FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 20 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, Jr., No. 19-60004
Debtor, BAP No. 18-1172
------------------------------
MEMORANDUM*
CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, Jr.,
Appellant,
v.
STEVEN M. SPEIER, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.
In re: CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, Jr., No. 19-60008
Debtor, BAP No. 18-1172
------------------------------
STEVEN M. SPEIER, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellant,
v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, Jr.,
Appellee
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Lafferty III, Spraker, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted April 14, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and FERNANDEZ and W. FLETCHER, Circuit
Judges.
Chapter 7 debtor Clifford Allen Brace, Jr. appeals pro se from the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP’s”) decision vacating and remanding in part
the bankruptcy court’s June 19, 2018, order finding Brace in contempt,
determining violations of the automatic stay, and ordering sanctions. Chapter 7
trustee Steven M. Speier cross-appeals from the BAP’s denial of his motion to
dismiss Brace’s appeal.
We must consider jurisdiction sua sponte. Greene v. United States (In re
Souza), 795 F.2d 855, 857 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986). We dismiss the appeal and cross-
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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1. In this case, the BAP remanded to the bankruptcy court to make
additional findings and explain its conclusions regarding the basis for and amount
of the $5,000 sanction award and to set forth the exact steps Brace must take to
purge his contempt and avoid incarceration. “[A]n order from the BAP is not final
if it ‘remands for factual determinations on a central issue.’” Ocwen Loan
Servicing v. Marino (In re Marino), 949 F.3d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Gugliuzza v. FTC (In re Gugliuzza), 852 F.3d 884, 895 (9th Cir. 2017)); see also
Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586, 594
(2020) (“Orders in bankruptcy cases qualify as ‘final’ when they definitively
dispose of discrete disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case” and “leave
nothing more for the Bankruptcy Court to do in that proceeding”). “We have
departed from this rule only when the BAP remands for ‘purely mechanical or
computational task[s] such that the proceedings on remand are highly unlikely to
generate a new appeal.’” In re Marino, 949 F.3d at 487 (alteration in original)
(quoting Sahagun v. Landmark Fence Co., In. (In re Landmark Fence Co., Inc.),
801 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2015)). Because those factors are not present here,
we lack appellate jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it.
2. Speier’s cross-appeal similarly must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final order. Farber v. 405
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N. Bedford Dr. Corp. (In re 405 N. Bedford Dr. Corp.), 778 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from
a bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to dismiss debtor’s petition for bad faith
filing). We have permitted an appeal from a BAP order when it “1) resolves and
seriously affects substantive rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue to
which it is addressed.” In re Gugliuzza, 852 F.3d at 894 (quoting Eden Place, LLC
v. Perl (In re Perl), 811 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2016)). Neither factor is present
here. Thus, we lack appellate jurisdiction and must dismiss the cross-appeal.
3. We need not, and do not, reach any other issue on appeal. Each party
shall bear its own costs.
DISMISSED.
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