the Child back into the
home. FCM Davids recommended several services “to help build and repair
the relationship between the family and dad and daughter,” including a parent
family functional assessment and family therapy. Id. at 38.
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[12] At the close of the fact finding hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Child a
CHINS. The trial court proceeded immediately to disposition. The trial court
ordered Father to participate in the parental participation order, which the trial
court incorporated into its dispositional decree. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
17. The parental participation order ordered Father to participate in a parenting
family functioning assessment, follow the recommendations from that
assessment, and participate in family therapy after a positive recommendation
from the Child’s therapist. Father now appeals.
Analysis
[13] Father argues the evidence is insufficient to conclude that the Child is a
CHINS. CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the
juvenile code.” N.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs (In re N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 106
(Ind. 2010). On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions thereon in granting DCS’s CHINS petitions. When reviewing
findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of
review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and
second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. In re I.A., 934
N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). We will set aside the trial court’s judgment
only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the
findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not
support the judgment. Id.
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[14] Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 provides that:
. . . [A] child is a child in need of services if, before the child
becomes eighteen years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously
impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the
inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian,
or custodian to supply the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision;
and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without
the coercive intervention of the court.
[15] “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish
parents.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a
determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in
need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without intervention of
the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the
child . . . . [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that
creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted).
[16] Father argues that DCS failed to prove that the Child is a CHINS because: (1)
the only services the Child needs are therapy that the Child is already receiving
and wanted to continue; (2) coercive intervention of the trial court was not
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necessary to get the Child the assistance she needed; and (3) Father did not
need any specific services. We disagree.
[17] While the Child has accepted that she will continue her therapy and other
services, Father said multiple times that he did not need services and that there
are no issues with his parenting. Father told DCS the problem is with the
Child, and not with Father. Father has failed to secure an alternative to the
trial court’s intervention. The Child is without a home and the State is required
to intervene. Assisting the Child is not a one-way street, and the fact the Child
is willing to engage in services does not mean coercive intervention is not
necessary. Father does not understand the Child cannot do this alone and is
not willing to help the Child. The trial court ordered Father to participate in a
parenting assessment, follow the recommendations from the assessment, and
participate in family therapy when the Child’s therapist determined the Child
was ready. 4
[18] Father cites In re V.H., 967 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), as a “similar
situation” where the mother refused to pick up her child from Lutherwood
because she wanted the Child to receive additional services. Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 12. The Mother in J.H., however, was taking action even after DCS
became involved, such as contacting her physician and scheduling a
4
The trial court’s conclusion does not support Father’s contention that the court “did not find the Father
needed any particular services.” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. At the very least, Father’s participation in therapy with
the Child when she was ready constituted a service by Court intervention.
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psychological evaluation for her child after learning it would take a significant
amount of time for DCS to obtain one. In this case, FCM Davids testified
Father could not share what has been done to assist the Child other than not
allowing the Child to return to the home.
[19] Father has been clear that he will not participate in services to help the Child
absent court intervention. See cf. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 581 (Ind. 2017)
(finding coercive intervention of the court was not needed when parents
completed the parenting curriculum, parents were engaged in services, and
“serious” about doing what DCS asked parents to do). The trial court’s
conclusion is not clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[20] The evidence was sufficient to adjudicate the Child a CHINS. We affirm.
[21] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
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