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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALPHONSO WILLIAMS, :
:
Appellant : No. 1230 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 21, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004668-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2020
Alphonso Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his conviction of escape.1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the facts underlying the
instant appeal as follows:
Lester Smith [(“Smith”)], a shift supervisor at [] Keystone
Correctional Services [(“Keystone”)], testified that Keystone is a
secured facility that serves as “a halfway house and work release
center.” Residents of Keystone are “getting released from jail and
they come there on parole, or else they come back…. They’re
brought back from [a] parole violation. So[,] they stay with us
until parole sees them, and then they get a home plan and go
back out.” The doors are locked[,] and the property is surrounded
by fences with barbed wire.
On June 8, 2018, [Williams], a resident at Keystone, was
out on a job search. When he returned to the facility, [] Smith
was instructed to strip search [Williams] due to a suspected drug
offense. During the search, [] Smith found two bags of synthetic
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121.
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marijuana in [Williams’s] underwear. [Williams] was then given
a urine test and tested positive for synthetic [marijuana]. The
facility director was notified, as was the Pennsylvania State Police.
[] Smith testified that [Williams] returned to the housing unit
[but], after a formal count of residents was conducted, it was
determined that [Williams] was missing. [] Smith was able to
view Keystone surveillance footage and observed [Williams] going
over the fence with a sheet on top of the barbed wire.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 1-2 (citations omitted; paragraph break
added). Williams was apprehended on August 4, 2018.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Williams of escape. The
trial court subsequently sentenced Williams to one to three years in prison,
plus fines and costs. Thereafter, Williams filed the instant timely appeal,
followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
complained of on appeal.
Williams presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the evidence was insufficient to prove [Williams] guilty
of escape[,] when the Commonwealth’s witness testified that
Keystone Correctional Facility houses individuals who are released
from jail and paroled[,] and failed to provide evidence to refute
that he was on parole status at Keystone Correctional Facility?
Brief for Appellant at 4.
Williams claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
of escape. See id. at 11. Specifically, Williams argues that the
Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding his “resident status” at
Keystone. Id. According to Williams, the Commonwealth failed to present
evidence that he was at Keystone “for one of the reasons delineated for official
detention under [18 Pa.C.S.A.] § 5121(e)[,] nor was testimony presented that
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he was committed to Keystone under any court order.” Brief for Appellant at
11-12. Further, Williams argues that there was no evidence that his status
was anything other than a “parolee.” Id. at 12.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s claim and concluded
that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 3-7. We agree with
the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm
on this basis as to Williams’s claim. See id. We additionally observe the
following.
In Commonwealth v. Davis, 852 A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. 2004), this
Court addressed a similar issue. The defendant in Davis claimed that he had
been paroled, and was therefore no longer subject to “official detention,” as
defined by the escape statute. Id. at 396. In considering whether the
defendant remained in “official detention,” this Court opined that “the term
‘prerelease’ essentially translates into ‘prior to release’ and begs the question,
prior to release on what? Given that the provisions for ‘prerelease programs’
are found in the provisions for parole, it logically follows that the term
‘prerelease program’ refers to a program that predates release on parole.”
Id. at 396.
In Commonwealth v. Scott, 967 A.2d 995 (Pa. Super. 2009), this
Court applied Davis in addressing a similar claim. The defendant in Scott
was on “prerelease.” Id. at 998. Id. However, the defendant was not
required to serve a minimum period in the prerelease program. Id. at 999.
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The defendant argued that the evidence had failed to establish that he was in
“official detention,” as he was on parole at the time he left the facility. Id. at
998. The defendant’s argument was based upon his receipt of a letter
indicating his parole status, “and the apparent presumption that [the]
issuance of the letter commenced his release on parole.” Id. at 998. The
defendant argued, in the alternative, that, even assuming he was not yet
paroled, the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish that he remained in
official detention. Id. The defendant relied upon Davis as supporting this
proposition. See id.
This Court rejected the defendant’s assertions: “Unfortunately, the
authority upon which [the defendant] relies does not establish that his parole
commenced before he left [the facility,] or that the Commonwealth is
compelled to disprove his assertion that parole had been granted.” Id.
[T]he record verifies only that [the defendant] was serving a
period of prerelease when he absconded from Kintock Broad,[2]
not that he was on parole. Commonwealth witness Roberta
Albany, a [Department of Corrections (“DOC”)] records custodian,
testified that she was familiar with the letter [the defendant] had
received from the [Pennsylvania] Board of Probation and Parole.
She also testified, however, that [the defendant’s] parole
remained to be confirmed before a DOC public hearing officer[,]
who would issue a release order following [the defendant’s]
agreement to the terms of the probation[,] and that the order
would then be included in [the defendant’s] DOC file. Id. [The
defendant] never attended a DOC hearing and no release order
[was] ever issued for his parole. Id. Accordingly, his “prerelease”
status remained unchanged and he continued in “official
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2 Kintock Broad was a Community Correction Center then in operation in
Philadelphia. See id. at 997.
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detention” while at Kintock Broad. As the trial court recognized,
[the defendant] was not on parole and, consequently, was
properly subject to a charge of [e]scape upon leaving the Kintock
facility. As [the defendant] does not dispute his conduct in leaving
the facility without authorization, we find the evidence legally
sufficient to sustain his conviction for [e]scape….
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, in Davis and Scott, the use of the term “parole” was not
dispositive of the defendant’s status for purposes of the escape statute.
Rather, the Court looked to whether the defendant was in “confinement” or
“official detention.” See Davis, 852 A.2d at 396; Scott, 967 A.2d at 998-99.
Here, the evidence established that Williams was confined in a secure
facility. See N.T., 6/21/19, at 9 (wherein Smith testified that the facility was
a secured facility where the “doors are locked[,] and the property is
surrounded by fences with barbed wire”). Further, as defense counsel
conceded to the trial court, Williams would need a “home plan … before he
[could] be officially released out onto the street.” N.T., 6/21/19, at 27
(emphasis added). Thus, the evidence established that Williams had not yet
been “released” from “official detention.” See id. Therefore, based upon the
analysis set forth in the trial court’s Opinion, and our review set forth above,
we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Williams’s conviction of
escape.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/17/2020
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