FILED
MAY 28, 2020
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 37165-4-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
COREY J. WILLIAMS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
SIDDOWAY, J. — In January 2019, Corey Williams filed a motion for arrest of
judgment in Benton County Superior Court cause no. 15-1-01178-6, a prosecution in
which he had been originally charged in October 2015. Jurors had returned verdicts
finding him guilty of residential burglary and second degree theft almost three years
earlier. Judgment and sentence had been entered and appealed, and his convictions had
been affirmed by this court in spring 2018. State v. Williams, No. 34171-2-III (Wash. Ct.
App. Apr. 3, 2018) (unpublished).1
The trial court orally ruled on the motion in February 2019 and signed findings,
conclusions and an order on the motion to arrest judgment in March 2019. In addition to
1
Https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/341712_unp.pdf.
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State v. Williams
making findings about the outcome of the 2016 criminal trial and the 2018 appeal, the
court found that Mr. Williams’s
current motion argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction for Residential Burglary because the property was abandoned by
the owner, Gail Timmins, that Ms. Timmins had no knowledge that the
defendant entered onto the property and that the defendant had placed a lien
of the property which gave him the right to possess the property under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 75. From these findings of fact, the trial court concluded:
1. The defendant’s Motion to Arrest Judgment is not timely and is denied.
2. However, the Court will address the defendant’s substantive arguments
pursuant to CrR 7.8 or RCW 10.73.090.
3. The defendant’s motion, if brought under CrR 7.8 or pursuant to RCW
10.73.090, would be timely.
4. To address the defendant’s substantive arguments:
a) Whether Ms. Timmins abandoned the real property is irrelevant.
She was still the owner of the property.
b) Whether she had knowledge that the defendant had entered the real
property is irrelevant. The State must prove that the defendant had
knowledge he was unlawfully entered [sic] property but not that the
victim knew of the unlawful entry.
c) The Claim of Lien was filed under RCW 60.04, which is titled
“Mechanics’ and Materialmens’ Liens.” Such liens do not give the
lien holder a right of possession. The UCC is not applicable.
5. The defendant has not made a substantial showing that he is entitled to
relief.
6. Rather than transferring the motion to the Court of Appeals, this Court
will deny the defendant’s motion, which will allow him to appeal from
this order if he so decides.
CP at 76.
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No. 37165-4-III
State v. Williams
Mr. Williams appeals.
ANALYSIS
Appearing pro se, Mr. Williams appeals the denial of his January 2019 motion to
arrest judgment in this 2016 prosecution. The motion lacked any explanation of its basis.
The grounds appear to have been set forth in a supporting affidavit from Mr. Williams, to
which both the State’s opposition to the motion and the trial court’s order refer. The
superior court docket indicates that an affidavit was filed on the same day as the January
2019 motion. Unfortunately, Mr. Williams failed to designate the affidavit for inclusion
in the clerk’s papers, and it is therefore not a part of the record on review. The appellant
bears the burden of providing an adequate record for our review. Story v. Shelter Bay
Co., 52 Wn. App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988). If the appellant fails to meet the
burden, the trial court’s decision generally stands automatically. Id. Since Mr. Williams
does not challenge the trial court’s fourth finding summarizing the argument in the
January 2019 motion, we will, as an accommodation to Mr. Williams, treat the finding as
an accurate statement of his arguments.
Two of Mr. Williams’s assignments of error involve matters that were not raised
by his January 2019 motion. The court could not err by failing to address them.
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No. 37165-4-III
State v. Williams
One complains that a motion to arrest judgment that Mr. Williams filed in late
February 2016 was never heard, which he contends violated his right to due process.2 A
failure to address a different CrR 7.4 motion made in 2016 is not properly part of the
appeal of an order that does decide a different CrR 7.4 motion made in January 2019.
The second complains of an asserted Brady3 violation. But as the State points out,
discovery violations are not a basis for a CrR 7.4 motion and Mr. Williams’s January
2019 motion did not assert a discovery violation.
We turn to Mr. Williams’s two assignments of error that directly relate to his
January 2019 motion and the decision denying it.
Assignment of Error Two:
“By entering in ‘knowledge’ in place of ‘intent’ in the new findings of fact and
conclusions of law relieves the State of their mandatory burden to prove every
element of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Br. at 1.
As summarized by the trial court, one part of Mr. Williams’s arguments in his
January 2019 motion to arrest judgment was that “there was insufficient evidence to
support the conviction for Residential Burglary because the property was abandoned by
the owner, Gail Timmins, [and] Ms. Timmins had no knowledge that the defendant
2
The State contends the motion was never noted for hearing in accordance with
local rules. Mr. Williams asserts that it was, and attaches two documents to his reply
brief as proof. Neither was designated for inclusion in the clerk’s papers, however, and
we will rely only on the certified record from the superior court clerk.
3
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
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No. 37165-4-III
State v. Williams
entered onto the property.” CP at 75 (emphasis added). Evidence at Mr. Williams’s
2016 trial established that Ms. Timmins, who owned one of the burgled homes, had
become unable to make the mortgage payments, had received collection notices, and,
expecting the mortgagee to foreclose, had moved out before the burglary. Williams, slip
op. at 7. Mr. Williams asked that the jury be instructed that her abandonment of the
home was a defense to the residential burglary charge. Id. at 8.
This court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct on abandonment as a
defense to residential burglary. Id. at 15-17. We observed that abandonment is a
statutory defense to criminal trespass in the first degree, but the legislature has not
identified abandonment as a defense to residential burglary. Id. at 15-16. We observed
that this court “has repeatedly held that the jury need not be instructed on abandonment
as a defense to residential burglary.” Id. (citing cases).
Turning back to the 2019 motion, Mr. Williams points out that the findings that
respond to his abandonment argument include one statement of law that is incorrect. The
trial court’s conclusion of law 4(b) states, “Whether [Ms. Timmins] had knowledge that
the defendant had entered the real property is irrelevant. The State must prove that the
defendant had knowledge he was unlawfully entered [sic] property but not that the victim
knew of the unlawful entry.” CP at 76. The court correctly stated that whether Ms.
Timmins had knowledge that Mr. Williams entered the real property is irrelevant and that
the State did not need to prove that she knew of the unlawful entry. The trial court
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No. 37165-4-III
State v. Williams
misspoke when it stated that to prove residential burglary, the State must prove that a
defendant knew he was unlawfully entering. Rather, for residential burglary, the State
must prove that the defendant entered a residence unlawfully, with an intent to commit a
crime therein.
The court’s bottom line response to Mr. Wlliams’s substantive argument was still
correct, however: it was irrelevant that Ms. Timmins was unaware of Mr. Williams’s
entry onto the property. The court’s misstatement of the law was inconsequential.
Assignment of Error Three:
“[T]he Honorable Judge Spanner abuse[d] his discretion by not weighing in evidence
and testimony in a factual hearing about abandonment when the
fact finder has brought in a new [finding] of fact and conclusion of law
outside the jury verdict.” Appellant’s Br. at 2
Following Mr. Williams’s valid point that “knowledge one is unlawfully entering
property” is not an element of residential burglary, he makes a head-spinning argument
that the trial court relieved the State of its burden of proving first degree residential
burglary at the 2016 trial.
The argument appears to go like this: (1) In the 2019 order, the trial court made
findings about what the State had been required to prove at the 2016 trial, (2) the
“knowledge of unlawfully entering property” the court states was required to be proved
was less than the “unlawful entry/intent to commit a crime” culpability that the State
actually needed to prove, (3) the State therefore was not required during the 2016 trial to
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No. 37165-4-III
State v. Williams
prove the elements of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) the court
should have instructed on the lesser included crime of first degree criminal trespass.
The problem is that the March 2019 order did not make findings about what the
State was required to prove at the 2016 trial. It made a general statement about what
proof of residential burglary requires and, in one particular, misspoke. To determine
what the State was required to prove at the 2016 trial, we would look at the 2016 jury
instructions and the jury’s verdict. One could also look at this court’s 2018 decision
affirming the conviction. The instructions correctly state the elements of first degree
residential burglary and the jury’s verdict establishes that the elements were proved to its
satisfaction.
What the trial court was doing in the March 2019 order was explaining why the
abandonment issue raised by Mr. Williams was irrelevant. In providing that explanation,
the judge included one inconsequential misstatement of law. We can substitute a correct
statement of law for the court’s misstatement and the court’s bottom line—that Ms.
Timmins’s lack of knowledge was irrelevant—still holds true:
Whether [Ms. Timmins] had knowledge that the defendant had entered the
real property is irrelevant. The State must prove that the defendant entered
the residence unlawfully, with the intent to commit a crime therein, but not
that the victim knew of the unlawful entry.
Compare to CP at 76.
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No. 37165-4-III
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Denial of the CrR 7.8 motion is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_____________________________
Siddoway, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
_____________________________
Fearing, J.
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